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Previous studies have analysed how religious beliefs may affect economic activity. We extend this literature by examining how Confucianism is linked to innovation activity at the firm level in China. We analyse the relationship between Confucianism and several proxies for input and outputs of innovation activities. Our results show that Confucianism is significantly related to lower levels of innovation activity regardless of which measure for firm‐level innovation we use. We also find that the nature of ultimate ownership influences this relationship, with innovation among state‐controlled firms being significantly more affected by Confucianism. This study thus adds to the understanding of how traditional belief systems influence behaviour among economic actors.

We examine how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects firms’ cash holdings and how such changes in cash holdings affect firm value and capital investment in China. Our findings suggest t...

We examine the impact of political uncertainty on a firm’s corporate philanthropy (CP) contribution and the associated direct tangible benefits of CP to a firm. Specifically, we examine two testabl...

Previous studies have linked personal characteristics of business leaders to corporate decisions and outcomes. We analyze if the traumatic experience of the Chinese Famine has an impact on managerial decisions. By exploiting the exogenous variation in local severity of the famine, we find that having lived through the famine during one's younger years is associated with more conservative financial, investment, and cash holding policies, a lower likelihood of unethical behavior, and better firm performance during economic downturns.

Using a clean setting in China, we test the Miller (1977) hypothesis that stocks are overvalued in the presence of short sale constraints and dispersion of opinion as an extension of Berkman et al. (2009). We find that stocks with short sale constraints have significantly negative abnormal returns during earnings announcement periods, especially when investors have diverse opinions. These results are robust to alternative measures of abnormal returns and endogeneity concern. The findings help to explain the impact of short sale constraints on pricing efficiency and have important policy implications for relaxing restrictions on short selling and improving regular information disclosure in emerging markets.

We study short selling around earnings announcements and examine the potential sources of their information. Using unique daily aggregate short selling transactions in China, we find that short sellers significantly increase (decrease) their short positions before negative (positive) earnings surprise. In addition, abnormal high short selling is significantly associated with negative post-earnings announcement stock returns. The findings suggest that short sellers, on average, are informed and sophisticated traders and they can exploit profitable opportunities contained in earnings announcements. Finally, we find that stocks with poor governance or more insiders have higher (lower) abnormal short selling in negative (positive) earnings surprise, indicating private information leakage from firms with weak governance; which is consistent with the tipping argument. Our findings have important policy implications for capital market regulation in China.

This study examines the role of executive compensation in public governance. We collect data on corruption cases that involve top-level executives in Chinese listed state-controlled firms. We find a significant positive relationship between underpayment of executives and the likelihood of an investigation into corrupt behavior. We also show that corruption is positively associated with firm performance and that the relationship between underpayment of executives and corruption is influenced by firm performance, suggesting that top managers are more likely to engage in illicit behavior if they are compensated poorly while the firms under their control perform well. Finally, we find that pay-performance sensitivity decreases when top executives are involved in corruption investigations, indicating a lack of pecuniary incentives. Our empirical findings point toward an important relationship between executive compensation and corrupt behavior, thus providing valuable input to the understanding of executive pay and its effects in China’s state sector.

This study examines how ownership structure affects the information environment of publicly traded firms in China. We hypothesize that concentrated ownership and the associated separation of ultimate control and ownership rights create agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors leading controlling owners to withhold firm-specific information from the market. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the effect of ultimate ownership structure and analyst coverage on stock return synchronicity. We find that a greater separation of control and ownership rights increases the response coefficient of stock return synchronicity to analyst coverage. This result is robust to endogeneity, a series of robustness checks, and an alternative hypothesis based on noise trading. The incentive of controlling owners to limit firm transparency thus leads analysts to disseminate more market-wide information.

It has been argued that the state sector is advancing at the cost of the private sector in China. To examine this issue, we conduct an empirical analysis in which we exploit the launch of a large stimulus programme in the autumn of 2008. We find that stateowned enterprises (SOEs) are better able to maintain their leverage levels and have better access to both short- and long-term debt compared with private firms after the

We study how Chinese private entrepreneurs benefit from participating in politics. Using original hand-collected data on listed firms controlled by private entrepreneurs, we document a significant positive relationship between political participation and subsequent change in firm performance. We also provide evidence that the change in social status cannot explain the change in performance. We then identify several ways through which firms gain preferential treatment when the controlling entrepreneur participates in politics: better access to debt financing, preferential tax treatment, more government subsidies, and superior access to regulated industries.

