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This symposium began with a call for papers "reassessing the validity of the Chicago School's assumptions about competition and considering whether a more aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement is now warranted." That framing uncritically accepts the premises of antitrust's new populist movement:first, that "the Chicago School" marked an abrupt break from prior academic analysis of antitrust law, and second, that its adherents shared acommonpositive agenda fundamentally at odds with robust antitrust enforcement. Both of those premises are false. The Chicago School represented alogical continuation of the antitrust analysis developed over the preceding decades, and its members shared no positive doctrinal agenda. Instead, they shared acommitment only to promoting consumer interests by means of rigorous economics. Of course, that commitment influenced how the economics profession and antitrust policymakers thought, and progressive "post-Chicago" scholarship today shares the same commitment to consumer welfare and economic rigor. Such scholarship thus has farmore in common with Chicago School scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s than with today's populist movement, which abandons any coherent framework altogether. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on durable success in the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and challenges to that vision in both competition and consumer protection. It mentions paternalism in consumer protection and populism in antitrust and economic cult based in the University of Chicago somehow dominates FTC thinking particularly in antitrust. It also mentions misuse of courts and governmental agencies is a particularly effective means of delaying or stifling competition.

Throughout most of the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC" or "Commission") history, the agency has been condemned as ineffective. Indeed, the prestigious 1969 American Bar Association Report said that the FTC should either change or be abolished. The disastrous decade of the 1970s followed, in which the FTC tried to become the second most powerful legislature in Washington. The Commission then finally developed a bipartisan regulatory program, recognizing that the FTC was not the star player in the economy but had an important role in enforcing the rules that facilitate market interactions. Following the ABA report's recommendation, the program's consumer protection foundation was a systematic and aggressive attack on consumer fraud. This Article discusses this modern FTC, providing details on programs involving fraud, conventional advertising, and privacy. We explain how, embracing a more limited role and recognizing its past mistakes, the FTC became one of the world's most widely respected government agencies. Unfortunately, the agency has recently lost its way in regulating traditional advertising, threatening to restrict truthful information to consumers that is vital to the optimal performance of competitive markets. We also discuss the newest part of the FTC's mission, protecting consumer privacy. The heart of the program has been to prevent harmful misuse of sensitive information, most notably the National Do Not Call Registry, one of the most popular government initiatives ever. In attempting to broaden the basis for protection of privacy, the agency currently threatens to impede rapidly evolving information technology markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers brief information on the benefits and potential costs of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-style regulation in protecting the consumers.

Discusses Robert Pitofsky's role as one of the key founding fathers of the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Recognition that consumer welfare is the agency's reason for being; Pitofsky's achievements as director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection; Market-based approach to the regulation of advertising; Application of consumer protection principles to the Internet.

Presents a text of the speech given by Timothy J. Muris, director of the U.S. Bureau of Consumer Protection, on consumer protection.

Presents the text of the speech made by Timothy J. Muris, professor at George Mason University School of Law, during the 39th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law in on April 10&mdash12;, 1991 in Washington D.C., on the topic of economics and consumer protection.