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How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the "mind-body problem") has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novel methods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) review methodological advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically reconsidering the role of the frontal cortex may further delineate NCCs, (3) advocate the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness., (Copyright © 2017 the authors 0270-6474/17/3710882-12$15.00/0.)

Recently, blink-related delta oscillations (delta BROs) have been observed in healthy subjects during spontaneous blinking at rest. Delta BROs have been linked with continuous gathering of information from the surrounding environment, which is classically attributed to the precuneus. Furthermore, fMRI studies have shown that precuneal activity is reduced or missing when consciousness is low or absent. We therefore hypothesized that the source of delta BROs in healthy subjects could be located in the precuneus and that delta BROs could be absent or reduced in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC). To test these hypotheses, electroencephalographic (EEG) activity at rest was recorded in 12 healthy controls and nine patients with DOC (four vegetative states, and five minimally conscious states). Three-second-lasting EEG epochs centred on each blink instance were analyzed in both time- (BROs) and frequency domains (event-related spectral perturbation or ERSP and intertrial coherence or ITC). Cortical sources of the maximum blink-related delta power, corresponding to the positive peak of the delta BROs, were estimated by standardized Low Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography. In control subjects, as expected, the source of delta BROs was located in the precuneus, whereas in DOC patients, delta BROs were not recognizable and no precuneal localization was possible. Furthermore, we observed a direct relationship between spectral indexes and levels of cognitive functioning in all subjects participating in the study. This reinforces the hypothesis that delta BROs reflect neural processes linked with awareness of the self and of the environment., (Copyright © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc., a Wiley company.)

Top-down, feedback projections account for a large portion of all connections between neurons in the thalamocortical system, yet their precise role remains the subject of much discussion. A large number of studies has focused on investigating how sensory information is transformed across hierarchically-distributed processing stages in a feedforward fashion, and computational models have shown that purely feedforward artificial neural networks can even outperform humans in pattern classification tasks. What is then the functional role of feedback connections? Several key roles have been identified, ranging from attentional modulation to, crucially, conscious perception. Specifically, most of the major theories on consciousness postulate that feedback connections would play an essential role in enabling sensory information to be consciously perceived. Consequently, it follows that their efficacy in modulating target regions should drastically decrease in nonconscious brain states [non-rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, anesthesia] compared to conscious ones (wakefulness), and also in instances when a given sensory stimulus is not perceived compared to when it is. Until recently, however, this prediction could only be tested with correlative experiments, due to the lack of techniques to selectively manipulate and measure the activity of feedback pathways. In this article, we will review the most recent literature on the functions of feedback connections across brain states and based on the presence or absence of perception. We will focus on experiments studying mismatch negativity, a phenomenon which has been hypothesized to rely on top-down modulation but which persists during nonconscious states. While feedback modulation is generally dampened in nonconscious states and enhanced when perception occurs, there are clear deviations from this rule. As we will discuss, this may pose a challenge to most theories of consciousness, and possibly require a change in how the level of consciousness in supposedly nonconscious states is assessed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neuronal activity is markedly different across brain states: it varies from desynchronized activity during wakefulness to the synchronous alternation between active and silent states characteristic of deep sleep. Surprisingly, limited attention has been paid to investigating how brain states affect sensory processing. While it was long assumed that the brain was mostly disconnected from external stimuli during sleep, an increasing number of studies indicates that sensory stimuli continue to be processed across all brain states—albeit differently. In this review article, we first discuss what constitutes a brain state. We argue that—next to global, behavioral states such as wakefulness and sleep—there is a concomitant need to distinguish bouts of oscillatory dynamics with specific global/local activity patterns and lasting for a few hundreds of milliseconds, as these can lead to the same sensory stimulus being either perceived or not. We define these short-lasting bouts as micro-states. We proceed to characterize how sensory-evoked neural responses vary between conscious and nonconscious states. We focus on two complementary aspects: neuronal ensembles and inter-areal communication. First, we review which features of ensemble activity are conducive to perception, and how these features vary across brain states. Properties such as heterogeneity, sparsity and synchronicity in neuronal ensembles will especially be considered as essential correlates of conscious processing. Second, we discuss how inter-areal communication varies across brain states and how this may affect brain operations and sensory processing. Finally, we discuss predictive coding (PC) and the concept of multi-level representations as a key framework for understanding conscious sensory processing. In this framework the brain implements conscious representations as inferences about world states across multiple representational levels. In this representational hierarchy, low-level inference may be carried out nonconsciously, whereas high levels integrate across different sensory modalities and larger spatial scales, correlating with conscious processing. This inferential framework is used to interpret several cellular and population-level findings in the context of brain states, and we briefly compare its implications to two other theories of consciousness. In conclusion, this review article, provides foundations to guide future studies aiming to uncover the mechanisms of sensory processing and perception across brain states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the cortical source of blink-related delta oscillations (delta BROs) in resting healthy subjects has been localized in the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PCu), one of the main core-hubs of the default-mode network. This has been interpreted as the electrophysiological signature of the automatic monitoring of the surrounding environment while subjects are immersed in self-reflecting mental activities. Although delta BROs were directly correlated to the degree of consciousness impairment in patients with disorders of consciousness, they failed to differentiate vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) from minimally conscious state (MCS). In the present study, we have extended the analysis of BROs to frequency bands other than delta in the attempt to find a biological marker that could support the differential diagnosis between VS/UWS and MCS. Four patients with VS/UWS, 5 patients with MCS, and 12 healthy matched controls (CTRL) underwent standard 19-channels EEG recordings during resting conditions. Three-second-lasting EEG epochs centred on each blink instance were submitted to time-frequency analyses in order to extract the normalized Blink-Related Synchronization/Desynchronization (nBRS/BRD) of three bands of interest (low-alpha, high-alpha and low-beta) in the time-window of 50–550 ms after the blink-peak and to estimate the corresponding cortical sources of electrical activity. VS/UWS nBRS/BRD levels of all three bands were lower than those related to both CTRL and MCS, thus enabling the differential diagnosis between MCS and VS/UWS. Furthermore, MCS showed an intermediate signal intensity on PCC/PCu between CTRL and VS/UWS and a higher signal intensity on the left temporo-parieto-occipital junction and inferior occipito-temporal regions when compared to VS/UWS. This peculiar pattern of activation leads us to hypothesize that resting MCS patients have a bottom-up driven activation of the task positive network and thus are tendentially prone to respond to environmental stimuli, even though in an almost unintentional way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]