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The world abounds with different perspectives, which necessitates balancing between maintaining the currently relevant perspective and flexibly switching between perspectives, if needed. Employing the distinction between reactive and proactive control (Braver, 2012), we argue that previous research on perspective-taking has mainly looked at the cost of activating reactive control to deal with what is happening now. Here we examine the cost of activating proactive control in order to be prepared for what might happen in the future. In three experiments, we embed a perspective-taking task (Samson et al., 2010) into a task-switching design and calculate perspective-mixing costs to capture proactive control. We show that a context in which perspective shifts might occur unpredictably (compared to a context in which such shifts are not expected) results in a poorer ability to maintain any perspective, but especially one's own. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

How do (reportable) emotional feelings come to be? Following William James and many others, Givon et al. (2020) described the generation of feelings as evidence accumulation toward a boundary. In this work, we began clarifying the nature of "evidence". In two preregistered experiments, participants were presented with normed emotion-evoking negative/positive pictures that were described as reflecting either authentic or fictitious happenings ("fictional reappraisal"). In negative pictures (but contrary to our predictions, not in positive pictures), fictional reappraisal slowed feeling reports and reduced the rate of unpleasant feeling reports. An evidence accumulation model, the Hierarchical Linear Ballistic Accumulator model, was fit to the results from negative stimuli. This analysis indicated that fictional reappraisal selectively slowed the rate of evidence accumulation favoring (the normatively "correct") unpleasant feeling reports and speeded evidence accumulation favoring (the normatively "wrong") pleasant feeling reports. Fictional reappraisal did not change the response criterion, specifying the required amount of evidence for report. These results suggest that cognitive appraisals contribute to (and are a part of) emotional evidence, as operationalized in evidence accumulation models, and provide additional support for the usefulness of these models for the study of feeling reports. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Little is known about how stimulus- and response-based interference might interact to contribute to the costs of switching between cognitive tasks. We analyzed switch costs in a novel cued task-switching/card-matching paradigm in a large study (N = 95). We reasoned that interference from previously active task sets may be contingent upon the retrieval of these task sets via stimulus processing, or alternatively, via response processing. We examined the efficacy of these two factors through eligibility manipulations. That is, stimulus/response features that were capable of retrieving task sets from the previous trial remained eligible (or not) on the current trial. We report three main findings: first, no switch costs were found when neither stimulus features, nor response features, were adequate for the retrieval of the previously executed task sets. Second, we found substantial switch costs when, on switch trials, stimulus features kept the previously executed task eligible, and we found roughly equivalent switch costs when the previously executed response remained eligible. Third, evidence for stimulus-induced switch costs was exclusively observed when previously executed responses remained ineligible. These data indicate that stimulus-based interference, and of importance, response-based interference, contribute comparably to switch costs. Possible interpretations of non-additive switch costs are discussed.

A key goal of model-based cognitive neuroscience is to estimate the trial-by-trial fluctuations of cognitive model parameters in order to link these fluctuations to brain signals. However, previously developed methods are limited by being difficult to implement, time-consuming, or model-specific. Here, we propose an easy, efficient and general approach to estimating trial-wise changes in parameters: Leave-One-Trial-Out (LOTO). The rationale behind LOTO is that the difference between parameter estimates for the complete dataset and for the dataset with one omitted trial reflects the parameter value in the omitted trial. We show that LOTO is superior to estimating parameter values from single trials and compare it to previously proposed approaches. Furthermore, the method makes it possible to distinguish true variability in a parameter from noise and from other sources of variability. In our view, the practicability and generality of LOTO will advance research on tracking fluctuations in latent cognitive variables and linking them to neural data., Competing Interests: SG, NM No competing interests declared, (© 2019, Gluth and Meiran.)

Humans are often remarkably fast at learning novel tasks from instructions. Such rapid instructed task learning (RITL) likely depends upon the formation of new associations between long-term memory representations, which must then be actively maintained to enable successful task implementation. Consequently, we hypothesized that RITL relies more heavily on a proactive mode of cognitive control, in which goal-relevant information is actively maintained in preparation for anticipated high control demands. We tested this hypothesis using a recently developed cognitive paradigm consisting of 60 novel tasks involving RITL and 4 practiced tasks, with identical task rules and stimuli used across both task types. A robust behavioral cost was found in novel relative to practiced task performance, which was present even when the two were randomly inter-mixed, such that task-switching effects were equated. Novelty costs were most prominent under time-limited preparation conditions. In self-paced conditions, increased preparation time was found for novel trials, and was selectively associated with enhanced performance, suggesting greater proactive control for novel tasks. These results suggest a key role for proactive cognitive control in the ability to rapidly learn novel tasks from instructions., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

