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This chapter examines the role of the Secretary-General as the “face” of the United Nations, focusing specifically on the two African Secretaries-General: Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992–1996) and Kofi Annan (1997–2006). Though I characterize Boutros-Ghali and Annan respectively as “the pharaoh” and “the prophet”, every Secretary-General has exhibited such traits, as well as those of a third and more common metaphor of being a sort of “Pope”. Through these three lenses, the chapter examines the major achievements and failures of Boutros-Ghali and Annan, as well as the reaction of key actors at the United Nations to the efforts of both men to achieve their objectives in the areas of peace and security, socio-economic development, and “humanitarian intervention”. Since both Africans occupied the post for the fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, this is also a study of the role of the Secretary-General in the post-Cold War era. This period saw tremendous changes in the geopolitical landscape, including the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the rise of a unipolar world, the eruption of conflicts in the Balkans and Africa, and an increase in the membership of the United Nations from 159 to 192. All of these transformations had an impact on the United Nations in general but led, in different ways, to greater attention being paid to the role of its Chief Administrative Officer. Another reason to focus on the two African Secretaries-General concerns the importance of the United Nations to Africa and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction As we have shown in previous chapters, countries under structural adjustment for a relatively long period tend to have governments that provide lower than expected levels of respect for economic and social rights (Chapter 7). The deprivations caused by structural adjustment conditions are generally unpopular in less developed countries: anti-government demonstrations occur more often (Chapter 7). Sometimes these protests become violent, increasing the occurrence of riots and organized rebellion (Chapter 7). Governments often respond to these challenges to their authority by increasing the repression of physical integrity rights (Chapter 8). Many country studies have also provided evidence that structural adjustment conditions have led to reduced government respect for worker rights. For example, comparative case studies conducted by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) took a close look at the effects of structural adjustment programs on workers in Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, and Zimbabwe (SAPRIN 2004). The study's findings showed how a combination of labor-market reforms, layoffs resulting from privatizations and civil service reform, and the shrinking of labor-intensive productive sectors had severely undermined the position of workers. Employment levels had dropped, jobs had become more precarious, real wages had deteriorated, income distribution had become less equitable, and worker rights and unions had been weakened. Structural adjustment reforms had allowed employers greater flexibility in establishing the terms and conditions of work, and public enterprises had been privatized without adequate regulation (SAPRIN 2004, Chapter 4; also see Heredia and Purcell 1996; Lloyd 2001). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction In 2000, the World Bank and IMF, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations published a jointly prepared document titled A Better World for All. In it, the world's two most important international financial institutions guaranteed that, in partnership with others, they would make substantial progress in reducing world poverty by 2015. The report proposes measuring poverty reduction in seven areas: world poverty (the percentage of people living on the equivalent of 1 US dollar or less per day), gender gaps in school enrollment, primary school enrollment, infant mortality and maternal mortality (Sadasivam 1997), access to health services, and sustainable development. Among other specific goals mentioned in the report, the promises include decreasing rates of infant mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality by three-fourths, providing access to all that need health services, and ensuring that all children are enrolled in primary school. Taken together, the goals in the report are commonly referred to as the “Millennium Development Goals.” This report and these promises made in it were necessary because there is a growing consensus that most of the countries we usually refer to as “developing economies” are not developing at all or are not developing as quickly as had been hoped. Jeffrey Sachs, an economist who directs the Millennium Development Project, notes that, according to World Bank estimates, 1.1 billion people or about one-sixth of the world's population live in extreme poverty (Sachs 2005). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction In 1982 the Republican administration of Ronald Reagan voiced concern over the state of emergency decreed by the Chilean military government of Augusto Pinochet and the increased levels of human rights abuses that were taking place. The administration threatened to direct its representative to the IMF to vote against the award of structural adjustment packages unless the Pinochet regime lifted its state of emergency and improved its record of respect for human rights. Three years later the Reagan administration also abstained in its support for World Bank and IMF loans to Chile for several months until the regime lifted its state of siege (Coad 1985; Omang 1985). Apparently the administration was concerned over the levels of human rights abuses taking place; most attention had been paid to the opposition press censorship (Coad 