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Network-on-chip facilitates glueless interconnection of various on-chip components in the forthcoming system-on-chips. As in the case of any new technology, security is a major concern in network-on-chip (NoC) design too. In this work, we explore a covert threat model for multiprocessor system-on-chips (MPSoCs) stemming from the use of malicious third-party network-on-chips (NoCs). We illustrate that a rogue NoC (rNoC) can selectively disrupt the perceived availability of on-chip resources, thereby causing large performance bottlenecks for the applications running on the MPSoC platform. Further, to counter the threat posed by rNoC, we propose a runtime latency auditor that enables an MPSoC integrator to monitor the trustworthiness of the deployed NoC throughout the chip lifetime. We also discuss measures that can be taken to minimize the impact of a rNoC, once it is detected. Our comprehensive cross-layer analysis of our novel detection technique indicates modest overheads of 12.73% in area, 9.844% in power, and 5.4% in terms of network latency.

Continuous technology scaling has made aging mechanisms, such as negative bias temperature instability and electromigration primary concerns in network-on-chip (NoC) designs. In this paper, we extensively analyze the effects of these aging mechanisms on NoC routers and links. We observe a critical need of a robust aging-aware routing algorithm that not only reduces power-performance overheads caused due to aging degradation, but also minimizes the stress experienced by heavily utilized routers and links. To solve this problem, we propose an aging-aware adaptive routing algorithm and a router microarchitecture that routes the packets along the paths, which are both least congested and experience minimum aging degradation. After an extensive experimental analysis using real workloads, we observe 13% and 12.17% average overhead reduction in network latency and energy–delay product per flit, a 10.4% improvement in performance, and a 60% improvement in mean time to failure using our aging-aware routing algorithm.

In this paper, we propose a covert threat model for MPSoCs designed using 3rd party Network-on-Chips (NoC). We illustrate that a malicious NoC can disrupt the availability of on-chip resources, thereby causing large performance bottlenecks for the software running on the MPSoC platform. We then propose a runtime latency auditor that enables an MPSoC integrator to monitor the trustworthiness of the deployed NoC throughout the chip lifetime. For the proposed technique, our comprehensive cross-layer analysis indicates modest overheads of 12.73% in area, 9.844% in power and 5.4% in terms of network latency.

Network-On-Chips (NoCs) have become the standard communication platform for future massively parallel systems due to their performance, flexibility and scalability advantages. However, reliability issues brought about by scaling in the sub-20nm era threaten to undermine the benefits offered by NoCs. In this paper, we showthat QoS policies exacerbate the reliability profile of an exascale system. To mitigate this imposing challenge, we propose Dynamic Wearout Resilient Routing (DWRR) algorithms in QoS-enabled exascale NoCs. Our proposal includes two novel DWRR algorithms enabled by a critical-path monitor and a broadcast-based routing configuration. Using PARSEC benchmarks, our best algorithm improves QoS and long-term sustainability (Mean Time To Failure) of the system by an average of 16% and 25% compared to a state-of-the-art fault tolerant technique, respectively. Copyright 2014 ACM.

In this paper, we uncover a novel and imminent threat to an emerging computing paradigm: MPSoCs built with 3rd party IP NoCs. We demonstrate that a compromised NoC (C-NoC) can enable a range of security attacks with an accomplice software component. To counteract these threats, we propose Fort-NoCs, a series of techniques that work together to provide protection from a C-NoC in an MPSoC. Fort-NoCs's foolproof protection disables covert backdoor activation, and reduces the chance of a successful side-channel attack by "clouding" the information obtained by an attacker. Compared to recently proposed techniques, Fort-NoCs offers a substantially better protection with lower overheads. Copyright 2014 ACM.