The effect of physical temperature on cognition and behavior has been the focus of extensive research in recent years, demonstrating that embodied concepts are grounded in, and shaped by, sensorimotor physical experiences. Nevertheless, less is known about how experienced and perceived temperatures affect cognitive control, one of humans core executive functions. In the present work, we primed participants with cool versus warm temperature using a between participants manipulation of physical touch experience (Experiment 1), and a within participants manipulation of seeing landscape views associated with cool vs. warm temperatures (Experiment 2). In both experiments, cool compared to warm temperatures lead to improved performance on an anti-saccade task, an established cognitive control measure. Implications are discussed.

Attachment is related to behaviors, including contact maintenance/proximity seeking, and to the keeping of the attachment figure physically, visually, or mentally accessible. In a series of experiments, we observed an analogous behavior in a simple laboratory task in the absence of any stress-related manipulations. Participants performed an easy, choice reaction time (RT) task (often emotionally neutral) on pictures (or names) of significant others versus other persons, both familiar and unfamiliar to them. Results showed that participants took longer to press the key, which started the next trial, when the current trial involved the picture (or name) of their significant other. This effect was observed among parents who responded to their children's pictures, people who are in a romantic relationship, and young adults who responded to the name of a parent; it was only eliminated when participants adopted an analytic approach (i.e., judged the person's age). These results indicate that attachment-related behavioral tendencies, associated with keeping the representation of the significant other active, may be easily invoked in a simple task, even without any apparent stress manipulation. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

Few studies have addressed action control training. In the current study, participants were trained over 19 days in an adaptive training task that demanded constant switching, maintenance and updating of novel action rules. Participants completed an executive functions battery before and after training that estimated processing speed, working memory updating, set-shifting, response inhibition and fluid intelligence. Participants in the training group showed greater improvement than a no-contact control group in processing speed, indicated by reduced reaction times in speeded classification tasks. No other systematic group differences were found across the different pre-post measurements. Ex-Gaussian fitting of the reaction-time distribution revealed that the reaction time reduction observed among trained participants was restricted to the right tail of the distribution, previously shown to be related to working memory. Furthermore, training effects were only found in classification tasks that required participants to maintain novel stimulus-response rules in mind, supporting the notion that the training improved working memory abilities. Training benefits were maintained in a 10-month follow-up, indicating relatively long-lasting effects. The authors conclude that training improved action-related working memory abilities.

Post-error slowing (PES) has been shown to reflect a control failure due to automatic attentional capture by the error. Here we aimed to assess whether PES also involves an increase in cognitive control. Using a cued-task-switching paradigm (Experiment 1) and a Stroop task (Experiment 2), the demand for top down control was manipulated. In Experiment 1, one group received dimension cues indicating the relevant stimulus dimension (e.g., "number") without specifying the response-category-to-key mapping, hence requiring considerable top down control. Another group was shown mapping cues providing information regarding both the relevant task identity and its category-to-key mapping (e.g., "one three"), requiring less top down control, and the last group received both types of cues, intermixed. In Experiment 2, one group performed a pure incongruent Stroop condition (name ink color of incongruent color names, high control demand), and another group received a pure neutral Stroop condition (name color patches, low control demand). In Experiment 2a, participants received the two conditions, intermixed. A larger PES was observed with dimension cues as compared with mapping cues, and with incongruent Stroop stimuli as compared to neutral stimuli, but not when the conditions were intermixed. These findings reveal that PES is influenced by the control demands that characterize the given block-wide experimental context and show that proactive cognitive control is involved in PES., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Two experiments examined the relation between mindfulness practice and cognitive rigidity by using a variation of the Einstellung water jar task. Participants were required to use three hypothetical jars to obtain a specific amount of water. Initial problems were solvable by the same complex formula, but in later problems ("critical" or "trap" problems) solving was possible by an additional much simpler formula. A rigidity score was compiled through perseverance of the complex formula. In Experiment 1, experienced mindfulness meditators received significantly lower rigidity scores than non-meditators who had registered for their first meditation retreat. Similar results were obtained in randomized controlled Experiment 2 comparing non-meditators who underwent an eight meeting mindfulness program with a waiting list group. The authors conclude that mindfulness meditation reduces cognitive rigidity via the tendency to be "blinded" by experience. Results are discussed in light of the benefits of mindfulness practice regarding a reduced tendency to overlook novel and adaptive ways of responding due to past experience, both in and out of the clinical setting.

