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Secure property rights are often seen as a precondition of incentives for long‐term sustainable use by communities dependent on natural resources. Securing formal property rights can be challenging in coastal small‐scale fisheries, which often operate under open access conditions. We argue that insecure, informal rights can offer one pathway for property‐rights regime change, and may also provide greater flexibility for developing sustainable fishing practices compatible with climate change adaptation, among other policy‐relevant outcomes. The process of establishing short‐term but renewable area‐based conservation tools, such as the Fish Refuges of Baja California Sur, Mexico, offers the opportunity to examine how community‐based strategies can generate incentives for conservation despite the lack of secure property rights. Using in‐depth qualitative methods, socioeconomic surveys, and ecological data from 2009 to 2019, we studied the process of engagement among fishers, civil society, and government. We focused on understanding the emerging transition from a scenario of open access and limited withdrawal property rights, toward locals' attaining of insecure defacto management and exclusion property rights and longer‐term visions of resource use and conservation. Altogether, this case illustrates the potential and limitations of Fish Refuges as an area‐based fisheries and conservation tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Harvesting has received most theoretical, empirical, and policy attention towards understanding common-pool resource dilemmas. Yet, pre-harvesting and post-harvesting activities influence harvesting outcomes as well. Broadening the analytical focus beyond harvesting is needed to imagine new ways of theorizing and governing the commons. Fishing—which is synonymous with harvesting—is a case in point. We contribute to a beyond-harvesting research agenda by incorporating concepts from common-pool resources theory that have not received enough attention in the literature. We compare two ubiquitous self-organizing strategies (i.e., fishing cooperatives and patron-client relationships) fishers use to access means of production and analyze their effects on the distribution of benefits resulting from harvesting. We use rarely available longitudinal data of monetary loans to fishers in Mexican small-scale fisheries and find that cooperatives can deliver broader distribution of benefits than patron-client relationships. Our study highlights the importance of historically and contextually situating analyses linking the effects of pre-harvesting processes on harvesting outcomes, and the benefits of broadening the scope of inquiry beyond a narrow policy attention on harvesting to move towards a fuller understanding of commons dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Highlights: [•] We examine the governance of large common pool resources through a protected area network in Palau. [•] We analyze nested, polycentric governance as a political scalar project. [•] We highlight potential tradeoffs that may accompany the prioritization of ecological scale as a guide for institutional reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using common-pool resources theory we propose several attributes for protected area governance that could influence the emergence of successful collectiveaction with adaptive capacity for biodiversity conservation. Proposed attributes were observed at the Guanacaste Conservation Area (ACG) and absent at other less successful conservation areas. The attributes are (1) a clear and inspiring vision internalized by the staff; (2) practice-based learning opportunities; (3) high organizational "contextuality"; (4) long-term financial and administrative autonomy; and (5) a diversity of cross-scale linkages to access resources. We discuss how these attributes could interact to facilitate adaptive capacity for biodiversity conservation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Addressing global fisheries overexploitation requires better understanding of how small-scale fishing communities in developing countries limit access to fishing grounds. We analyze the performance of a system based on individual licenses and a common property-rights regime in their ability to generate incentives for self-governance and conservation of fishery resources. Using a qualitative before-after-control-impact approach, we compare two neighbouring fishing communities in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Both were initially governed by the same permit system, are situated in the same ecosystem, use similar harvesting technology, and have overharvested similar species. One community changed to a common property-right regime, enabling the emergence of access controls and avoiding overexploitation of benthic resources, while the other community, still relies on the permit system. We discuss the roles played by power, institutions, socio-historic, and biophysical factors to develop access controls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the challenges of the people in moving ahead from the theory of Garrett Hardin. It outlines how Hardin emphasizes the overuse of the natural resources as well as its tragic consequences. It mentions Hardin's suggested solutions to prevent future natural tragedies such as state control or individual ownership. However, it points out how Hardin's analysis of the tragedy presents a universal phenomenon, and emphasizes why overharvesting occur due to shortage. It suggests the need to develop theoretical understanding acknowledge the uniqueness of the human beings.

The Seri people, a self-governed community of small-scale fishermen in the Gulf of California, Mexico, have ownership rights to fishing grounds where they harvest highly valuable commercial species of bivalves. Outsiders are eager to gain access, and the community has devised a set of rules to allow them in. Because Seri government officials keep all the economic benefits generated from granting this access for themselves, community members create alternative entry mechanisms to divert those benefits to themselves. Under Hardin's model of the tragedy of the commons, this situation would eventually lead to the overexploitation of the fishery. The Seri people, however, are able to simultaneously maintain access and use controls for the continuing sustainability of their .fishing grounds. Using insights from common-pool resources theory, I discuss how Seri community characteristics help mediate the conflict between collective action dilemmas and access and use controls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]