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When humans make biased or suboptimal choices, they are often attributed to complex cognitive processes that are viewed as being uniquely human. Alternatively, several phenomena, such as suboptimal gambling behavior and cognitive dissonance (justification of effort) may be explained more simply as examples of the contrast between what is expected and what occurs as well as Wagner's Standard Operating Procedure model based on reward prediction error. For example, when pigeons are attracted to choices involving a suboptimal, low probability of a high payoff, as in unskilled gambling behavior, it may be attributed to reward prediction error or the contrast between the low probability of reward expected and the sometimes high probability of reward obtained (when one wins). Similarly, justification of effort, the tendency to attribute greater value to rewards that are difficult to obtain, is typically explained in terms of the tendency to inflate the value of a reward to justify the effort required to obtain it. When pigeons prefer outcomes that require more effort to obtain, however, it is more likely to be explained in terms of contrast between the effort and the reward that follows. We readily attribute the behavior of animals to contrast-like effects or reward prediction error, however, when similar behavior occurs in humans, we also should be prepared to explain it in terms of simpler learning mechanisms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

In the current studies, we addressed the development of effort-based object valuation. Four- and 6-year-olds invested either great or little effort in order to obtain attractive or unattractive rewards. Children were allowed to allocate these rewards to an unfamiliar recipient (dictator game). Investing great effort to obtain attractive rewards (a consonant situation) led 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, to enhance the value of the rewards and thus distribute fewer of them to others. After investing effort to attain unattractive rewards (a dissonant situation), 6-year-olds cognitively reduced the dissonance between effort and reward quality by reappraising the value of the rewards and thus distributing fewer of them. In contrast, 4-year-olds reduced the dissonance behaviorally by discarding the rewards. These findings provide evidence for the emergence of an effort-value link and underline possible mechanisms underlying the primacy of cognitive versus behavioral solutions to dissonance reduction.

The action-based model of dissonance theorizes that when individuals have conflicting cognitions with action implications , they experience dissonance. This dissonance motivates the individual to value one action tendency over the other, thereby facilitating effective action. Thus, a decrease in the motivation to act (decreased approach motivation) should decrease this tendency to value one action tendency over the other (dissonance reduction). The present research tested this prediction by using an embodied manipulation, a supine posture, to decrease approach motivation. In Experiment 1, relative to an upright posture, a supine posture decreased dissonance reduction in an effort justification paradigm. In Experiment 2, a supine posture decreased the spreading of alternatives following a difficult decision. These results suggest that embodied manipulations that reduce approach motivation decrease dissonance reduction. The findings support the action-based model of dissonance, and suggest that embodied manipulations of reduced approach motivation reduce the rationalization of behavior.

If judiciously applied, cognitive terminology can encourage further examination of phenomena in useful ways that may not otherwise be studied. I give examples of 3 phenomena, the study of which have benefitted from a cognitive perspective. For the first, transitive inference behavior, it appears that noncognitive accounts cannot satisfactorily account for the effects that have been found. For the second, functional equivalence, positing the development of common representations has identified the possible nature of those representations. For the third, cognitive dissonance (or justification of effort), producing it in the laboratory with nonhuman animals suggests that a simpler mechanism, such as positive contrast, may be involved. If one approaches cognitive terminology with an open mind and conducts well-designed experiments that juxtapose cognitive accounts against simpler accounts, cognitive terminology can be the impetus for experiments that explore phenomena in novel, exciting, and useful ways and that ultimately have considerable heuristic value.

The effort justification phenomenon, in which greater value is given to rewards that require more effort to obtain, is frequently explained in terms of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Here, we employed a novel combination of operant and lick analysis techniques to show that rats place more value on a sucrose reward when it follows high effort than when the same reward follows low effort. This is the first demonstration of a direct analogue of the effort justification phenomenon in nonhuman animals. As the behavior of rats is normally considered in terms of relatively simple mechanisms, the current results question the need for complex cognitive accounts for the effort justification phenomenon (in rats or humans). As an alternative, we examine the possibility that high effort produces an aversive state that enhances reward value by a process of contrast.

Cunha and Caldieraro (2009) investigated whether sunk-cost effects, which are well documented in hypothetical situations involving monetary investments, also occur in choice situations with purely behavioral investments. Their results suggest that decision makers indeed fall prey to behavioral sunk-cost effects under certain circumstances. I have been unable to replicate their pattern of results in three separate investigations. In these studies, I attempted to recover the effect using two other behavioral effort manipulations in addition to the manipulation used by Cunha and Caldieraro. This failure to replicate the pattern of results calls into question the robustness of the initial findings.

