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Little is known about the interplay between affective and cognitive processes of decision making within the bounded rationality perspective, in particular for the debate on adaptive decision making and strategy selection. This gap in the knowledge is particularly important as affect and deliberation may direct preferences in opposite directions. How do decision makers solve such dissonance? In this paper, we address this question by exploring the use of integral affect as a choice heuristic in comparison with and in conjunction to “take the best,” and weighted addition of attributes (WADD). We operationalize theories of reliance on affect in choice through a "Take the emotionally best" algorithm. Its predictive power is experimentally tested against other models, including mixed-sequential cognitive/affective procedures. We find that individual decisions are better predicted by a sequential combination of "Take the emotionally best" and "Take the best" with a slight dominance of the former. Conditions of cognitive/affective ambivalence, low discrimination ability and high complexity provide the cognitive architecture where such blended choice strategies predict decisions more precisely. This implies that reliance on integral affect may precede the use of cognitive cues following an ecological rationality perspective rather than supporting a kind of competition between affect and cognition as implied in current literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify the affective factors underlying conflict behavior. Traditional conflict research assumes that when individuals face conflicts they follow a rational process, thus denying the role of emotion-relevant variables. Design/methodology/approach – In total, 358 undergraduate students from the University of Santiago de Compostela were classified into four different affective groups (happy, inactive, sad, and surprised) based on their actual emotional experience and asked to complete ROCI-II. ANOVA were conducted to test hypotheses. Findings – Results reveal that affective groups statistically differ in their self-reported conflict management styles. Positive moods and feelings have been found to be related to the preference for more cooperative strategies. Research limitations/implications – This study is exploratory in nature and since hypotheses were only partly supported, future research should address this topic in depth. Practical implications – It has been suggested that, in order to handle conflicts properly, individuals should take into account both their cognition and emotion. Originality/value – This paper sheds light on current research in the prediction of conflict behavior by examining the impact of affect out from the lab. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision making (DM) 2 2 Decision making is abbreviated as DM throughout the text. is a complex process that appears to involve several brain structures. In particular, amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) seem to be essential in human decision making, where both emotional and cognitive aspects are taken into account. In this paper, we present a computational network model representing the neural information processing of DM, from perception to behavior. We model the population dynamics of the three neural structures (amygdala, OFC and LPFC), as well as their interaction. In our model, the neurodynamic activity of amygdala and OFC represents the neural correlates of secondary emotion, while the activity of certain neural populations in OFC alone represents the outcome expectancy of different options. The cognitive/rational aspect of DM is associated with LPFC. Our model is intended to give insights on the emotional and cognitive processes involved in DM under various internal and external contexts. Different options for actions are represented by the oscillatory activity of cell assemblies, which may change due to experience and learning. Knowledge and experience of the outcome of our decisions and actions can eventually result in changes in our neural structures, attitudes and behaviors. Simulation results may have implications for how we make decisions for our individual actions, as well as for societal choices, where we take examples from transport and its impact on CO 2 emissions and climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Emotion or stress can jeopardize decision-making relevance and cognitive functioning. In this paper we examine plan continuation error (PCE), an erroneous behavior defined as a “failure to revise a flight plan despite emerging evidence that suggests it is no longer safe” (Orasanu et al., 2001). Our hypothesis is that negative emotional consequences attached to the go-around decision provoke a temporary impairment of the decision-making process and favor PCE. We investigated this hypothesis with a simplified landing task in which two possible contributors to those emotions, namely the uncertainty of a decision outcome and the reward/punishment, associated to the outcome were manipulated. A behavioral experiment (n =12) and a second one (n =6) using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) were conducted. Behavioral results of both studies showed the effectiveness of the financial incentive to bias decision making toward a more risky and less rational behavior from a safety point of view. Neuroimaging data showed that the PCE behavior was underpinned by the contribution of brain circuitry of emotion and reward during the decision-making process. Taken together, behavioral and fMRI result support the hypothesis that PCE can be provoked by a temporary impairment of rational decision-making due to the negative emotional consequences attached with the go-around. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Pupil dilation is implicated as a marker of decision-making as well as of cognitive and emotional processes. Here we tested whether individuals can exploit another’s pupil to their advantage. We first recorded the eyes of 3 "opponents", while they were playing a modified version of the "rock-paper-scissors" childhood game. The recorded videos served as stimuli to a second set of participants. These "players" played rock-paper-scissors against the pre-recorded opponents in a variety of conditions. When players just observed the opponents’ eyes without specific instruction their probability of winning was at chance. When informed that the time of maximum pupil dilation was indicative of the opponents’ choice, however, players raised their winning probability significantly above chance. When just watching the reconstructed area of the pupil against a gray background, players achieved similar performance, showing that players indeed exploited the pupil, rather than other facial cues. Since maximum pupil dilation was correct about the opponents’ decision only in 60% of trials (chance 33%), we finally tested whether increasing this validity to 100% would allow spontaneous learning. Indeed, when players were given no information, but the pupil was informative about the opponent’s response in all trials, players performed significantly above chance on average and half (5/10) reached significance at an individual level. Together these results suggest that people can in principle use the pupil to detect cognitive decisions in another individual, but that most people have neither explicit knowledge of the pupil’s utility nor have they learnt to use it despite a lifetime of exposure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]