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The traditional Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) mind-based model suggests that humans understand the world through ontological categories and make socially strategic inferences to avoid threats and focus on utility. This study used an image choice task to test three key factors – category templates, threat, and utility – believed to influence people's preferences within the CSR framework. The study had three main goals: (1) to refine previous CSR research by providing a more accurate, empirically scaled measure of these three factors using the image choice task; (2) to assess how each factor affected participants' image preferences; and (3) to explore any interactions between these factors. In a pilot study, we first quantified the threat and utility levels for each image stimulus. Our main study found that, contrary to some previous findings, category templates significantly influenced image preferences, though not in the hierarchy proposed by traditional CSR models. Threat and utility also had independent, significant effects on preferences. However, category templates had the strongest influence on participant choices. The effects of threat and utility varied depending on whether the influence of category templates was accounted for. These findings support certain CSR theories but challenge the proposed hierarchical structure. We also confirmed some previous findings, clarified the relative impact of the three factors, and provided empirical measures of template typicality, utility, and threat for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prayer, a repeated practice of paying attention to one's inner mental world, is a core behavior across many faiths and traditions, understudied by cognitive scientists. Previous research suggests that humans pray because prayer changes the way they feel or how they think. This paper makes a novel argument: that prayer changes what they feel that they perceive. Those who pray, we find, are more likely to report sensory and perceptual experiences which they take to be evidence of a god or spirit. Across three studies encompassing data from thousands of participants across five different cultures, we find that the amount of time spent daily in prayer is associated with the frequency of such events—and that prayer is associated with some of these experiences more strongly than others. Time in prayer has the strongest relationship with the frequency of everyday events (like dreams or strong emotion) that are experienced as not generated by the self but by a god or spirit. Prayer is also associated with more anomalous experiences like voices and a sense of presence, but prayer has no association with more dramatic events such as possession, out‐of‐body experiences, and sleep paralysis. Our results not only suggest interesting relationships between practice and experience in a religious domain, but hint at the power of practice to shape experience more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) seeks to find causal explanations for the origin, dissemination and transmission of theistic beliefs. One of the beliefs related to the field of religion is counterintuitive concepts: ideas and concepts that violate the automatic and non-reflective expectations of our mental tools. According to the researchers of CSR, counterintuitive concepts, if they are used in their minimal sense and do not weaken the conceptual coherence, cause the permanence and transmission of religious beliefs in comparison with other beliefs. Therefore, counter intuitiveness plays an important role in understanding religion. Despite the positive points of counterintuitive concepts, we believe that these concepts have ambiguities and problems that, if not properly explained and corrected, will cause problems in the acceptance and fixation of theistic beliefs: First, metare presentation's inability to solve the problem of distinguishing between counterintuitive religious beliefs and other counterintuitive concepts. Second, ambiguity in the explanatory role of counterintuitive concepts. Third, emphasis on cognitive architecture and not paying attention to the role of upbringing and culture in identifying counterintuitive concepts. Fourth, the inconsistency in the analysis of some counterintuitive concepts such as God with the official doctrine of religions. Fifth, not paying attention to conscious intuitions. Sixth, it seems that with the naturalization of beliefs in the cognitive system, human agents will take the place of supernatural agents, but the statistics show something else. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper a criticism is presented against the research program in the cognitive sciences that devotes itself to the study of religion, the so-called cognitive science of religion (CSR). It is argued that this discipline neglects the role of emotions in its attempt to explain why religious beliefs are adherent, i.e., memorable, evocative, and easily disseminated. The explanation offered by CSR is built up, to a large extent, upon the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis, which relates the adherence of religious beliefs to the degree of counterintuitiveness of the concepts figuring in their content. Although this hypothesis satisfactorily explains the adherence of a range of religious beliefs, some religious beliefs exist - the so-called mystical beliefs - whose adherence does not seem to be fully explained without the involvement of emotions and feelings. In the paper, a concrete example is presented, the example of the mystical belief in cosmic consciousness, or supreme consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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A central claim often made to debunk religious beliefs is that they would be formed regardless of whether they are true or false. One way to support this claim is to apply findings from the cognitive science of religion. However, this use of science in an argument against religious beliefs has been strongly criticized. This article is about weaknesses in that criticism. I consider two arguments. Firstly, the