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The heavy-metal pollution of the consumer-electronics industry has been a serious environmental problem in China. Since 2010, Chinese ENGOs have taken a few measures to address this challenge. Under the influence of other stakeholders, Chinese ENGOs have only played a limited role. To further explore the potential of domestic ENGOs, it would be necessary to understand how they have approached the heavy-metal challenge and why their contribution has been moderate. By using the method of "process tracing," this paper presents a preliminary attempt to trace and generate localized knowledge of Chinese ENGOs' approach and the influence of other stakeholders. Specifically, this paper divides the actions of Chinese ENGOs into the following three phases: initial participation, progressive involvement of MNCs, and collaborative tracking and online disclosure. Then, it traces the participation of Chinese mass media, domestic suppliers, local governments, and communities. It argues that the following six constraining factors have contributed to shaping the limited role of those Chinese ENGOs: (1) the complexity of the consumer-electronics supplier network; (2) Chinese ENGOs' lack of leverage on MNCs; (3) Chinese ENGOs' shortage of financial and human resources under a broad agenda; (4) domestic mass media's lack of long-term interest; (5) reluctant participation of Chinese suppliers and local governments; and (6) conflicting interests within local communities. Three policy options for further exploring the potential of Chinese ENGOs are discussed, including financial and technical support, further engagement of international ENGOs, and supportive policy-making and interregional coordination by local governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses a policy analogy approach to explore China's attitude toward the possibility of global carbon market integration, including the development of a common cap-and-trade market for the global civil aviation industry. Like in other foreign policy domains, in international cap-and-trade, China faces a ‘trilemma’ between carbon market integration, state sovereignty and policy flexibility. By referring to how China has approached a comparable trilemma in foreign exchange policy making, we analyse China's possible stance on international cap-and-trade. We argue that China will prefer to gradually establish and strengthen, to a limited extent, intergovernmental governance mechanisms, which allow nation-states to prioritize sovereignty and policy flexibility in carbon trading policy making. In the conclusion we use this argument to explain China's responses to the carbon-trading initiatives of Australia, the EU, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Bank. Policy relevance The international community has reached a consensus on the use of market mechanisms for mitigating climate change. While opposing the EU's plan to include Chinese airlines in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, China has started to co-explore with Australia the possibility of linking their carbon markets, and has adopted a supportive attitude toward the carbon trading initiatives led by the ICAO and the World Bank. Considering China's status as the largest emitting country of GHGs and its interdependence with major developed and developing countries, China's substantial participation would be crucial to the success of the global market-based efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This article presents an initial attempt to develop a better understanding of China's stance on international cap-and-trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]