In this paper, I extend a model of deliberation developed in earlier studies (Carroll 2003, 2001) to examine the quality of deliberation on environmental issues in the House of Representatives. The quality of deliberation in legislative debate can be measured as a function of three components: First, the inclusiveness of discussion. (How many viewpoints are incorporated into the argument?). Second, the public or private nature of policy discussion. (Do members appeal to generally shared values and interests or to narrow partisan and district concerns?). Third, the rhetorical strategy used by members. (Do members adequately represent the arguments of political opponents? Do policy statements include polarized rhetoric or personal attacks on political opponents?). Using content analysis, I examine member statements on major environmental legislation in the period under consideration and assign scores for each component. These scores are then summed to create a composite measure of the quality of deliberation for each statement. Because deliberation is time and resource intensive, it should be used only when other strategies for winning support are unavailable or expensive. The quality of deliberation is therefore expected to vary with the relative cost of alternatives such as bargaining, side-payments, and leadership pressure. To use a simple example, one might expect the quality of deliberation to increase when an issue divides party members and prevents the leadership from enforcing party unity. Other factors that may increase the quality of deliberation include when the policy is discussed (debates early in the term allow more time for the working out of a deliberative strategy), access to leadership powers (formal prerogatives decrease the need to use deliberation), point in the electoral cycle (election year debates will forego inclusiveness for appeals directed toward specific constituencies), and publicity (media presence turns attention away from persuading other members to posturing for the public). I will test this argument using OLS regression on a sample of environmental bills selected from the House Resources Committee during the 104th-108th Congresses. The dependent variable will be the composite measure of deliberation. The key explanatory variables are scheduling (a scaled variable gauging where the bill falls during the session), media attention (mentions of the bill in Congressional Weekly and major national newspapers), power within committee (a scale variable that scores members according to party membership and position within the committee structure) and electoral pressure (measured by a dummy variable where 1= election year, 0 = off year). Significant relationships among the variables will suggest how and when legislators incorporate deliberation into larger rhetorical and political strategies to win votes. By rigorously examining legislative deliberation as it occurs on a daily basis in the House of Representatives, this paper goes beyond previous research and sets a foundation for future study. Isolating the environmental conditions under which representatives use deliberation enables us to move beyond theoretical debates and toward an understanding of deliberation as a pragmatic approach for building legislative coalitions. References: 2003. Deliberation in the House of Representatives: Evidence from Trade and Environmental Policy Debates. Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association. April 15-18, San Antonio, TX 2001. The Role of Ideology in Legislative Deliberation: Congressional Member Organizations and Environmental Policy. Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, November 8-11, Atlanta, GA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]