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A significant proportion of the US population does not believe that climate change is a serious problem and immediate action is necessary. We ask whether individuals' experiences with long-run changes in their local climate can override the power of partisanship that appears to dominate this opinion process. We merge individual-level data on climate change perceptions and the main determinants previously identified by the literature with county-level data on an exogenous measure of local climate change. While we find that local climate change significantly affects perceptions and in the expected direction, partisanship and political ideology maintain the strongest effect. We then field a randomized online experiment to test whether partisanship also drives support for pro-climate policies and the willingness to make environmentally friendly individual choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While existing literature points to a number of factors that shape subnational support for climate policy, the extant scholarship has struggled to illustrate a clear and convincing explanation for subnational support of climate policy efforts and whether that support is meaningful. By looking to the United States, where subnational actors have an important role in environmental policy development and implementation, we find that legislators' ideology and membership in the minority party determines sponsorship of climate bills. Specifically, liberal legislators with the fewest opportunities to signal efficacy to their constituents are the most likely to support subnational climate change policy efforts. Given that the individuals most likely to support climate policy efforts are those without capacity, many support efforts may be more symbolic than substantive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has now been 12 months since Donald J. Trump was elected President of the United States, a man who as a candidate for the job called the scientific evidence for climate change “a hoax,” vowed to deregulate the American economy from what he considered to be onerous oversight, and bring back jobs that he claimed were lost as a result of the effort to combat the rise in global atmospheric temperatures. So, now is a good time to examine the president’s words and deeds regarding climate change – a sort of first-year job performance review or report card. What has he been able to accomplish? Has he laid a foundation for a successful agenda? And what are the most significant challenges to his energy and climate policy objectives? [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Climate change is complex during the best of times. It is commonly conceptualized as the quintessential global collective action problem: it affects those who do not contribute to it while the benefits of climate change mitigation measures are not restricted to those who pursue such measures. This conceptualization illustrates the high transaction costs involved in domestic policies as well as in international agreements addressing climate change, and it is of academic and practical interest. As such, this Article discusses the current challenges that climate change policies face, focusing on the linkages between the climate change policies of the Trump administration and the COVID-19 pandemic and on the effects of those linkages, both in the United States and globally. Specifically, this Article addresses the Trump administration's attacks on climate science and its deregulatory climate agenda, as well as the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. In addition, it discusses principles of international law and the challenges related to state liability for environmental harms in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. This Article also assesses how the United States' climate policies are likely to aggravate inequalities both domestically, as well as globally, in the aftermath of the pandemic. This Article offers several original contributions. First, it provides a unique assessment of how the deregulatory climate policies implemented nationally and internationally by the Trump administration have magnified the COVID-19 crisis. Second, the law and economics methodology used in this Article validates the claim that improving environmental quality is connected to optimizing early regulatory action. Third, this Article discusses the challenges of state liability for climate harms in the aftermath of the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and concurrent COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, this Article offers relevant insights for the literature on climate change that are likely to be applicable to critical future situations, whether they are health-related, a global economic crisis, or climate-related emergencies. Ultimately, this Article concludes that, in the aggregate, all such climate change policies have contributed to increased pollution, including elevated greenhouse gas emissions that have aggravated pre-pandemic inequalities embedded within the United States and among countries. Consequently, the domestic and international policy choices of the Trump administration are worsening the impact of the pandemic, particularly for those in more vulnerable positions, as well as indelibly poisoning the global commons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How did New York City's climate politics change after Hurricane Sandy, and why? Prevailing accounts of extreme weather's impact on climate politics draw on survey data and characterize climate policy in vague terms. However, weather does not do the work of politics; the specifics of climate policy matter. I develop a relational sociological approach focused on mobilized actors, political economy, and event theory. Drawing on interviews and document analysis, I show how senior disaster officials, New York's Mayor Bloomberg and his Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, community groups and Occupy Sandy activists responded to Hurricane Sandy. Actors maintained outlooks