Some studies found that cognitive functions of human beings may be altered while exposed to radiofrequency radiation (RFR) emitted by cellular phones. In two recent studies, we have found that experiment duration and exposure side (i.e., phone's location--right or left) may have a major influence on the detection of such effects. In this brief follow-up experiment, 29 right-handed male subjects were divided into two groups. Each subject had two standard cellular phones attached to both sides of his head. The subjects performed a spatial working memory task that required either a left-hand or a right-hand response under one of the two exposure conditions: left side of the head or right side. Contrary to our previous studies, in this work external antennas located far away from the subjects were connected to the cellular phones. This setup prevents any emission of RFR from the internal antenna, thus drastically reducing RFR exposure. Despite that, the results remain similar to those obtained in our previous work. These results indicate that some of the effects previously attributed to RFR can be the result of some confounders., (Copyright © 2011 Wiley-Liss, Inc.)

The literature shows that switching among simple cognitive tasks is difficult and involves a performance cost. Accordingly, cost-benefit considerations seem to predict that task switching would not occur spontaneously. Here we show that spontaneous task switching is a robust phenomenon, despite its costs. In Experiment 1, participants had to judge shapes according to one of three possible dimensions. Importantly, they were given the option to choose another relevant dimension or let the computer program change the dimension for them, but only if they wanted to do so. The results showed that spontaneous task switching was prevalent, despite robust switching costs. Experiment 2 extended this finding in showing spontaneous switching from an easy task to a more difficult task. The authors provide two possible explanations for the phenomenon that posit that spontaneous switching may be unpreventable or even advantageous.

This study examined the time dependence effects of exposure to radiofrequency radiation (RFR) emitted by standard GSM cellular phones on the cognitive functions of humans. A total of 48 healthy right-handed male subjects performed a spatial working memory task (that required either a left-hand or a right-hand response) while being exposed to one of two GSM phones placed at both sides of the head. The subjects were randomly divided into three groups. Each group was exposed to one of three exposure conditions: left-side of the head, right-side, or sham-exposure. The experiment consisted of 12 blocks of trials. Response times (RTs) and accuracy of the responses were recorded. It was found that the average RT of the right-hand responses under left-side exposure condition was significantly longer than those of the right-side and sham-exposure groups averaged together during the first two time blocks. These results confirmed the existence of an effect of exposure on RT, as well as the fact that exposure duration (together with the responding hand and the side of exposure) may play an important role in producing detectable RFR effects on performance. Differences in these parameters might be the reason for the failure of certain studies to detect or replicate RFR effects., ((c) 2008 Wiley-Liss, Inc.)

The present study was set out to evaluate the cognitive costs of two major emotion regulation strategies under conditions of increased challenge. Previous studies have established that cognitive reappraisal (construing an emotional event in nonemotional terms) has no cognitive costs. However, in all of these studies, reappraisal was initiated at the emotional situation onset, before emotional response tendencies sufficiently evolved. In the present study, the challenge of regulation strategies was increased by initiating strategies online at a late time point in an emotional situation. Applying this procedure revealed for the first time a cognitive cost for reappraisal and also provided double dissociation between reappraisal and another major cognitive emotion regulation strategy--distraction (diverting attention from an emotional situation via producing neutral thoughts). Specifically, late reappraisal, relative to distraction, resulted in an expenditure of self control resources. Late distraction but not reappraisal impaired memory encoding of the emotional situation., (2008 APA, all rights reserved)

Control by action representation and input selection (CARIS) is a modeling framework for task-switching experiments, which considers action-related effects as critical constraints. It assumes that control operates by choosing control parameter values, representing input selection and action representation. Competing CARIS models differ in whether (a) control parameters are determined by current instructions or represent a perseveration, (b) current instructions apply to the input selection and/or to action representation. According to the chosen model (a) task execution results in a default bias in favor of the executed task thus creating perseverative tendencies; (b) control counteracts these tendencies by applying a transient momentary bias whose locus (input selection or action representation) changes as a function of task preparation time; (c) this happens because the task-cue (e.g., SHAPE) initially attracts attention to the immediately available cue-information (e.g., target shape) and then attracts it to inferred or retrieved information (e.g., "circle" is related to the right key press).

