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Deepfake speech represents a real and growing threat to systems and society. Many detectors have been created to aid in defense against speech deepfakes. While these detectors implement myriad methodologies, many rely on low-level fragments of the speech generation process. We hypothesize that breath, a higher-level part of speech, is a key component of natural speech and thus improper generation in deepfake speech is a performant discriminator. To evaluate this, we create a breath detector and leverage this against a custom dataset of online news article audio to discriminate between real/deepfake speech. Additionally, we make this custom dataset publicly available to facilitate comparison for future work. Applying our simple breath detector as a deepfake speech discriminator on in-the-wild samples allows for accurate classification (perfect 1.0 AUPRC and 0.0 EER on test data) across 33.6 hours of audio. We compare our model with the state-of-the-art SSL-wav2vec model and show that this complex deep learning model completely fails to classify the same in-the-wild samples (0.72 AUPRC and 0.99 EER)., Comment: Submitted to ACM journal -- Digital Threats: Research and Practice

Underwater datacenters (UDCs) hold promise as next-generation data storage due to their energy efficiency and environmental sustainability benefits. While the natural cooling properties of water save power, the isolated aquatic environment and long-range sound propagation in water create unique vulnerabilities which differ from those of on-land data centers. Our research discovers the unique vulnerabilities of fault-tolerant storage devices, resource allocation software, and distributed file systems to acoustic injection attacks in UDCs. With a realistic testbed approximating UDC server operations, we empirically characterize the capabilities of acoustic injection underwater and find that an attacker can reduce fault-tolerant RAID 5 storage system throughput by 17% up to 100%. Our closed-water analyses reveal that attackers can (i) cause unresponsiveness and automatic node removal in a distributed filesystem with only 2.4 minutes of sustained acoustic injection, (ii) induce a distributed database's latency to increase by up to 92.7% to reduce system reliability, and (iii) induce load-balance managers to redirect up to 74% of resources to a target server to cause overload or force resource colocation. Furthermore, we perform open-water experiments in a lake and find that an attacker can cause controlled throughput degradation at a maximum allowable distance of 6.35 m using a commercial speaker. We also investigate and discuss the effectiveness of standard defenses against acoustic injection attacks. Finally, we formulate a novel machine learning-based detection system that reaches 0% False Positive Rate and 98.2% True Positive Rate trained on our dataset of profiled hard disk drives under 30-second FIO benchmark execution. With this work, we aim to help manufacturers proactively protect UDCs against acoustic injection attacks and ensure the security of subsea computing infrastructures., Comment: Accepted to IEEE S&P 2024

Eye tracking is routinely being incorporated into virtual reality (VR) systems. Prior research has shown that eye tracking data, if exposed, can be used for re-identification attacks. The state of our knowledge about currently existing privacy mechanisms is limited to privacy-utility trade-off curves based on data-centric metrics of utility, such as prediction error, and black-box threat models. We propose that for interactive VR applications, it is essential to consider user-centric notions of utility and a variety of threat models. We develop a methodology to evaluate real-time privacy mechanisms for interactive VR applications that incorporate subjective user experience and task performance metrics. We evaluate selected privacy mechanisms using this methodology and find that re-identification accuracy can be decreased to as low as 14% while maintaining a high usability score and reasonable task performance. Finally, we elucidate three threat scenarios (black-box, black-box with exemplars, and white-box) and assess how well the different privacy mechanisms hold up to these adversarial scenarios. This work advances the state of the art in VR privacy by providing a methodology for end-to-end assessment of the risk of re-identification attacks and potential mitigating solutions., Comment: To appear in IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics

Latest developments in computer hardware, sensor technologies, and artificial intelligence can make virtual reality (VR) and virtual spaces an important part of human everyday life. Eye tracking offers not only a hands-free way of interaction but also the possibility of a deeper understanding of human visual attention and cognitive processes in VR. Despite these possibilities, eye-tracking data also reveal privacy-sensitive attributes of users when it is combined with the information about the presented stimulus. To address these possibilities and potential privacy issues, in this survey, we first cover major works in eye tracking, VR, and privacy areas between the years 2012 and 2022. While eye tracking in the VR part covers the complete pipeline of eye-tracking methodology from pupil detection and gaze estimation to offline use and analyses, as for privacy and security, we focus on eye-based authentication as well as computational methods to preserve the privacy of individuals and their eye-tracking data in VR. Later, taking all into consideration, we draw three main directions for the research community by mainly focusing on privacy challenges. In summary, this survey provides an extensive literature review of the utmost possibilities with eye tracking in VR and the privacy implications of those possibilities., Comment: This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be accessible

Our research discovers how the rolling shutter and movable lens structures widely found in smartphone cameras modulate structure-borne sounds onto camera images, creating a point-of-view (POV) optical-acoustic side channel for acoustic eavesdropping. The movement of smartphone camera hardware leaks acoustic information because images unwittingly modulate ambient sound as imperceptible distortions. Our experiments find that the side channel is further amplified by intrinsic behaviors of Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) rolling shutters and movable lenses such as in Optical Image Stabilization (OIS) and Auto Focus (AF). Our paper characterizes the limits of acoustic information leakage caused by structure-borne sound that perturbs the POV of smartphone cameras. In contrast with traditional optical-acoustic eavesdropping on vibrating objects, this side channel requires no line of sight and no object within the camera's field of view (images of a ceiling suffice). Our experiments test the limits of this side channel with a novel signal processing pipeline that extracts and recognizes the leaked acoustic information. Our evaluation with 10 smartphones on a spoken digit dataset reports 80.66%, 91.28%, and 99.67% accuracies on recognizing 10 spoken digits, 20 speakers, and 2 genders respectively. We further systematically discuss the possible defense strategies and implementations. By modeling, measuring, and demonstrating the limits of acoustic eavesdropping from smartphone camera image streams, our contributions explain the physics-based causality and possible ways to reduce the threat on current and future devices.

Providing security guarantees for embedded devices with limited interface capabilities is an increasingly crucial task. Although these devices don't have traditional interfaces, they still generate unintentional electromagnetic signals that correlate with the instructions being executed. By collecting these traces using our methodology and leveraging a random forest algorithm to develop a machine learning model, we built an EM side channel based instruction level disassembler. The disassembler was tested on an Arduino UNO board, yielding an accuracy of 88.69% instruction recognition for traces from twelve instructions captured at a single location in the device; this is an improvement compared to the 75.6% (for twenty instructions) reported in previous similar work., Comment: Accepted to the poster section of the 7th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy 2022

The Android operating system is currently the most popular mobile operating system in the world. Android is based on Linux and therefore inherits its features including its Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanisms. These mechanisms are used by processes to communicate with one another and are extensively used in Android. While Android-specific IPC mechanisms have been studied extensively, Unix domain sockets have not been examined comprehensively, despite playing a crucial role in the IPC of highly privileged system daemons. In this paper, we propose SAUSAGE, an efficient novel static analysis framework to study the security properties of these sockets. SAUSAGE considers access control policies implemented in the Android security model, as well as authentication checks implemented by the daemon binaries. It is a fully static analysis framework, specifically designed to analyze Unix domain socket usage in Android system daemons, at scale. We use this framework to analyze 200 Android images across eight popular smartphone vendors spanning Android versions 7-9. As a result, we uncover multiple access control misconfigurations and insecure authentication checks. Our notable findings include a permission bypass in highly privileged Qualcomm system daemons and an unprotected socket that allows an untrusted app to set the scheduling priority of other processes running on the system, despite the implementation of mandatory SELinux policies. Ultimately, the results of our analysis are worrisome; all vendors except the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) have access control issues, allowing an untrusted app to communicate to highly privileged daemons through Unix domain sockets introduced by hardware manufacturer or vendor customization., Comment: Accepted to EuroS&P 2022