and practices consistent with their position in the city's power relations. This selective continuity shifted New York's climate policy from decarbonization-focused tentative cosmopolitanism to adaptation-focused defensive parochialism. I term this convergent prioritization of adaptation a 'fortress of solitude' social logic. Only subsequent events explain New York's 2019 low-carbon legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars who study the failure of climate change policy in the United States tend to focus on the mechanics of denial and the coordinated efforts of political operatives, conservative think tanks, and partisan news outlets to cast doubt on what has become overwhelming scientific consensus. In contrast, we address a factor that has been understudied until now – the role of climate change advocacy in the U.S. Congress. Using quantitative text analysis on a corpus of floor speeches published in the Congressional Record between 1996 and 2015, we find notable differences in the language partisans use. Democrats communicate in ways that are message-based, emphasizing the weight of scientific evidence, while Republicans tend towards a softer, cue-based narrative based on anecdotes and storytelling. We end with a discussion of what climate change advocates can hope to accomplish through the 'politics of talk,' especially in an age of heightened polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study assesses the direct, indirect, and total impacts of political partisanship on state‐level utilities' investment in energy efficiency. This subject is of utmost importance because energy efficiency improvement has become a linchpin in worldwide efforts to combat climate change and other environmental challenges. Analysis of data on 51 electric utilities nested within 31 U.S. states indicates that political partisanship influences utilities' energy efficiency policies. There is strong evidence that electric utilities in states dominated by the Republican Party are less likely to invest in energy efficiency than those in states governed by the Democratic Party. This finding suggests that political partisanship may be shaping the policy and regulatory frameworks put in place by state governments to incentivize or compel the participation of private‐sector entities' in environmental management and/or resource conservation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem, research strategy, and findings: Climate scientists have developed high-resolution climate models to project local effects of climate change. However, such high-resolution climate information is not widely incorporated into climate change adaptation plans. In this study we analyze high-resolution (1.24x1.24-mile grid) temperature data generated by a climate model for Los Angeles County (CA). The data include projected surface air temperature and the number of extreme heat days (daily maximum temperature exceeding 95 °F) between a baseline period (1981-2000) and a mid-21st-century period (2041-2060). The data assume that human-induced greenhouse gas emissions will continuously increase at the current level and no change in existing built environments. We find significant geographic heterogeneity in terms of climate change effects in Los Angeles County. Also, given the assumptions, we expect inland suburban areas where urban expansion has been occurring to have more severe extreme heat effects than central and coastal areas by mid-century. Takeaway for practice: Planners should engage with climate scientists to access and use high-resolution climate data. The use of high-resolution climate data needs to be mandated in plan-making in the era of climate change. Many regions may have different spatial patterns of extreme heat events and require tailored climate adaptation plans. In Los Angeles County, for example, continuing suburbanization in inland valley areas may need to be discouraged, whereas coastal areas with the least effects may consider denser, inclusive redevelopment strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is experiencing growing impacts of climate change but currently receives a limited policy response from its national leadership. Within this policy void, many state governments are stepping up and taking action on adaptation planning. Yet we know little about why some states adopt State Adaptation Plans (SAPs), while others do not. This article investigates factors that predict the emergence of SAPs, both in terms of policy adoption and policy intensity (goal ambitiousness). Applying the diffusion of innovation theory, I consider the relative influence of internal state characteristics, regional pressures, and test for conditional effects between government ideologies and severity of the problem. The results show interesting differences between predictors that influence policy adoption and ambitiousness. States are more motivated to adopt a policy when faced with greater climate vulnerability, have more liberal citizenry, and where governments have crossed policy hurdles by previously passing mitigation plans. The intensity of policies and goal setting, moreover, is more likely to be driven by interest group politics and diffuse through policy learning or sharing information among neighboring states in Environmental Protection Agency regions. These findings support an emerging scholarship that uses more complex dependent variables in policy analysis. These variables have the potential to differentiate symbolic from substantive policies and capture finer information about predictors of importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An interview with Adrianna Quintero, director of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion at the Energy Foundation. Topics include the disproportionate impact of harms caused by environment such as climate change on people of color, women and girls, and the poor, mitigation or reinforcement of environmental racism by environmental policy regime in the U.S., and efforts which should be taken by leaders to make people feel involved in the environmental movement.

