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Africa has not invested enough in its healthcare system, and China has been investing in and financing much of Africa's transportation system. Many African countries' fragile health and transportation systems have been further weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic. This literature review confirms the interdependence of the key functional areas of comprehensive development planning and the importance of building and maintaining a sound transportation infrastructure. With respect to partnerships with China, African nations need to strengthen government functional areas more comprehensively, considering all of the areas of development planning including trade as well as transportation and aid issues. It is all the more apparent given the COVID-19 pandemic that these trade deals need to include simultaneous heavy investments in healthcare, education, housing, public utilities (water and electricity), and economic development through improved supply chain management and the use of advanced digital technology. In addition to the deal structures for China's investments in Africa’s transportation infrastructure, there are also opportunities to reimagine the African nations’ internal transportation spending. For example, there are models in the United States for using transportation funds to invest in health clinics in transit stations. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought this issue to bear, and it is a problem that can be rectified with "comprehensive" development planning that takes into account all of the key functional areas of planning: healthcare, environmental protection, safety, education, housing, economic development, and transportation. Five recommendations follow the literature review and discussion.

Im Auftrag der Stiftung Familienunternehmen befragte das ifo Institut mehr als 1 400 Familien- und Nicht-Familienunternehmen, wie die Konkurrenzintensität zu chinesischen Unternehmen bzw. deren Produkten im europäischen Binnenmarkt ist und wie sich die Europäische Union gegenüber der Volksrepublik positionieren sollte. Die befragten Unternehmen erwarten vor allem die verbesserte Durchsetzung des Schutzes geistigen Eigentums und den Abbau von Investitionsbeschränkungen für europäische Unternehmen in China. Protektionistische Maßnahmen wie Schutzzölle oder Importquoten werden im Hinblick auf China mehrheitlich nicht präferiert.

This analysis examines the opportunities and challenges facing the United Kingdom (UK) government in building a closer economic partnership with China beyond Brexit. While showing how the goals of each side overlap in key areas of mutual interest, evidence is presented to explain how fundamental imbalances persist in trade and investment relations due to China’s economic management system. The authors further argue that political constraints imposed on the UK by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) as economic partners will constrain the British government’s room for manoeuvre when negotiating with the Chinese. The analysis identifies potential modalities for achieving some improvement in UK-China bilateral links by drawing on the outcome of the Switzerland-China Free Trade Agreement but concludes that political factors will continue to limit outcomes and that a major transformation of UK-China economic relations is not a realistic prospect for the foreseeable future.

Introduction. The article presents the author’s interpretation of the Kyrgyz-Chinese cooperation within the framework of “One Belt – One Way” (OBOW) strategy. On the basis of the studied materials, the author analyzes positive and negative factors and problems of implementing “One Belt – One Way” project between the two countries. The researcher pays particular attention to the prospects of the project in creating favorable conditions for close economic ties between the regions of the two countries that lie along the Silk Road. Methods. The historical and legal, comparative and other methods form the theoretical and methodological basis of the article. The historiography of the issue – the consideration of Chinese “One Belt – One Way” strategy in the Kyrgyz Republic by foreign and Kyrgyz scientists and expert communities – is a direct object of the study. Analysis. The activity of the Chinese OBOW initiative should be considered in the context of the integration of the Kyrgyz Republic into the world community, thereby determining its place and role, its political and legal system. Many Western and Russian scientists believe that the main tool for promoting the Chinese strategy in relations with partners is the provision of loans, which cannot but cause concern and discussion around the OBOW project. The main debatable dominants in the analysis of facts and analytics are investment, trade and economic, transport and infrastructure directions, and mining industry. Results. The results of the study show that the potential areas for expanding the Chinese presence in Kyrgyzstan will remain transport and communications, mining, hydropower, etc. In Kyrgyzstan, the Chinese OBOW initiative is treated differently, there are a lot of positive and negative opinions concerning it. First, the OBOW project is perceived as a competitor to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in Eurasia. Second, the migration flows of Chinese citizens are increasing every year, the “Chinese demographic threat” is growing every year, and the people of Kyrgyzstan are concerned about this issue. Third, environmental safety, the safety of life and health of people, flora and fauna, the environment and others are also concerned. Fourth, the corruption of some Chinese companies creates a negative opinion of citizens.

Der Gipfel zwischen China und der Europäischen Union am 9. April steht unter gemischten Vorzeichen. Europa muss eine Antwort finden auf Chinas Strategie, seine internationale wirtschaftliche Expansion durch Investitionen voranzutreiben und durch politischen und wirtschaftlichen Druck zu zementieren. Es drohen Gegenreaktionen des Westens, vor allem der USA. Eine Eskalation würde auch der EU schaden. Das Kommissionspapier zum Gipfel ist mit ausgewogenen Zielen ein guter Ansatz für den Dialog mit China.

