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George Benston's indefatigable pursuit of the truth about perennially troublesome questions involved in the market behavior of regulated financial institutions deserves a better fate than he met with the empirical results of this paper. In the relatively short time I have had to reflect on his paper, I have come to the conclusion that his problems arose mainly from deficiencies in his data, some heroic attempts to adjust the data to allow for vital considerations which could not be measured directly, and some problems of mis-specification or multi-collinearity which deprived him of results which would be more consistent with the theory he presents at the beginning of his paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores price-volume-credit risk relationships in the regulated small loan portion of the consumer finance industry. We seek insight into two questions which are basic to public policy decisions concerning the enactment of legal ceilings on rates, limits on loan sizes, and restrictions on entry in small loan legislation. These questions are: When legal rate ceilings are higher, do licensed small loan lenders accept poorer credit risks? When legal rate ceilings are higher, will the availability of loans (amount of loans made or outstanding) be greater or less? If the assumption of competition were applicable, the answers to these questions would be simple and direct: that licensed lenders would be forced to accept poorer credit risks and the availability of loans would be greater when legal rate ceilings are higher. The converse, of course, would be the case when legal rate ceilings are lower. In almost every state there are small loan laws which limit the price of loans and the maximum loan size. But the assumption of competition is not applicable since the regulatory philosophies applied by the states vary from fairly strict public utility-type regulation in New York to relatively free entry and high rate and loan size limits in several southern states. We turn, then, to the differences in price-volume-credit risk relationships among the states under conditions of imperfect competition to answer the two questions raised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has established that finance companies accept poorer credit risks for personal loans where legal rate ceilings are higher. This finding suggests that the volume of personal loans extended or outstanding might also be positively associated with legal rate ceilings, but the supply of finance company personal loans has displayed positive, negative, and zero correlations with interest rate levels. There are two major reasons for this past chaos concerning supply: The credit data utilized have been faulty, and the model specifications have been inadequate. The purpose of this paper is to overcome these deficiencies. The first section below contains a brief description of the credit data that will be employed. The second section contains our model specifications. The test results are presented in section three. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the market for consumer installment credit in the U.S. since World War II. The author discusses the basic market structure--which comprises cash lending and installment financing--and notes how, at the local level, it tends to be monopolistic. Changes in market structure witnessed since World War II include explosive growth of installment credit, and the growing incidence of retailers committing their receivables to financial institutions. A reduced elasticity of credit's supply, easier credit terms, and competing interpretations of the market's response to changes in credit policy all characterize the post-war period.

Background: Economic inequality in the United States is extreme, but little is known about the national origin of affluent households. Households in the top one percent by total wealth own vastly disproportionate quantities of household assets and have correspondingly high levels of economic, social, and political influence. The overrepresentation of white natives (i.e., those born in the U.S.) among high-wealth households is well-documented, but changing migration dynamics suggest that a growing portion of top households may be immigrants. Methods: Because no single survey dataset contains top wealth holders and data about country of origin, this paper uses two publicly-available data sets: the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Multiple imputation is used to impute country of birth from the SIPP into the SCF. Descriptive statistics are used to demonstrate reliability of the method, to estimate the prevalence of immigrants among top wealth holders, and to document patterns of asset ownership among affluent immigrants. Results: Significant numbers of top wealth holders who are usually classified as white natives may be immigrants. Many top wealth holders appear to be European and Canadian immigrants, and increasing numbers of top wealth holders are likely from Asia and Latin America as well. Results suggest that of those in the top one percent of wealth holders, approximately 3% are European and Canadian immigrants, .5% are from Mexico or Cuban, and 1.7% are from Asia (especially Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mainland China, and India). Ownership of key assets varies considerably across affluent immigrant groups. Conclusion: Although the percentage of top wealth holders who are immigrants is relatively small, these percentages represent large numbers of households with considerable resources and corresponding social and political influence. Evidence that the propensity to allocate wealth to real and financial assets varies across immigrant groups suggests that wealth ownership is more global than previous research suggests and that immigrant groups are likely to become more prevalent in top wealth positions in the U.S. As the representation of immigrants in top wealth positions grows, their economic, social, and political influence is likely to increase as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an update on consumer credit and payments in the U.S. as of the 1st quarter of 2006. Differences between the objectives of private providers and payment services and the Federal Reserve System; Credit contract choices of consumers; Expectations of consumers to minimize borrowing costs.

The article discusses the cost of consumer credit. Due to consumers' unfamiliarity with credit finance structures, there is a significant amount of confusion and misinformation regarding installment charges. An analysis of finance charges is presented. The critical terms, which determine how charges are calculated are 'constant ratio,' 'actuarial yield,' and 'direct ratio.' A common misconception is that bank charges are lower than finance company charges; they are nearly identical. Both those extending the lines of credit and the consumers using the credit are not adequately informed of their costs.

The article presents criticism and commentary on the reports "Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code," by Robert W. Johnson and "Unconscionable Conduct and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code," by Allison Dunham, both included within the issue addressing the economic and social-moral conceptual bases of the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code of the U.S. in the late 1960s. The conclusions of the reports are challenged, suggesting that competition should be market centered rather than legislatively mandated.

The article discusses the increased cooperation between commercial banks and finance companies in regard to consumer credit. The article notes that the method for financing consumer instalment credit began before World War II, but has every prospect of being expanded in the coming years. The article describes the past dependence of finance companies on bank credit, the traditional relationship between the two, recent developments relative to volume discounts and special reserve provisions, and the implications of these arrangements on the institutional structure.