Environmental policy in the United States (US) is known for its media-specific approach to problems, and scholars have argued that this is ineffective. To combat these problems, some have argued for a more coordinated, integrated approach to policymaking. With Congressional gridlock prohibiting legislative solutions, the Obama administration offers some examples of a regulatory path to policy integration. Importantly, these efforts do not entail significant organizational remodels, which can be difficult to adopt. Three different 'types' of policy integration from the US Environmental Protection Agency and Bureau of Land Management are described. These cases serve as a potential roadmap for broader implementation of policy integration within the fragmented US bureaucracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing partisan divide in Congress stalled almost all new federal climate policy in 2011. The divide frustrated efforts to pass a cap-and-trade carbon permitting system, spawned a battle between the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Congress, pushed most substantive climate change policy down to the municipal level and hindered US ability to effectively negotiate an international climate agreement. Amid the federal partisan wrangling, US cities have enacted far-sighted climate policy initiatives, and the growing cost of fossil fuels has stimulated investment in renewable energy, edging the country closer to commercially viable alternatives to fossil fuels. These trends could help provide an alternate route to climate mitigation, even without international treaties or national legislation. But the inevitable shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources would be greatly hastened by federal action to tax carbon dioxide emissions and use the revenue generated to support alternative energy technologies. That action is extremely unlikely to occur unless climate change comes to be seen in the United States as a practical, rather than ideological, issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our understanding of the determinants of public concern about climate change relies heavily on survey research in the United States. But can those findings be generalized to the rest of the world? Analysis of the Pew Research Center's 2015 Global Attitudes Survey shows fairly similar patterns in the English-speaking Western democracies and, to a lesser extent, western Europe, but party identification and political ideology matter much less in most of the globe, and demographic factors have very different impacts. Female, younger, and less religious people tend to worry more about climate change in English-speaking Western democracies. In most of the world, however, concern is only weakly correlated with gender, rises with age and religiosity, and is more strongly correlated with education. A new measure of commitment to democratic values proved to be the most consistent predictor of concern globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Obama's climate change record is assessed by looking at his success in translating policy goals into policy outputs (laws or regulatory action) during his time in office. Obama's campaign speeches are examined to identify specific promises to take action on climate change before proceeding to examine whether, how and with what success he managed to act upon these pledges. Obama is shown to have set out a multi-pronged approach to deal with climate change in his campaign speeches and succeeded in translating many of his goals into policy outputs. This finding contributes to debates about Obama's 'green' credentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amidst congressional gridlock, administrative rulemaking is the main pathway for environmental policy making. Scholars have assessed the role of the institutions of government (the president, Congress, and the courts) and key interest groups (i.e., business and environmental interests) in shaping rulemaking outcomes. What is missing from this literature is an assessment of the role of key implementers, state environmental agencies. This research fills this gap by assessing the role and impact of state government agencies in three case studies of rulemaking at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Based on original interviews and a public comment analysis, this research suggests that state agencies play an active and influential role in EPA rulemaking. And, in some cases, state agencies wield more influence than other interest groups. Interviewees argued that this influence stems from these agencies' unique voice as an implementation collaborator. As a result, researchers should incorporate an assessment of the role of these interests to more effectively explain regulatory outcomes at the EPA and potentially across the bureaucracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although substantial attention has focused on efforts by the new Administration to block environmental policies, climate politics have been contentious in the US since well before the election of Donald Trump. In this paper, we extend previous work on empirical examinations of echo chambers in US climate politics using new data collected on the federal climate policy network in summer 2016. We test for the similarity and differences at two points in time in homophily and echo chambers using Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) to compare new findings from 2016 to previous work on data from 2010. We show that echo chambers continue to play a significant role in the network of information exchange among policy elites working on the issue of climate change. In contrast to previous findings where echo chambers centered on a binding international commitment to emission reductions, we find that the pre-existing echo chambers have almost completely disappeared and new structures have formed around one of the main components of the Obama Administration’s national climate policy: the Clean Power Plan. These results provide empirical evidence that science communication and policymaking at the elite level shift in relation to the policy instruments under consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the Juliana v U.S. case which involves American climate change policy and is considered the most important environmental case in the country. The violation made by the U.S. federal government to the plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to liberty, life, and property by substantially causing or contributing to a dangerous concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is mentioned.