A one-time program (OTP) works as follows: Alice provides Bob with the implementation of some function. Bob can have the function evaluated exclusively on a single input of his choosing. Once executed, the program will fail to evaluate on any other input. State-of-the-art one-time programs have remained theoretical, requiring custom hardware that is cost-ineffective/unavailable, or confined to adhoc/unrealistic assumptions. To bridge this gap, we explore how the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) of modern CPUs can realize the OTP functionality. Specifically, we build two flavours of such a system: in the first, the TEE directly enforces the one-timeness of the program; in the second, the program is represented with a garbled circuit and the TEE ensures Bob's input can only be wired into the circuit once, equivalent to a smaller cryptographic primitive called one-time memory. These have different performance profiles: the first is best when Alice's input is small and Bob's is large, and the second for the converse.

A protocol for two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) aims to allow the parties to learn the output of function $f$ of their private inputs, while leaking nothing more. In a sense, such a protocol realizes a trusted oracle that computes $f$ and returns the result to both parties. There have been tremendous strides in efficiency over the past ten years, yet 2P-SFE protocols remain impractical for most real-time, online computations, particularly on modestly provisioned devices. Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides hardware-protected execution environments, called enclaves, that may be viewed as trusted computation oracles. While SGX provides native CPU speed for secure computation, previous side-channel and micro-architecture attacks have demonstrated how security guarantees of enclaves can be compromised. In this paper, we explore a balanced approach to 2P-SFE on SGX-enabled processors by constructing a protocol for evaluating $f$ relative to a partitioning of $f$. This approach alleviates the burden of trust on the enclave by allowing the protocol designer to choose which components should be evaluated within the enclave, and which via standard cryptographic techniques. We describe SGX-enabled SFE protocols (modeling the enclave as an oracle), and formalize the strongest-possible notion of 2P-SFE for our setting. We prove our protocol meets this notion when properly realized. We implement the protocol and apply it to two practical problems: privacy-preserving queries to a database, and a version of Dijkstra's algorithm for privacy-preserving navigation. Our evaluation shows that our SGX-enabled SFE scheme enjoys a 38x increase in performance over garbled-circuit-based SFE. Finally, we justify modeling of the enclave as an oracle by implementing protections against known side-channels., Comment: Full version, with proofs, of conference paper at AsiaCCS 2019; updated to include copyright information

Voice Processing Systems (VPSes), now widely deployed, have been made significantly more accurate through the application of recent advances in machine learning. However, adversarial machine learning has similarly advanced and has been used to demonstrate that VPSes are vulnerable to the injection of hidden commands - audio obscured by noise that is correctly recognized by a VPS but not by human beings. Such attacks, though, are often highly dependent on white-box knowledge of a specific machine learning model and limited to specific microphones and speakers, making their use across different acoustic hardware platforms (and thus their practicality) limited. In this paper, we break these dependencies and make hidden command attacks more practical through model-agnostic (blackbox) attacks, which exploit knowledge of the signal processing algorithms commonly used by VPSes to generate the data fed into machine learning systems. Specifically, we exploit the fact that multiple source audio samples have similar feature vectors when transformed by acoustic feature extraction algorithms (e.g., FFTs). We develop four classes of perturbations that create unintelligible audio and test them against 12 machine learning models, including 7 proprietary models (e.g., Google Speech API, Bing Speech API, IBM Speech API, Azure Speaker API, etc), and demonstrate successful attacks against all targets. Moreover, we successfully use our maliciously generated audio samples in multiple hardware configurations, demonstrating effectiveness across both models and real systems. In so doing, we demonstrate that domain-specific knowledge of audio signal processing represents a practical means of generating successful hidden voice command attacks.

Establishing unique identities for both humans and end systems has been an active research problem in the security community, giving rise to innovative machine learning-based authentication techniques. Although such techniques offer an automated method to establish identity, they have not been vetted against sophisticated attacks that target their core machine learning technique. This paper demonstrates that mimicking the unique signatures generated by host fingerprinting and biometric authentication systems is possible. We expose the ineffectiveness of underlying machine learning classification models by constructing a blind attack based around the query synthesis framework and utilizing Explainable-AI (XAI) techniques. We launch an attack in under 130 queries on a state-of-the-art face authentication system, and under 100 queries on a host authentication system. We examine how these attacks can be defended against and explore their limitations. XAI provides an effective means for adversaries to infer decision boundaries and provides a new way forward in constructing attacks against systems using machine learning models for authentication.

The USB protocol has become ubiquitous, supporting devices from high-powered computing devices to small embedded devices and control systems. USB's greatest feature, its openness and expandability, is also its weakness, and attacks such as BadUSB exploit the unconstrained functionality afforded to these devices as a vector for compromise. Fundamentally, it is virtually impossible to know whether a USB device is benign or malicious. This work introduces FirmUSB, a USB-specific firmware analysis framework that uses domain knowledge of the USB protocol to examine firmware images and determine the activity that they can produce. Embedded USB devices use microcontrollers that have not been well studied by the binary analysis community, and our work demonstrates how lifters into popular intermediate representations for analysis can be built, as well as the challenges of doing so. We develop targeting algorithms and use domain knowledge to speed up these processes by a factor of 7 compared to unconstrained fully symbolic execution. We also successfully find malicious activity in embedded 8051 firmwares without the use of source code. Finally, we provide insights into the challenges of symbolic analysis on embedded architectures and provide guidance on improving tools to better handle this important class of devices., Comment: 18 pages, CCS 2017

Data provenance is a valuable tool for detecting and preventing cyber attack, providing insight into the nature of suspicious events. For example, an administrator can use provenance to identify the perpetrator of a data leak, track an attacker's actions following an intrusion, or even control the flow of outbound data within an organization. Unfortunately, providing relevant data provenance for complex, heterogenous software deployments is challenging, requiring both the tedious instrumentation of many application components as well as a unified architecture for aggregating information between components. In this work, we present a composition of techniques for bringing affordable and holistic provenance capabilities to complex application workflows, with particular consideration for the exemplar domain of web services. We present DAP, a transparent architecture for capturing detailed data provenance for web service components. Our approach leverages a key insight that minimal knowledge of open protocols can be leveraged to extract precise and efficient provenance information by interposing on application components' communications, granting DAP compatibility with existing web services without requiring instrumentation or developer cooperation. We show how our system can be used in real time to monitor system intrusions or detect data exfiltration attacks while imposing less than 5.1 ms end-to-end overhead on web requests. Through the introduction of a garbage collection optimization, DAP is able to monitor system activity without suffering from excessive storage overhead. DAP thus serves not only as a provenance-aware web framework, but as a case study in the non-invasive deployment of provenance capabilities for complex applications workflows.

Two-party secure function evaluation (SFE) has become significantly more feasible, even on resource-constrained devices, because of advances in server-aided computation systems. However, there are still bottlenecks, particularly in the input validation stage of a computation. Moreover, SFE research has not yet devoted sufficient attention to the important problem of retaining state after a computation has been performed so that expensive processing does not have to be repeated if a similar computation is done again. This paper presents PartialGC, an SFE system that allows the reuse of encrypted values generated during a garbled-circuit computation. We show that using PartialGC can reduce computation time by as much as 96% and bandwidth by as much as 98% in comparison with previous outsourcing schemes for secure computation. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach with two sets of experiments, one in which the garbled circuit is evaluated on a mobile device and one in which it is evaluated on a server. We also use PartialGC to build a privacy-preserving "friend finder" application for Android. The reuse of previous inputs to allow stateful evaluation represents a new way of looking at SFE and further reduces computational barriers., Comment: 20 pages, shorter conference version published in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Pages 582-596, ACM New York, NY, USA