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Government perpetrated attacks against independent media, ranging from journalists' imprisonment to verbal attacks against outlets, carry an adverse effect for freedoms in democracies. Verbal attacks specifically provide leaders with a low-cost, easy to execute tool to delegitimize critical media. In this paper we present a theoretical contribution on when leaders in unconsolidated democracies verbally attack the media. Furthermore, we propose a way to quantitatively measure such attacks. Focusing on unconsolidated democracies, we argue that verbal attacks against independent media will increase when leaders face non-institutional ouster attempts like major protests and coups due to two reasons: 1) the surprise nature of these events, and 2) their disconnect to fully democratic means of staying in power. Our analysis examines verbal attacks on independent media by former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. We code 385 airings of Chávez's weekly program Aló Presidente, from May 1999 to January 2012, counting verbal attacks against independent media. Using a Box-Tiao intervention model, we find Chávez's verbal attacks against independent media significantly increased during non-institutional ouster efforts, such as major protests and the 2002 coup attempt. These findings show the degree to which elected leaders will go to discredit uncomfortable media outlets in unconsolidated democracies during uncertain political events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populists are often identified based on their behavior, but the discursive element of their identities is also a frequently observed characteristic of this type of leader. We examine the determinants of populist foreign policy rhetoric in the case of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez. We argue that a leftist populist leader such as Chávez will focus on anti-imperialist themes, and we consider two mechanisms that may indicate the conditions under which he will use them: diversion, which would typically be expected from a populist, and capacity. We use time-series analysis of rhetorical data scraped from the entire corpus of Aló Presidente—Chávez's weekly television series—to test our hypotheses. The evidence supports the capacity mechanism, that Chávez is emboldened to use anti-imperialist rhetoric when the price of oil is high. His rhetoric, thus, matches his resources and ability to provide domestic and international goods to support his own identity as a protector and savior of the common people from domestic and global elites engaged in the imperialistic enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Hugo Chávez Frias assumed the Venezuelan presidency in 1999, Venezuela has strengthened ties with most of its Latin American neighbors, particularly those where sympathetic leftist administrations also managed to assume power, including Argentina. With our analysis we show: 1) that Argentine media, divided between pro- and anti-government positions, presents a polarized view of chavismo; and 2) that Argentine public opinion regarding Chávez is not necessarily divided on the basis of ideological affiliations (left-right), but rather by the rejection or support of the former Argentine government. With these findings, we argue that in such a polarized information environment, chavismo is a polarizing issue and a tool that can be exploited in the domestic realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the first year of chavismo without Hugo Chávez presence in Venezuelan politics. 2013 was not only marked by the death of the re-elected president Chavez, but also for how close the opposition was to winning the presidential election held to choose a new resident. The results of this election set the pattern for the year's political life, which saw an increase in the level of confrontation between the two forces. After taking a look at the countries increasingly troubled economy and safety situation and at the December local elections, the article concludes analyzing the possibilities that open up with the upcoming electoral vacuum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]