Search

This paper develops the question of the important role played by Hippocratic medicine as a paradigm of knowledge and skill in Plato’s thought. Specifically, it focuses on Plato’s exploitation of the analogy between the medical notion of health as a balanced condition of the body, on one hand, and political justice on the other. First, I examine Plato’s thought on the status of the technai and particularly of medicine, prompted by the “Socratic” connection of moral virtue and knowledge, through an analysis of the relevant passages in a number of dialogues from the Apology of Socrates to the Gorgias and the Phaedrus. In the second section I endeavour to clarify the specific function of the references to medical techne in diverse contexts of the Republic and the Laws, aiming to claim its positive role as a model in the Platonic “psychopolitical” project against Levin’s recent attempt at undermining it., Cette communication traite la question du rôle important joué par la médecine hippocratique comme paradigme de la connaissance et de la compétence dans la pensée de Platon. Plus spécifiquement, elle se concentre sur l’exploitation que fait Platon de l’analogie entre d’une part la notion médicale de santé comme condition corporelle équilibrée et d’autre part la justice au sens politique. Nous examinerons d’abord la conception platonicienne du statut des technai et en particulier de la médecine, question qu’appelle le lien «socratique » entre vertu morale et connaissance, en analysant les passages pertinents de divers dialogues, de l’Apologie de Socrate au Gorgias et au Phèdre. Dans la seconde section nous nous efforcerons de clarifier la fonction spécifique des références à la technè médicale dans divers contextes tant dans La République que dans Les Lois, dans le but de défendre son rôle paradigmatique positif dans le projet « psycho-politique » platonicien pour nous opposer aux tentatives récentes de Levin pour le lui dénier., Sassi Maria Michela. Taking Care of the City: the Appeal to Notions and Methods of Hippocratic Medecine in Plato’s Political Thought. In: Dialogues d'histoire ancienne, vol. 47, n°2, 2021. pp. 113-133.

The representation of the ‘dying Socrates’ was extremely popular among artists during the 17th and 18th centuries, while there are several artworks with this concept during the early 19th century. This article's main aim is to use the methodological tool of the Grammar of Visual Design in forming a teaching proposal based on the Harvard University ‘Artful Thinking Project’. This teaching proposal can be applied to a Language, a Philosophy or a History course. As a second aim, we propose a new typology for that era's artworks on the subject of the last moments of Socrates.

Xenophon's Socrates, like Plato's, holds that wisdom comes with practical abilities. But influential interpretations of Xenophon's Socrates attribute to him a splintered view of wisdom, on which there is no wisdom simpliciter which is specially connected to all good actions. This article argues that a crucial text (Memorabilia 3.9.5) is significantly more problematic for the splintered view than hitherto appreciated, while the texts which are supposed to support the splintered view do not. Instead, this article argues that for Xenophon's Socrates the unwise lack self-knowledge, and so also lack a special prohairetic ability needed for doing fine and good actions.

This article looks to Attic comedy to explain Socrates’ first argument in Plato's Hippias Major: his refutation of Hippias’ claim that the Beautiful is a beautiful girl. As part of his argument, Socrates introduces three examples of beautiful things—a mare (θήλεια ἵππος), a lyre (λύρα) and a pot (χύτρα)—all of which are used in comedy as metaphorical obscenities for sexualized women. The author contends that an erotic reading of the text accomplishes what no other interpretation can: (1) a unified account of the passage that (2) allows for Socrates’ successful refutation of (3) a proposal in keeping with Hippias’ character. In addition, it explains (4) Socrates’ choice of examples—in particular, the rarely cited χύτρα—and (5) Hippias’ otherwise inexplicable reaction to the χύτρα, as well as (6) the analogous relationship of monkeys and men to pots and girls.

As a literate and well-educated person, the author of the Gospel of Luke and the Acts of the Apostles (“Luke”) would have been familiar with Plato’s Apology of Socrates, one of the most widely-known ancient Greek texts in the Mediterranean world in the 1st century CE. Indeed, it appears that “Luke” may have used his, and his readers’, familiarity with stories about the life, trial, and death of Socrates, and with the account in Plato’s Apology of Socrates specifically, as an interpretive tool in three “trial” scenes narrated in Luke-Acts: those of Jesus, Peter, and, most obviously, Paul.

