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This article presents the work of Czech theologian and priest Tomáš Halík as a theology for the post-secular. The first section outlines three general post-secular themes woven throughout his corpus: the blessedness of spiritual seeking, a receptivity to the critical insights of atheism, and the affirmation of doubt and uncertainty as an integral feature of Christian faith. The second section then demonstrates what is distinctive about Halík's contribution: his engagement with themes of both plurality and uncertainty in a single theological schema. I argue this is an apt response to the post-secular dynamics of the nova effect—as outlined by Charles Taylor and others—that is otherwise lacking in the literature to date. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many critics observe a methodological flaw in Taylor's work. They claim that there is an alleged discrepancy between Taylor's historical approach on the one hand and his defense of fullness in terms of openness to transcendence on the other. This article challenges this verdict by disambiguating the relation between the role of history in Taylor's narrative and his personal defense of fullness in terms of religious openness to agapeic transcendence. In order to underpin this position, I first assess the originality of Taylor's analysis of the historical origin of secularization by comparing his master reform narrative with other stories of secularization (§2), in particular that of Marcel Gauchet (§23). The outcome of this comparison leads to the question regarding the ontological presence of transcendence as a religious experience of fullness. Taylor's answer to this question is evaluated from an epistemological stance (§4) and a more general cultural approach (§5). In order to retrieve a religious experience of fullness, Taylor highlights the important role of what he calls subtler languages (§6). Finally, the question is raised how subtle words in a 'post-revolutionary climate' may retrieve that personal, religious experience of fullness (§7). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles Taylor's method of philosophical argumentation is distinctive, interlacing historical, ontological, phenomenological, hermeneutical, theistic, and ethical strands. His writings contribute to debates in many domains, including sociology, theology, and political theory, speaking both to his peers in the academy and to wider publics. Often, he assumes the role of socio-cultural critic, diagnosing the features of our contemporary culture and society that people experience as a loss or decline. In this paper, I focus on A Secular Age, where he discusses the predicament of the modern secularized self, who exists in a condition of spiritual instability, pulled in two directions: on the one side motivated by the oppressive effects of religious orthodoxy to reject the earlier established faiths; on the other side, driven by a sense of emptiness to look for something that could compensate for the meanings lost with theistic transcendence. My paper discusses Taylor's account of the 'immanent frame' of the modern secularized self-understanding, assessing the strengths and limitations of his hermeneutical approach to this self-understanding. It calls on him to develop its potentials as a more robust form of immanent critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This guest editor's introduction explains the rationale for the special issue 'Charles Taylor at 90: On Taylor's Legacy and Impact.' It describes the contributions to the special issue and summarizes Taylor's replies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within his earliest contributions to the human sciences, Charles Taylor challenged dominant behavioral views by advancing a hermeneutical conception of human agency. For Taylor, persons continually navigate their meaningful worlds and make sense of things and act in light of background horizons of significance and social imaginaries. Yet, conceptions of children have lagged as dominant outlooks construe young people as immature and incapable – perpetuating behavioral approaches to controlling their actions rather than hermeneutic ones that recognize them as agents. Working with Taylor's ideas, I discuss a Childhood Ethics ontological approach to understanding children and childhood. Specifically, I: (a) draw on Taylor's critique of naturalistic approaches to the human sciences to highlight problems that underlie universalist claims about all childhoods; (b) relate Taylor's articulation of human agency, centered on strong evaluation and human linguistic capacity, to the Philosophy of Childhood and Childhood Studies to address current questions regarding our understanding of agency within childhood; and (c) describe a hermeneutic ontology that can inform the development of empirical research, policy-making and practices that relate to children. I close with an outline of priority questions that can orient future investigations within this area of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his critique of the therapeutic, Taylor argues that therapy fails to engage with the ethical and spiritual significance of human suffering. Therapy's denial of ethics is representative of a wider modern difficulty with accommodating Taylor's view of ethical discourse as the articulation of the qualitative distinctions of worth implicit in our strong evaluations. In the case of therapy, this rejection of ethics stems from the claim to offer a set of scientifically based techniques of psychological change, and from protections for patient autonomy that are derived from a negative conception of liberty. Taylor's critique of negative liberty demonstrates the inevitability of strong evaluation and serves to highlight how therapy covertly offers ethical proposals while denying that it is doing so. A psychoanalytic case vignette illustrates how it would be possible to give an ethical frame to therapeutic aims. To locate standard conceptions of psychological health in the context of Taylor's history of the modern identity would emphasize their ethical significance and open the possibility to move therapy beyond the therapeutic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses Charles Taylor's philosophy of human sociality, focusing especially on Taylor's analysis of what happens, when a linguistic exchange or