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As the economy is recovering from the recent financial crisis, we explore the appropriateness of a corporate monitoring organ, which is a component separate from the board of directors, to enhance firm-specific information disclosure. Findings of this study, rooted in the evidence from China's stock markets, confirm that having a separate and effective monitoring organ results in a higher level of idiosyncratic risk, as long as the legal environment is sufficiently strong and the functionality of this separate monitoring organ is clearly defined. Effects of regulatory changes and ownership characteristics are addressed to help better understand the corporate governance–idiosyncratic risk relationship. Moreover, this study sheds light on timely global issues about information transparency and supervision, the lack of which becomes one of the major causes of the ongoing financial crisis, and presents an important challenge before corporate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manuscript Type Empirical Research Issue We investigate the joint effects of family control and the regulatory environment on entrepreneurial growth through the lens of socio-emotional wealth ( SEW) theory. Research Findings Taking into consideration both economic and non-economic goals of entrepreneurial firms, measured by sales growth and employment growth respectively, we find that, compared to their non-family-controlled counterparts, family-controlled firms tend to have lower sales growth rates, but higher employment growth rates. Furthermore, less favorable regulatory environments reduce both sales and workforce growth rates to a greater extent for family-controlled firms than for non-family-controlled firms. Theoretical/Academic Implications We add to the corporate governance and family business management literature by documenting that the regulatory environment moderates the corporate governance effect of family control on the economic and non-economic goals of family-controlled firms. The findings also contribute to the family business management literature by enriching and providing strong evidence in favor of the SEW theory through our exploration of the moderating role that macro-governance plays in the family control- SEW relation. This research also makes contributions to the entrepreneurship literature, laying a foundation for future empirical studies on entrepreneurial growth by separating its economic from its non-economic dimensions. Practitioner/Policy Implications Our findings provide practical implications for both policy makers and entrepreneurs. They not only help entrepreneurs better understand growth strategies in various macro-governance settings, but also provide governments and policymakers with potential policy implications to encourage entrepreneurial and economic growth. Policies that improve the macro-governance environment can help family firms to prosper by contributing to their economic and non-economic growth, both of which are important for economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's corporate governance system implements both American and German style mechanisms, but the supervisory board, a typical feature of German style governance is generally considered dysfunctional. After 2006, the newly amended Chinese Corporate Law significantly enhances the role played by supervisory boards. Our study examines if the new Corporate Law improves supervisory board's monitoring over executive compensation, which becomes one of the main agency concerns in China's emerging market, thus providing a quasi-experimental testing of the legal approach of governance (La Porta et al. in J Financ Econ 58:3-27, ). We examine the effects of both size and meeting frequency of supervisory boards on executive compensations in Chinese listed companies, by using data before and after the new Corporate Law became effective in 2006. We find that before the new Corporate Law became effective, supervisory boards did not affect executive compensation, although their role after that became significant; both supervisory board size and meeting frequency affect total executive compensation, and supervisory board size also influences pay-performance sensitivity. Furthermore, we find that there exists a non-linear effect of supervisory board meeting frequency on executive pay, and an optimal range exists. Policy implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]