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Grounded cognition theories assume that conceptual processing depends on modality-specific brain systems in a context-dependent fashion. Although the relation of abstract concepts to modality-specific systems is less obvious than for concrete concepts, recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies indicated a foundation of abstract concepts in vision and action. However, due to their poor temporal resolution, neuroimaging studies cannot determine whether sensorimotor activity reflects rapid access to conceptual information or later conceptual processes. The present study therefore assessed the time course of abstract concept processing using event-related potentials (ERPs) and compared ERP responses to abstract concepts with a strong relation to vision or action. We tested whether possible ERP effects to abstract word categories would emerge in early or in later time windows and whether these effects would depend on the depth of the conceptual task. In Experiment 1, a shallow lexical decision task, early feature-specific effects starting at 178 ms were revealed, but later effects beyond 300 ms were also observed. In Experiment 2, a deep conceptual decision task, feature-specific effects with an onset of 22 ms were obtained, but effects again extended beyond 300 ms. In congruency with earlier neuroimaging work, the present feature-specific ERP effects suggest a grounding of abstract concepts in modal brain systems. The presence of early and late feature-specific effects indicates that sensorimotor activity observed in neuroimaging experiments may reflect both rapid conceptual and later post-conceptual processing. Results furthermore suggest that a deep conceptual task accelerates access to conceptual sensorimotor features, thereby demonstrating conceptual flexibility., (© 2020. The Author(s).)

The grounding of concepts in the sensorimotor brain systems is controversially discussed. Grounded cognition models propose that concepts are represented in modality-specific sensorimotor, but also emotional and introspective brain areas depending on specific experiences during concept acquisition. Accumulating evidence suggests that concrete concepts are closely linked to modality-specific systems, whereas the mere existence of abstract concepts seems to contradict grounded cognition approaches. Here, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we adopted a theory-driven approach frequently used for investigating concrete concepts to the domain of abstract concepts: We compared brain activation to abstract concepts with a known motor versus visual feature content as determined by a previous property listing study. Carefully matched motor (e.g., fitness) and visual (e.g., beauty) abstract words were presented to 24 participants along with pseudowords while performing a lexical decision task. Furthermore, participants performed two localizer tasks by actually moving their hands (motor localizer) and by looking at real pictures (visual localizer). Processing of motor abstract words specifically activated frontal and parietal motor areas, whereas processing of visual abstract words specifically elicited higher activity in temporo-occipital visual areas, albeit at a more lenient statistical threshold. According to inclusive masking analyses, this differential activity pattern to motor and visual abstract concepts overlapped with brain activations observed during hand movements (pre- and postcentral gyrus) and object perception (fusiform and lingual gyrus). Thus, consistent with the grounded cognition framework, our results suggest that, similar to concrete concepts, abstract concepts related to action and vision are grounded in modality-specific brain systems typically engaged in actual perception and action depending on their conceptual feature content., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)