China’s growing trade and investment in South Asia have caused several concerns in India, with fears of encirclement on the rise, especially post the Chinese takeover of a 99-year long lease of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. China’s economic prowess has been the reason behind its increasing teeth in international relations, and this is visible even in South Asia. The primary reason behind China’s arrival at the world stage as an economic powerhouse has been its export-led growth strategy, which was enabled by globalization. However, China has utilized trade and investment not just as tools to strengthen its own economy but also to gain a strategic edge in international politics. While most of China’s trade depends on the comparative advantage it has, what is also pertinent is that China’s trade is not just economic in nature, and beyond comparative advantage, it moves to the realm of strategic trade. In the case of its trade with South Asian countries, what is also seen is a "weaponization" of trade. A clear example of this lies in China’s economic linkages with South Asia.

With US President Trump in office for half a year now, some people are still hoping that he will back away from his proclaimed protectionist policies. ­Given the current mood of populism in the United States, however, we cannot assume that Trump will yield to the pressure from domestic companies with a strong stake in China and return to some kind of "realpolitik." As a result, trade protectionism, investment barriers, and competition over global technological leadership will likely increase under the Trump administration, opening up new space for cooperation between the European Union and China. Populists in the United States are blaming globalisation for the loss of jobs and rising economic insecurity. They want to halt the shift of global economic power in favour of other countries. Trump is accusing China of profiting disproportionally from global free trade. China–US trade disputes within the World Trade Organization framework can be expected to intensify. Concurrently, bilateral trade agreements are preferred by the Trump administration, as it believes the United States can reap trade benefits more effectively this way. The United States will strengthen its request for better access to the Chinese market, while Chinese direct investment in the United States will come under more pressure. We can expect that China's acquisitions of US companies with sensitive technology will be further restricted. The US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is expected to lead to a decrease in US economic influence in Asia. The Trump administration seems to prioritise the short-term satisfaction of its populist clientele over the long-term impact on US competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the Trump administration, we can expect that tension in US–China economic relations will increase. While the United States will remain an important economic partner of the European Union, the latter should use the window of opportunity to strengthen its trade and investment relations with China. Concluding the EU–China Investment Agreement will be an important step in this direction. In the light of Trump's "America First" policy, the Chinese side might be more willing to enter into this agreement, which will protect investments and facilitate greater market access for European companies.

Mega-events such as the World Cup and the Olympics have been used for economic development, urban transformation and global status enhancement. Beijing and Shanghai embraced these purposes when they won the bids for the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo respectively. This article examines the pre-event economic changes in Beijing and Shanghai that are associated with their pursuit of mega-events. Changes in a group of economic indicators are tracked from 1997 to 2006. It was found that after winning the bids for the Olympics and the World Expo, Beijing and Shanghai experienced greater growth in construction and tourism, a speeding-up in economic development and restructuring, and an improvement in physical infrastructure. However, the enhancement of global exposure was not accompanied by growth in foreign trade and in the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) industries. The empirical analyses place the mega-events in large economic contexts and provide a base for future post-event studies.

The global financial crisis has had a large negative impact on China's economy, particularly on employment, but the government responses appear to have been effective. This article focuses on the social policy responses after the crisis, and how these are situated in the austere social policies that have come about since the economic reforms started in 1978, and the recent aims to create a “harmonious society” and the challenges and contradictions these contain.

The true nature and purpose of China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative are subject to much speculation. The one certainty is that OBOR commands powerful high-level Chinese support and is backed by a large investment of political capital. It is no less than the personal signature initiative of President Xi, who has made clear that he regards it as central to his political legitimacy and as the tangible embodiment of his "China Dream" of rejuvenating the nation and its ruling Communist Party - which in his mind are probably the same thing. However, the initiative faces formidable challenges. It remains unclear how much new investment OBOR has generated, how far it makes economic or geo-political sense or, indeed, how far China can afford to support it, given its current economic and financial difficulties. There has been fierce competition to win government support for OBOR projects but its political nature risks leading to serious misallocation of resources. (...)

This article gives a short overview of the population dynamics in the Russian Far East, and of the recent efforts of the Russian government to make the region more attractive for internal and external migrants and capital flows. This paper will also evaluate the role of China, a country sharing more than 3500 kilometres of border with the Far Eastern Federal District, in the region's economy. To unfold the potential of the region, further efforts should be made to invest into the industrial infrastructure, but also into the development of social infrastructure. The latter, together with information on implementation of Target Federal Programmes in mass-media, should create positive stimuli for migration inflows. Higher transparency of legislation related to migration and investment may create pre-requisites for attracting more Chinese (seasonal) manpower and financial resources, without aggravating sovereignity concerns of local population and politicians.