1985). This example provides an intriguing contrast to the founding charter of both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which excludes political considerations in the loan-agreement process of these institutions. When decisions are being made about the allocation, amount, and conditions under which resources are apportioned, the idea that only economic factors affect the evaluation of member countries' representatives to these decision-making boards, is, at best, wishful thinking: politics inevitably becomes involved. In our historical assessment of how these institutions came to make their decisions over the 1981–2003 period, we built upon the existing literature that identified significant factors affecting the decisions of these institutions to enter into structural adjustment agreements with developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction Based on the critiques of structural adjustment programs described in Chapter 3, the weight of most case study findings, and the findings of the highest-quality large-n comparative studies, our main hypothesis was that, other things being equal, the more years a developing country had been under structural adjustment the worse its government's respect for most human rights. In addition, consistent with the critical perspective presented in the previous chapter, we expected to find that greater exposure to structural adjustment conditions would be associated with more civil conflict, especially violent civil conflict. In this chapter we examine a number of issues that recur throughout the rest of the book. We describe the importance of studying both the World Bank and IMF if one is interested in estimating the impact of structural adjustment. We explain the importance of controlling for the effects of selection. We also discuss how we measured structural adjustment receipt and implementation: two of the key variables used. Part of the chapter discusses the use of the CIRI data set which provides the source of many of the dependent variables used in the analyses (Cingranelli and Richards 2006). Finally, some of the control variables common to several of the chapters are described. Why study both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund? Both institutions promote structural adjustment policies, yet the great majority of existing research has concentrated on one institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction What is the impact of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund on government respect for human rights and on equitable economic development? Many different groups have protested that the impacts have been negative. Recent anti-structural adjustment demonstrations have taken place at the 1999 Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, at the annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank (in Washington DC on alternate years), and at the annual summits of the Group of 8 (G8) industrialized countries. There were massive protests at the 2005 Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata (near Buenos Aires), at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the IMF and World Bank in Prague, and at the 2001 G8 meeting in Turin, among others. Protesters have questioned the motives and criticized the impacts of these institutions on the economies and societies of liberalizing countries. The popular press has reported upon the activities of these institutions extensively, with much criticism of the austerity measures that have been associated with structural adjustment agreements and their harsh consequences in developing countries. With emotions raised and hyperbole flowing, we need to step back and ask if the criticism of these institutions is warranted. Has the academic community generated any answers when trying to assess the impact of these institutions? Recent studies which have controlled for what have become known as “issues of selection” have concluded that IMF structural adjustment agreements have deleterious consequences on economic growth (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction There is a growing consensus that greater respect for certain human rights leads to economic development that benefits a broader section of society. In this chapter, we explore the logic behind this argument and discuss the relevant findings from previous research. Based on this logic and empirical findings, we conclude that the Bank and the Fund ought to be pursuing a human rights-based approach to economic development in less developed countries. In Chapter 11, we explicitly define what such an approach would look like. For now, let us simply define a human rights-based approach to economic development as one that explicitly seeks to improve the human rights practices of the governments of developing countries as a method to improve levels of economic development. We begin by defining economic development. Economic development that includes economic growth accompanied by a relatively high level of respect for economic and social rights has been described as “equitable economic development” (Sen 1999). It is also sometimes called “high-quality economic growth,” “pro-poor economic growth,” or “equitable economic growth,” the term we will use. This type of growth we believe is the appropriate measure to decide whether economic development is taking place within a society. This is also the standard that we believe should be used to evaluate the economic outcomes of structural adjustment programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction In 1981, the Reagan administration in the US, the Thatcher administration in the UK, and their allies compelled the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Group (known as the “International Financial Institutions” [IFIs]) to launch an ideological assault against the state and promote a shift in power from the state to the