Whereas explicit measures of the self-concept typically demonstrate a negative bias in depressed individuals, implicit measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT), revealed an opposite, positive bias. To address this inconsistent pattern, the authors examined, using a novel paradigm, mental set maintenance (i.e., the difficulty of maintaining active a required mental set) and set operation (the efficiency of executing the mental set while it is maintained). Dysphoric (N = 33) and nondysphoric (N = 30) participants alternated between an IAT focusing on self reference and a matched neutral task. Nondysphorics had greater difficulty in maintaining a negative self reference task compared to a neutral task. Conversely, dysphorics did not exhibit such difficulty, and they maintained a negative self-reference task more easily than nondysphorics. No group differences were evinced in smoothness of set operation. These results suggest that the shield protecting nondysphorics from maintaining negative mental sets is absent in dysphorics., ((Copyright) 2008 APA, all rights reserved.)

Real-life emotion regulation often occurs at some point after an emotion-triggering event (ETE) has been introduced, but most previous research has involved regulation before or after the ETE. In a series of experiments, the authors examined online regulation via distraction and cognitive reappraisal by manipulating the strategy initiation point in sadness-evoking films. Distraction was effective even when initiated late, presumably because it involves diluting the ETE contents by mixing them with a nonsad input. By contrast, reappraisal was less effective when initiated late, suggesting a possible point of no return for this strategy: Adopting a detached view late in the ETE may be difficult because it involves continued focus on the ETE and hence requires overcoming a previously formed tendency of identifying with the emotional content.

The present study examined the effects of exposure to Electromagnetic Radiation emitted by a standard GSM phone at 890 MHz on human cognitive functions. This study attempted to establish a connection between the exposure of a specific area of the brain and the cognitive functions associated with that area. A total of 36 healthy right-handed male subjects performed four distinct cognitive tasks: spatial item recognition, verbal item recognition, and two spatial compatibility tasks. Tasks were chosen according to the brain side they are assumed to activate. All subjects performed the tasks under three exposure conditions: right side, left side, and sham exposure. The phones were controlled by a base station simulator and operated at their full power. We have recorded the reaction times (RTs) and accuracy of the responses. The experiments consisted of two sections, of 1 h each, with a 5 min break in between. The tasks and the exposure regimes were counterbalanced. The results indicated that the exposure of the left side of the brain slows down the left-hand response time, in the second-later-part of the experiment. This effect was apparent in three of the four tasks, and was highly significant in only one of the tests. The exposure intensity and its duration exceeded the common exposure of cellular phone users.

Increased demands on cognitive control trigger changes in processing mode. One such modulation involves a shift from parallel to serial processing. This study assessed the role of control demand in determining whether dual-task processing is performed serially or in parallel. We used two critical indices, based on the response-selection bottleneck model, to show that response selection was serial when a task switch was involved, but partly parallel when the simultaneous performance of the tasks did not involve task switching.

Participants switched between two randomly ordered discrimination tasks and each trial began with the presentation of a task cue instructing which task to execute. The authors induced phasic alertness by presenting a salient uninformative stimulus after the task cue was provided, and at variable intervals before the target stimulus was presented (Experiments 1-3) or before the task cue (Experiment 4). When the alerting stimulus preceded the target stimulus or the task cue by an optimal interval, RT was faster, indicating an alert state and the task-switching cost was reduced. These results support the suggestion of De Jong (Acta Psychologica, 1999) that alertness improves the overcoming of retrieval competition through improved goal representation, but also show that the effect is specific to the residual task-switching cost.

To switch from one cognitive task to another is thought to rely on additional control effort being indicated by performance costs relative to repeating the same task. This switch cost can be reduced by advance task preparation. In the present experiment the nature of advance preparation was investigated by comparing a situation where an explicit task cue was presented 2000 ms in advance of the target stimulus (CTI-2000) with a situation where cue and target were presented in close succession (CTI-100). We mapped the blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) activation correlates of switch-related control effort and advance task preparation to test alternative explanations why advance preparation is reducing switch costs. A previously reported control-related cortical network of frontal and parietal brain areas emerged that was more strongly activated for switching between tasks. However, this was true exclusively for CTI-100 where no advance task preparation was possible. At CTI-2000 these same brain areas were equally engaged in both switch and repeat trials. For some of these areas, this common activation was time-locked to the presentation of both the cue as well as the target. Other areas were exclusively associated with target processing. The overall pattern of results suggests that advance task preparation is a common process of pre-activating (cue-locked activation) the currently relevant task set which does not face interference from a persisting N - 1 task set. During target processing the same brain areas are re-engaged (subsequent target-locked activation) to apply the pre-activated task set. Though being common to repeat and switch trials, advance preparation has a differential benefit for switch trials. This is because the instructed task set has time to settle into a stable state, thus becoming resistant against disruption from the previous task set, which is retrieved by the current target stimulus.

