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Constitutional theory is a mess. Disagreements about originalism and living constitutionalism have become intractable. Constitutional theorists make some arguments that seem clearly fallacious and advance proposals that are pie in the sky. One of the reasons for the mess is an overreliance by constitutional theorists on "outcome reasons," justifications that rely on the theorist's beliefs about what outcomes are good and what outcomes are bad. This outcome-drive approach is exemplified by the so-called "canonical cases" argument, which evaluates positions in normative constitutional theory on the basis of their counterfactual implications for a handful of prior decisions of the Supreme Court. Among the many problems with "outcome reductionism" (exclusive reliance on outcome reasons) is the reality that none of the fundamental and feasible options for normative constitutional theory can guarantee outcomes that that most citizens would find acceptable, much less optimal. Living constitutionalism produces constitutional outcomes that reflect the moral values and political ideology of Supreme Court Justices, but over the long run there is no guarantee that the Justices will do what any individual believes is required by justice. Decades ago, the Justices established a constitutional right to abortion, but recently they reversed course. Dramatic changes in constitutional law are inevitable given that the Justices are selected by the President and Congress, institutions that will change their political makeup in unpredictable ways over time. Outcome reductionism is not a sensible method for normative constitutional theory, but there is a better approach. Outcome reasons can be supplemented by process reasons such as legitimacy, the rule of law, and institutional capacities. The way forward for constitutional theory involves a holistic assessment of both outcome reasons and process reasons via the method of reflective equilibrium. The way forward requires a frank acknowledgement of the consequences of deep and persistent disagreement about fundamental questions concerning justice and the common good. And therefore, the way forward will require an acknowledgement that a legitimate constitutional order will require compromise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization relied on history and tradition to overrule Roe v. Wade. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen articulated a history and tradition test for the validity of laws regulating the right to bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District looked to history and tradition in formulating the test for the consistency of state action with the Establishment Clause. These cases raise important questions about the Court's approach to constitutional interpretation and construction. Do Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy represent a new theory of constitutional interpretation and construction based on history and tradition? In the alternative, should the references to history and tradition in these opinions be understood through the lens of Constitutional Pluralism as modalities of constitutional argument? Finally, can the use of history and tradition in Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy be reconciled with the Supreme Court's embrace of Public Meaning Originalism? Part I of this Article elucidates the constitutional concepts of history and tradition. Part II lays out four distinct roles that history and tradition can play: (1) as evidence of original meaning and purpose, (2) as modalities of constitutional argument within a constitutional pluralist framework, (3) as a novel constitutional theory, which we call "Historical Traditionalism," and (4) as an implementing doctrine. Part III investigates the roles of history and tradition in Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy. Part IV articulates a comprehensive strategy for the incorporation of history and tradition in constitutional jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Original public meaning" has become increasingly important in constitutional discourse. This Article investigates the nature of original public meaning in three steps. First, each word in the phrase "original public meaning" is explicated and clarified. The word "original" represents the idea that the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified. The word "public" signifies that the relevant meaning is ordinary meaning, the understanding of the text conveyed to the public at the time each provision was framed and ratified. The word "meaning" refers to the set of ideas (concepts and propositions) that constitute the communicative content of the constitutional text. The second step situates original public meaning in the context of normative constitutional theory, explaining its role in both Public Meaning Originalism and nonoriginalist constitutional theories. The third and final step investigates the foundations of original public meaning in the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, via an exploration of the distinctions between (a) speaker's meaning and sentence meaning, (b) semantics and pragmatics, (c) sense and reference, and (d) conceptual meaning versus prototypical meaning. Each of the three steps contributes to the articulation of a conception of original public meaning that aims at conceptual clarity, precision, and theoretical depth. The original public meaning of the constitutional text is the communicative content (the set of concepts and propositions) that was conveyed to the public at the time each provision was drafted, proposed, and ratified. Both semantics (the meaning of words and phrases) and pragmatics (meaning conveyed by context) play essential roles in the complex multistage process by which constitutional communication occurs. For public meaning originalists, the original public meaning of the text ought to bind constitutional actors, including judges, legislators, and executive officials. Sometimes, the recovery of original public meaning is relatively easy--the absence of linguistic drift, common sense, and the immediate context make the meaning of the constitutional text readily accessible to contemporary readers. But sometimes, the original public meaning of the constitutional text is difficult to discern, requiring both a deep reading of the constitutional record and careful application of the methods of historical linguistics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on conceptual framework for such an investigation and then focus on the constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction in the federal courts. It mentions formal notification of legal proceedings issued by a court of law; in other words, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process of Law Clause requires service of process. It also mentions discussion of the implications of originalist constitutional theory for personal jurisdiction.

