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In The New Religious Intolerance, Martha Nussbaum addresses rising intolerance and fear of difference in contemporary societies. She suggests overcoming these issues through ethical consistency, equality, and the cultivation of sympathetic imagination. Nussbaum views this imaginative engagement as a form of civic friendship essential for societal transformation. However, we argue that her concept of civic friendship is problematic. First, Nussbaum's criteria do not suffice to define friendship. Second, this thin concept of civic friendship is unlikely to achieve the societal transformation Nussbaum envisions. We propose developing a more substantive account of civic friendship. This paper aims to create an Aristotelian account of civic friendship within a capabilitarian framework compatible with contemporary, plural societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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