In the Phaedo Plato describes Socrates’ final moments, just before his death. The statements he then makes can be treated as his philosophical creed. Socrates compares his own words to a swan song sung by the creature right before its approaching death and reminds his listeners of the swans’ prophetic gift. It can be said that in his final hour Socrates, just like Apollo’s swan, sings a song about the immortality of the human soul. Socrates refers to the Orphic “secret doctrine” (although he does not mention their name directly), revealing his thoughts on his own fate after death.

The paper claims that Socrates’ disawoval of wisdom in the Apology is not to be taken too seriously since it belongs to the rhetorical strategy of the sovereign philosopher who speaks in front of the crowd. In the political arena, the philosopher admits his obligation to become a philosopher-king, but only under a condition: only if his fellow-citizens would freely recognize his legitimacy to rule. As a potential ruler, he has to take into consideration the existing law code which is to be respected if his intended political reform should take place and succeed. The paper stresses that despite Plato’s condemnation of the democratic way of life current in Athens, he never criticizes Athenian law code as such; Solonian legal reform forms a starting point for his own political project. As a brief glance at the proposed law code of Magnesia in Plato’s Laws makes clear, the Platonic philosopher is full of respect to the Athenian legislative tradition.

For several decades, scholars of Plato's dialogues have focussed their efforts on understanding Socrates’ philosophy by unravelling the arguments used to establish it. On this view, Socrates’ philosophy is presented in his arguments, and, as Gregory Vlastos says, ‘Almost everything Socrates says is wiry argument; that is the beauty of his talk for a philosopher.’ In this paper I raise questions about what can be learned about Socrates’ philosophy through analysis of his arguments. One critic of what he views as traditional interpretations of Plato—‘the sole frame of reference used by most interpreters of Plato from antiquity to the present’—describes this approach as follows: (i)reading the dialogues to discover Platonic or Socratic doctrines, and(ii)the logic of the arguments on which these doctrines are based.While I subscribe to the first point, I have questions about (ii), the ready contention that Plato's dogmas are based on the arguments through which they are defended in dialogues.

In this piece, I propose a reading of Plato’s Gorgias that pays special attention to the role that the fictional audience plays in the unfolding of the dialogue. To this end, I use some of the insights that Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts–Tyteca conveyed in their seminal work, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation in order to argue that thinking about the way in which Socrates’ arguments are shaped by the different audiences that Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles aim to address and represent provides us with a new hermeneutical understanding of what is at stake in each of the different interactions Socrates engages in throughout the dialogue. In unpacking the way in which Socrates appropriates Gorgias’ particular audience, transforms Polus’ universal audience, and challenges Callicles’ elite audience, I provide an outline of the difficulties that Plato’s Socrates has to overcome in order to achieve the ‘community of minds’ that Perelman and Olbrechts–Tyteca identify as the bedrock of fruitful argumentation. Having done this, in the last section I turn to Plato’s Phaedrus, for the purpose of making evident that thinking about Plato’s deployment of rhetorical audiences is a crucial step in the effort to expose the implicit continuity that links the discussion of rhetoric delivered by the Gorgias to that of the Phaedrus.

Divers portraits de l’education socratique, quoique apparemment contradictoires sur certains points, temoignent d’une conception de la παιδeία qui ne consiste pas a proprement parler dans l’enseignement mais d’abord et avant tout dans la frequentation de Socrate. Cette etude entend examiner la conception originale de l’education defendue par Socrate dans ses divers portraits, et en particulier en ce qui concerne les modes de transmission de la vertu et du savoir au sein du rapport enseignant-eleve. A cette fin, j’analyserai la profonde revision de la παιδeία operee par l’enseignement socratique en me concentrant sur la notion de συνουσία et donc aussi sur la theorie de l’ἔρως que certaines sources, notamment Eschine et Platon, assignent a Socrate. Cette etude, divisee en quatre parties, se penche sur certains passages tires de (1) l’Alcibiade d’Eschine, en rapport avec d’autres dialogues de l’auteur ; (2) le Banquet de Platon, en parallele avec une section du Theetete ; (3) le Theages et le Premier Alcibiade ; (4) les Memorables de Xenophon.