critic of debunking can argue that the debunker makes empirically dubious claims about the origin of religious beliefs. I argue that the debunker can avoid this problem because the controversial empirical claims are not necessary. General naturalistic assumptions about the origin of religion also create worries that support the central debunking claim. The second criticism focuses on the highly general nature of the claims or assumptions debunkers make about the origin of religious beliefs. Critics maintain that such claims or assumptions, even if true, fail to affect the specific religious beliefs you or I form. I respond, arguing that this criticism fails to engage with the most prominent version of debunking, which aims at classes of beliefs. Furthermore, by making a detour through a related discussion in metaethics, I show how this version of the debunking argument can be extended in such a fashion that it applies to a given individual who forms a religious belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Matthew Braddock's argument from false god beliefs (AFG) is one of the most significant debunking arguments to emerge from the growing literature on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This argument aims to produce a defeater for any basic theistic belief. In this essay, I reply to AFG by defending a counter-example to AFG's crucial premise. In particular, I argue that the cognitive mechanisms posited by CSR do not "significantly contribute" to perceptually based theistic belief formation in the way that AFG claims. As a result, a large class of basic theistic beliefs remains undefeated in the face of AFG. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks what, if anything, Christian theology should learn from the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Two possible answers are explored. The first is that Christian theology has nothing to learn from CSR. This is rejected in favour of the second: theology can learn from CSR by appropriating CSR insights carefully and critically to a theological understanding formed first and foremost by Scripture. Karl Barth's theological critique of religion and his engagement with Ludwig Feuerbach are used as a model for this approach. The article concludes with specific proposals about how, and how not, to engage theologically with CSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The minimally counterintuitive (MCI) thesis in the cognitive science of religion proposes that supernatural concepts are prevalent across cultures because they possess a common structure—namely, violations of intuitive ontological assumptions that facilitate concept representation. These violations are hypothesized to give supernatural concepts a memorability advantage over both intuitive concepts and "maximally counterintuitive" (MXCI) concepts, which contain numerous ontological violations. However, the connection between MCI concepts and bizarre (BIZ) but not supernatural concepts, for which memorability advantages are predicted by the von Restorff (VR) effect, has been insufficiently clarified by earlier research. Additionally, the role of inferential potential (IP) in determining MCI concepts' memorability has remained vague and only rarely controlled for. In a pre‐registered experiment, we directly compare memorability for MCI and MXCI concepts, compared to BIZ concepts, while controlling for IP as well as degree of bizarreness. Results indicate that when IP and bizarreness are controlled for, memorability of counterintuitive and BIZ concepts—relative to intuitive control concepts—is similar across concepts with one, two, and three characteristics. Findings suggest that the MCI and VR effects may be manifestations of the same underlying mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious hate propaganda, which is sustained communication by an authority that attempts to guide an audience towards persecuting others based on religion, is a speech crime. Yet, it is one of the least understood and most difficult speech crimes to prosecute. This is due to misunderstandings and epistemic gaps regarding how persecutory language, which would otherwise have little significance for prosocial religious adherents, becomes meaningful for a religious community. Drawing from the cognitive science of religion (CSR), this article develops and explores the hypothesis that for some religious communities, discursive attacks on others become meaningful when they center on dangerous accusations. Dangerous accusations portray the other as capable of mystical harm and, when made by cultural authorities, become socially accepted truths if repeated during rituals of veridiction. This article shows that dangerous accusations are at the heart of religious hate propaganda and exploit cognitive biases for threat perception, coalitional psychology, and costly signaling. Moreover, dangerous accusations can reinforce the social order and maintain social cohesion. Together, an analysis of speech crimes and dangerous accusations shed light on how religious hate propaganda works, how it can offer meaning to religious communities, and how it can justify persecution in certain environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce the first set of stimuli designed to resolve methodological and theoretical issues that have muddled the interpretation of results on the memorability of supernatural concepts (e.g., ghosts, souls, spirits), an important line of research in the cognitive science of religion (Barrett, 2007). We focus here on Boyer's (1994), Boyer, 2001) pioneering minimally counterintuitive (MCI) hypothesis according to which supernatural concepts tap a special memory-enhancing mechanism linked to violations of default intuitive inferences. Empirical tests of the MCI account have given rise to a vexed picture that renders meaningful interpretation difficult. The lack of a common standard of comparison among different studies, coupled with the presence of uncontrolled variables independently known to affect memorability, lie at the heart of these problems. We show that our new stimuli offer the hope of resolving these issues, thereby establishing a more secure foundation