Search

Software-based control of life-critical embedded systems has become increasingly complex, and to a large extent has come to determine the safety of the human being. For example, implantable cardiac pacemakers have over 80,000 lines of code which are responsible for maintaining the heart within safe operating limits. As firmware-related recalls accounted for over 41% of the 600,000 devices recalled in the last decade, there is a need for rigorous model-driven design tools to generate verified code from verified software models. To this effect, we have developed the UPP2SF model-translation tool, which facilitates automatic conversion of verified models (in UPPAAL) to models that may be simulated and tested (in Simulink/Stateflow). We describe the translation rules that ensure correct model conversion, applicable to a large class of models. We demonstrate how UPP2SF is used in themodel-driven design of a pacemaker whosemodel is (a) designed and verified in UPPAAL (using timed automata), (b) automatically translated to Stateflow for simulation-based testing, and then (c) automatically generated into modular code for hardware-level integration testing of timing-related errors. In addition, we show how UPP2SF may be used for worst-case execution time estimation early in the design stage. Using UPP2SF, we demonstrate the value of integrated end-to-end modeling, verification, code-generation and testing process for complex software-controlled embedded systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing complexity of modern Cyber–Physical Systems (CPS) and the frequent communication between their components make them vulnerable to malicious attacks. As a result, secure state estimation is a critical requirement for the control of these systems. Many existing secure state estimation methods suffer from combinatorial complexity which grows with the number of states and sensors in the system. This complexity can be mitigated using optimization-based methods that relax the original state estimation problem, although at the cost of optimality as these methods often identify attack-free sensors as attacked. In this paper, we propose a new optimal graph-search algorithm to correctly identify malicious attacks and to securely estimate the states even in large-scale CPS modeled as linear time-invariant systems The graph consists of layers, each one containing two nodes capturing a truth assignment of any given sensor, and directed edges connecting adjacent layers only. Then, our algorithm searches the layers of this graph incrementally, favoring directions at higher layers with more attack-free assignments, while actively managing a repository of nodes to be expanded at later iterations. The proposed search bias and the ability to revisit nodes in the repository and self-correct, allow our graph-search algorithm to reach the optimal assignment faster and tackle larger problems. We show that our algorithm is complete and optimal provided that process and measurement noises do not dominate the attack signal. Moreover, we provide numerical simulations that demonstrate the ability of our algorithm to correctly identify attacked sensors and securely reconstruct the state. Our simulations show that our method outperforms existing algorithms both in terms of optimality and execution time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]