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The UK is often regarded as the archetype of Westminster democracy and as the empirical antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western Europe. Yet, in recent years a different account has emerged which focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics that limit the executive. It is to this body of scholarship that this article responds, locating the recent chapter of coalition government within the wider context of the UK's democratic evolution. To do so, the article draws on Lijphart's two-dimensional typology of democracies, developing a refined framework that enables systematic comparison over time. The article demonstrates that over the course of the 2010-2015 Parliament, the UK underwent another period of majoritarian modification, driven by factors including the long-term influence of the constitutional forces unleashed under Labour and the short-term impact of coalition management. The article makes several important contributions, salient in the UK and beyond. Theoretically, it offers a critical rejoinder to debates regarding the relationship between institutional design and democratic performance. Methodologically, it demonstrates that the tools of large-scale comparison can be effectively scaled down to facilitate within-case analysis. Empirically, it provides a series of conclusions regarding the tenability of the UK's extant democratic architecture under the weight of pressures to which it continues to be subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The delegation of public tasks to arm’s-length bodies remains a central feature of contemporary reform agendas within both developed and developing countries. The role and capacity of political and administrative principals (i.e. ministers and departments of state) to control the vast network of arm’s-length bodies for which they are formally responsible is therefore a critical issue within and beyond academe. In the run-up to the 2010 General Election in the United Kingdom, the ‘quango conundrum’ emerged as an important theme and all three major parties committed themselves to shift the balance of power back towards ministers and sponsor departments. This article presents the results of the first major research project to track and examine the subsequent reform process. It reveals a stark shift in internal control relationships from the pre-election ‘poor parenting’ model to a far tighter internal situation that is now the focus of complaints by arm’s-length bodies of micro-management. This shift in the balance of power and how it was achieved offers new insights into the interplay between different forms of governance and has significant theoretical and comparative relevance. Points for practitioners For professionals working in the field of arm’s-length governance, the article offers three key insights. First, that a well-resourced core executive is critical to directing reform given the challenges of implementing reform in a context of austerity. Second, that those implementing reform will also need to take into account the diverse consequences of centrally imposed reform likely to result in different departments with different approaches to arm’s-length governance. Third, that reforming arm’s-length governance can affect the quality of relationships, and those working in the field will need to mitigate these less tangible challenges to ensure success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing literature on 'agencification', 'quangocratization', and the 'autonomization' of the state has highlighted a coordination dilemma in contemporary public governance whereby governments rely on delegated governance but are frustrated by the lack of control that arises from such structures. In the run-up to the 2010 General Election in the United Kingdom this coordination dilemma was prominent as the capacity of the Cabinet Office to exert control over arm's-length bodies, either directly or indirectly, received intense criticism. This article presents the findings of the first detailed research project to examine the subsequent Coalition Government's approach to this dilemma. It argues that in relation to the governance of public bodies, the role and capacity of the Cabinet Office has been transformed. In mapping this development the article explores the implications of the centre striking back in the context of 'post-New Public Management' reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article returns to Christopher Hood's influential work, The politics of quangocide, to examine the United Kingdom's coalition government's approach to public bodies reform since May 2010. It combines theoretical-innovation and fresh empirical research to argue that the coalition has not simply engaged in quangocide, but has adopted a dual-track strategy based upon 'bureau-shuffling' and a focus on strengthening internal control rather than outright abolition. This has significant international and comparative relevance due to the manner in which these findings resonate with broader 'post New Public Management' narratives of state restructuring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attitudes to quangos are paradoxical. On the one hand they are perceived to be undemocratic, unaccountable organisations, while on the other they are seen to improve effectiveness, limit political interference and increase public confidence in government. This paradox is reflected in the behaviour of political parties, which generally adopt a harsh line towards quangos in opposition, but come to rely on these bodies in office. Ahead of the 2010 general election it was, however, noticeable that the Conservative party rejected this dynamic by promising to pursue 'a more sophisticated approach'. This article explores the Coalition government's subsequent 'public bodies reform programme', assessing its progress against recommendations contained within the Institute for Government's Read before Burning report of July 2010. It concludes that while the Coalition has addressed long-standing concerns about the day-to-day governance of public bodies, it has failed to resolve a set of broader and strategic (metagovernance) issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of arm's-length bodies to deliver certain services, to regulate certain sectors or to assume responsibility for particularly salient political issues is neither new in historical terms or a feature unique to the UK in comparative terms. What is particularly distinctive, however, is the Coalition Government's attempts since 2010 to reduce the number of ‘quangos’ while also strengthening the capacity of the core executive and sponsor departments to control and co-ordinate this dense and fragmented sphere of delegated governance. Drawing upon the findings of the first research project to analyse the current Public Bodies Reform Agenda, this article provides an account of the ‘filling-in’ of the ‘hollowing out’. It argues that when viewed through a historical lens, the Coalition Government has adopted a distinctive approach to ‘the quango problem’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Some problems of governance regularly resurface, and the use and role of ‘quangos’— public bodies operating at arm's-length to ministers—is a case in point. The administrative history of the British state is littered with official reviews and political debates about quangos. Historically, governments, whatever their reforming zeal, have found it difficult to make substantial changes. Now the UK government has initiated a rapid and large-scale set of reforms. This article analyses these changes and highlights five challenges for governments wishing to reform arm's-length bodies: mapping, assessing, reconfiguring, saving, and accounting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While clear lines of accountability are normally considered a sine qua non of any modern democracy, this article argues that too much accountability can be as problematic as too little. Through the application of a number of analytical ‘hooks’ drawn from the accountability studies literature, it argues that if the coalition government’s rhetorical commitment to a shift from a ‘Big State’ to a ‘Big Society’ is implemented, it may well flounder due to its inability to reconcile the centrifugal forces of devolution and localism with the centripetal forces of political accountability and public expectation. Indeed, without a more aggressive, sophisticated and indeed honest approach to accountability, the ‘Big Society’ is unwittingly likely to forge an even ‘Bigger State’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There has been a notable surge in research on the shift from elected government to appointed governance. As the work of public bodies and the decisions made by their board members can impact upon the everyday lives of citizens, the extent to which their boards are both representative and diverse is of great salience. Focusing on the boards of public bodies in the UK, this article explores whether the Labour government's ambition to improve diversity in public appointments was achieved over its three terms of office, and seeks to explain why public boards have remained 'male, pale and stale'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]