"China's new leadership has launched a series of foreign policy and economic initiatives whose implications reach far beyond their own region. Washington disapproves of Beijing's plans, regarding the proposed financial institutions in particular as a challenge to their established Western-dominated counterparts. China's response is that these are sensible and important additions to the existing architecture. European states failed to fall in line with the US stance, and many became founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China's overarching vision of "new Silk Roads" integrating Asia and Europe by land and sea also demands a European response. In order to achieve better coordination than they managed over the AIIB question, the European Union and European states need to discuss and evaluate the economic and political dimensions of the Chinese initiatives in their overall context." (Autorenreferat)

"China hat unter der neuen Führung eine Reihe außenpolitischer und außenwirtschaftlicher Initiativen gestartet, die weit über die eigene Region hinausweisen. Die US-Regierung steht den chinesischen Plänen ablehnend gegenüber und sieht vor allem die von China angestoßenen Finanzinstitutionen als Herausforderung für die etablierten und westlich dominierten Einrichtungen. China dagegen argumentiert, es handle sich um sinnvolle und wichtige Ergänzungen der bestehenden Architektur. Die europäischen Staaten schlossen sich der Haltung der USA nicht an, viele wurden Gründungsmitglieder der Asiatischen Infrastrukturinvestitionsbank (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB). Chinas übergreifende Vision der »neuen Seidenstraßen« über Land und See zielt auf eine Integration Asiens und Europas durch Infrastrukturnetzwerke und erfordert daher ebenfalls eine Positionierung von europäischer Seite. Um zu einer besseren Abstimmung untereinander zu kommen als im Falle der AIIB, müssen EU und europäische Staaten die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Dimensionen der chinesischen Initiativen im Gesamtzusammenhang diskutieren und bewerten." (Autorenreferat)

Im Jahr 2014 ist Europa mit einer Investitionssumme von 18 Mrd. USD zu einer der Top-Zielregionen für chinesische Investoren avanciert. Die chinesischen Direktinvestitionen in Europa erreichten im vergangenen Jahr ein Rekordniveau. Um neben den Handelsbeziehungen auch die bilateralen Investitionsbeziehungen stärker auszubauen, haben die EU und China auf dem 17. bilateralen Gipfel am 29. Juni 2015 in Brüssel bekräftigt, die Gespräche über das EU-China-Investitionsabkommen zu intensivieren. China verfolgt in Europa eine differenzierte Investitionsstrategie. In den Kernländern Europas investieren chinesische Unternehmen, um sich einen Zugang zu modernen Technologien, wertvollen Vermögensgegenständen und Marken zu verschaffen. Gleichzeitig öffnet die Staatsschuldenkrise in den südeuropäischen Ländern Türen für den Einstieg chinesischer Investoren in öffentliche Versorgungsunternehmen und die Logistikinfrastruktur sowie in die Finanzdienstleistungsbranche. In den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern fördert China dagegen Investitionen in den Infrastrukturausbau. Die Übernahmen deutscher "Hidden Champions" in der Maschinenbau- und Automobilindustrie führen zu einem schnellen Ausbau der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit chinesischer Unternehmen. Die Investition der Firma COSCO in den griechischen Hafen Piräus und der damit verbundene Ausbau des Eisenbahnnetzes im Hinterland, der zwischen den 16 mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern und China vereinbart wurde, deuten auf eine neue, strategische Dimension chinesischer Direktinvestitionen in Europa hin. Das Branchenspektrum chinesischer Investitionen ist breiter geworden. Chinesische Finanzinvestoren halten verstärkt Ausschau nach wachstums- und renditestarken Objekten in Europa. Die Neuausrichtung des chinesischen Wirtschaftsmodells und die neue Seidenstraßeninitiative werden künftig das Tempo und die Struktur der chinesischen Direktinvestitionen im Ausland beeinflussen.