conversation starts. On his view, a shared space emerges, in which some object or topic is irreducibly 'for us', entre nous, not merely 'for me' and 'for you,'. When something is brought to our shared attention, a 'we' is at the same time created. This article asks, first, how this differs from mutual recognition of others as candidate conversation partners, and from joint commitments, which bind the parties and structure further joint action. The article argues, against Margaret Gilbert, that these are three different phenomena highlighting different aspects of human sociality. Secondly, the article discusses the nature of the 'we': does the irreducibility claim commit Taylor to a view of plural subjects or 'group minds'? Thirdly, the article outlines two possible readings of a 'shared space': one posits an emergent social layer and another an emergence of a 'conversationally extended mind'. Both are possible interpretations of Taylor's account, while neither is committed to a notorious phenomenal group mind or to a more demanding rational unity -view (Carol Rovane). Taylor's 'entre nous' offers a distinct perspective, of continuing relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that we should read Taylor's philosophy as a philosophy of liberation and that it is as a philosopher of liberation that Taylor distinguishes himself as a critical theorist. It begins with a short outline of Taylor's theory of freedom, emphasising the conception it contains of the process of becoming free. It then looks at Taylor's view of the role theory can take in that process. The liberating power of theory isn't something that Taylor often remarks explicitly upon, but from the few remarks he does make it is clear that he sees his own theory as potentially having such a power. The discussion then turns to the tasks of critical theory. After summarising these tasks, the paper considers how Taylor attempts to address them in his own work. The point of the discussion is not just to show the convergence between Taylor's theoretical agenda and that of critical theory, but also to indicate how critical theory can learn from the integration in Taylor's work of the tasks critical theory sets itself. The paper concludes by noting a dilemma that faces critical theorists who aspire to such integration today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given Taylor's status as one of the most important thinkers in contemporary moral and political philosophy, it is somewhat surprising that so little attention has been paid to the implications of his views for metaethics. To fill this gap, this paper considers the highly unorthodox approach to metaethics articulated in his philosophy. While his views can be seen as 'anti-metaethical,' I argue that Taylor in fact takes the cause of metaethics in a new direction by showing the problems of moral realism in a whole new light. To demonstrate this, I first sketch the mainstream debate on moral realism (§1) to clear the way for Taylor's non-mainstream approach (§2). I continue to explain his unusual position by highlighting the contrast between the classical conception of moral facts and Taylor's key concepts of 'strong evaluation' and 'moral sources' (§3). Against the background of this contrast, I turn to Taylor's view on the nature of language to explain how it informs his distinctive conception of moral realism (§4). I conclude by discussing the implications of Taylor's realism for wider trends within metaethics (§5). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I argue, first, that René Arcilla's project in his book Wim Wenders's Road Movies: Education without Learning, can be understood as an effort to draw the reader away from a conception of personhood grounded in the Enlightenment and towards an expressive‐romantic conception. Yet the sense of the person to which Arcilla leads the reader alters the Romantic conception considerably. Arcilla is attentive not only to how a disengaged, instrumental and fragmented approach to life can lead one astray but also to how a highly individualised search for authenticity and truth can sever one's connection to others and the world. In his proposal for a certain kind of education, Arcilla transcends and yet retains key components of the individualism that has troubled so many critics of both strands of the modern identity. The second argument of this essay is that a distinct pedagogical approach can be detected in Arcilla's text, one that is aligned with his conception of the kind of self into which the reader is being educated. In essence, Arcilla enacts the shifted conception of education that his book describes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accounts of spiritual formation which depend overmuch on individualism are likely distorted by that individualism, and this article argues that an account of collective-personhood can provide a necessary corrective to this anthropological distortion. The article begins by diagnosing the problem of individualism in formation, utilizing Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self, and critiquing several common practices of spiritual formation. Following this, we consider Bonhoeffer's theological vision for the collective-person from his first book, Sanctorum Communio. Next, we examine Murray Bowen's Family Systems Theory to help us envision, from a social scientific perspective, how such a collective-personhood might look. The article concludes with a provisional model for spiritual formation of collective-persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article presents Charles Taylor's critical philosophy of language and it reviews his recent book on the human linguistic capacity. Critical philosophy of language is understood here as a broad (philosophical, social and political) perspective on language characterized by multifaceted concern with the linguistic and cognitive mechanisms involved in language use. The paper discusses Taylor's interest in language and philosophy of language, and focuses on his seminal distinction between the 'designative-instrumental' and 'constitutive-expressive' theories of language. In the former theory language is understood within the confines of Cartesian representational epistemology, whereas in the latter language constitutes meaning and shapes human experience (one of the features important for defining the critical approach to philosophy of language). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Video Abstract Transcendence and Immanence: Deciphering Their Relation through the Transcendentals in Aquinas and Kant This article examines the relationship between the conspicuous and complicated terms of transcendence and immanence, which may equally be defined as essentially connected or diametrically opposed. Recent developments in two largely unrelated sets of scholarship—the re-evaluation of secularization, and the relationship between medieval and modern philosophy—provide a helpful means to arrive at a clearer understanding of this challenging problem. Charles Taylor and Jan Aertesn act as foci for these developments, particularly through their respective concerns with epistemic framing in relation to transcendence and immanence, and the role of transcendentals in medieval philosophy. This examination brings these two concepts together, examining the idea of transcendentals offered by both Aquinas, a thinker of the transcendent frame, and Kant, a thinker of the immanent frame. From this juxtaposition, we can offer two contrasting understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence from within both the transcendent and immanent frames. Finally, two brief literary examples demonstrate how these two ways of reading transcendence and immanence may be employed in the contextual understanding of religious writing. To understand the unity and division between transcendence and immanence is to better comprehend two primary terms in the study of religion and to appreciate a fundamental development in the history of religion in the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to critically re-open the closed structure of news coverage of ethnic minorities by proposing a dialogical model of representation, which evokes mutual understanding across differences through well-crafted narratives of minority experiences. Informed by Mikhail Bakhtin and Charles Taylor, it explores the notion of "dialogue" within journalistic narratives and delineates two dialogical approaches, namely the evaluative articulation of moral values and the polyphonic incorporation of different voices. The former suggests that journalists should employ nuanced languages to situate ethnic minorities' aspirations and experiences in a common "horizon of significance". The latter challenges the hegemonic monologue of an ostensibly objective narration and accentuates the manifold voices from ordinary people, urging the journalists to rethink their positionality as narrators. Two cases are analyzed to reveal how the dialogic representation can be realized in news reporting, calling for a transition from "ethics of inarticulacy" to ethics of care in journalism practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We review Valery Chirkov’s “Fundamentals of research on culture and psychology: Theory and methods.” The book is written as a textbook, but clearly takes a position that work in culture and psychology should be “problem-oriented, realist, and case-based” (p. 299). It is an innovative piece that covers philosophical paradigms, planning research, and conducting research. Our review outlines main claims made by the book that are likely provocative to mainstream variable-based research and ones that will likely challenge cultural psychologists. Despite the provocations, we argue that the book is an excellent place to start because, as illustrated through the work of Charles Taylor, Chirkov insinuates generative conversations about moral goods. A complimentary discussion through the purview Slavoj Žižec shows how Chirkov promotes awareness of a potential fetish with research methods that are counter productive and unethical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although adjustment after trauma is often positively associated with meaning, some studies challenge this connection (Bonanno, Memory, 21(1), 150-156, 2013; Silver and Updegraff 2013). In this article we elaborate on the relation between existential meaning and resilience. First, we conceptualize existential meaning-searching for and finding meaning in life-in terms of 'orienting in moral space', using the philosophical ideas of Taylor (1989), the psychological meaning-making model of Park ( Psychological Bulletin, 136(2), 257-301, 2010), and existential theory. We argue that orienting systems in moral space are 'believable visions of the good'. We then search recent literature on resilience-in particular literature in which the connection with meaning is challenged-for indications of a connection with existential meaning. We conclude that resilience necessarily comprises a 'moral dimension' that is an adaptive process of (eventually) finding meaning in life. Finally, we discuss implications for the role that pastoral counselors, as professionals in the domain of existential meaning, may play in promoting resilience in organizations where employees regularly face existential issues like violence, suffering, and death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that in recent years, the therapeutic ethos and the ideal of authenticity have become aligned with distinctively neo-liberal notions of personal responsibility and self-reliance. This situation has radically exacerbated the threat to political community that Charles Taylor saw in the ‘ethics of authenticity’. I begin by tracing the history of the therapeutic ethos and its early (Rieff, Lasch, MacIntyre) and late (Furedi) critics. I then discuss Charles Taylor’s argument that the culture of self-fulfillment generated by the therapeutic ethos harbors an important moral ideal, namely, the ethic of authenticity. Pace Taylor, I argue that authenticity has now become thoroughly instrumentalized in the service of the guiding political rationality of neo-liberalism. I make this case through a discussion of its uptake in managerial techniques and practices and also in popular culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The famous twentieth-century philosophers Charles Taylor and Michael Dummett have both commented on the Rushdie Affair. This article analyzes their criticism of the British author Salman Rushdie and tries to demonstrate the relevance of this criticism against the backdrop of the massacre in the editorial offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris on January 7, 2015. Unfortunately, two great philosophers of our time do not give