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China, an upstream state and a regional hegemon in the Mekong River Basin, is commonly viewed as unilaterally exploiting water resources, irrespective of downstream states (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia). This view is derived mainly from China's unilateral exploitation of the upper watershed for hydroelectricity and navigation, raising concerns about negative socio-ecological impacts on the downstream states. However, recent empirical evidence shows that China is gradually getting involved in negotiations and processes with the downstream states, compromising with them little by little. Indications of this policy shift include: (a) its signing agreements for hydrological data exchange, (b) confidence-building with co-riparans in the Dialogue Meeting of the Mekong River Commission, and (c) multinational negotiation with co-riparians in framework of regional institutions. In light of this shift, this article argues that China is not fully enjoying its superior resources or its superior riparian position, contrary to the common view. The aim of this paper is to (1) explain and provide updated information on these negotiation mechanisms, which are attempting to resolve the upstream-downstream dispute in the Mekong River Basin, and (2) produce counterevidence against the Theory of Hegemonic Cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]