The article presents an exploratory study to examine the predatory and deceptive nature of refund anticipation loans (RALs) in the United States. Data were gathered from a medium-sized midwestern city. Results indicate that deception exists because RAL marketing communication does not provide essential information regarding effective interest rates and effective costs. Consumers are making decisions based on erroneous beliefs about the product. When the real cost of the loan is revealed, behavior is likely to change.

The article reports on the growing popularity and dangers of consumer credit, specifically lower income families which become indebted. The business of the family has seen the growth of credit unions, personal loan departments in banks, and personal finance companies.The author states that selling on credit became a result of rising levels of production. The troubles of debt are described. Potential solutions include increased consumer education and improved regulation of the process by which credit is extended.

The article discusses the operating features of U.S. consumer finance companies in the 1950's. Consumer finance companies are lending institutions engaged in money retailing and budget counseling services. Their operating costs and rates of charge have been the highest all of major consumer borrowing agencies. They are just second to commercial banks as the most important source of consumer installment loans. Consumer finance companies are specialized, mass finance agencies differing with regard to risk assumed or capital accepted.

This article examines the effect of regulation, population characteristics and competition on the market for personal cash loans. The author states that because provisions in consumer finance legislation do not behave independently it seems to be logical to study how consumers are impacted by these multi-faceted regulations. Specifically, the author is interested in examining provisions made on small-loan legislation and how they impact the amount of small-loan service. The author applies a multiple regression analysis to a cross-section of data to examine the relationships between regulatory, demographic and competitive factors with the amount of loan service offered by small-loan companies.

The article considers the success of the U.S. consumer finance industry post World War II. The article presents an analysis of the composite earnings record of the principle units within that industry, compares this with the composite record of the major industrial enterprises, and presents a comparison with primary industries in manufacturing and trade industries. Among the conclusions, the article finds that the profitability of the consumer finance industry declined in the postwar period; the earnings decline in that industry was slightly less than in trade or manufacturing; and the composite return was more stable than for the other 33 industrial groups examined and growth was pronounced.

Economic geographers have deployed a variety of spatial categories (e.g., scale, territory and border) to describe and theorize the spatiality of market making and marketization processes. This article supplements these accounts with insights from the work of post-structural geographers oriented toward the site. To this end, the article introduces the notion of the marketsite. Marketsites are points where heterogeneous elements are brought together and assembled in an effort to realize the conditions required for the performance of model markets and market subjectivities. Using the example of smart disclosure, the article argues that the use of disclosure labels to improve consumer decision making has transformed the point of sale and other transactional junctures into incipient marketsites—niches where various behavioral techniques are deployed to summon into being subjects who behave as if they were Homines economici. The behavioral turn in economics has focused the market-making efforts of a variety of actors on the market subject and strategic sites in people’s everyday lives where they can be guided and nudged into alignment with market models. Together such marketsites delineate a new, and largely uncharted, geography of encounter between (behavioral) economic theory and actually existing markets. Drawing on fieldwork developing and testing a fee disclosure box for a prepaid debit card, I show that the production of marketsites, where Homo economicus can survive, is a messy process that rarely succeeds. Regardless, such efforts reveal valuable insights into how the behavioral turn in economics is reshaping the spatiality of market-making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the developments made in the field of lending and financial technology industry in the U.S. Topics discussed include national bank charter proposed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for regulating the financial technology industry; enactment of Federal Trade Commission Act and the and Consumer Financial Protection Act for protecting consumers; and legitimacy of the charter.

The article presents criticism and commentary on the reports "Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code," by Robert W. Johnson and "Unconscionable Conduct and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code," by Allison Dunham, both included within the issue addressing the economic and social-moral conceptual bases of the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code of the U.S. in the late 1960s. The usefulness of the code on increasing competition within the credit market is reasserted and additional suggestions are offered regarding the levels of federal regulation needed in such credit regulations.

The owned home is central to both the American Dream and the financial lives of U.S. households. This article explores the typical financial trajectories of homeowners during the Great Recession, assessing the viability of positioning home equity at the core of a household's balance sheet. Using the 2007–2009 reinterview panel of the Survey of Consumer Finances, we describe the diverse balance sheets of groups of homeowning households. While some homeowners lost equity and wealth in the Great Recession, we find that an owned home introduced severe risk of loss, but homeowners were less likely than renters to lose very large proportions of their wealth. The experience of homeowners' balance sheets during the downturn was diverse, and the typical experiences of different groups are compared and contrasted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents an examination of the impact of the United States' Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL) of 1907-1930 and discusses the role the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) played in bringing about the passage of the USLL. It discusses issues related to the law, including the high rates of interest that were associated with the small loan business and the benefits and drawbacks of making credit available to poor and working people. Additionally, the article examines why some states passed the law much more quickly than others.

There has grown up in the U.S., a new group of consumer financing enterprises, which are of vital concern to the social worker. These enterprises have arisen in response to a change in the national economy. More than any other type of consumer credit, the personal finance "industry" as it is called, finds itself in close relationship with the social worker. The personal financing agency aims quite as directly at the repayment of its loan, together with the charges authorized by the state. Both the business and the welfare agencies deal with a group of people on the same economic level-mainly urban families in temporary financial distress by reason of ill health, unemployment, pressure of debt, or inadequate management families whose meager resources make them ineligible to bank credit. The increasing recognition of the significance of personal financing business, to social work is doubtless responsible for the growing mutual understanding and cooperation between the urban social agencies and personal financing concerns.

Two abstracts are presented for articles pertaining to the governmental and regulatory aspects of marketing. The first is "Credit Legislation and the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code," by Ira M. Millstein. The second is "Economic Report on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices of District of Columbia Retailers," by the United States Federal Trade Commission.