Search

Real networks are not only multi-layered yet also dynamic. The role of coordinated network evolution regarding dynamic multi-layer networks where both network and strategy evolution simultaneously show diverse interdependence by layers remains poorly addressed. Here, we propose a general and simple coevolution framework to analyze how coordination of different dynamical processes affects strategy propagation in synergistically evolving interdependent networks. The strategic feedback constitutes the main driving force of network evolution yet the inherent cross-layer self-optimization functions as its compensation. We show that these two ingredients often catalyze a better performance of network evolution in propagating cooperation. Coordinated network evolution may be a double-edged sword to cooperation and the network-adapting rate plays a crucial role in flipping its double-sided effect. It often economizes the cost and time consumption for driving the system to the full cooperation phase. Importantly, strongly coupled slow-tuned networks can outperform weakly coupled fast-regulated networks in solving social dilemmas, highlighting the fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution and the importance of synergistic effect of dynamical processes in upholding human cooperation in multiplex networks.

The evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks is arousing increasing concern based on the fact that more and more complex systems in the real-world have been proven to be organized in the form of multi-layer networks rather than single-layer networks. In this study, we examine the effects of self-organized interdependence on the evolution and stabilization of cooperation with social dilemmas depicted by the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) and the Public Goods Game (PGG) in which agents with the most common strategy have the chance to be rewarded proportionally to the fitness of corresponding agents belonging to the other network. We show that such a type-free rewarding rule, independent of game strategy, establishes a time-varying interdependence between two initially independent populations whereby cooperation is highly promoted as well as stabilized both in the two-player PDG and in the multi-player PGG. Majority-pressure based interdependence at stake has proven pretty neutral in regard to game strategy because it is contingent on strategy configuration rather than strategy itself, which thus gives birth to homologous communities, including cooperative as well as non-cooperative, and thereby an enhanced spatial reciprocity between non-identical networks is triggered. Of particular interest is the double-edged sword effect of network interdependence on cooperation although in most instances the heavier the interdependence, the better the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, interpretations of the nontrivial relationship between cooperation and benchmark threshold measuring the strategy’s local popularity highlight that rewarding the minimum majority is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in such scenario. Finally, we claim our observations are also quite robust with respect to mutation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]