When we think of the contributions made by the ancient Greek, the philosophy of Socrates and Plato, the plays by Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, or the historical thinking of Herodotus and Thucydides may come to or minds. Between the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, Athens set the stage for unprecedented cultural developments in the history of humankind. However, we sometimes forget that the historical period in which these authors lived and produced their masterpieces was also a time of war and plague. Some way or other, all these authors participated in the Peloponnesian War. And the Athenians, who were a major power at the beginning of the conflict, emerged as the defeated party in the end.The main source of information we have about the Peloponnesian War is Thucydides’ work known as the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides took an active part in the war as a general on the Athenian side. But after failing to protect a city, of strategic value for the Athenians, he lost his position as a general and was forced into exile. It is in the exile, then, that Thucydides writes the Peloponnesian War, seeking to take into consideration the accounts provided by all parties involved in the conflict. The text, though, remained unfinished. And it is unclear whether the order of chapters, as displayed in most modern editions, matches Thucydides’ original plan. It is not my intention here to examine the structure of the Peloponnesian War as a whole. My goal is far more modest: I intend to focus only on a few specific passages in which Thucydides discusses the causes of war and the reasons for violent conflict among human beings.

This paper deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images (‘the non-standard interpretation’); (b) the non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus; (c) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo.

This article examines a lecture that Booker T. Washington delivered to the Tuskegee literary society in order to argue for Washington’s place within a Black Socratic tradition. Readings of this obs...

This article deals with the agon of Wealth, offering a reconsideration of Penia (Poverty). The first part tries to show that Aristophanes was consistently drawing from the comic model of philosophers for this personification. This makes Penia a negative character, preventing the audience from sympathizing with her reasons. The second part of the paper analyzes the evidence for a closer relation between Penia’s arguments and those of Socrates in Plato’s Republic (esp. Books 4 and 5).

In the opening of Plato’s Lysis, Socrates criticizes the love-besotted Hippothales’ way of speaking to, and about, Hippothales’ yearned-for Lysis. Socrates subsequently proceeds to demonstr...

Plato’s Phaedo has long captivated readers with its moving portrayal of the death of Socrates. But the philosophic significance of the dialogue’s emotional power is rarely considered. In th...

This article maps the complex and changing interrelation of madness (μανία) and truth (ἀλήθεια) in the erotic speeches of the Phaedrus. I try to show that μανία is not merely a secondary aspect but rather a fundamental element within the structure binding together the sequence of speeches. I will show how what starts as an apparently simple binary opposition between μανία and ἀλήθεια in Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech suffers an important modification at the beginning of the palinode, and is finally turned upside down in the radical reappraisal caused by the focus on erotic μανία. The result is a different understanding of μανία, as well as a reassessment of the status and cognitive reliability of day-to-day human perspective.

The article brings under scrutiny an understudied dialogical account about the deposition of the patriarch of Constantinople Nicholas IV Mouzalon (1147-51). A close reading shows that this is not an official record of the proceedings but a piece of fiction that deliberately inverts the generic conventions of the two types of texts indicative of the 12th-century literary landscape, namely 1) minutes of church councils and 2) syllogistic theological dialogues. The anonymous author invites the reader to recognize the all-familiar scheme of the Socratic interrogation but eventually departs from it investing the protagonists (Manuel I Komnenos and Mouzalon) with features that distance them from their Platonic models. The text seems to be inextricably linked to Mouzalon’s canonical dilemma: can an archbishop who previously voluntarily fled from his office be appointed archbishop once again? In fact, the author’s primary concern is not the patriarch but the emperor, a judge-logician who is at one and the same time Socrates and more than Socrates, and the new language able to reflect the changing balance between the imperial and ecclesiastical powers in mid- 12th-century Byzantium.

This short paper offers an interpretation of Socrates’ closing words in Plato’s Apology. I argue that the closing words are directed at two particular groups of people at the trial, the three accusers and the jurymen who voted for Socrates’ death penalty. The interpretation I propose does not assume any confusing shifts in the intended recipients of Socrates’ words. Instead, it gives a natural reading of all the verbs and pronouns in the second person plural that follow the third person plural autōn at 41e1, it fixes the reference of the final ō andres accordingly and without compromising the distinction introduced by addressing only the friendly jurors with ō andres dikastai. In addition, I argue that the interpretation makes excellent sense of Plato’s text and gives it a richer meaning than what we find in the literature.

