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Aim: Recently, a growing awareness has developed of the extraordinary complexity of factors that influence the clinical reasoning underpinning the diagnostic process. The aim of the present report is to delineate these factors and suggest strategies for dealing more effectively with this complexity., Method: Six major clusters of factors are described here: (A) individual characteristics of the decision maker, (B) individual intellectual and cognitive styles, (C) ambient and homeostatic factors, (D) factors in the work environment including team factors, (E) characteristics of the medical condition, and (F) factors associated with the patient. Additional factors, such as health care systems, culture, politics, and others are also important., Results: A review of the literature suggests that most clinicians trained under existing methods achieve a level of expertise presently referred to as "routine" or "classic." The results of studies of diagnostic failure, however, suggest that this level of expertise has proved insufficient. A growing literature suggests that more effective clinical decision might be achieved through adaptive reasoning, leading to enhanced levels of expertise and mastery., Conclusions: It is proposed here that adaptive expertise may be achieved through emphasizing additional features of the reasoning process: being aware of the inhibitors and facilitators of rationality; pursuing the standards of critical thinking; developing a comprehensive awareness of cognitive and affective biases and how to mitigate them; developing a similar depth and understanding of logic and its fallacies; engaging metacognitive processes such as reflection and mindfulness; and through approaches embracing creativity, lateral thinking, and innovation.

Introduction: Although patient safety has improved steadily, harm remains a substantial global challenge. Additionally, safety needs to be ensured not only in hospitals but also across the continuum of care. Better understanding of the complex cognitive factors influencing health care-related decisions and organizational cultures could lead to more rational approaches, and thereby to further improvement., Hypothesis: A model integrating the concepts underlying Reason's Swiss cheese theory and the cognitive-affective biases plus cascade could advance the understanding of cognitive-affective processes that underlie decisions and organizational cultures across the continuum of care., Methods: Thematic analysis, qualitative information from several sources being used to support argumentation., Discussion: Complex covert cognitive phenomena underlie decisions influencing health care. In the integrated model, the Swiss cheese slices represent dynamic cognitive-affective (mental) gates: Reason's successive layers of defence. Like firewalls and antivirus programs, cognitive-affective gates normally allow the passage of rational decisions but block or counter unsounds ones. Gates can be breached (ie, holes created) at one or more levels of organizations, teams, and individuals, by (1) any element of cognitive-affective biases plus (conflicts of interest and cognitive biases being the best studied) and (2) other potential error-provoking factors. Conversely, flawed decisions can be blocked and consequences minimized; for example, by addressing cognitive biases plus and error-provoking factors, and being constantly mindful. Informed shared decision making is a neglected but critical layer of defence (cognitive-affective gate). The integrated model can be custom tailored to specific situations, and the underlying principles applied to all methods for improving safety. The model may also provide a framework for developing and evaluating strategies to optimize organizational cultures and decisions., Limitations: The concept is abstract, the model is virtual, and the best supportive evidence is qualitative and indirect., Conclusions: The proposed model may help enhance rational decision making across the continuum of care, thereby improving patient safety globally., (© 2017 The Authors. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Numerous studies have shown that diagnostic failure depends upon a variety of factors. Psychological factors are fundamental in influencing the cognitive performance of the decision maker. In this first of two papers, we discuss the basics of reasoning and the Dual Process Theory (DPT) of decision making. The general properties of the DPT model, as it applies to diagnostic reasoning, are reviewed. A variety of cognitive and affective biases are known to compromise the decision-making process. They mostly appear to originate in the fast intuitive processes of Type 1 that dominate (or drive) decision making. Type 1 processes work well most of the time but they may open the door for biases. Removing or at least mitigating these biases would appear to be an important goal. We will also review the origins of biases. The consensus is that there are two major sources: innate, hard-wired biases that developed in our evolutionary past, and acquired biases established in the course of development and within our working environments. Both are associated with abbreviated decision making in the form of heuristics. Other work suggests that ambient and contextual factors may create high risk situations that dispose decision makers to particular biases. Fatigue, sleep deprivation and cognitive overload appear to be important determinants. The theoretical basis of several approaches towards debiasing is then discussed. All share a common feature that involves a deliberate decoupling from Type 1 intuitive processing and moving to Type 2 analytical processing so that eventually unexamined intuitive judgments can be submitted to verification. This decoupling step appears to be the critical feature of cognitive and affective debiasing.

