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The Internet has evolved into a ubiquitous and indispensable digital environment in which people communicate, seek information, and make decisions. Despite offering various benefits, online environments are also replete with smart, highly adaptive choice architectures designed primarily to maximize commercial interests, capture and sustain users' attention, monetize user data, and predict and influence future behavior. This online landscape holds multiple negative consequences for society, such as a decline in human autonomy, rising incivility in online conversation, the facilitation of political extremism, and the spread of disinformation. Benevolent choice architects working with regulators may curb the worst excesses of manipulative choice architectures, yet the strategic advantages, resources, and data remain with commercial players. One way to address some of this imbalance is with interventions that empower Internet users to gain some control over their digital environments, in part by boosting their information literacy and their cognitive resistance to manipulation. Our goal is to present a conceptual map of interventions that are based on insights from psychological science. We begin by systematically outlining how online and offline environments differ despite being increasingly inextricable. We then identify four major types of challenges that users encounter in online environments: persuasive and manipulative choice architectures, AI-assisted information architectures, false and misleading information, and distracting environments. Next, we turn to how psychological science can inform interventions to counteract these challenges of the digital world. After distinguishing among three types of behavioral and cognitive interventions-nudges, technocognition, and boosts-we focus on boosts, of which we identify two main groups: (a) those aimed at enhancing people's agency in their digital environments (e.g., self-nudging, deliberate ignorance) and (b) those aimed at boosting competencies of reasoning and resilience to manipulation (e.g., simple decision aids, inoculation). These cognitive tools are designed to foster the civility of online discourse and protect reason and human autonomy against manipulative choice architectures, attention-grabbing techniques, and the spread of false information.

The 11 articles in this issue explore how people respond to climate change and other global challenges. The articles pursue three broad strands of enquiry that relate (1) to the effects and causes of "skepticism" about climate change, (2) the purely cognitive challenges that are posed by a complex scientific issue, and (3) the ways in which climate change can be communicated to a wider audience. Cognitive science can contribute to understanding people's responses to global challenges in many ways, and it may also contribute to implementing solutions to those problems., (Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)

The dissemination and control of information are indispensable ingredients of violent conflict, with all parties involved in a conflict or at war seeking to frame the discussion on their own terms. Those attempts at information control often involve the dissemination of misinformation or disinformation (i.e., information that is incorrect by accident or intent, respectively). We review the way in which misinformation can facilitate violent conflicts and, conversely, how the successful refutation of misinformation can contribute to peace. We illustrate the relevant cognitive principles by examining two case studies. The first, a retrospective case, involves the Iraq War of 2003 and the "War on Terror." The second, a prospective case, points to likely future sources of conflict arising from climate change and its likely consequences., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)

Working memory is crucial for many higher level cognitive functions, ranging from mental arithmetic to reasoning and problem solving. Likewise, the ability to learn and categorize novel concepts forms an indispensable part of human cognition. However, very little is known about the relationship between working memory and categorization. This article reports 2 studies that related people's working memory capacity (WMC) to their learning performance on multiple rule-based and information-integration perceptual categorization tasks. In both studies, structural equation modeling revealed a strong relationship between WMC and category learning irrespective of the requirement to integrate information across multiple perceptual dimensions. WMC was also uniformly related to people's ability to focus on the most task-appropriate strategy, regardless of whether or not that strategy involved information integration. Contrary to the predictions of the multiple systems view of categorization, working memory thus appears to underpin performance in both major classes of perceptual category-learning tasks., (2012 APA, all rights reserved)

It is well known that people often continue to rely on initial misinformation even if this information is later corrected and even if the correction itself is remembered. This article investigated the impact of emotionality of the material on people's ability to discount corrected misinformation. The focus was on moderate levels of emotionality comparable to those elicited by real-world news reports. Emotionality has frequently been shown to have an impact upon reasoning and memory, but the generality of this influence remains unclear. In three experiments, participants read a report of a fictitious plane crash that was initially associated with either an emotionally laden cause (terrorist attack) or an emotionally more neutral cause (bad weather). This initial attribution was followed by a retraction and presentation of an alternative cause (faulty fuel tank). The scenarios demonstrably affected participants' self-reported feelings. However, all three experiments showed that emotionality does not affect the continued influence of misinformation.