Zeno from Citium in Cyprus (ca 333/4–262/1 BC), of Phoenician origin, founder of the Stoic school. Ca 300 BC he started teaching at Athens at s.c. Painted Stoa (a gallery on the Athenian Agora); after it was named the Stoic school. Zeno experienced the influence of academicians (division of philosophy in three parts), megarians (logic), Aristoteles and possibly Heraclites (physics), cynics and Socrates (ethics). Having this as a basis he developed his special doctrine. Three parts of philosophy are inseparably connected. Logic investigates the principles and the limits of knowledge. Physics located at the middle place formulates the laws of the universe and thereby installs the basis of ethics. Ethics as the crown of the teaching proves the final end of the rational being: life in accordance with nature, that is with the prescriptions of the cosmic logos, corresponds to happiness.

In the article, a little-studied question of the critical interpretation of the philosophical and psychological position of the representative of Scotland tradition James Mill (1773–1836) in the university philosophy, especially in the work of Kharkiv Professor Fedor Zelenogorskii (1839–1908) is presented. At first, the main periods of scientific and creative career of Fedor Zelenogorskii, including his studying at the Kazan Clerical Academy (1862–1864) and the historical-philosophical faculty at the Kazan University (1864–1868) are considered. Then his scientific internship from 1871 till 1873 in Germany and Switzerland is emphasized. During that period, he attended lectures of such famous Professors as Moritz Drobisch (Leipzig), Eduard Zeller (Heidelberg), Friedrich Albert Lange (Zurich, and Marburg), who was the author of the work “Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart” (1866). Then the features of the teaching and the publications of Fedor Zelenogroskii in his “Kharkiv period” (1874–1908) are pointed out, during which he was, at first, private docent, then extraordinary and ordinary professor of philosophy. Fedor Zelenogorskii’s works at this time comprise three areas: 1) Antique philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aristippus of Cyrene), 2) works in the history of philosophy, for instance, Kharkiv university philosophy and Ukrainian philosophy (J. B. Schad, A I. Dudrovich, M. N. Protopopov, G. S. Skovoroda, at al.), 3) logic, psychology and pedagogic. In the last group, his doctoral monograph “On mathematical, metaphysical, inductive and critical research and proof methods” (1877) was of great importance. Fedor Zelenogorskii’s very important work was his monograph “Essay of Development of Psychology from Descartes to our Time” (Kharkiv, 1885). The positions of well-known philosophers (Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Berkley, Leibniz, Locke, and John Stewart Mill) and less-known thinkers (Glisson, Bonnet, and James Mill) were here analyzed. Fedor Zelenogorskii’s critical interpretation of the psychological viewpoint of James Mill in his two volumes work “Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind” (1829, 1869) occupies an important place in this analysis. According to him, Chapter III. “The Association of Ideas” of James Mill's work played a key role. James Mill appears here as a representative of associative psychology (David Hartley, Thomas Brown, J. F. Herbart, John Stewart Mill). The Kharkiv philosopher gave credit to James Mill for his contribution to the development of the causal law in Chapter “XXIV. The Will” of this work. In turn, Fedor Zelenogorskii’s important achievement was the popularization of the ideas of the Scotland philosopher and psychologist James Mill, in particular, because of his translation of extracts from the work “Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind”.

The article deals with the topic of "initiations" in Plato's Phaedrus. The idea of initiation was characteristic of Greek mysteries, especially the Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries, which played a large role in the formation of Greek philosophy. The essence of initiations was the experience of divinity. The motive of initiations in Plato's Phaedrus seems to have a similar meaning. This is also suggested by the allegory of human souls as chariots and the mystical “epopteia” motif woven into it, suggesting Eleusinian analogies.

Critics, from Athenaeus in the second century CE and Eduard Zeller in the nineteenth, to the present day, have been concerned with problems of authenticity and the dating of Plato’s work, including the inconsistent internal dramatic dates of the dialogues and other anachronisms within them. This article examines the relationship between the imaginary time of the dialogues and Plato’s own context, between the blurring of time and temporal relationships in the dialogues and the arguments that they contain, the construction of anachronistic communities and genealogies within them, through which Plato negotiates his own relationship with Socrates, and the deconstruction and re-negotiation of familial relationships, particularly those between fathers and sons. It uses insights from recent explorations of temporality in queer theory to generate a historicist reading that emphasizes the affective role of time within Plato’s writing. It argues that Plato uses the temporal setting of dialogues to underscore themes of their arguments, and that these anachronic settings can be read as an artefact of Plato’s own reception of Socrates’ life and death, and its context in the turmoil of the Peloponnesian War and the loss and restoration of democracy.