This Essay sketches an originalist methodology using ideas from legal theory and theoretical linguistics, including the distinctions between interpretation and construction and between semantics and pragmatics. The Essay aims to dispel a number of misconceptions about the methods used by originalists. Among these is the notion that originalists rely on dictionary definitions to determine the communicative content of the constitutional text. Although dictionaries may play some role, the better approach emphasizes primary evidence such as that provided by corpus linguistics. Another misconception is that originalists do not consider context; to the contrary, the investigation of context plays a central role in originalist methodology. Part I of this Essay articulates a theoretical framework that draws on ideas from contemporary legal theory and linguistics. Part II investigates methods for determining the constitutional text's semantic content. Part III turns to methods for investigating the role of context in disambiguating and enriching what would otherwise be sparse semantic meaning. Part IV describes an originalist approach to constitutional construction. The Essay concludes with a short reflection on the future of originalist methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the fixation of the constitutional text known as Fixation Thesis with its role in the contemporary originalist constitutional theory. It mentions the application of the fixation thesis in the domestic violence, cruel and unusual punishment, and privileges or immunities of citizens of the U.S. It also mentions that constitutional interpretation that discerns the communicative content of the constitutional text.

The article discusses the intellectual history of constitutional theory and doctrine in America, and it mentions how intellectual history could constitute a theory and method of constitutional interpretation in the U.S. A law review article by Professor Saul Cornell, which addresses constitutional history and the originalism constitutional interpretation theory, is mentioned. The definition of the word "meaning" is examined, along with the U.S. Constitution and communicative content.

An essay is presented on artificial intelligence (AI), pattern-matching algorithms, and artificial meanings that are produced by entities other than individual natural persons as of March 2014. Versions 1.0 and 2.0 of The Chinese Intersection thought experiment, which involve the legal rules for regulating transportation systems, are examined. Legal communication, the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, and the Shanghai Artificially Intelligent Traffic Authority are examined.

An essay is presented on the relation between the legal context and the content of the law. Topics discussed include doctrines of constitutional law, relation between the communicative content and the legal content and interpretation of the judicial opinion. It also discusses the interaction between the communicative content and the legal content.

The article focuses on the extra textual sources used in the unwritten constitution in reference to the book "America's Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live by" by Amar Akhil Reed. It states the role of extra textual sources in designating the sources of constitutional law. Various components of extra textual sources include judicial opinions, confederation and originalism of the constitutional theory.

Constitutional interpretation is the activity that discovers the communicative content or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. Constitutional construction is the activity that determines the legal effect given the text, including doctrines of constitutional law and decisions of constitutional cases or issues by judges and other officials. The interpretation-construction distinction, frequently invoked by contemporary constitutional theorists and rooted in American legal theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, marks the difference between these two activities. This Article advances two central claims about constitutional construction. First, constitutional construction is ubiquitous in constitutional practice. The central warrant for this claim is conceptual: because construction is the determination of legal effect, construction always occurs when the constitutional text is applied to a particular legal case or official decision. Although some constitutional theorists may prefer to use different terminology to mark the distinction between interpretation and construction, every constitutional theorist should embrace the distinction itself, and hence should agree that construction in the stipulated sense is ubiquitous. Construction occurs in every constitutional case. The second claim is more substantive and practical. In some cases, construction can simply translate the plain meaning of the constitutional text into corresponding doctrines of constitutional law--we might call this strict construction. But in other cases, the constitutional text does not provide determinate answers to constitutional questions. For example, the text may be vague or irreducibly ambiguous. We can call this domain of constitutional underdeterminacy the construction zone. The second claim is that the construction zone is ineliminable: the actual text of the U.S. Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require constitutional construction that goes beyond the meaning of the text for their application to concrete constitutional cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author discusses narratives, normativity, and causation associated with the constitutional law in the U.S., with reference to Barry Friedman's book "The Will of the People." According to the author, the book is a narrative that relates public opinion to judicial behavior. The author says that narratives can provide important input for the development of causal theories, but they can also be misleading.

The article offers information on incorporation and originalism, methods of constitutional interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. The author discussed the definition of originalism and incorporation. The author also presented a narrower scope of inquiry to the privileges and immunities mentioned in the 14th Amendment for ordinary U.S. citizens.

Argues the use of judicial virtue in selecting judges who will interpret laws and translate their ideas into constitutional doctrine in the U.S. Characteristics of the theories of judicial review and constitutional interpretation; Role of institutional capacities in legal interpretation; Comparison of contemporary legal theories and modern moral philosophy; Implications of virtue ethics for legal theory; Interpretation of constitutional virtues based on the aretaic theory of constitutional interpretation.