The question of how much the outcomes of cultural evolution are shaped by the cognitive capacities of human learners has been explored in several disciplines, including psychology, anthropology and linguistics. We address this question through a detailed investigation of transmission chains, in which each person passes information to another along a chain. We review mathematical and empirical evidence that shows that under general conditions, and across experimental paradigms, the information passed along transmission chains will be affected by the inductive biases of the people involved-the constraints on learning and memory, which influence conclusions from limited data. The mathematical analysis considers the case where each person is a rational Bayesian agent. The empirical work consists of behavioural experiments in which human participants are shown to operate in the manner predicted by the Bayesian framework. Specifically, in situations in which each person's response is used to determine the data seen by the next person, people converge on concepts consistent with their inductive biases irrespective of the information seen by the first member of the chain. We then relate the Bayesian analysis of transmission chains to models of biological evolution, clarifying how chains of individuals correspond to population-level models and how selective forces can be incorporated into our models. Taken together, these results indicate how laboratory studies of transmission chains can provide information about the dynamics of cultural evolution and illustrate that inductive biases can have a significant impact on these dynamics.

Knowledge partitioning refers to the notion that knowledge can be held in independent and non-overlapping parcels. Partitioned knowledge may cause people to make contradictory decisions for identical problems in different circumstances. We report two experiments that explored the boundary conditions of knowledge partitioning in categorization. The studies examined whether or not people would partition their knowledge (1) when categorization rules were or were not verbalizable and (2) when the to-be-categorized stimuli comprised perceptually separable or integral dimensions. When learning difficulty was controlled, partitioning occurred across all combinations of verbalizability and integrality/separability, underscoring the generality of knowledge partitioning. Partitioning was absent only when the task was rapidly learned and people reached a high level of proficiency, suggesting that task difficulty plays a critical role in the emergence of partitioned knowledge.

Participants learned to classify seemingly arbitrary words into categories that also corresponded to ad hoc categories (see, e.g., Barsalou, 1983). By adapting experimental mechanisms previously used to study knowledge restructuring in perceptual categorization, we provide a novel account of how experimental and preexperimental knowledge interact. Participants were told of the existence of the ad hoc categories either at the beginning or the end of training. When the ad hoc labels were revealed at the end of training, participants switched from categorization based on experimental learning to categorization based on preexperimental knowledge in some, but not all, circumstances. Important mediators of the extent of that switch were the amount of performance error experienced during prior learning and whether or not prior knowledge was in conflict with experimental learning. We present a computational model of the trade-off between preexperimental knowledge and experimental learning that accounts for the main results.

Knowledge restructuring occurs when people shift to a new strategy or representation during learning. Although knowledge restructuring can frequently be experimentally encouraged, there are instances in which people resist restructuring and continue to use an expedient but imperfect initial strategy. The authors report 3 category learning experiments that reconciled those conflicting outcomes by postulating that, for restructuring to occur, learners must be dissatisfied with their knowledge and a usable alternative must be available. In line with expectation, restructuring was elicited only when an alternative strategy was pointed out and when people's initial expedient strategy entailed performance error. Neither error nor information about the alternative strategy by itself was sufficient to induce restructuring.

The authors present 2 experiments that establish the presence of knowledge partitioning in perceptual categorization. Many participants learned to rely on a context cue, which did not predict category membership but identified partial boundaries, to gate independent partial categorization strategies. When participants partitioned their knowledge, a strategy used in 1 context was unaffected by knowledge demonstrably present in other contexts. An exemplar model, attentional learning covering map, was shown to be unable to accommodate knowledge partitioning. Instead, a mixture-of-experts model, attention to rules and instances in a unified model (ATRIUM), could handle the results. The success of ATRIUM resulted from its assumption that people memorize not only exemplars but also the way in which they are to be classified., (((c) 2004 APA, all rights reserved))

According to the knowledge partitioning framework, people sometimes master complex tasks by creating multiple independent parcels of partial knowledge. Research has shown that knowledge parcels may contain mutually contradictory information, and that each parcel may be used without regard to knowledge that is demonstrably present in other parcels. This article reports 4 experiments that investigated knowledge partitioning in categorization. When component boundaries of a complex categorization were identified by a context cue, a significant proportion of participants learned partial and independent categorization strategies that were chosen on the basis of context. For those participants, a strategy used in one context was unaffected by knowledge demonstrably present in other contexts, suggesting that knowledge partitioning in categorization can be complete.