Cities in the USA engage in action on climate change, even as the federal government remains resistant to comprehensive climate policy. While experts generally agree that local level adaptation and mitigation policies are critical to avoiding the worst climate impacts, the degree to which cities communicate climate change issues to their constituents has yet to be fully explored. In this article, we evaluate how US cities communicate climate change-related issues, problems, and policies. We use a computer-assisted approach to evaluate climate change efforts by cities by examining the full text of press releases of 82 large cities in the USA. We first identify who discusses climate change, finding that many large cities in the USA address climate change in their public communication. Second, we examine the content of these discussions. Many cities discuss weather-related concerns in conjunction with broad collaborative efforts to address global warming, while city-based policy discussions focus more on energy and transportation efforts. Third, we evaluate the local factors associated with these discussions. We find that the city’s climate vulnerability is particularly influential in shaping the level and timing of climatic communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State governments in the United States are well placed to identify opportunities for mitigation and the needs for adaptation to climate change. However, the cost of these efforts can have important implications for budgets that already face pressures from diverse areas such as unfunded pensions and growing health care costs. In this work, the current level of spending on climate-related activities at the state level are evaluated and policy recommendations are developed to improve financial management practices as they relate to climate risk. An examination of state budgets reveals that climate mitigation and adaptation activities represent less than 1% of spending in most states. The data collection highlights the obstacles to collecting accurate spending data and the lack of budgetary and accounting procedures in place. More importantly, the difficulty in benchmarking these activities poses challenges for the analysis of state-level policies as well as planning and modelling future climate-related spending. Other policy contexts, including public pensions and infrastructure, can provide guidance on budgetary and accounting tools that may help states prepare for and more efficiently manage climate-related expenditures. Key policy insights Climate change mitigation and adaptation will require substantial investments across many levels of government on a wide range of activities. Currently, US states are not clearly demarcating climate expenditures, hindering the identification of climate-related budgetary risks. In the absence of guidelines, these longer term fiscal outlays may remain chronically underfunded in favour of more near-term spending priorities. Establishing appropriate financial management and data collection practices is important for more sophisticated cost-effectiveness and policy analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Trump has embarked on an ambitious and far-reaching attempt to reshape American environmental policy. In regard to climate change, water quality, and other areas, his administration's actions constitute an attempt to roll back existing environmental protections and torecalibrateAmericanenvironmentalfederalism.Theseactionslargelyrepresentacontinuationof the practice of presidential reliance on the tools of the administrative presidency that has shaped U.S. environmental policy over the past forty years, although the Trump Administration has employed these tools in an especially aggressive fashion. Because changing public policy through administrative means is a time-consuming process that invites legal challenge, the full implications of these efforts will not be known for several years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The well-established association between economic output and carbon emissions has led researchers in sociology and related disciplines to study new approaches to climate change mitigation, including policies that stabilize or reduce GDP growth. Within this degrowth approach, working time reduction is a key policy lever to reduce emissions as well as protect employment. In the United States, the abdication of responsibility for mitigation by the federal government has led to the emergence of state climate leadership. This study is the first to analyze the relationship between emissions and working hours at the state level. Our findings suggest that over the 2007-2013 period, state-level carbon emissions and average working hours have a strong, positive relationship, which holds across a variety of model estimation techniques and net of various political, economic, and demographic drivers of emissions. We conclude that working time reduction may represent a multiple dividend policy, contributing to enhanced quality of life and lower unemployment as well as emissions mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major goal of the environmental movement is to conserve or improve the natural environment, but evidence showing that environmental mobilization produces positive environmental outcomes is mixed. This article addresses a fundamental question about the relative impact of pro‐environmental mobilization and the scope of an environmental policy regime on the natural environment. Using panel data at the state level from 1990 through 2007, we explore how environmental protest and environmental policies independently (or jointly) reduce CO2 emissions in U.S. states. We find that the level of emissions in a state declines in states with increases in pro‐environmental protest, net of the effects of the range of environmental policies enacted, gasoline taxes, liberal attitudes, reliance on the fossil fuel industry, number of registered lobbyist organizations, gross state product, and population size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the climate policies in California and New York. It mentions the role played by politicians in the two states why their policies were considered as stronger in the U.S. along with the usefulness of the process and structural theories in the policy adoption of the two states. It discusses certain structural advantages and constraints that contributes to development of strong climate policies in California and New York. It highlights the similarities of the climate policies of the states and the reason why California's policy was stronger compared with New York's.