for the study of the memorability of supernatural concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Cognitive science of religion is sometimes portrayed as having no bearing on the theological doctrines of particular religious traditions, such as Christianity. In this paper, I argue that the naturalistic account of the etiology of religious beliefs offered by the cognitive science of religion undermines the important Christian doctrine of the grace of faith, which teaches that the special gift of divine grace is a necessary precondition for coming to faith. This has some far-reaching ramifications for Christian theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ibn Taymiyya proposes his unique epistemology by employing the concept of the fiṭra. When his statements describing the fiṭra are collected, we see that Ibn Taymiyya has presented a detailed view of human nature and how that nature relates to God and the universe as a whole. His fiṭra-centric theory of human nature can be usefully compared to other theories, not only within the Islamic tradition but also in theories of the self found in other religions or even contemporary scientific theories. As of yet, Ibn Taymiyya's work has not been studied through the lens of Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). Ibn Taymiyya is an ideal candidate for applying CSR research to Islamic thought in order to reach broader insights about theories of human nature within the Islamic scholarly tradition. CSR findings are relevant to Ibn Taymiyya's work specifically because Ibn Taymiyya claims that certain human emotions, intuitions, and behaviors are inborn and universal. By applying CSR, we can conclude that some aspects of Ibn Taymiyya's theological perspective are grounded in deeper and more universal features of human cognition that are not specific to the particularities of his biases, his milieu, political pressures of his time, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant explanation of the origins of religion in the nineteenth century was what we will call the Positivist Theory of religion, according to which religion is understood as form of primitive science, falsely based on an animistic method of explanation of events. Recently, this theory has been revived under the guise of evolutionary psychology and has arguably become the dominant naturalistic explanation of religion today. This essay examines this new form of animism based on the hypothesis of an ‘agency detector’ in the human mind that causes us to believe in gods and spirits. The essay argues that the new positivist theory of religion suffers from all the flaws of the earlier one as well as additional problems of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion represents a significant stream in the current academic study of religion. It can also be considered a critical reaction to the phenomenology of religion, which converged religious studies on confessional approaches. For a long time, the protectionist paradigm, represented above all by the aforementioned phenomenology of religion, prevailed in the study of religion. Therefore, there was a strong need to revive the naturalistic approach to the study of religion and to base research on scientific foundations. Cognitive science of religion has committed itself to the so-called second wave of consilience and seeks to integrate the methodology of natural sciences into the research of religion (naturalism, reductionism, explanation, experiment, hypothesis-driven research). The comparison of the perspective of the phenomenology of religion with the findings of the cognitive science of religion will be illustrated by the case of dance. It will directly show how the choice of one or the other theoretical framework significantly affects the whole research. The difference is not only in the way the problem is considered but especially the explanatory potential and verifiability of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the ritual practices denigrated through explicit or implicit criticism levied by the biblical writers is the worship of a deity or deities on the rooftops – sometimes of royal architecture, and at other times on private houses. In the present study I interpret this practice using concepts derived from the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and cognitive linguistics. I summarize previous typologies of objects employed in the sacrificial cult of the ancient Southern Levant, confirming prior arguments for understanding shaft-type limestone altars as stylized models of architectural precursors. From a cognitive perspective, these stylized architectural models prompted offrants to run a conceptual blend that replaced the modest small-scale vegetable or incense offering of the offrant's small-scale input space with the more sumptuous small-scale offering – or even large-scale animal sacrifice – of the monumental-scale input. This cognitive explanation provides explanation for Deuteronomistic and Priestly attempts to limit the practice, and occasions insight into the temporal aspects of "sacred space." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-engages with the science versus religion debate in the light of the last three decades of scholarly progress in the study of religion coming from the cognitive and evolutionary sciences of religion. I begin by asking (1) 'if it is indeed possible to account for the origins of religious belief, its cultural transmission and evolution, and its maintenance— without any appeal to the real existence of any supernatural deity—then are we in a position to say we have explained it all away?' If we are, how does this affect central themes in the philosophy of religion about God's existence? In (2) I provide an outline of the cognitive and evolutionary approach to explaining religion. In section (3) I discuss abductive reasoning (3.1), problems with the accusation of having committed the genetic fallacy when answering (1) in favour of positive atheism (3.2), the need for first-order justifications of religious belief (3.3), and in (3.4) a peculiar divine attribute (i.e. omnipotent potential in a causal chain of events) that appears to immunise religious belief in a particular kind of supernatural deity from having been explained away. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this response article, I argue that Launonen's criticisms either are beyond the scope of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also criticize Launonen's claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion has inspired several debunking arguments against theistic belief. Hans Van Eyghen's book Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion is the first monograph devoted to answering such arguments. This article focuses on Van Eyghen's responses to two widely discussed debunking arguments, one by Matthew Braddock and another by John Wilkins and Paul Griffiths. Both responses have potential but also face problems. Even if Van Eyghen manages to show that these authors have not fully excluded the possibility of noninferential theistic belief being underpinned by reliable belief-forming processes, he fails to offer convincing reasons to think the processes are in fact reliable. A positive argument for their reliability might ultimately have to be based on evidence for God's existence, namely, theistic arguments. The question of the rationality of religious belief (de jure) thus cannot be isolated from the question of God's existence (de facto). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion (CSR) is the study of how mental processes interact with and influence the formation and transmission of religious concepts. In this article, we examine how CSR may contribute to theological research and ministry practice. We begin with both an overview of CSR as a field and examinations of religious concepts and cognitive processes. We then address key concepts from Christian theology and scripture – the image of God (imago Dei), sense of the divine (sensus divinitatis), and ethics – and explore how CSR may contribute to research on these topics. We also consider how findings from CSR may influence everyday Christian life and ministry practice, specifically religious education and worship. Finally, we discuss limitations of and future directions for CSR.

The traditional view of hell as eternal conscious torment is challenged by proponents of universalism and conditional immortality. However, they need to explain why the church has been misled in adopting the traditional view. This paper draws from cognitive and evolutionary science of religion to provide an "error theory" of why eternal hell became the dominant view. Early Christianity grew rapidly despite persecution and marginalization. The fear of hell probably helped Christian communities to maintain cooperation by weeding out free riding even in times of crisis. Here the traditional view proved to be more effective than its competitors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teleology involves an appeal to function to explain why things are the way they are. Among scientists and philosophers, teleological explanations are widely accepted for human-made artifacts and biological traits, yet controversial for biological and nonbiological natural entities. Prior research shows a positive relationship between religiosity and acceptance of such controversial teleological explanations. Across three large online studies, we show that the relationship between religiosity and teleological acceptance cannot be explained by acceptance of objectively false explanations. Furthermore, we show that anthropomorphism and a belief in supernatural agents each independently predict teleological acceptance. In contrast, the tendency to inhibit intuitively appealing, yet incorrect responses to simple reasoning problems was associated with lower teleological acceptance. These results provide strong support for an intention-based account of teleology, and further contribute to the existing literature which situates teleological reasoning within a dual-process framework. Several avenues of future research are discussed, including the need to dissociate implicit and explicit measures of teleological belief, and the need for a greater focus on cross-cultural variation in teleological beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion (CSR) has inspired a number of debunking arguments against god‐belief. They aim to show that the belief‐forming processes that underlie belief in god(s) are unreliable. The debate surrounding these arguments gives the impression that CSR offers new scientific evidence that threatens the rationality of religious belief. This impression, however, is partly misleading. A close look at a few widely discussed debunking arguments shows, first, that CSR theories as such are far from providing sufficient empirical evidence that the belief‐forming processes behind god‐belief are unreliable. Thus, appealing solely to CSR theories makes a debunking argument weak. Second, there are strong arguments that also invoke CSR, but these gain their strength primarily from more familiar claims about evolutionary epistemology and religious diversity. What CSR actually does in these arguments is providing an explanation of why people might believe in gods even if gods did not exist. But explaining is not debunking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory of mind, the theory that humans attribute mental states to others, has become increasingly influential in the Cognitive Science of Religion in recent years, due to several papers which posit that supernatural agents, like gods, demons, and the dead, are accredited greater than normal knowledge and awareness. Using Old Norse mythology and literary accounts of Old Norse religion, supported by archaeological evidence, I examine the extent to which this modern perspective on religious theory of mind is reflected in religious traditions from the Viking Age. I focus especially on the extent to which superperception and superknowledge were attributed to Old Norse supernatural agents and the impact of this on expressions of religion; how the attribution of theory of mind varied with circumstances and the agents to which it was being attributed; and the extent to which features of religious theory of mind common in other societies were