There has been much concern with the abundance of misinformation in public discourse. Although misinformation has always played a role in political debate, its character has shifted from support for a specific position to a 'shock and chaos' stream of misinformation and conspiracy theories. Exposure to conspiracy theories can have considerable adverse impact on society. I argue that scholars therefore have a responsibility to combat conspiracy theories and misinformation generally. Exercising this responsibility requires an understanding of the varied rhetorical roles of conspiracy theories. Here I focus on instances in which people reject unequivocal scientific evidence and invoke conspiracy theories, or radical anti-institutional positions, based on ideological imperatives. I argue that those positions do not always reflect true attitudes. Instead, people may deploy extreme rhetoric as a pragmatic tool of political expression. I investigate this possibility by focusing on the role of conspiracy theories in the rejection of science. Conspiracist cognition and rhetoric violate the epistemic standards that underpin science. Ironically, this violation of epistemic standards renders conspiracy theories useful as a rationally deployed tool that serves political purposes. I present a study that confirms that conspiracy theories can be deployed to support worldview-motivated denial of science. I provide suggestions how scholars can debunk or defang conspiratorial rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scientifically well-established results--such as the fact that emission of greenhouse gases produces global warming--are rejected by sizable proportions of the population in the United States and other countries. Rejection of scientific findings is mostly driven by motivated cognition: People tend to reject findings that threaten their core beliefs or worldview. At present, rejection of scientific findings by the U.S. public is more prevalent on the political right than the left. Yet the cognitive mechanisms driving rejection of science, such as the superficial processing of evidence toward the desired interpretation, are found regardless of political orientation. General education and scientific literacy do not mitigate rejection of science but, rather, increase the polarization of opinions along partisan lines. In contrast, specific knowledge about the mechanisms underlying a scientific result--such as human-made climate change--can increase the acceptance of that result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Hebb repetition effect refers to the finding that immediate serial recall is improved over trials for memory lists that are surreptitiously repeated across trials, relative to new lists. We show in four experiments that the Hebb repetition effect is also observed with a complex-span task, in which encoding or retrieval of list items alternates with an unrelated processing task. The interruption of encoding or retrieval by the processing task did not reduce the size of the Hebb effect, demonstrating that incidental long-term learning forms integrated representations of lists, excluding the interleaved processing events. Contrary to the assumption that complex-span performance relies more on long-term memory than standard immediate serial recall (simple span), the Hebb effect was not larger in complex-span than in simple-span performance. The Hebb effect in complex span was also not modulated by the opportunity for refreshing list items, questioning a role of refreshing for the acquisition of the long-term memory representations underlying the effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are required to mitigate climate change. However, there is low willingness amongst the public to prioritise climate policies for reducing emissions. Here we show that the extent to which Australians are prepared to reduce their country's CO2 emissions is greater when the costs to future national income are framed as a “foregone-gain”—incomes rise in the future but not by as much as in the absence of emission cuts—rather than as a “loss”—incomes decrease relative to the baseline expected future levels (Studies 1 & 2). The provision of a normative message identifying Australia as one of the world's largest CO2 emitters did not increase the amount by which individuals were prepared to reduce emissions (Study 1), whereas a normative message revealing the emission policy preferences of other Australians did (Study 2). The results suggest that framing the costs of reducing emissions as a smaller increase in future income and communicating normative information about others' emission policy preferences are effective methods for leveraging public support for emission cuts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been growing interest in the relationship between the capacity of a person's working memory and their ability to learn to categorize stimuli. While there is evidence that working memory capacity (WMC) is related to the speed of category learning, it is unknown whether WMC predicts which strategies people use when there are multiple possible solutions to a categorization problem. To explore the relationship between WMC, category learning, and categorization strategy use, 173 participants completed two categorization tasks and a battery of WMC tasks. WMC predicted the speed of category learning, but it did not predict which strategies participants chose to perform categorization. Thus, WMC does not predict which categorization strategies people use but it predicts how well they will use the strategy they select. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consolidation refers to the putative process by which existing memories are strengthened over time. There is a widespread consensus within the neuroscientific community that consolidation is an important component of human memory. By contrast, the notion is rarely employed by cognitive modellers. We focus on behavioural data that have frequently been cited in support of consolidation-for example, the Ribot gradient in amnesia and the temporal effects of retroactive interference-and show that (1) those data are in fact problematic for classic consolidation theory and (2) can be explained readily within a cognitive model based on temporal distinctiveness. We suggest that this changes the evidentiary landscape for consolidation and narrows the field of supporting evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working memory is crucial for many higher-level cognitive functions, ranging from mental arithmetic to reasoning and problem solving. Likewise, the ability to learn and categorize novel concepts forms an indispensable part of human cognition. However, very little is known about the relationship between working memory and categorization, and modeling in category learning has thus far been largely uninformed by knowledge about people's memory processes. This article reports a large study (N = 113) that related people's working memory capacity (WMC) to their category-learning performance using the 6 problem types of Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). Structural equation modeling revealed a strong relationship between WMC and category learning, with a single latent variable accommodating performance on all 6 problems. A model of categorization (the Attention Learning COVEring map, ALCOVE; Kruschke, 1992) was fit to the individual data and a single latent variable was sufficient to capture the variation among associative learning parameters across all problems. The data and modeling suggest that working memory mediates category learning across a broad range of tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the effects of the duration and type of to-be-articulated distractors during encoding of a verbal list into short-term memory (STM). Distractors and to-be-remembered items alternated during list presentation, as in the complex-span task that underlies much of working-memory research. According to an interference model of STM, known as serial order in a box (SOB; Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2002), additional repeated articulations of the same word between list items should cause minimal further disruption of encoding into STM even though the retention interval for early list items is increased. SOB also predicts that the articulation of several different distractor items should lead to much enhanced disruption if the distractor interval is increased. Those predictions were qualitatively confirmed in 4 experiments that found that it is the type of distractors, not their total duration, that determines the success of encoding a list into STM. The results pose a challenge to temporal models of complex-span performance, such as the time-based resource sharing model (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004). The results add to a growing body of evidence that memory for the short term is not exclusively governed by purely temporal processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The processes that determine unsupervised categorization, the task of classifying stimuli without guidance or feedback, are poorly understood. Two experiments examined the emergence and plasticity of unsupervised strategies using perceptual stimuli that varied along two separable dimensions. In the first experiment, participants either classified stimuli into any two categories of their choice or learned identical classifications by supervised categorization. Irrespective of the complexity of classification, supervised and unsupervised learning rates differed little when both modes of learning were maximally comparable. The second experiment examined the plasticity of unsupervised classifications by introducing novel stimuli halfway through training. Whether or not people altered their strategies, they responded to novel stimuli in a gradual manner. The gradual and continuous evolution and adaptation of strategies suggests that unsupervised categorization involves true learning which shares many properties of supervised category learning. We also show that the choice of unsupervised strategy cannot be predicted from the properties of early learning trials, but is best understood as a function of the initial distribution of dimensional attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] We propose an active removal process that operates in an item-specific fashion. [•] Removal serves WM updating and general WM functioning by preventing interference. [•] WM updating involves switching between maintenance and updating modes of WM. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