market. From 1981 to the present, the IFIs have financed structural adjustment agreements (SAAs) in developing and transition countries to achieve that goal. Structural adjustment agreements call upon recipient governments to liberalize and privatize economies in the context of strict budget discipline. Adjustment lending facilitates economic integration – the hallmark of globalization – on terms that are advantageous to corporate and finance capital. The policy conditions associated with adjustment loans have accelerated transnational corporate penetration and expansion of markets in developing countries and lowered risks of portfolio investment and foreign direct investment. The role of the state has been reshaped to serve market liberalization, as governments have downsized, decentralized, and privatized (or “contracted out”) their functions. Such measures were intended to jump-start economic growth and free up resources for debt service. However, in most countries, public investment in critical areas (health care, education, infrastructure) foundered, growth rates were disappointing, and debts mounted to unsustainable levels (Pettifor 2001). This volume explores the relationship between adjustment and respect for human rights. Importantly, as governments in developing countries implemented World Bank and IMF-financed structural adjustment programs (SAPs), respect for human rights diminished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction In 2004, Haiti's fortunes executed a full circle. Shortly after leading the celebrations marking Haiti's bicentennial anniversary of its independence in February 2004, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, three-time president of Haiti, was swept from power by violent rebellion. Aristide's departure and the preceding turmoil, the culmination of a political and economic crisis that had festered for years, provoked a US and French military intervention, shortly thereafter replaced by a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force to restore order and create the conditions for long term stability and democracy. These unhappy developments are all the more striking for following on intense international involvement in Haiti's affairs throughout the 1990s. In particular, the UN engaged in a broad range of activities in support of democracy in Haiti, including election monitoring in 1990, UN Security Council (UNSC)-mandated sanctions in 1993–1994, a naval blockade in 1993–1994, UNSC-authorised use of force in 1994 against the military regime that had removed Aristide from power three years earlier and a major peacekeeping operation (PKO) in the years 1994–1996, subsequently reduced to a small international force aimed at building a domestic police force. The case offers the first, and to date only, instance of the UNSC authorising the use of force to effect the restoration of democracy within a member state. Unlike in a number of other situations, democratic processes were not seen as a means of national reconciliation, nor were elections seen as a mechanism to anchor fragile peace agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction Three developments with significant implications for the management of the world economy in the 1990s were growth in emerging markets, capital mobility, and the rise of regionalism. After the “lost decade” of the 1980s growth accelerated in the developing world. Exports from developing countries grew twice as rapidly as production, by nearly 10 percent per annum. Disturbances in emerging markets, including financial crises, became a prominent concern. And emerging market economies, for their part, increasingly insisted on a voice in the management of the international system. The preceding reference to financial crises points to the second important development, namely rising capital mobility. A growing number of countries relaxed controls on capital movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Advances in information and communications technologies reduced the costs and increased the attractions of investing across borders. In response, net private capital flows to developing countries rose sixfold between 1983–1989 and 1993–1996. Capital mobility promised to extend the benefits of portfolio diversification, consumption smoothing, and higher rates of capital formation to developing countries. But capital flows proved not just large but also volatile. Their management thus proved a major challenge. The third important development was the rise of regionalism. The 1990s saw the deepening and widening of the European Union. It also saw the establishment of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) and the development of Asian regionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EC's policy of conditional recognition, we have seen, represents a significant departure from legal thinking and historic state practice as well as a novel approach to conflict management. It is not, however, the first time that conditionality has been used in support of political aims. For more than two decades, states and multilateral organisations have been employing political conditionality in their relations with developing countries, often in pursuit of objectives akin to those of the EC in Yugoslavia, such as the promotion of human rights and, more recently, democratisation and ‘good governance’. Indeed, since the 1970s the EC/EU itself has used and continues to use political conditionality as part of its trade and aid programmes, imposing on recipient states requirements relating to their domestic political structures that in many ways are not unlike the requirements it stipulated for the new state authorities in Yugoslavia. This final chapter examines these parallel uses of political conditionality for what they suggest about the potential for, and the limitations of, conditional recognition as an instrument of conflict management. It