This article provides an overview of the contributions to philosophy of Nigerian philosopher Sophie Bọ´sẹ`dé Olúwọlé (1935–2018). The first woman to earn a philosophy PhD in Nigeria, Olúwọlé headed the Department of Philosophy at the University of Lagos before retiring to found and run the Centre for African Culture and Development. She devoted her career to studying Yoruba philosophy, translating the ancient Yoruba Ifá canon, which embodies the teachings of Orunmila, a philosopher revered as an Óríṣá in the Ifá pantheon. Seeing his works as examples of secular reasoning and argument, she compared Orunmila's and Socrates' philosophies and methods and explored similarities and differences between African and European philosophies. A champion of African oral traditions, Olúwọlé argued that songs, proverbs, liturgies, and stories are important sources of African responses to perennial philosophical questions as well as to contemporary issues, including feminism. She argued that the complementarity that ran throughout Yoruba philosophy guaranteed women's rights and status, and preserved an important role for women, youths, and foreigners in politics.

Recently, two books have appeared that venture to re-investigate modern legal theory's ancient Greek underpinnings. In both books, the notion of nomos plays a central role. Firstly, Thanos Zartaloudis has published a remarkable study in which he delves into the manifold meanings of that ancient Greek word. Zartaloudis offers us an extraordinarily rich analysis of the polyvalent forms and uses of nomos from the age of Homer up to the days of Socrates – the classical period in which nomos would finally come to acquire its sense of an enacted legal norm (‘law’) or binding social convention (‘custom’). Secondly, nomos is of central importance in Johan van der Walt’s recent book on the intertwined modern notions of liberal democracy and the rule of law – referred to by Van der Walt as the concept of liberal democratic law. For Van der Walt, the analysis of ancient Greek nomos and its long and tortuous reception history in western thought is crucial for a proper understanding of what the modern concept of liberal democratic law entails and how it could be saved for the future.

Plato'sGorgiasmight as well have been namedOn Shame. The word appears sixty-nine times in the course of the dialogue with a lion's share of references to shame being made by Socrates’ character. Callicles comes in second in his use of the term. Cairns notes that in the corpus of the lyric poet Theognis of Megara (sixth century BC) we have ‘the first instance of the nounaischunē.’ Cairns goes on to comment on Theognis’ use of αἰσχύνη and says that ‘[h]ere it appears in the objective sense, but later it will also be found in a subjective sense, as the reaction to or mental picture of disgrace and so as equivalent ofaidōs.’ Although it is important to differentiate αἰσχύνη and αἰδώς, the terms, as Cairns suggests, are capable of expressing interchangeable meanings. Hence, in our comparative study of shame in theGorgiasand in theClouds, we pay close attention to and examine the context in which a given term appears. The central role that shame plays in theGorgiasis the subject matter of analyses by Race, Bensen Cain, McKim, and Dodds. Race is confident that ‘of all the motifs running through the work, the most insistent is that of shame, for the word aischyne (along with verbal forms of aischynomai and the adjective aischros) occurs over 75 times.’ In line with the view that shame is central in theGorgias, we offer a further contribution, which focuses on the affinity between the treatment of shame in that dialogue and in Aristophanes’Clouds. We argue that either the ostensible subject of theGorgias, which is usually identified as rhetoric, is not the dialogue's true concern or the explicit subject matter cannot be understood without its accompanying element, which is shame. To support this thesis, we undertake a comparative analysis of the thematic, heuristic, and conceptual use of shame in theGorgiasin view of Aristophanes’ play. We argue that the characters in theCloudsportray the same perennial attitudes to life as do the interlocutors in theGorgiasand, what is more, the characters in both works evoke with more than incidental clarity certain historical figures (Alcibiades and Pericles). Thus, both works, as we claim, are commenting on and, even though theCloudsis a comedy, serve as the ground for our philosophical reflection on the political, educational, and cultural ideals of ancient Greece. Moreover, theCloudsmakes light of, instead of endorsing, such distinctions as shameful/laudable, natural/conventional, old/new, education/didacticism, and moral/prudish. We draw on the humor of theClouds, which allows us to withhold immediate judgment about these dichotomies in order to then examine these same notions which are problematized in theGorgias.