Issue frames portraying climate science as uncertain are cited as a key impediment to new climate change and energy policies. However, some have recently argued that the debate over policy impacts, especially policy impacts on consumers, has become more politically salient than the debate over science. This study applies qualitative content analysis to 340 documents from the conservative think tank, the Heartland Institute, to test whether certain policy frames have become more common among leading opponents of climate policy in the United States. The results indicate a continued reliance on science framing, with more directed attacks on climate scientists and fewer frames stressing the uncertainty of climate science. An increase in the use of policy frames related to effects on consumers also suggests that opposition to climate policy is taking new forms as the political debate evolves, with ramifications for climate change policy opposition on an international scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major goal of the environmental movement is to conserve or improve the natural environment, but evidence showing that environmental mobilization produces positive environmental outcomes is mixed. This article addresses a fundamental question about the relative impact of pro‐environmental mobilization and the scope of an environmental policy regime on the natural environment. Using panel data at the state level from 1990 through 2007, we explore how environmental protest and environmental policies independently (or jointly) reduce CO2 emissions in U.S. states. We find that the level of emissions in a state declines in states with increases in pro‐environmental protest, net of the effects of the range of environmental policies enacted, gasoline taxes, liberal attitudes, reliance on the fossil fuel industry, number of registered lobbyist organizations, gross state product, and population size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some coastal cities there is an urgent need to decide on adaptation investments given the long periods needed to complete the relevant infrastructures. However such decisions are usually made under significant uncertainty due to local climate change and socio-economic impacts. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has developed four global scenarios according to different representative concentration pathways (RCPs); however, using these scenarios directly is equivalent to using incomplete information in the decision-making process because they do not provide information on what sea level rise behavior is most probable. In this study, I propose a model which assigns probabilities to IPCC scenarios with Local Sea Level Rise (LSLR) information. I obtain expected damage and risk measures for the world's 120 major coastal mega-cities at specific moments in time. That is, I consider uncertainty in both scenario selection and within each scenario. With this information it is possible to make adaptation investment decisions under uncertainty with a criterion of not exceeding certain risk levels in the future. The paper shows that in the year 2100 for the equal probability mixed scenario (25% RCP 2.6, 50% RCP 4.5 and 25 RCP 8.5) the expected damage is US$ 1,251,732 millions for New Orleans and US$ 1,196,517 millions for Guangzhou. The risk measurements show that in that year the damage in the 5% of worse cases will be US$ 2,800,756 millions for Guangzhou and US$ 1,832,466 millions for New Orleans. However, not all countries have sufficient resources to make the necessary adaptation investments, so we analyze expected damage and risk according to World Bank country income groups. The paper shows that the USA and China will need to make major adaptation investments in the future. The coastal LSLR risk in lower-income cities is also calculated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Protected areas (PAs) cover about 22% of the conterminous United States. Understanding their role on historical land use and land cover change (LULCC) and on the carbon cycle is essential to provide guidance for environmental policies. In this study, we compiled historical LULCC and PAs data to explore these interactions within the terrestrial ecosystem model (TEM). We found that intensive LULCC occurred in the conterminous United States from 1700 to 2005. More than 3 million km2 of forest, grassland and shrublands were converted into agricultural lands, which caused 10,607 Tg C release from land ecosystems to atmosphere. PAs had experienced little LULCC as they were generally established in the 20th century after most of the agricultural expansion had occurred. PAs initially acted as a carbon source due to land use legacies, but their accumulated carbon budget switched to a carbon sink in the 1960s, sequestering an estimated 1,642 Tg C over 1700–2005, or 13.4% of carbon losses in non‐PAs. We also find that PAs maintain larger carbon stocks and continue sequestering carbon in recent years (2001–2005), but at a lower rate due to increased heterotrophic respiration as well as lower productivity associated to aging ecosystems. It is essential to continue efforts to maintain resilient, biodiverse ecosystems and avoid large‐scale disturbances that would release large amounts of carbon in PAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Superstorm Sandy hit the northeastern United States in October 2012, knocking out power to 10 million people and highlighting energy and critical infrastructure system vulnerabilities in the face of a changing climate. The increased frequency and intensity of such disruptive events is shifting priorities in electricity system planning around the world, including how multiple stakeholders consider linkages between climate vulnerability and energy. This research links smart grid development with adaptation to changing climates and explores how different stakeholders grapple with system vulnerabilities and climate disruptions. To illustrate this, the in-depth case study assesses post-Sandy discourse to compare how electricity sector stakeholder groups in New York, Massachusetts and Vermont associate energy, smart grid, and climate change. To explore how different energy system stakeholders frame the impacts of Superstorm Sandy on energy system planning, we