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We begin our commentary by summarizing the commonalities and differences in cognitive phenomena across cultures, as found by the seven papers of this topic. We then assess the commonalities and differences in how our various authors have approached the study of cognitive diversity, and speculate on the need for, and potential of, cross-disciplinary collaboration., (Copyright © 2015 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)

In this paper I will focus on one capacity, that for mental modeling, in part because analogy, visualization, and simulation contribute to reasoning through mental modeling and in part because mental modeling is a central notion used in analyses of conceptual change across the literatures of studies of science, learning, and cognitive development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critiques of cognitive psychology and cognitive science principally target cognitivism, defined here as doctrinal commitment to computational processing over internal representations as a model of human intelligence. This paper reviews the principal points of critique, but argues that some prominent efforts within cognitive science currently exhibit conceptual and methodological broadening, to the point of revision or rejection of the core assumptions of cognitivism. Three such efforts are highlighted: Hutchins' distributed cognitive framework, Nersessian and Newstetter's ethnographic and historical analysis of innovation in engineering laboratories, and Tomasello's account of cultural evolution in relation to cognitive achievement. The paper claims that such research efforts and the philosophical frameworks that support them offer unrealized opportunities for enhanced dialogue and participation with cognitive science for psychologists critical of cognitivism. Conceptual and methodological advantages of critical engagement are acknowledged, with focus on the problems of innovation and cognitive failure in science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the nature of model-based reasoning in the interplay between theory and experiment in the context of biomedical engineering research laboratories. where problem solving involves using physical models. These "model systems" are sites of experimentation where in vitro models are used to screen, control, and simulate specific aspects of in vivo phenomena. As with all models, simulation devices are idealized representations, but they are also systems themselves, possessing engineering constraints. Drawing on research in contemporary cognitive science that construes cognition as occurring in a complex distributed system comprising people and artifacts, I argue that reasoning with model systems is a constraint satisfaction process involving co-construction, manipulation, and revision of mental and physical models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the influence of Thomas Kuhn's scientific theories on research in cognitive science. Problem of the nature of concept representation and its relation to conceptual change; Discussion of the theory of concepts; Details on nomic concepts, problem situations and frames.