A growing number of studies on the higher-order cognitive functions of the human brain use brain-imaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). For the validity and generality of fMRI results, it is important that the relevant cognitive processes are equivalent to those functioning in typical settings used in behavioral research. This equivalence could be, for example, endangered by different spatial frames of reference when lying in the scanner. In the present study, we tested whether the cognitive processes, as reflected in behavioral data in brain-imaging settings, are indeed functionally equivalent to those reflected in "purely" behavioral settings. To this end, we used a task-switching paradigm with a spatial component, increasing the likelihood to find effects of experimental setting. We compared the data of three different groups that only differed in testing environments (real, operating fMRI vs simulated fMRI vs standard behavioral with upright position of participants) but used otherwise strictly equivalent experimental conditions. Of importance for our validation purposes, unlike previous studies, we included a group with a behavioral setting, and we tested whether we would replicate a nontrivial, complex three-way interaction across all three groups. We replicated the predicted complex data pattern in all groups, suggesting functional equivalence of the underlying cognitive processes. We also found strongly increased reaction time (RT) levels in the two fMRI groups. We attribute this increase to unspecific distracting factors affecting late motor processes and discuss potential methodological implications of this increased baseline RT in the scanner.

The present study introduces a continuous tracking procedure to investigate cognitive stopping in individual trials. Our measure of stopping performance had a mean similar to mean stopping times estimated in the stop signal paradigm, suggesting a common underlying process. Additional findings indicate that stopping performance and tracking performance were dissociable. First, while stopping times were primarily affected by stop signal modality, tracking performance was primarily affected by tracking difficulty. Second, tracking performance influenced tracking but not stopping in immediately following trials. Stopping influenced neither tracking performance nor stopping in immediately following trials. Finally, there was no correlation between tracking performance and stopping performance, or any dependency between them as found in the conditional means.

Participants switched between two randomly ordered, two-choice reaction-time (RT) tasks, where an instructional cue preceded the target stimulus and indicated which task to execute. Task-switching cost dissipated passively while the participants waited for the instructional cue in order to know which task to execute (during the Response-Cue Interval). Switching cost was sharply reduced, but not abolished, when the participants actively prepared for the task switch in response to the instructional cue (during the Cue-Target Interval). The preparation for a task switch has shown not to be a by-product of general preparation by phasic alertness or predicting target onset. It is suggested that task-switching cost has at least three components reflecting (1) the passive dissipation of the previous task set, (2) the preparation of the new task set, and (3) a residual component., (Copyright 2000 Academic Press.)

This article describes a quantitative model, which suggests what the underlying mechanisms of cognitive control in a particular task-switching paradigm are, with relevance to task-switching performance in general. It is suggested that participants dynamically control response accuracy by selective attention, in the particular paradigm being used, by controlling stimulus representation. They are less efficient in dynamically controlling response representation. The model fits reasonably well the pattern of reaction time results concerning task switching, congruency, cue-target interval and response-repetition in a mixed task condition, as well as the differences between mixed task and pure task conditions.

The process-dissociation procedure was used to estimate the influence of spatial and form-based processing in the Simon task. Subjects made manual (left/right) responses to the direction of arrows (> or <) presented to the left or right of fixation. Manipulating the proportion of incongruent trials (e.g., a right-pointing arrow presented to the left of fixation) affected both the size and direction of the Simon effect. To account for this pattern of data, we compared process estimates based on three possible relationships between spatial and form-based processing: independence, redundancy, and exclusivity. The independence model provided the best account of the data. Most telling was that independent form-based estimates were superior at predicting observed performance on arrows presented at fixation and did so consistently across conditions (r's > .80). The results provide evidence that the form ("what") and spatial location ("where") of a single stimulus can have functionally independent effects on performance. They also indicate the existence of two kinds of automaticity--an associative ("implicit learning") component that reflects prior S-R mappings and a nonassociative component that reflects the correspondence between stimulus and response codes.