conducted 22 focus groups with a broad range of organizations representing diverse aspects of the electricity system including utilities, regulatory authorities, research and development agencies, regional transmission organizations, academic research institutions, consumer advocacy and environmental organizations across the three states. We used these data to examine post-Sandy discourse about climate mitigation and climate adaptation, routine system management, and the potential value of “smart grid” for future energy system planning. We found that both New York and Massachusetts stakeholders focused more on climate adaptation than climate mitigation, while stakeholders in Vermont focused more on mitigation. In all three states stakeholder discussions of adaptation focused most heavily on system resilience and reliability, whereas discussions of mitigation focused on demand-side management and demand response followed by alternative energy strategies. These results suggest that extreme weather and climate disruptions will differentially shape discourse around smart grid and energy system change and shift the focus among energy system stakeholders on climate adaptation compared to climate mitigation. This research demonstrates variation between political jurisdictions (states) and energy system stakeholders in energy system planning in the face of new challenges related to an uncertain and rapidly changing world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model was used to assess the impacts of climate change and proposed adaptation measures on yields of corn ( Zea mays L.) and soybean ( Glycine max L.) as well as aggregated yields of C 3 [soybean, alfalfa ( Medicago sativa L.), winter wheat ( Triticum aestivum L.)] and C 4 [corn, sorghum ( Sorghum bicolor L.), pearl millet ( Pennisetum glaucum L.)] crop types from representative farms in ten Southeastern US states. Adaptations included annual biochar applications and irrigation. Historical baseline (1979–2009) and future (2041–2070) climate scenarios were used for simulations with baseline and future CO 2 concentrations of 360 ppmv and 500 ppmv, respectively. Four regional climate models (RCMs) nested within global climate models (GCMs) were used to run future simulations. The experiment was analyzed as randomized complete block design with split-plots in time for baseline vs. future comparisons, and as a randomized complete block design with repeated measures for comparisons between future periods within each RCM_GCM model. Compared to historical baseline scenario, increases in future corn yield ranged between 36–83%, but yields decreased by 5–13% towards 2066–2070 due to temperature stress. Future soybean yields decreased by 1–13% due to temperature and moisture stresses. Future aggregated C 4 crops produced higher yields compared to historical C 4 yields. There were no differences between future aggregated and historical C 3 crop yields. Both crop types were negatively affected by progressing climate change impacts towards the end of 2066–2070 simulation period. Reductions in future aggregated C 3 crop yields ranged between 10–22%, and between 6–10% for C 4 crops. We explained lower reductions in C 4 compared to C 3 crops due to a lesser degree of photorespiration, better water use efficiency, and better heat tolerance under conditions of high light intensities and increased temperatures in C 4 crops. Irrigation resulted in increased future corn yields between 29–33%, and 3–38% of aggregated C 4 crop yields, with no effect on soybean or aggregated C 3 crop yields. In some regions, biochar applications caused significant yield reductions of 9.5–20% for corn, 5–7% for aggregated C 3 , and 3–5% for aggregated C 4 crops, depending on the model. Yield reductions were ascribed to alterations in plant nutrient availability. It was concluded that under drier weather scenarios, irrigation may be a promising adaptation strategy for agriculture in the Southeastern US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change presents a challenge to land management agencies tasked with managing landscapes to protect natural resources and provide key goods and services in the face of ecological change, complexity, and uncertainty. Land management agencies, like the U.S. Forest Service, have developed multi-faceted strategies that utilize concepts like resilience and ecological integrity to guide adaptation. To address an extant research need, we conducted a qualitative case study, consisting of interviews with Forest Service staff in the Rocky Mountain Region, to explore how local federal land managers approach adaptation. Our goals were to understand what impacts managers are finding salient, perceptions of current agency strategies, and aspects of policy and practice that support effective adaptation planning. Interview participants anticipate impacts to disturbance regimes, wildlife species, and human uses. Participants intend to draw on agency policies, like its climate change scorecard and its land management planning regulations. However, the participants note that ambiguous concepts, uncertainty, and institutional variables make adaptation planning challenging in practice. A major theme apparent in the interviews was the use of partnerships with a range of other entities to address climate change. Ambiguity associated with concepts like resilience and ecological integrity allow them to function as boundary concepts; however, this ambiguity makes it challenging for managers to operationalize these concepts. These findings revealed that climate change adaptation is leading to and revealing the need for broader governance change. Moving forward, it will be crucial to adjust current governance structures to support long-term partnerships adept at translating scientific knowledge into actions and implementing complex boundary concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses how 10 localities in the USA and England, recognised as leaders in clean energy and climate action, have used collaborative approaches to develop local climate change plans and energy conservation, efficiency, and renewable energy initiatives. It examines these planning and policy-making processes in the context of Margerum's [2008. A typology of collaboration efforts in environmental management.Environmental Management, 41 (4), 487–500] typology of “action”, “organizational”, and “policy-level” collaborations, as well as Gray's [1989.Collaborating: finding common ground for multiparty problems. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass] classification of collaboration in the “problem-setting”, “direction-setting”, and “implementation” phases. We conducted interviews with local elected officials, municipal staff, energy professionals, and citizen volunteers in each community, supplemented with an analysis of their adopted energy, climate change, and land-use plans. We find that despite the different government structures and political contexts between the two countries, there was a surprising amount of commonality in how the case study localities used collaborative planning to develop local climate plans and clean energy initiatives. These processes were most often initiated by local elected officials and/or high-level staff members, and then carried out in collaboration with local third-sector organisations and other community stakeholders. In the USA, collaboration was strongest at the policy level and in the direction-setting phase, with the distinguishing feature that citizen advisory boards or stakeholder working groups often took a more active role in shaping local plans and policies. The English localities had some of those same types of collaborations, but were more likely to also employ action collaboration, in the implementation phase, in which third-sector organisations coordinated with the locality to directly provide clean energy services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the state of the economy condition public concern for the environment? Scholars have long argued that environmental preferences decline during economic downturns as individuals prioritize short-term economic needs over longer-term environmental concerns. Yet, this assumption has rarely been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny at the individual level. The presumed link between economic and environmental preferences is revisited, using the first individual-level opinion panel (n = 1043) of US climate attitudes, incorporating both self-reported and objective economic data. In contrast with prior studies that emphasize the role of economic downturns in driving environmental preference shifts, using a stronger identification strategy, there is little evidence that changes in either individual economic fortunes or local economic conditions are associated with decreased belief that climate change is happening or reduced prioritization of climate policy action. Instead, the evidence suggests that climate belief declines are associated with shifting political cues. These findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of political conflict over environmental policy globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the role of the United Nations organization in international negotiations for measures to control climate change. Topics discussed include the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), the Paris Agreement on climate change of, and the negotiations conducted for the Kyoto Protocol. Also mentioned is the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement by U.S. President Donald Trump.

A central concern in policy studies is understanding how multiple, contending groups in society interact, deliberate, and forge agreements over policy issues. Often, public discourse turns from engagement into impasse, as in the fractured politics of climate policy in the USA. Existing theories are unclear about how such an 'adversarial turn' develops. We theorize that an important aspect of the adversarial turn is the evolution of a group's narrative into what can be understood as an ideology, the formation of which is observable through certain textual-linguistic properties. Analysis 'of' these narrative properties elucidates the role of narrative in fostering (1) coalescence around a group ideology, and (2) group isolation and isolation of ideological coalitions from others' influence. By examining a climate skeptical narrative, we demonstrate how to analyze ideological properties of narrative, and illustrate the role of ideological narratives in galvanizing and, subsequently, isolating groups in society. We end the piece with a reflection on further issues suggested by the narrative analysis, such as the possibility that climate skepticism is founded upon a more 'genetic' meta-narrative that has roots in social issues far removed from climate, which means efforts at better communicating climate change science may not suffice to support action on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To analyze the factors affecting US public concern about the threat of climate change between January 2002 and December 2013, data from 74 separate surveys are used to construct quarterly measures of public concern over global climate change. Five factors should account for changes in levels of concern: extreme weather events, public access to accurate scientific information, media coverage, elite cues, and movement/countermovement advocacy. Structural equation modeling indicates that elite cues, movement advocacy efforts, weather, and structural economic factors influence the level of public concern about climate change. While media coverage exerts an important influence, it is itself largely a function of elite cues and economic factors. Promulgation to the public of scientific information on climate change has no effect. Information-based science advocacy has had only a minor effect on public concern, while political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is critical in influencing climate change concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the international relations between the U.S. and the United Nations (UN) along with the engagement of the U.S. with the UN under the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Topics mentioned include the foreign policy priorities of Trump's administration, the financing of the UN climate-change mitigation by the U.S. government and the strong and productive relationship of the UN with President Trump, who is serious in his statements about solving global problem for the country's interests.

