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This study shows, for the first time, that the evolution of a simple behavior, scrounging, at the individual level can have effects on populations, food chains, and community structure. In particular, the addition of scrounging in consumer populations can allow multiple consumers to coexist while exploiting a single prey. Also, scrounging in the top predator of a tritrophic food chain can stabilize interactions between the top predator, its prey, and its prey's prey. This occurs because the payoffs to scrounging for food in a population are negative frequency dependent, allowing scroungers to invade a population and to coexist with producers at a frequency which is density‐dependent. The presence of scroungers, who do not search for resources but simply use those found by others (producers) reduces the total amount of resource acquired by the group. As scrounging increases with group size, this leads to less resource acquired per individual as the group grows. Ultimately, this limits the size of the group, its impact on its prey, and its ability to outcompete other species. These effects can promote stability and thus increase species diversity. I will further suggest that prey may alter their spatial distribution such that scrounging will be profitable among their predators thus reducing predation rate on the prey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many parasites are known to manipulate the behaviour of intermediate hosts in order to increase their probability of transmission to definitive hosts. This manipulation must have costs. Here we explore the combined effects of three such costs on the amount of effort a parasite should expend on host manipulation. Manipulation can have direct costs to future reproductive success due to energy expended to manipulate the host. There may also be indirect costs if other parasites infect the host and profit from the manipulation without paying the cost of manipulation. These “free riders” may impose a third cost by competing with manipulators for resources within the host. Using game theory analysis and several different competition models we show that intrahost competition will decrease the investment that a parasite should make in manipulation but that manipulation can, under some circumstances, be a profitable strategy even in the presence of non-manipulating competitors. The key determinants of the manipulator’s success and its investment in manipulation are the relatedness among parasites within the host, the ratio of the passive transmission rate to the efficiency of increasing transmission rate and the strength of competitive effects. Manipulation, when exploited by others, becomes an altruistic behaviour. Thus we suggest that our model may be generally applicable to cases where organisms can exploit the investment of others (possibly kin) while also competing with the organism whose investment they exploit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]