present in the historical North. On this basis, I also evaluate the usefulness of Old Norse historiography to Cognitive Science of Religion and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents an overview on some specificities of philosophical and of sociological approaches to religion. Among the chosen philosophical epistemological models are described: religion as universum (F.Schleiermacher, G.W.F.Hegel); the anthropocentric approach; the religion interpreted as a moral phenomenon (I.Kant); religion within the framework of dichotomies of human nature (E.Fromm, P.Tillich). The author presents and comments a few aspects of the J.Beckford’s analysis of problems and trends in the sociology of religion. The latest development in the Cognitive science of religion (CSR) are emphasized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) is distinctive in its systematic methodology and its interdisciplinary nature. In the field of the study of religion, however, scholars are hardly receptive to CSR because of its "scientific" nature. The reason for this is that CSR is understood as distinct from other studies, nevertheless it has humanistic backgrounds. In order to investigate the intellectual backgrounds of CSR, the paper will describe the initial development of CSR by introducing researches and academic cooperation in the period from the 1990s to the early 2000s. Moreover, by examining academic contexts, what the emergence of CSR brought about to the study of religion will be clarified. CSR emerged as a result of the debate between modernist and postmodernist, connecting various views and resulting in a great shift in the intellectual landscape. This interdisciplinary role can be seen as the most important achievement of CSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The workshop series of the project »Mapping Religionswissenschaft« offered networking opportunities, insights into processes of theory development, as well as valuable possibilities to exchange with representatives of the study of religion to early career researchers. In this article, two participants reflect upon three of these workshops (with Sebastian Schüler, Adrian Hermann, and Steffen Führding). The lively and intensive discussions within the workshops led to fruitful and further-reaching debates about their own research objects and approaches, as well as the challenges of (theoretical) work in the study of religion(s). Dunja Sharbat Dar and Dominika Hadrysiewicz exchange their experiences and insights from these workshops in a dialogue, and relate them to their own pursued research project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cognitive Science of Nationalistic Behavior (CSNB), presented in this paper, integrates the political sciences of nationalities as invented communities with an evolutionary cognitive analysis of social forms as products of the human mind. The framework is modeled after the Cognitive Science of Religion, where decades of cross-disciplinary work has generated standards, predictions, and data about the role of individual cognitive tendencies in shaping societies. We study the nationalistic calendar as a cultural attractor and draw on cue-based behavioral motivation and differential autobiographical memory systems to explain its appeal to the human mind. Calendrical elements are analyzed in the context of essentialist thought patterns and action representation systems. We conclude with the implications of calendrical thinking on the control of elites who aim to forge and reinforce national identities. This paper lays the groundwork for applying a similar approach to the study of other nationalistic elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seven researchers in the growing field of the cognitive science of religion recently claimed to have documented the unique neural correlates of spirituality separate from and independent of religion. They claimed that spirituality is therefore a natural part of human cognition and suggested that they proved definitively that spirituality is substantively different than religion. Using insights developed by scholars associated with the critical religion approach to the academic study of religion, this article identifies a series of methodological errors that undermine the researchers' project and that potentially impacts the larger academic study of the cognitive science of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an introduction to the Symposium on "The New Scientific Study of Religion Moving On." The introduction briefly indicates why the cognitive science of religion (CSR) needs re‐evaluation. It subsequently gives an overview of the contributions of the symposium's articles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases. I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more flexibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion (CSR) has increased influence in religious studies, the resistance of religious protectionists notwithstanding. CSR's most provocative work stresses the role of implicit cognition in explaining religious thought and conduct. Exhibiting explanatory pluralism, CSR seeks integrative accounts across the social, psychological, and brain sciences. CSR reflects prominent trends in the cognitive sciences generally. First, CSR is giving greater attention to the new tools and findings of cognitive neuroscience. Second, CSR researchers have done carefully designed, nonlaboratory studies of experience, incorporating precise physiological measures, obtaining astonishing findings about the experiences of ritual participants and observers. Third, CSR theorists have advanced evolutionary hypotheses about religions from eight perspectives (cross‐indexing three levels of selection with three mechanisms of selection). Cultural group selectionists headline credibility enhancing displays and Big Gods in the religious consolidation of large‐scale societies. Other CSR researchers marshal counterevidence and advance alternative hypotheses. CSR findings are incompatible with the New Atheists' projects on two fronts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by‐product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or "adaptivism" concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers a critical analysis of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) as applied to new and quasi-religious movements, and uncovers implicit conceptual and theoretical commitments of the approach. A discussion of CSR's application to new religious movement (NRM) case studies (charismatic leadership, paradise representations, Aḥmadiyya, and the International Society for Krishna Consciousness) identifies concerns about the theorized relationship between CSR and wider socio-cultural factors, and proposals for CSR's implication in wider processes are discussed. The main discussion analyses three themes in recent work relating CSR to religious and religion-like activities that extend and reframe the model. These include (1) identification of distinctive and accessible cognitive pathways associated with new forms of religious belief and practice (in particular in 'New Age' movements), (2) application of CSR to movements and practices outside traditional definitions of religion (near death experiences, conspiracy theories, virtual reality), and (3) engaging CSR in wider cultural processes and negotiations (religion in healthcare settings, and the definition of the study of esoteric religious traditions within academic domains). The conclusion identifies two particular findings: (1) that application of CSR in these areas renders underlying cognitive processes more available to scrutiny and (2) that CSR is employed to identify and enlarge the category of religion. The conclusion suggests that the study of CSR in its application to NRMs and quasi-religion identifies a wide field of common and overlapping themes and interests in which CSR is a more active operand than is commonly assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contemporary field of cognitive science proposes that religion (1) is a natural evolutionary development and (2) involves a two-system model of reasoning that, in a Christian context, moves from basic beliefs in God to a theological elaboration of those beliefs. The transition from natural religion to theology can lead to tensions, if not contradictions in thinking. An examination of the writings of Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) on petitionary prayer uncovers this difficulty, both among his Northampton parishioners and Edwards himself. Pastors and theologians would do well to appreciate the implications of cognitive science in consideration of their own formulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a 7E model of the human mind, which was developed within the cognitive paradigm in religious studies and its primary expression, the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This study draws on the philosophically most sophisticated currents in the cognitive sciences, which have come to define the human mind through a 4E model as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended. Introducing Catherine Malabou's concept of "plasticity," the study not only confirms the insight of the 4E model of the self as a decentered system, but it also recommends two further traits of the self that have been overlooked in the cognitive sciences, namely the negativity of plasticity and the tension between giving and receiving form. Finally, the article matures these philosophical insights to develop a concrete model of the religious mind, equipping it with three further Es, namely emotional, evolved, and exoconscious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article summarizes the main tenets of the monograph Naturalismus a protekcionismus ve studiu náboženství (Naturalism and Protectionism in the Study of Religions), published in Czech by Masaryk University Press in 2017. The monograph, to be published in English by Bloomsbury in 2020, identifies a serious methodological schism between naturalism and protectionism in the modern (19th and 20th century) Study of Religions, tracks the earliest roots of these competing paradigms to Pre-Socratic philosophy and early Christian literature, and evaluates the contribution of the Cognitive Science of Religion to the renewal of the naturalist approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this response, I identify and address five recurring issues raised in the commentaries to my recently published book, An Introduction to the Cognitive Science of Religion: Connecting Evolution, Brain, Cognition, and Culture. These issues are: (1) Conceptualizing and studying religion, (2) the dialogue between method and theory, (3) the theological implications of the CSR, (4) history and culture, and finally, I end with (5) the future of religion and the CSR. I conclude that while further developments are inevitable in a subdiscipline as young as the CSR, we have made tremendous progress already in revitalizing the study of religion towards a more scientifically grounded perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this review, we discuss three vision impairments in the cognitive science of religious beliefs. We first assess the CSR's improvements upon previous generations' "mindblindness." We also address "contextblindness," the CSR's relative lack of focus on the extant environment's role in the formation and retention of religious beliefs. Finally, we address the problem of the CSR's "ecoblindness," that is, ignoring how beliefs are aligned with the distribution of resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this commentary on Claire White's An Introduction to the Cognitive Science of Religion: Connecting Evolution, Brain, Cognition, and Culture (London: Routledge, 2021), I contrast the circuitous way in which I (and probably a number of others) initially came to teach cognitive science of religion (CSR) at the undergraduate university level with the more direct (and knowledgeable) way in which White came to do so. I then briefly discuss her comprehensive and coherent presentation of the CSR, noting, however, several issues with which I have problems (fractionation, an ahistorical "presentist" bias, and whether or not an "agnostic" view of religious teachings should remain the norm in the modern