Background: Locating terrestrial sources and sinks of carbon (C) will be critical to developing strategies that contribute to the climate change mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement. Here we present spatially resolved estimates of net C change across United States (US) forest lands between 2006 and 2010 and attribute them to natural and anthropogenic processes. Results: Forests in the conterminous US sequestered −460 ± 48 Tg C year, while C losses from disturbance averaged 191 ± 10 Tg C year. Combining estimates of net C losses and gains results in net carbon change of −269 ± 49 Tg C year. New forests gained −8 ± 1 Tg C year, while deforestation resulted in losses of 6 ± 1 Tg C year. Forest land remaining forest land lost 185 ± 10 Tg C year to various disturbances; these losses were compensated by net carbon gains of −452 ± 48 Tg C year. C loss in the southern US was highest (105 ± 6 Tg C year) with the highest fractional contributions from harvest (92%) and wind (5%). C loss in the western US (44 ± 3 Tg C year) was due predominantly to harvest (66%), fire (15%), and insect damage (13%). The northern US had the lowest C loss (41 ± 2 Tg C year) with the most significant proportional contributions from harvest (86%), insect damage (9%), and conversion (3%). Taken together, these disturbances reduced the estimated potential C sink of US forests by 42%. Conclusion: The framework presented here allows for the integration of ground and space observations to more fully inform US forest C policy and monitoring efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of cities in the United States have devised climate action plans (CAPs) to mitigate the effects of climate change. However, few of these plans address strategies to adapt to the long term effects of climate change that will occur in the near and distant future. The research presented in this article examines why cities choose to embed adaptation provisions in their CAPs. Our study codes the content of CAPs for all cities ( N = 98) in the United States with populations greater than 50,000. We find cities that frame problems associated with climate change in the language of hazards are more likely to include adaptation strategies in their CAPs than cities that focus on other types of environmental harm. Our findings suggest that more robust efforts to plan for climate change will require the activation of communities of interest beyond those that have been instrumental in setting the current climate agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Takings Clause jurisprudence is in a state of disarray. The Supreme Court of the United States has not eased the difficult task of determining what constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Although the Supreme Court provided some guidance by articulating a three-prong test for determining what constitutes such a taking, it failed to define each prong. In a concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor defined the character of the governmental act prong by emphasizing the importance of the purposes served by a governmental act. Justice O'Connor's approach is well suited to handle future environmental regulations aimed at protecting coastal regions from rising sea levels. By embracing this approach, the Court can reduce the confusion surrounding takings jurisprudence, provide uniformity at a critical time, swiftly handle the excess of takings claims that will inevitably materialize, and give deferential treatment to important regulations that possess strong public purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The few systematic international comparisons of climate policy strength made so far have serious weaknesses, particularly those that assign arbitrary weightings to different policy instrument types in order to calculate an aggregate score for policy strength. This article avoids these problems by ranking the six biggest emitters by far – China, the US, the EU, India, Russia, and Japan – on a set of six key policy instruments that are individually potent and together representative of climate policy as a whole: carbon taxes, emissions trading, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy quotas, fossil fuel power plant bans, and vehicle emissions standards. The results cast strong doubt on any idea that there is a clear hierarchy on climate policy with Europe at the top: the EU does lead on a number of policies but so does Japan. China, the US, and India each lead on one area. Russia is inactive on all fronts. At the same time climate policy everywhere remains weak compared to what it could be. Policy relevance This study enables climate policy strength, defined as the extent to which the statutory provisions of climate policies are likely to restrict GHG emissions if implemented as intended, to be assessed and compared more realistically across space and time. As such its availability for the six biggest emitters, which together account for over 70% of global CO2emissions, should facilitate international negotiations (1) by giving participants a better idea of where major emitters stand relative to each other as far as climate policy stringency is concerned, and (2) by identifying areas of weakness that need action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]