charts the evolution of these policy initiatives and the thinking behind them – politically conditioned aid in particular – and explores the similarities they bear to the EC's use of conditional recognition. It also looks at how effective political conditionality has been and identifies factors that may account for its successes and shortcomings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chapter 3 argued for a view of diplomatic recognition as an informal regime governed by its own set of norms, legal as well as political, that historically have contributed to the maintenance of a stable order in the international system. Because the practice of recognition originates with states and serves to protect their interests, it is an inherently conservative institution. Outside of decolonisation states are reluctant to confer recognition on new claimants unless their claims are undisputed, for in the absence of terrae nullius (territories belonging to no one) recognition can only be achieved at the expense of existing states, and the dismemberment of one state is perceived to pose a threat to the integrity of all states as well as to weaken the foundations of the state-based international order. Although the EC's policy with regard to Yugoslavia might seem to contradict this view – to reflect instead an incautious and even subversive use of recognition – the EC, we have seen, sought to contain the disruptive effects of its actions by interpreting them so narrowly as to have limited application to other states. Statehood for Croatia thus would not mean statehood for, say, Spain's Catalonia or Russia's Chechnya. There is another way in which the practice of recognition, rather than serving to ensure stability, can be disruptive of the established order, and that is in its potential for exacerbating the violence that may accompany the creation of a new state, particularly if the parent state is contesting and seeking to suppress the emergence of the entity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immediately after the collapse of communism in Europe, many students of international relations predicted a return to balance-of-power politics among the great European powers. Others foresaw new balancing between the United States and Europe as the international system moved from a bipolar order to a multipolar world. A decade later, the distinguished observer Joseph Joffe argued that Western Europe and Russia might join together to offset American power: “Ten years after victory in the cold war, the United States is still No. 1 by any conceivable measure. But the lesser actors – Russia, Europe, China – are beginning to make true what history and political theory have predicted all along: Great powers will generate ‘ganging up.’ Nos. 2, 3, and 4 will seek to balance against Mr. Big.” And a recent book by a leading Europe scholar, Charles Kupchan, predicts that a united Europe will emerge as America's main long-term strategic challenger. Joffe, Kupchan, and other realists like John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz eventually may be right. Perhaps the German, French, and Russian coalition during the 2003 Iraq war is just the beginning. In the future, realpolitik and balance of power may return as the organizing principles of international politics on the European continent. Someday, the “lesser” powers may seek to balance against the United States. To date, however, what is more striking is how wrong these realist predictions since 1989 have proven to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our exposition so far has provided a detailed account of the creation of the semiconductor industry in four East Asian countries. We have analysed the organisational and institutional strategies employed, and sought to account for the achievements outlined in Chapter 1. We now shift gear to examine the strategies employed in comparative perspective, probing them for strengths and weaknesses. In this chapter, we confine our attention to the semiconductor industry, looking at the character of the industry created in each of the different countries, and extrapolating from this to analyse, at least to a first approximation, what may be the core strengths and the potential pitfalls of the leverage and learning approach to creating new industries. The advantage of our approach is that we are focusing on a single industry, over the course of its entire trajectory. Thus, many of the concerns and issues expressed in more general terms by other scholars can be tackled with greater precision in the case of this specific industry, and be subjected to more searching scrutiny. We examine the institutional pathways followed by the industry creation process characteristic of each country, look at their commonalities and differences, and attempt to account for them. The implications of such an analysis are brought out in our study of the sustainability of the industries created. In Chapter 7 we probe the leverage strategies more generally, examining their strengths and limits to their applicability, and the potential pitfalls involved in using them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In February 1983, Korea's most famous businessman, Lee Byung-Chull, founder and chairman of Samsung, made his most famous statement in a long and distinguished career. Samsung intended, he said, to become a world player in memory chip production. He was prepared to put up 100 billion won – an astonishing $133 million – to back his assertion for a company as small as Samsung. In effect he was betting the future of the company on semiconductors. Less than two years later, Samsung astonished the world with its 64K DRAM, produced at its gleaming new wafer-fabrication plant at Kiheung. Within another two years, it was making profits from its 256K DRAM, produced only months after Japanese industry leaders were scaling up their own production. Within