Though Plato's Phaedo does not focus on pleasure, some considerable talk on pleasure takes place in it. Socrates argues for the soul's immortality and, while doing so, hopes to highlight to his companions how important it is to take care of our soul by focussing on the intellect and by neglecting the bodily realm as far as is possible in this life. Doing philosophy, so his argument goes, is something like dying, if we grant that death is the separation of the soul from the body and notice that genuine philosophers wish nothing else than to be detached from the bodily realm. For indulging into bodily pleasures has detrimental consequences on the soul, impeding the search of truth and distorting reality, and so philosophers should undertake to purify themselves from all bodily concerns and gratifications and love the objects of learning and knowledge without deviation and distraction. On the contrary, ordinary people fall for the bodily realm as the only real domain that should therefore be of priority and of their earnest concern.

In a forthcoming article, Willy Clarysse presents an overview of the name Socrates in Egypt. He argues for an evolution from a ‘normal Greek name’, with no specific reference to the Athenian philosopher (Ptolemaic period), to a Greek name with Egyptian connotations (Roman period).

The volume Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, recently edited by Ch. Moore and A. Stavru (Brill, 2018), favours the pluralistic approach to the sources that has gained increasing acceptance over the last decades, and thus shares the choice not to limit the study of Socrates to the canonical ‘quartet’ Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle. Indeed, the volume partly continues an existing trend, but at the same time proves to reinforce it by further refining and scrutinising this field of research. The very welcome result is a collection of essays that provides a rich and nuanced picture of Socrates from the Old Comedy to Neoplatonism, based on Socratic literature as well as non-Socratic material – the latter including both non-Socratic authors and non-Socratic passages by Socratic authors. Because of the variety of themes and the number of contributions, which present a vast range of methodological approaches, the work offers a privileged point of view for investigating the ongoing advancements in our understanding of Socratism. Rather than providing a thorough presentation of all chapters, which would inevitably oversimplify their content, this paper attempts to highlight – also through the comparison with the existing literature – the main results of the analysis conducted and their specific contribution to the field.

Recent scholarship on Plato'sCratylus(=Cra.) has yielded interpretations that assign various functions of philosophical importance to the dialogue's lengthy etymological section. Barney (2001) considers the section an ‘agonistic display’ (69–73) in which Socrates beats contemporary practitioners of etymology at their own game while, at the same time, offering a cosmological theory intended for serious intellectual competition. In this context, Barney emphasizes the importance of Parmenides, a charioteer who journeys towards Truth, as a literary point of reference for Socrates’ own etymological quest after the true meaning of names which, from Cratylus’ naturalist perspective on language, are considered indicative of their referents’ essential nature. The contents of the etymologies may be a ‘rational reconstruction’ (52–7) of Cratylus’ linguistic naturalism. Sedley (2003) stresses the encyclopedic character of Socrates’ lexical interpretations and argues that these are ‘exegetically correct’ (28) in representing the opinions of the name-givers of old who subscribed to a Heraclitean view of a world in flux, as is reflected in the original form of the names they devised. Ademollo (2011) stresses that Socrates’ etymologies display the evolution of Greek intellectual thought, shown to be heavily reliant on the assumption of a universe in flux, and serve to exhibit the weaknesses in Cratylus’ naturalist view of language.