university curricula). Nevertheless, White's Introduction is a most welcome and longoverdue contribution to the academic study of religion, the 150-year trajectory of which has been characterized by an anti-scientific history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a brief overview of Claire White's An Introduction to the Cognitive Science of Religion for the benefit of readers who have not had access to the book but are interested in following the critical discussion raised in this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of the paper is to present some theories of religious thinking from the perspective of Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) – standard and extended model, evolutionary approach to religious cognition. The main focus of CSR is on unconscious processes such as thoughts, biases, emotions, and motivations. Cognitive scientists of religion are interested in exploring the causal mechanisms that might account for the recurrent patterns of religious beliefs and practices. This need not be in confl ict with the religious or theistic explanation of religion, in contrary, it can help a better understanding of how religious concept are spread, remembered, developed and entrenched in human mind. The results of CSR can help us to understand the link between natural religious thinking, religious doctrine and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interview given by Lluis Oviedo, a full Professor for Theological Anthropology at the Pontifical University Antonianum of Rome, and Fundamental Theology at the Theological Institute of Murcia (Spain). He is team member of research group on Creditions, based in Graz University (Austria). He edits a book series on "New approaches to the scientific study of religion" (Springer) and the bibliographic bulletin Reviews in Science, Religion and Theology. Research interests focus on the dialogue between theology and sciences, including the new scientific study of religion, and more recently to the interaction between religious belief and AI, and to how religious beliefs and behaviors are related to personal and social wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural disparity - the variation across cultural traits such as knowledge, skill, and belief - is a complex phenomenon, studied by a number of researchers with an expanding empirical toolkit. While there is a growing consensus as to the processes that generate cultural variation and change, general explanatory frameworks require additional tools for identifying, organizing, and relating the complex causes that underpin the production of cultural disparity. Here I develop a case study in the cognitive science of religion and demonstrate how concepts and distinctions drawn from work on contrastive explanation and manipulationist accounts of causation provide such tools for distinguishing explanatory levels, organizing causal narratives, and accounting for cross-cultural patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious studies' collective advocacy on behalf of diversity and inclusion stands in poignant contrast to its persisting exclusionary ethos (within most quarters of the field) concerning questions of method. A legacy of prohibitions in religious studies about who can study religions and about how they must proceed when doing so has tended to curb innovation. Born of protectionism or special pleading or outright religious impulses, such prohibitions have skewed the field in favor of the idiosyncratic over the recurrent, of the idiographic over the systematic, and of the interpretive over the explanatory. My long-standing interest in the promise of the cognitive sciences for studying religion has been, in part, to redress those imbalances. Redressing imbalances, however, does not involve dismissing the idiosyncratic, the idiographic, or the interpretive, but only suggests, first, that they are not the whole story and, second, that greater attention to the recurrent, the systematic, and the explanatory will enrich - not eliminate - our understandings and our inquiries. The first of those two propositions follows from the second. My aim in this paper is to substantiate that second proposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the use of evolutionary theory in the cognitive science of religion (CSR), with special attention to critical issues and new developments. In the first part of the article, I will discuss the definition of evolution and describe the Modern Synthesis (or neo-Darwinian theory). In the next part, I will consider various evolutionary perspectives in CSR, including evolutionary psychology, sexual selection, gene-culture co-evolution, and cultural evolution. In the final part, I will turn to the problems with the Modern Synthesis and present a new approach based on network theory, with potential applications to the study of biological and cultural systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the extent to which the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and Donald Davidson's semantic holism (DSH) harmonize. We first characterize CSR, philosophical semantics (and more specifically DSH). We then note a prima facie tension between CSR and DSH's view of First-Person Authority (that we know what is meant when we speak in a way that we do not when others speak). If CSR is correct that the causes of religious belief are located in cognitive processes in the mind/brain, then religious insiders might have no idea what they are talking about: only the scholar of CSR would have a chance of knowing what they 'really' mean. The article argues that the resolution to this problem is to take seriously DSH's rejection of semantic bifurcation, specifically rejecting the idea that religious and non-religious language can be sharply distinguished. We conclude by supporting the following claims: (i) common cognitive neural/psychological processes are explanatorily relevant in proposed meaning-theories for any discourse, and (ii) those processes need semantic supplementation with reference to external and naturalistic factors (biological, cultural, environmental etc.). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]