Auf dem EU-China-Gipfel Ende Juni 2015 in Brüssel beschlossen beide Seiten, ihre Zusammenarbeit mit der Gründung einer gemeinsamen "Konnektivitätsplattform" auszuweiten. Damit werden zwei Flaggschiff-Programme, die Investitionsoffensive der EU und die chinesische Seidenstraßen-Initiative, miteinander verbunden. Chinas wachsende Bedeutung als Partner für die Europäische Union (EU) spiegelt sich in der angekündigten Beteiligung des Landes an der EU-Investitionsoffensive wider. Schwerpunkte sind Infrastruktur, Energie und Innovation. Hierbei könnten Synergien mit der chinesischen Seidenstraßen-Initiative genutzt werden. Offen ist allerdings, wie divergierende Interessen zusammengeführt werden können. Die aktuelle wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der EU ist durch eine geringe Investitionstätigkeit, Wachstumsschwäche und sinkende Wettbewerbsfähigkeit vieler Mitgliedsländer gekennzeichnet. Hier setzt die Investitionsoffensive für Europa an. Chinas Seidenstraßen-Initiative fokussiert vor allem auf den Ausbau der Transportinfrastruktur auf dem Land- und Seeweg von China durch Zentralasien bzw. durch den Indischen Ozean nach Europa. Während die Länder Kerneuropas über eine relativ gut ausgebaute Infrastruktur verfügen, bestehen in vielen Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas noch große Defizite. Diese Länder haben großes Interesse an chinesischen Investitionen. Über die "16+1"-Initiative verfolgt China einen regionalen Kooperationsansatz, der elf EU-Mitgliedsländer und fünf Beitrittskandidaten aus Mittel- und Osteuropa einschließt. Die zunehmende Bindung dieser Länder an China löst in der EU die Befürchtung aus, dass damit der Einfluss der EU-Regelwerke abnimmt. Mit der Gründung der Konnektivitätsplattform soll eine Abstimmung zwischen der EU und den chinesischen Interessen erfolgen. Gerade die Entwicklung der Infrastruktur im europäischen Raum erfordert eine Gesamtplanung und einheitliche Standards.

Im Jahr 2015 wird das Wirtschaftswachstum in Lateinamerika zum fünften Mal in Folge niedriger als im Vorjahr ausfallen, das BIP wird nach Schätzungen des IWF sogar um 0,8 Prozent schrumpfen. Dennoch baut China seine Präsenz in Lateinamerika aus. Der wirtschaftliche Einbruch Lateinamerikas hängt vor allem mit dem Verfall der Rohstoffpreise zusammen. Das niedrigere Wachstum in und die geringere Nachfrage aus China spielen dabei eine wichtige Rolle. Die Intensivierung der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der VR China und den lateinamerikanischen Staaten birgt für beide Seiten hohe Risiken. Ungeplante Konjunkturkrisen oder strategische Anpassungen der nationalen Wirtschaftsplanung strahlen auf das jeweils andere System aus. Solange wenigstens eine der beiden Wirtschaftsregionen boomt, profitieren allerdings immer noch beide. Chinas Interessen in Lateinamerika sind vor allem wirtschaftlicher Natur. Es geht um die Sicherung der Versorgung mit Rohstoffen, um Exportmärkte und Investitionsmöglichkeiten für chinesisches Kapital. Lateinamerika fällt in eine neue Abhängigkeit vom Rohstoffexport zurück, trotz Diversifizierung der Handelspartner. China will die Handelswege zwischen Asien und Lateinamerika ausbauen. Zwei chinesische Prestigeprojekte - ein interozeanischer Kanal durch Nicaragua und eine transkontinentale Eisenbahnlinie durch Südamerika - illustrieren dieses Bestreben. Image und Reputation spielen in der chinesischen Außenpolitik eine zentrale Rolle. Die chinesische Charmeoffensive und Soft-Power-Politik gegenüber Lateinamerika soll die Rolle Chinas als global agierender Akteur positiv zur Geltung bringen. Die Kooperation mit Regionalorganisationen wie der CELAC ermöglicht es der VR China, ihre neue selbstdefinierte Rolle als regelsetzende Großmacht auszutesten - ohne in direkten Konflikt mit etablierten Strukturen und Akteurskonstellationen zu geraten. China überholt Europa als Handelspartner in Lateinamerika. Europa sollte sich der Herausforderung durch die chinesische Konkurrenz stellen und trilaterale Optionen ausloten.