Contents: Foreword. Part I Introductory Essays: Introduction, Alan Chalmers What is philosophy?, Trevor Curnow What Greek philosophy means to us today, Ian Hunt. Part II The Precursors of Philosophy: Homer, Seamus Sweeney Hesiod, Aude Engel Aesop, Leo Groarke. Part III The Pre-socratics and Socrates: Thales of Miletus, Patricia O'Grady Anaximander of Miletus, Dirk L. Couprie and Heleen J. Pott Sappho, Christina Clark Pythagoras, Thomas Kiefer Xenophanes, Hye-kyung Kim Aeschylus, Seamus Sweeney Anaxagoras, Patricia O'Grady Heraclitus, G. S. Bowe Parmenides, Allan F. Randall Empedocles, James M. Magrini Protagoras of Abdera and Plato's Protagoras, Jonathan Lavery The Sophists, Jonathan Lavery Zeno of Elea, Doukas Kapantais Sophocles, James M. Magrini Euripides, Seamus Sweeney Herodotus of Halicarnassus, Christine Farmer Diotima of Mantineia, Melanie B. Mineo Hippocrates of Cos, Andrew Gregory Socrates, Hope May Thucydides, Matthew Usher Democritus, Alan Chalmers. Part IV The Classical Period: Aristophanes, Robert Phiddian Plato, Gerasimos Santas Plato's Symposium, Steven R. Robinson The Anonymous Iamblichi, Louis Groarke Diogenes of Sinope, Marjolein Oele Eudoxus of Cnidos, Andrew Gregory Aristotle, Hope May. Part V The Hellenistic Philosophers: Theophrastus of Eresus, Irene Svitzou Pyrrho, Leo Groarke Epicurus, Dirk Baltzly Zeno of Citium, Maria Protopapas-Marneli Archimedes, Suzanne Roux Aristarchus of Samos, Andrew Gregory Carneades, G.S. Bowe Lucretius, Tim O'Keefe Seneca the Younger, Kartika Panwar Apollonius of Tyana, Gabriele Cornelli. Part VI The Roman Period: Epictetus, Keith Seddon Apuleius of Madauros, Bruce J. MacLennan Marcus Aurelius, William O. Stephens Plotinus, David J. Yount Sextus Empiricus, Sabatino Dibernardo Imablichus of Chalcis, Bruce J. MacLennan Anthony of Egypt and The Desert Fathers, Louis Groarke Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, Linos G. Benakis Hypatia of Alexandria, Virginia Haddad Proclus, Dirk Baltzly John Philoponus, Antonia Kakavelaki The Closure of the Academy of Athens, George Arabatzis. Part VII Archaeological Sites: The Athenian Acropolis, Evanthia Speliotis The Athenian Agora, Kevin Glowacki Corinth, G. S. Bowe Delphi, Deborah Nash Peterson Didyma, Peter Sommer Eleusis, Anne Farrell Epidaurus, Glenn Rawson Marathon, Trevor Curnow Miletus, Patricia O'Grady Ancient Olympia: athletic games and intellectual contests, Glenn Rawson Piraeus, Daniel Silvermintz Samos, Tim O'Keefe and Patricia O'Grady Syracuse, Phillip Meade Troy and Henry Schliemann, Patricia O'Grady. Glossary, Glenn Rawson Time Line, Andrew Gregory.

This article aims to investigate the identity of Socrates, the compiler of AP 14.1-64 (arithmetic problems and riddles). Leaving aside the traditional, but very uncertain, identification with Socrates the epigrammatist (D.L. 2.47), it is shown that the chronological conjecture by Carcopino 1926 (late 1st century BC-2nd century AD) no longer holds. A wider time frame is established (1st-4th centuries AD), although evidence from the (fairly) securely attributable poem (AP 14.1) seems to point to the mid-2nd century AD as the most plausible period of the poet’s activity. It is suggested that Socrates was a Pythagorising Middle Platonist associated with the philosopher Calvenus Taurus, even if his relationship with the Neo-Pythagorean and Middle Platonic traditions remains difficult to define precisely. The article also considers some of the relationships that have been shown to exist between diverging directions in Pythagoreanism (Delatte 1922), offering corrections for future attempts at Quellenforschung.

Plato’s Phaedo aims to restore the reputation of Socrates by transforming him from a political scapegoat of Athens to a hero of the city who had put him to death. As scholars have shown, the dialogue’s heroization of Socrates shares affinities with the religious tradition of the hero cult (see White, 2000; Nagy, 2015). In this article I argue that the conceptualization of the philosopher as a cult hero is developed further in the Republic and the Laws. The Republic presents Socrates as the “oikist” of the ideal polis, who makes religious decisions under the authority of god Apollo. In the same vein, the distinguished classes of the philosopher-rulers in the Republic and of the auditors in the Laws are compared to another group also subsumed under the category of cult-heroes, the victorious Olympic athletes., El Fedón de Platón tiene como objetivo restaurar la reputación de Sócrates transformándolo de un chivo expiatorio político de Atenas a un héroe de la misma ciudad que lo había condenado a muerte. Como han demostrado los estudiosos, la heroización de Sócrates en el diálogo comparte afinidades con la tradición religiosa del culto al héroe (ver White, 2000; Nagy, 2015). En este artículo sostengo que la conceptualización del filósofo como héroe de culto se desarrolla más en República y Leyes. La República presenta a Sócrates como el "oikist" de la polis ideal, que toma decisiones religiosas bajo la autoridad del dios Apolo. En el mismo sentido, las clases distinguidas de los filósofos-gobernantes en República y de los auditores en Leyes se comparan con otro grupo también subsumido bajo la categoría de héroes de culto, los atletas olímpicos victoriosos., Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación