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Sensory inputs enter a constantly active brain, whose state is always changing from one moment to the next. Currently, little is known about how ongoing, spontaneous brain activity participates in online task processing. We employed 7 Tesla fMRI and a threshold-level visual perception task to probe the effects of prestimulus ongoing brain activity on perceptual decision-making and conscious recognition. Prestimulus activity originating from distributed brain regions, including visual cortices and regions of the default-mode and cingulo-opercular networks, exerted a diverse set of effects on the sensitivity and criterion of conscious recognition, and categorization performance. We further elucidate the mechanisms underlying these behavioral effects, revealing how prestimulus activity modulates multiple aspects of stimulus processing in highly specific and network-dependent manners. These findings reveal heretofore unknown network mechanisms underlying ongoing brain activity's influence on conscious perception, and may hold implications for understanding the precise roles of spontaneous activity in other brain functions., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests The author declares no conflicts of interest., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The neural mechanisms underlying conscious recognition remain unclear, particularly the roles played by the prefrontal cortex, deactivated brain areas and subcortical regions. We investigated neural activity during conscious object recognition using 7 Tesla fMRI while human participants viewed object images presented at liminal contrasts. Here, we show both recognized and unrecognized images recruit widely distributed cortical and subcortical regions; however, recognized images elicit enhanced activation of visual, frontoparietal, and subcortical networks and stronger deactivation of the default-mode network. For recognized images, object category information can be decoded from all of the involved cortical networks but not from subcortical regions. Phase-scrambled images trigger strong involvement of inferior frontal junction, anterior cingulate cortex and default-mode network, implicating these regions in inferential processing under increased uncertainty. Our results indicate that content-specific activity in both activated and deactivated cortical networks and non-content-specific subcortical activity support conscious recognition.

A degraded, black-and-white image of an object, which appears meaningless on first presentation, is easily identified after a single exposure to the original, intact image. This striking example of perceptual learning reflects a rapid (one-trial) change in performance, but the kind of learning that is involved is not known. We asked whether this learning depends on conscious (hippocampus-dependent) memory for the images that have been presented or on an unconscious (hippocampus-independent) change in the perception of images, independently of the ability to remember them. We tested five memory-impaired patients with hippocampal lesions or larger medial temporal lobe (MTL) lesions. In comparison to volunteers, the patients were fully intact at perceptual learning, and their improvement persisted without decrement from 1 d to more than 5 mo. Yet, the patients were impaired at remembering the test format and, even after 1 d, were impaired at remembering the images themselves. To compare perceptual learning and remembering directly, at 7 d after seeing degraded images and their solutions, patients and volunteers took either a naming test or a recognition memory test with these images. The patients improved as much as the volunteers at identifying the degraded images but were severely impaired at remembering them. Notably, the patient with the most severe memory impairment and the largest MTL lesions performed worse than the other patients on the memory tests but was the best at perceptual learning. The findings show that one-trial, long-lasting perceptual learning relies on hippocampus-independent (nondeclarative) memory, independent of any requirement to consciously remember., Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing interest.

While neuroscientific research on perceptual awareness has traditionally focused on the spatial and temporal localizations of neural activity underlying conscious processing, recent development suggests that the dynamic characteristics of spatiotemporally distributed neural activity contain important clues about the neural computational mechanisms underlying conscious processing. Here, we summarize recent progress., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Conscious intention is a fundamental aspect of the human experience. Despite long-standing interest in the basis and implications of intention, its underlying neurobiological mechanisms remain poorly understood. Using high-definition transcranial DC stimulation (tDCS), we observed that enhancing spontaneous neuronal excitability in both the angular gyrus and the primary motor cortex caused the reported time of conscious movement intention to be ∼60-70 ms earlier. Slow brain waves recorded ∼2-3 s before movement onset, as well as hundreds of milliseconds after movement onset, independently correlated with the modulation of conscious intention by brain stimulation. These brain activities together accounted for 81% of interindividual variability in the modulation of movement intention by brain stimulation. A computational model using coupled leaky integrator units with biophysically plausible assumptions about the effect of tDCS captured the effects of stimulation on both neural activity and behavior. These results reveal a temporally extended brain process underlying conscious movement intention that spans seconds around movement commencement., (Copyright © 2015 Douglas et al.)

Despite intense recent research, the neural correlates of conscious visual perception remain elusive. The most established paradigm for studying brain mechanisms underlying conscious perception is to keep the physical sensory inputs constant and identify brain activities that correlate with the changing content of conscious awareness. However, such a contrast based on conscious content alone would not only reveal brain activities directly contributing to conscious perception, but also include brain activities that precede or follow it. To address this issue, we devised a paradigm whereby we collected, trial-by-trial, measures of objective performance, subjective awareness, and the confidence level of subjective awareness. Using magnetoencephalography recordings in healthy human volunteers, we dissociated brain activities underlying these different cognitive phenomena. Our results provide strong evidence that widely distributed slow cortical potentials (SCPs) correlate with subjective awareness, even after the effects of objective performance and confidence were both removed. The SCP correlate of conscious perception manifests strongly in its waveform, phase, and power. In contrast, objective performance and confidence were both contributed by relatively transient brain activity. These results shed new light on the brain mechanisms of conscious, unconscious, and metacognitive processing.

As functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has become a driving force in cognitive neuroscience, it is crucial to understand the neural basis of the fMRI signal. Here, we discuss a novel neurophysiological correlate of the fMRI signal, the slow cortical potential (SCP), which also seems to modulate the power of higher-frequency activity, the more established neurophysiological correlate of the fMRI signal. We further propose a hypothesis for the involvement of the SCP in the emergence of consciousness, and review existing data that lend support to our proposal. This hypothesis, unlike several previous theories of consciousness, is firmly rooted in physiology and as such is entirely amenable to empirical testing.

Consciousness science is experiencing a coming-of-age moment. Following three decades of sustained efforts by a relatively small group of consciousness researchers, the field has seen exponential growth over the past 5 years. It is increasingly recognized that although the investigation of subjective experiences is a difficult task, modern neuroscience need not and cannot shy away from the challenge of peeling away the mysteries of conscious experiences. In June 2023, with the joint support of the U.S. National Institutes of Health and the U.S. National Science Foundation, a 3-day workshop was held at the Bethesda, MD, campus of the National Institutes of Health, convening experts whose work focuses primarily on problems of consciousness, or an adjacent field, to discuss the current state of consciousness science and consider the most fruitful avenues for future research. This Special Focus features empirical and theoretical contributions from some of the invited speakers at the workshop. Here, I will cover the scope of the workshop, the content of this Special Focus, and advocate for stronger bridges between consciousness science and other subdisciplines of cognitive neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has identified late-latency, long-lasting neural activity as a robust correlate of conscious perception. Yet, the dynamical nature of this activity is poorly understood, and the mechanisms governing its presence or absence and the associated conscious perception remain elusive. We applied dynamic-pattern analysis to whole-brain slow (< 5 Hz) cortical dynamics recorded by magnetoencephalography (MEG) in human subjects performing a threshold-level visual perception task. Up to 1 second before stimulus onset, brain activity pattern across widespread cortices significantly predicted whether a threshold-level visual stimulus was later consciously perceived. This initial state of brain activity interacts nonlinearly with stimulus input to shape the evolving cortical activity trajectory, with seen and unseen trials following well separated trajectories. We observed that cortical activity trajectories during conscious perception are fast evolving and robust to small variations in the initial state. In addition, spontaneous brain activity pattern prior to stimulus onset also influences unconscious perceptual making in unseen trials. Together, these results suggest that brain dynamics underlying conscious visual perception belongs to the class of initial-state-dependent, robust, transient neural dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What neural mechanisms underlie the seamless flow of our waking consciousness? A necessary albeit insufficient condition for such neural mechanisms is that they should be consistently modulated across time were a segment of the conscious stream to be repeated twice. In this study, we experimentally manipulated the content of a story followed by subjects during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) independently from the modality of sensory input (as visual text or auditory speech) as well as attentional focus. We then extracted brain activity patterns consistently modulated across subjects by the evolving content of the story regardless of whether it was presented visually or auditorily. Specifically, in one experiment we presented the same story to different subjects via either auditory or visual modality. In a second experiment, we presented two different stories simultaneously, one auditorily, one visually, and manipulated the subjects' attentional focus. This experimental design allowed us to dissociate brain activities underlying modality-specific sensory processing from modality-independent story processing. We uncovered a network of brain regions consistently modulated by the evolving content of a story regardless of the sensory modality used for stimulus input, including the superior temporal sulcus/gyrus (STS/STG), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), the medial frontal cortex (MFC), the temporal pole (TP), and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Many of these regions have previously been implicated in semantic processing. Interestingly, different stories elicited similar brain activity patterns, but with subtle differences potentially attributable to varying degrees of emotional valence and self-relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]