When behavior suggests that the value of a reinforcer depends inversely on the value of the events that precede or follow it, the behavior has been described as a contrast effect. Three major forms of contrast have been studied: incentive contrast, in which a downward (or upward) shift in the magnitude of reinforcement produces a relatively stronger downward (or upward) shift in the vigor of a response; anticipatory contrast, in which a forthcoming improvement in reinforcement results in a relative reduction in consummatory response; and behavioral contrast, in which a decrease in the probability of reinforcement in one component of a multiple schedule results in an increase in responding in an unchanged component of the schedule. Here we discuss a possible fourth kind of contrast that we call within-trial contrast because within a discrete trial, the relative value of an event has an inverse effect on the relative value of the reinforcer that follows. We show that greater effort, longer delay to reinforcement, or the absence of food all result in an increase in the preference for positive discriminative stimuli that follow (relative to less effort, shorter delay, or the presence of food). We further distinguish this within-trial contrast effect from the effects of delay reduction. A general model of this form of contrast is proposed in which the value of a primary or conditioned reinforcer depends on the change in value from the value of the event that precedes it.

When humans are asked to evaluate rewards or outcomes that follow unpleasant (e.g., high-effort) events, they often assign higher value to that reward. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. There is now evidence that a similar phenomenon can be found in nonhuman animals. When demonstrated in animals, however, it has been attributed to contrast between the unpleasant high effort and the conditioned stimulus for food. In the present experiment, we asked whether an analogous effect could be found in humans under conditions similar to those found in animals. Adult humans were trained to discriminate between shapes that followed a high-effort versus a low-effort response. In test, participants were found to prefer shapes that followed the high-effort response in training. These results suggest the possibility that contrast effects of the sort extensively studied in animals may play a role in cognitive dissonance and other related phenomena in humans.

We humans value intelligence because we tend to have more of it than other species. But the flexibility implied by intelligence is not as reliable as genetically predisposed behavior and is only valuable when environments change. Nevertheless, environments do change and many species do have the flexibility to adapt behaviorally to those changes either through simple Pavlovian or instrumental learning or through more complex cognitive mechanisms. For example, in addition to the absolute properties of stimuli, animals appear to be able to use the relation between stimuli to guide their behavior and they can also learn general principles of learning (learning how to learn). More interesting, perhaps, they can form stimulus classes of stimuli that have perceptually common characteristics (trees or water) and even classes of arbitrary stimuli that share a common meaning (stimulus equivalence). When it comes to memory, animals appear to have flexibility in remembering not only events that they have already experienced (retrospectively) but also events that they expect to experience (prospectively), and they appear to have some control over what they will and will not remember. Evidence suggests further that they have some representation of their environment, such that when necessary, they can take a novel pathway to get to a goal (cognitive mapping), and they have rudimentary numerical competence. Although their ability to reason may be limited, they do show transitive inference behavior, the ability to imitate actions that they cannot see when they perform them, and some animals are able to recognize themselves in a mirror. Interestingly, studying animal intelligence can also lead us to more critically examine the origins of what has been thought to be certain complex human behavior. For example, humans tend to value rewards more when they have to expend greater effort to obtain them (cognitive dissonance or justification of effort) but this tendency is also found in other animals and may more parsimoniously be explained as an example of contrast (between the effort expended and the reward obtained). Similarly, the suboptimal tendency that humans often have to choose alternatives that have a very low probability of a high payoff (commercial gambling) can be found in other animals and appears to result from a general tendency to discount losses and focus on the value of gains rather than their probability. Overall, it appears that other animals have (to some degree), many of the cognitive abilities of humans, while also suffering from some of the suboptimal behavior thought to be attributable to human culture.

Context: The principles behind the process of creating new, spontaneous sequences out of previously ordered non-declarative stimuli have been scarcely addressed and, for such reason, remain highly unknown. Objective: This paper has four interconnected goals:(1) Introduce a new software-based neuropsychological test that can be used as a means to assess key aspects of the way people order and reorder non-declarative stimuli, based upon cognitive dissonance principles; (2) introduce a mathematical approach to the latter in ordering/re-ordering of non-declarative stimuli;(3) assess whether the principles of cognitive dissonance in ordering/re-ordering hold for a cohort of young adults with upper socio-economic level;(4) access the extent to which the same holds for children and adolescents and trace a curve of maturation of cognitive dissonance in ordering/re-ordering. Methods: Our multi-age and multi-language social Network Test implies the two stages, first the subject must order figures of human faces in order of preference, next, the software provides him with different pairs of figures which the subject must fulfill in order to built the intermediate arrays that he believe to interconnect the original pair. Our mathematical model is centered around the relation defined by increases in the distance separating these different pairs of figures in the initial order (distances 1, 5 and 11) and related increases in the mean number of intermediate arrays placed in the re-ordering phase; 105 subjects were tested. Results: The tendency to produce reorders that are consonant to the one produced in the initial phase increases with age. This trend inspired us to propose a cognitive dissonance index in spontaneous ordering/reordering of non-declarative stimuli, which may formalize the operation of a previously unknown cognitive dimension of the human mind and may serve as an index of cognitive maturation. To the extent that further studies endorse these perspectives, the tests, formulas, and theoretical principals may support new diagnostic methods and explorations in cognitive science.