"This article provides an analysis of policy initiatives aimed at rebalancing China's political economy, especially those contained in the 12th Five Year Plan and other recent pronouncements. The objective is to generate a conceptual examination of these policy measures, thereby highlighting their basic intent and purpose. The analysis shows that the Chinese leadership intends to pursue policies that can centralize, standardize and regulate the political economy under continued state guidance. Due to the considerable political obstacles that Chinese policy-makers face in rebalancing the political economy, a more state-centric approach is seen as necessary. China is therefore pursuing a policy package of refurbishing state capitalism. While a degree of liberalization is likely to be undertaken, the major thrust is one of revamping, restructuring and, ultimately, strengthening state control and guidance over the political economy." (author's abstract)

China has re-emerged to become a dominant foreign player in Cambodia. Politically, Cambodia is one of China’s oldest and closest allies. Economically, China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor, a major donor, and an increasingly important trading partner. Culturally, Chinese values are deeply embedded in many aspects of Cambodian society. However, China’s dominance is surrounded by renewed controversies. While the government warmly welcomes Chinese aid, saying that it comes with no strings attached, many experts are concerned that China is providing aid for more nefarious reasons. Critics also accuse Chinese investment and aid of having exacerbated corruption, weakened governance and harmed human rights, and of ruining Cambodia’s natural resources and environment. With such controversies, it is relevant and significant to assess the roles that China has played and continues to play in Cambodia’s socio-economic development. Using expert interviews, media analysis and an extensive literature review, this paper uniquely contributes to the existing discussion on China–Cambodia relations by closely examining the controversies of China’s investment and aid, critically analysing China’s interests in Cambodia, and asking if the relationship between the two nations is a positive-sum game.

As building-integrated photovoltaic (PV) solutions can meet around one-third of electricity demand in Germany and China, both countries are interested in exploring this potential. PV technologies have demonstrated significant price reductions, but large-scale global application of PV requires further technology improvements and cost reductions along the value chain. We analyze policies in Germany and China, including deployment support, investment support for manufacturing plants and R&D support measures, and we survey the industrial actors they can encourage to pursue innovation. While deployment support has been successful, investment support for manufacturing in these nations has not been sufficiently tied to innovation incentives, and R&D support has been comparatively weak. The paper concludes with a discussion of the opportunities for global policy coordination.

This contribution analyses the impact of the global financial crisis on the Chinese economy and the policies implemented by the Chinese government to cope with it. We argue, first, that China has not been able to decouple its economic performance from that of the U.S. and other developed countries. Second, although economic growth in the second quarter of 2009 showed that the stimulus package is working, the current development does not seem to be sustainable. In order to avoid another round of overheating, the government needs to adjust its stimulus policy. Third, the current crisis offers opportunities to conduct necessary structural adjustments in favour of more market-based and innovative industries, more investment by private companies and a stronger role of private consumption in economic growth. Fourth, with the external demand from the OECD countries declining, Chinese export companies need to further diversify their international markets and reorient their production and sales strategies to some extent towards the domestic market.

"The economic and political rise of China has led to considerable controversy regarding potential repercussions for the current global governance architecture. At least two opposing scenarios are conceivable: China's adaptation to the rules and norms system shaped by developed countries or the pursuit of a distinctive policy approach, a possibility that involves the danger of clashing regulatory policies. A recent and increasingly dynamic trend giving substance to the phenomenon of China's rising importance is the growth of outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) by Chinese enterprises. Against this background, the present paper investigates the evolution and change of Chinese international investment policy-making, with a particular focus on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as the most important legal instrument for the governance of global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. China has been a committed signatory of BITs since the early 1980s (120 treaties up to 2007). It is thus the second most active contracting party to BITs worldwide, surpassed only by Germany. The traditional Chinese BIT approach, however, has only cautiously supported the legal protection of FDI. As a mere capital-importer, China concluded BITs that contained serious reservations and safeguards intended to preserve policy spaces for the regulation of incoming investments. Starting at the end of the 1990s the Chinese government initiated a decisive policy shift towards a liberal BIT approach characterized by high levels of substantive and procedural investment protection. Upon examining a representative sample of Sino-foreign BITs, this study concludes that the policy shift was a pro-active decision of the Chinese government intended to introduce liberal treaty provisions first and foremost with developing countries which are the main destination of Chinese OFDI. A further explanation for this development may be found in the great importance attached to the promotion of OFDI through the 'Going Global' strategy announced by the Chinese government at the end of the 1990s. In sum, this paper concludes that China has adopted a complementary rather than a competitive approach in the field of global FDI governance. China has fully agreed to standards of the current international liberal regime for FDI protection and has become an important global player in this context. This policy shift will yield consequences for China itself by levelling the playing field for international investors. Furthermore, developing countries that have concluded BITs with China will face a further reduction of their legal and regulatory autonomy, which is already limited by treaties with developed countries. China's BIT policy, therefore, contradicts the widespread rhetoric of a mutual beneficial South-South cooperation. Lastly, the emerging complementarity of investment policies between China and developed countries at the bilateral level gives rise to the possibility of enhanced cooperation between both at higher levels, for instance as part of the Heiligendamm Process between G8 countries and emerging countries." (author's abstract)