us guidance here. The world is confused, our political leaders are confused, and great political philosophers are confused. This is important, because if freedom of expression, thought, and religion are to survive in this world, it is necessary to defend these freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this work we propose an approach to the particularities of the Charles Taylor's hermeneutics, trying to relate it to other areas studied by the author. We begin by analyzing the critics Taylor made to the currently dominant epistemological position, and then develop their own position, finally exploring the consequences both position have to think the social sciences and the political science specifically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles Taylor's A Secular Age is both important and insufficient to the study of religion, law, and politics in Latin America. While aspects of the North Atlantic experience of secularity have become globalized, shaping legal systems and other forms of collective governance around the world, local and regional histories and experiences often depart significantly from Taylor's account of secularity and conception of religion. Scholars of religion and politics in the region need to consider those aspects of local and regional history, such as indigenous and Afro-descendent histories and experiences, that challenge or may be indifferent to globalized Euro-American experiences of secularity and religion. To do so requires grappling with the global effects of the history charted by Taylor while also moving beyond it to account for practices, histories, and ways of life that work outside or against "secularity 3" and the presumptions about religion that it presupposes and produces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Endoxa is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article focuses on the debate about the relationship between religion and secularism in the public sphere. It is based on a reconstruction of the theories of John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor. In Rawls's theory, the main focus is his concept of public reason, its delimitation against the broader culture, and his proviso which specifies conditions for the introduction of comprehensive doctrines into public reasoning. Habermas replies critically to this concept as too restrictive for religious citizens. This critique reveals his distinction between religious and secular reason, his normative specification of their respective public claims and rights, and finally his idea of their mutual learning. Taylor on the contrary sees any exclusion of religion from public debates as problematic, and sets against it his interpretation of the neutrality of the secular state based on the inclusion of all forms of public expression into debate. In conclusion, the article identifies three key concepts -- constitution, reason and recognition -- and considers their contribution to the public sphere at the moment when the distinction between religion and secularism itself is questioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to shed light on some of the problematic assumptions underpinning the contemporary debate over the constitutional identity of the European Union. The central claim put forward here is that the development of the European Union’s constitution is significantly constrained by what Charles Taylor has described as the modern social imaginary. The constraint operates at two levels. First, modern understandings of constitutionalism typically ignore or underemphasize its dynamic and historical characteristics and its relationship with the self-understanding of political subjects. Thus, modern constitutionalism fails to acknowledge the importance of historically conditioned assumptions involved in the formation of the identities of political subjects. In short, it fails to understand constitutionalism as a ‘regime’. Second, modern constitutionalism’s blind-spots result in a relatively unreflective adherence to a particular type of constitutional regime: the modern economy and its associated ‘consumerist’ form of political citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores a significant puzzle: the persistence of modern representative democracy in post-independent India. It demonstrates how a politics of recognition, based on identities of caste, language, and religion, is crucial for understanding the origins, character, and trajectory of modern Indian democracy. These politics suffer various infirmities. Yet liberal, Marxist, and republican critiques of the politics of recognition in India, while offering valid theoretical alternatives and powerful moral visions, also suffer their own limitations. Perhaps more importantly, they evade questions of historical possibility, political efficacy, and practical reason that confront every political theory. The relative historical predominance of the politics of recognition in post-independent India, in contrast, reflects its capacity to engage powerful social imaginaries that enabled the realization of democratic norms, institutions, and practices. The general argument put forward develops several key themes that distinguish Charles Taylor’s philosophical vision of alternative modernities—the power of social imaginaries, nature of explanation in the human sciences, and vicissitudes of culture, politics, and history—to explain the trajectory of modern Indian democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Robinson's Gilead, one of Ames' greatest hopes is for his son to place himself "in the way of the gift." What is this gift, and what does it mean to place oneself in its way? The gift, I will argue, is what Charles Taylor has described as a moral source that is mediated by interpretive frameworks, and empowers us toward ideals otherwise difficult or impossible to sustain. Gilead enacts the necessary condition of having narratives of the gift, of having been in its way, in order to mediate its reception again. But if restoration is the great potential of the gift's reception for Ames, it also points to the condition of impossibility for Jack, who is never given such a gift, despite having always been in its way. Although there is no guarantee the gift will be given, what Gilead explores are the postsecular conditions necessary for the gift to be received. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]