In a companion paper, we proposed that cognitive debiasing is a skill essential in developing sound clinical reasoning to mitigate the incidence of diagnostic failure. We reviewed the origins of cognitive biases and some proposed mechanisms for how debiasing processes might work. In this paper, we first outline a general schema of how cognitive change occurs and the constraints that may apply. We review a variety of individual factors, many of them biases themselves, which may be impediments to change. We then examine the major strategies that have been developed in the social sciences and in medicine to achieve cognitive and affective debiasing, including the important concept of forcing functions. The abundance and rich variety of approaches that exist in the literature and in individual clinical domains illustrate the difficulties inherent in achieving cognitive change, and also the need for such interventions. Ongoing cognitive debiasing is arguably the most important feature of the critical thinker and the well-calibrated mind. We outline three groups of suggested interventions going forward: educational strategies, workplace strategies and forcing functions. We stress the importance of ambient and contextual influences on the quality of individual decision making and the need to address factors known to impair calibration of the decision maker. We also emphasise the importance of introducing these concepts and corollary development of training in critical thinking in the undergraduate level in medical education.

Both systemic and individual factors contribute to missed or delayed diagnoses. Among the multiple factors that impact clinical performance of the individual, the caliber of cognition is perhaps the most relevant and deserves our attention and understanding. In the last few decades, cognitive psychologists have gained substantial insights into the processes that underlie cognition, and a new, universal model of reasoning and decision making has emerged, Dual Process Theory. The theory has immediate application to medical decision making and provides an overall schema for understanding the variety of theoretical approaches that have been taken in the past. The model has important practical applications for decision making across the multiple domains of healthcare, and may be used as a template for teaching decision theory, as well as a platform for future research. Importantly, specific operating characteristics of the model explain how diagnostic failure occurs.

In the area of patient safety, recent attention has focused on diagnostic error. The reduction of diagnostic error is an important goal because of its associated morbidity and potential preventability. A critical subset of diagnostic errors arises through cognitive errors, especially those associated with failures in perception, failed heuristics, and biases; collectively, these have been referred to as cognitive dispositions to respond (CDRs). Historically, models of decision-making have given insufficient attention to the contribution of such biases, and there has been a prevailing pessimism against improving cognitive performance through debiasing techniques. Recent work has catalogued the major cognitive biases in medicine; the author lists these and describes a number of strategies for reducing them ("cognitive debiasing"). Principle among them is metacognition, a reflective approach to problem solving that involves stepping back from the immediate problem to examine and reflect on the thinking process. Further research effort should be directed at a full and complete description and analysis of CDRs in the context of medicine and the development of techniques for avoiding their associated adverse outcomes. Considerable potential exists for reducing cognitive diagnostic errors with this approach. The author provides an extensive list of CDRs and a list of strategies to reduce diagnostic errors.

Cognitive errors underlie most diagnostic errors that are made in the course of clinical decisionmaking in the emergency department. These errors are universal and are prevalent in the special milieu of the ED. Their properties appear to be distinct from those associated with the performance of procedures. They are often costly, but, importantly for both the patient and the physician, they are also highly preventable. Recent developments in education theory provide a means for minimizing and avoiding diagnostic error. Through the process of metacognition, clinicians can develop cognitive forcing strategies to abort such latent errors. Three levels of cognitive forcing strategies are described: universal, generic, and specific. Specific cognitive forcing strategies provide a formal cognitive debiasing approach to deal with what have previously been described as pitfalls in clinical reasoning. This metacognitive approach can be taught to practicing clinicians and to those in training to inoculate them against making diagnostic errors. The adoption of this method provides a systematic approach to cognitive root-cause analysis in the avoidance of adverse outcomes associated with delayed or missed diagnoses and with the clinical management of specific cases.

Deliberate clinical inertia is the art of doing nothing as a positive response. To be able to apply this concept, individual clinicians need to specifically focus on their clinical decision-making. The skill of solving problems and making optimal clinical decisions requires more attention in medical training and should play a more prominent part of the medical curriculum. This paper provides suggestions on how this may be achieved. Strategies to mitigate common biases are outlined, with an emphasis on reversing a 'more is better' culture towards more temperate, critical thinking. To incorporate such an approach in medical curricula and in clinical practice, institutional endorsement and support is required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]