This study examines whether venture capital (VC)-backed IPOs are more innovative than otherwise equivalent non-VC-backed IPOs. Using manually collected R&D records from annual reports and patent data from the Chinese State Intellectual Property Office (CSIPO) from 2007 to 2012, we find that VC-backed IPOs have higher R&D expenditures and more patents granted in the three years after IPOs. More specifically, they have more invention, application, and design patents in post-IPO. We use a two-stage instrumental variable, propensity score matching, difference-in-differences approach to mitigate selection biases and find our results to be consistent with our hypothesis. We conclude that VCs can positively influence IPO firms to increase R&D expenditures and innovative output levels in China. In addition, we document that the government ownership adversely affects innovation of VC-backed firms. Policy implications are discussed.

Purpose – Based on the theory of limited attention, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the investor behavior is influenced by attention, using the sample from earning announcement in China. Design/methodology/approach – Empirical research using the earning announcement data in China. Specifically, the authors use the sample from 2005 to 2010 in listed A-share firms with earning announcements in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market. Panel data regressions are used with Newey and West (1987) to correct for the potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that limited attention impact investor behavior in China. Findings – The authors find that the immediate price and volume reaction to earning surprise is much weaker and post-announcement drift is much stronger when a greater number of firms make earning announcements on the same day. The authors explain these findings mainly from behavioral bias. When investors process multiple information signals immediately or perform multiple objects simultaneously, their attention will be allocated selectively due to cognitive constraints. Such limited attention causes severe underreaction to immediate earnings announcement, therefore leads to mispricing abnormal related to public accounting information. In the long-run, the market adjusted and there is post-announcement drift. Research limitations/implications – Consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2009), the findings in this study indicate that individual investors’ behaviors are influenced by their limited attention in China. The results are different from Yu and Wang (2010) conclusions that same-day concentrated announcement help investors and facilitate information dissemination in China. The findings are explained by the investor distraction hypothesis proposed by Hirshleifer et al. (2009) that investor distraction causes market underreaction. Practical implications – The arrival of simultaneously extraneous earning information cause market prices and trading volume to react slowly to the relevant news about a firm because competing information signals distract investor from a given firm, causing market price to underreact to relevant news. These finding help us understand investor behavior and the impact of limited attention on security market. Social implications – Investor limited attention not only affects their stock-buying behavior, but also has an important impact on the efficiency of security market. Specifically, limited attention drive immediate underreaction to earning announcement and the post-earning announcement drift, especially when a greater number of same-day earning announcements are made by other firms. Originality/value – Limited attention affects security market in China.

This paper examines the value of political participation by private entrepreneurs in China. Using a unique sample of all initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms during 1994-2007 and political participation by the controlling entrepreneurs, we test the hypothesis that firms with entrepreneurs who participate in politics are able to exploit rent-seeking opportunities that normal firms do not have access to. We document that the long-run stock performance after the IPO of firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics is superior to that of common entrepreneurial firms. Our results also show that political participation has a significant positive effect on change in operating performance and a negative effect on first-day returns. Moreover, we find that economic development and local institutions are important for this value effect. The difference in performance is even larger in regions characterized by more abundant rent-seeking opportunities, indicating that the value effect of political participation likely originates from rent seeking. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that political participation facilitates entrepreneurs’ rent seeking.

This study examines the stock-picking ability of mutual funds in China using evidence from the IPO market. We hypothesize that the decision to invest in the IPO market contains positive information about a fund’s underlying expectation of newly listed firms’ future prospects. Using residuals from a model on the determinants of mutual funds purchases in the IPO market as proxy for consensus expectations, we find that IPO firms with high residual funds have significantly better stock returns and operating performance than those with low residual funds. In other words, residual funds can predict IPO future performance. These results are also robust to different specifications and alternative explanations such as mutual fund preferences or monitoring effects.

This paper investigates CEO incentives in Chinese state-controlled firms. We find that firm performance has a positive effect on CEO compensation. We also find that firm performance is positively associated with CEO promotion and negatively associated with CEO turnover. CEOs for state-controlled firms thus face significant incentives, not only in monetary form, but also in terms of career prospects. These results suggest that the CEO labor market in the Chinese state sector exhibits characteristics similar to those of managerial labor markets in developed countries, at least during our sample period. Moreover, we show that local institutions have a significant impact on the relationship between CEO incentives and firm performance, with performance having a larger effect on CEO compensation, promotion and turnover in regions characterized by stronger institutions. Overall, our results demonstrate that firm performance is associated with CEO incentives also for state-controlled firms in China, suggesting that there is a functioning labor market for top managers in the Chinese state sector.