• A reversal of narrative polarity results in a reverse-CIE. • Negation-only conditions may be more relevant than control conditions for the CIE. • In general, attitudes do not interact with the effectiveness of corrections. Misinformation – information that is false or inaccurate – can continue to influence people's memory and reasoning even after it has been corrected. Researchers have termed this the continued influence effect (CIE). However, to date, research has focused exclusively on examining the CIE in a single polarity, namely the ongoing effect of initially affirmed material that is later negated. No research has yet examined how reliance on outdated information may be affected if this polarity is reversed, that is, if initially-negated information is reinstated. It also remains unclear how participants' pre-existing beliefs may impact the acceptance of a correction, with prior evidence showing conflicting results. To investigate these questions, across two experiments we presented participants scoring high versus low on measures of relevant attitudes with fictional news reports that contained a piece of critical attitude-relevant information. This information was either true throughout, false throughout, initially-affirmed then retracted, or initially-negated then reinstated. Participants' reliance on the critical information was subsequently measured with the use of inferential-reasoning items. Reinstatement of initially-negated information was insufficient to bring reliance on that information to a baseline level – that is, reliance on information presented as true throughout was greater than reliance on negated and then reinstated information. This result was symmetrical with the conventional CIE observed with a reversed polarity. The effect of participants' pre-existing attitudes on continued reliance was equivocal. The results therefore suggest that the CIE is not contingent on polarity, raising questions about the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We respond to the comments of Logie and Vandierendonck to our article proposing benchmark findings for evaluating theories and models of short-term and working memory. The response focuses on the two main points of criticism: (a) Logie and Vandierendonck argue that the scope of the set of benchmarks is too narrow. We explain why findings on how working memory is used in complex cognition, findings on executive functions, and findings from neuropsychological case studies are currently not included in the benchmarks, and why findings with visual and spatial materials are less prevalent among them, (b) The critics question the usefulness of the benchmarks and their ratings for advancing theory development. We explain why selecting and rating benchmarks is important and justifiable, and acknowledge that the present selection and rating decisions are in need of continuous updating. The usefulness of the benchmarks of all ratings is also enhanced by our concomitant online posting of data for many of these benchmarks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Any mature field of research in psychology--such as short-term/working memory--is characterized by a wealth of empirical findings. It is currently unrealistic to expect a theory to explain them all; theorists must satisfice with explaining a subset of findings. The aim of the present article is to make the choice of that subset less arbitrary and idiosyncratic than is current practice. We propose criteria for identifying benchmark findings that every theory in a field should be able to explain: Benchmarks should be reproducible, generalize across materials and methodological variations, and be theoretically informative. We propose a set of benchmarks for theories and computational models of short-term and working memory. The benchmarks are described in as theory-neutral a way as possible, so that they can serve as empirical common ground for competing theoretical approaches. Benchmarks are rated on three levels according to their priority for explanation. Selection and ratings of the benchmarks is based on consensus among the authors, who jointly represent a broad range of theoretical perspectives on working memory, and they are supported by a survey among other experts on working memory. The article is accompanied by a web page providing an open forum for discussion and for submitting proposals for new benchmarks; and a repository for reference data sets for each benchmark. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]