Justification of effort is a form of cognitive dissonance in which the subjective value of an outcome is directly related to the effort that went into obtaining it. However, it is likely that in social contexts (such as the requirements for joining a group) an inference can be made (perhaps incorrectly) that an outcome that requires greater effort to obtain in fact has greater value. Here we present evidence that a cognitive dissonance effect can be found in children under conditions that offer better control for the social value of the outcome. This effect is quite similar to contrast effects that recently have been studied in animals. We suggest that contrast between the effort required to obtain the outcome and the outcome itself provides a more parsimonious account of this phenomenon and perhaps other related cognitive dissonance phenomena as well. Research will be needed to identify cognitive dissonance processes that are different from contrast effects of this kind. nt]mis|This research was facilitated by a fellowship from the Fulbright Scholar Program and the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, as well as by a visiting professorship at the University of Lille III for T.R.Z. Preparation of the article was facilitated by National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH 63726 to T.R.Z. 15;3

Stimuli associated with less effort or with shorter delays to reinforcement are generally preferred over those associated with greater effort or longer delays to reinforcement. However, the opposite appears to be true of stimuli that follow greater effort or longer delays. In training, a simple simultaneous discrimination followed a single peck to an initial stimulus (S+FR1 S-FR1) and a different simple simultaneous discrimination followed 20 pecks to the initial stimulus (S+FR20 S-FR20). On test trials, pigeons preferred S+FR20 over S+FR1 and S-FR20 over S-FR1. These data support the view that the state of the animal immediately prior to presentation of the discrimination affects the value of the reinforcement that follows it. This contrast effect is analogous to effects that when they occur in humans have been attributed to more complex cognitive and social factors.

Improving the 1957 Version on Dissonance Theory A Radical Point of View on Dissonance Theory Toward an Understanding of the Motivation Underlying Dissonance Effects - Is the Production of Aversive Consequences Necessary? Dissonance, Hypocrisy and the Self Concept Self-Affirmation Theory - an Update and Appraisal Unwanted Consequences and the Self - In Search of the Motivation for Dissonance Reduction What Exactly Have I Done? the Role of Self-Attribute Accessibility in Dissonance A Self-Accountability Model of Dissonance Reduction - Multiple Modes on a Continuum of Elaboration Computer Simulation of Cognitive Dissonance Reduction A Multiplicative Power Function Model of Cognitive Dissonance - Toward an Integrated Theory of Cognition, Emotion and Behaviour After Leon Festinger Moving Beyond Attitude Change in the Study of Dissonance-Related Processes "Remembering" Dissonance - Simultaneous Accessibility of Inconsistent Elements Moderates Epistemic Discomfort Appendexes: Social Communication and Cognition Reflections on Cognitive Dissonance - 30 Years Later - Historical Note on Festinger's Tests on Dissonance Theory.

The aim of this article is to highlight, 25 years on, the innovations of Festinger's theory of dissonance as regards its conception of cognitive functioning. Analysis of the dissonance ratio, on the basis of which Festinger evaluated the total amount of dissonance D/(D + C) gives rise to three propositions: (1) The total amount of dissonance is evaluated on the basis of a particular cognition G. (2) This cognition is neither the denominator, nor the numerator of the dissonance ratio; it is the cognitive expression of an effective conduct. (3) No presupposition is made concerning possible consonance or dissonance-relations between cognitions C and D. Thus reduction in dissonance is not presented as a process that always orients cognitive activity toward greater consistency, but as a rationalization of conduct which may adapt to an increase in certain inconsistencies, and even generate them. This new insight into Festinger's theory may be thought of as a new version that is quite distinct, both from earlier revisions of the theory, and from the various theories of cognitive consistency. It is hoped, moreover, that it will provoke reflection concerning the current orientatlons of cognitivism in social psychology.

Publisher Summary Cognitive dissonance occurs when a cognition that a person holds follows from the obverse of another. This chapter examines those relationships and proposes a new definition of cognitive dissonance. The state of the empirical findings to move toward a more comprehensive view of dissonance is reviewed in the chapter. When one understands what produces dissonance, it still needs further elaboration of the process to understand adequately the cognitive changes that ensue. The concept of dissonance must be differentiated into the concepts of dissonance arousal and dissonance motivation. It leads to the cognitive changes that are generally associated with cognitive dissonance. The integrative review of dissonance research is provided in the chapter. This survey narrows the scope of the theory, because it identifies the limited conditions under which dissonance effects are most likely to arise; cognitive dissonance is not the product of opposing cognitions. Dissonance theory concepts are applied to a broad range of phenomena so that the formulation remains exceedingly important.

In 1957, Festinger proposed a theory of cognitive dissonance which has probably generated more research than any other theory in social psychology. Briefly, cognitive dissonance theory asserts that if a person holds two cognitions which are discrepant, he will experience discomfort and be motivated to do something which will reduce the dissonance.