less than ten years, Samsung had emerged as the world's number one producer of DRAMs, generating enormous wealth for itself and Korea in the process. Lee was no stranger to challenges, having navigated Samsung from one industry to another, always noting where Japan had been successful and seeking to emulate the Japanese strategy, but with lower costs. He grew up under the Japanese occupation of Korea, studied for a time at Waseda University in Japan, and in 1936 founded a small rice mill in Taegu, southern Korea, with inherited funds. Over the next few years Lee traded in commodities, expanding into Japanese-occupied Manchuria. In 1938 he incorporated his small venture as Samsung Commercial Company (Samsung means ‘three stars’ in Korean), modelled on the triple diamond of Japan's Mitsubishi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until very recently, the economic ideology that inspired Japanese industrial policy has been largely neglected in social science discussions in English-speaking countries (but see Pyle 1974). It was widely believed that the Japanese experience of economic development had little intellectual foundation. Not only does every educated person in North America know that Western mainstream economics is largely irrelevant to the study of Japanese-type economies, even specialists in Japanese studies believe that neither academic nor government economists played a major role in Japan's high-growth strategy. Academia in general has long indulged in what Saitō Seiichirō (1981:298) calls “a fallacious contrast between the prosperity of the Japanese economy and the desolation of Japanese economics.” These perceptions may be correct in the sense that neoclassical economics has not exerted any notable influence on Japanese development. Academicians, however, have neglected the fact that a group of Japanese economists represented by Arisawa Hiromi (1896–1988), Nakayama Ichirō (1898–1980), and Tōbata Seiichi (1899–1983), who belonged to the generation educated before World War II, played a very important role in the state's policy making. These economists helped the nation to establish an urgent agenda, to identify the future direction of economic development, and to build a theoretical framework for Japan's industrial policy in the context of international pressures and domestic turmoil from the 1930s to the 1960s. Their major propositions, reflected in successive state policies, constituted the core of what Japanese economist Kanamori Hisao (1985:127) calls “Jissen-ha economics” (the economics of actual fighting) – the logic of Japanese industrial policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1980s, as governments and international financial institutions struggled to manage deep economic problems, the immediate tasks of establishing macroeconomic stability and initiating the process of structural adjustment received almost exclusive attention. Soon, however, policy makers, practitioners, and development specialists began to question why many reforms did not produce expected results more quickly. As they asked this question, the issue of the administrative capacity of the state acquired greater salience. Some policy reforms required long chains of administrative action if they were to be implemented – improved tax collection, customs reform, health sector restructuring, and decentralization of decision making, for example. Some required public officials to be active managers and problem solvers – deregulation, tariff reform, and privatization, for example. And the success of other reforms required procedures and institutional structures to facilitate market activities and to encourage risk taking by the private sector – the development of financial sector institutions and economic regulation, for example. Initial adjustment efforts in Latin America and Africa confirmed that if government institutions were to monitor public spending, stimulate trade, expand the revenue base, manage an effective foreign exchange regime, and encourage private sector investment, they had to be organized effectively to carry out routine functions and they had to be able to count on administrators able to perform assigned tasks willingly, competently, and efficiently. The same realization applied even more to efforts to decentralize government to local and regional levels and encourage reforms in agriculture, health, and education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Awaking one night ‘with a sharp stab of almost physical pain’, Winston Churchill realised that he might be dismissed as Prime Minister by Britain's voters in the summer of 1945. Brooding, he said ‘The power to shape the future would be denied me. The knowledge and experience I had gathered, the authority and goodwill I had gained in so many countries, would vanish.’ But, in fact, even after his defeat at the polls, his influence on world affairs was far from spent. If his credit at home was limited for the time being, it remained vast in the United States, the largest unit of the English-speaking peoples, a community of which he often spoke, exaggerating its cohesiveness. The extent of his prestige in America was never clearer than when he delivered his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946. On that occasion he was not simply warning the world of the danger of communism or of Soviet imperialism, or trying to stimulate the West to more appropriate policies. He was continuing an effort made since he had become Prime Minister to join Great Britain and the United States, at least their military and foreign policy directorates, in a much closer union. By the time of his defeat the previous July he had not succeeded, and at Fulton he made a last attempt. Churchill and the government he headed were determined to maintain a relationship with the United States unique among modern sovereign powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]