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Citizenship revocation has returned to the political agenda. In recent years, many Western democracies have either legislated or considered legislating citizenship revocation for terrorism offences. This paper analyses how Canada's short-lived experiment with citizenship revocation was represented in political, media and online discourses. Specifically, it identifies who has been interpreted a presumed candidate(s) of citizenship revocation, and analyses the discursive strategies employed to associate these targets with specific ethnic, national, or religious groups. We find that references to Muslims dominated public discourses on citizenship revocation. The articulation of these references reveals that Muslims were targeted not as individuals but as a category, indirectly branding them as less Canadian, and thereby symbolically un-belonging them from Canadian citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – This paper seeks to examine certain important aspects of the domestic laws of Nigeria, the UK, the USA and Canada with a view to pointing out the remarkable differences capable of affecting adversely the war on terror. Design/methodology/approach – Analyses the domestic laws of all four countries with a view to pointing out the remarkable differences capable of affecting adversely the war on terror. Findings – Despite the obvious zeal and commitment with which nations and states of the world have set out to wage a legal war on terrorism, particularly the aspect of financing it, and despite the existence of a convention of which they are members, serious disparity exists in the legal frameworks adopted for the war. Even amongst such countries as the UK, the USA and Canada, uniformity of laws and approach is still a far-fetched idea, a situation that is capable of hurting the international collaboration against terror. There is an urgent need for closer affinity between the laws of such countries while even countries like Nigeria that may not presently consider themselves as serious targets of terrorism need to urgently shirk themselves of such impressions and reform their laws. Originality/value – The paper makes suggestions as to how the differences in the laws of the four countries may be corrected or down played, and how the international objectives of uniformity of laws may be achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of energy sector security is in flux. A traditional focus on exploring the nexus between terrorism and physical energy infrastructure has given way to a new and specific emphasis on cyber attacks targeting electrical power grids. A noticeable gap in the literature exists in terms of presenting a more comprehensive assessment of the general threat environment. Our paper, and the larger project from which it stems, intends to fill this void and prompt more nuanced and empirically driven research on the topic that informs Canadian security policy. Our findings are informed by interviews conducted with American and Canadian energy sector officials, and a questionnaire carried out with energy sector companies. By examining a broader suite of disruptive threats to the energy sector, we paint a more inclusive picture of the many gateways through which the energy sector could be targeted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns that counter-terrorism laws and practices are directly and indirectly causing human rights violations have mounted. Much of the international focus has been on the United States. This paper highlights, however, that it is a debate with a truly global dimension. The author examines particular concerns that Canadian law enforcement and security agencies may have been complicit in the imprisonment and torture abroad of Canadian citizens who were of interest in the context of national security investigations. The cases are situated in the wider debate about torture that has emerged worldwide in recent years, and argues that any move to create exceptions to the absolute prohibition of torture, enshrined in numerous international treaties, would lead to both injustice and insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper starts with a new typology of terrorist acts based on a database of Canadian incidents. Terrorism is classified according to the scope of the stated objectives and the justification given for the acts committed. The typology is then used to extract the essential characteristics of different forms of terrorism and to explore the kinds of counterterrorist strategies which are most likely to be effective against each. Special attention is given to so-called ‘new’ terrorism and the best strategies to prevent or repress it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This piece provides a detailed case study of the evolution of counter-terrorism within a specific domestic security agency of a liberal-democratic state in the context of the Cold War. It does so by examining the creation of a counter-terrorism unit within Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service and how it responded to international terrorism. This occurred in between major terrorist attacks in Canada in 1970 and 1985 and included a growing focus on counter-terrorism even as counter-subversion remained a top priority within a still dominant Cold War domestic security framework. Ultimately, the article, based on thousands of pages of previously secret documents, argues that the Security Service could conceive of in a broader strategic sense the threat of terrorism but found it more challenging, for a variety of reasons, including the dominance of the Cold War and the difficulties around infiltrating ethnic communities, to collect intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the effects of counterterrorism policy in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2016. We use time series analysis and series hazard models to examine the influence of policy on (a) incidents of terrorist violence and (b) citizen perceptions of the threat of terrorism. Results indicate that counterterrorism policy is, for the most part, not related to significant changes in Canada but does report significant results for public opinion and terrorist incidents in the United States and the United Kingdom, although these effects are temporally defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expansive domains of counter-terrorism policing remain buffered from popular visibility, and police organizations remain primary definers of security threats and the police work involved in controlling these threats. Examining the interface between police image work and the continued intensification of the "war on terror," this article details how police agencies stage police raids, arrests, and press conferences in efforts to frame terrorism narratives in Canada; a police dramaturgy that shapes how the public consumes news about the threat of Islamic terrorism and the pre-crime interventionism of policing and security agencies. To examine these police newsmaking practices, two approaches are utilized: first by detailing experiences of defence lawyers who have worked on high-profile cases, then through an analysis of declassified documents related to the preparation and roll-out of a high profile national press conference to narrate the interdiction and killing of prospective terrorist Aaron Driver. Contributing to debates on police image work and contemporary debates around police power, this article demonstrates how policing agencies curate the image of counter-terrorism through newsmaking practices that exaggerate the threat of terrorism, shape the public imaginary around the threat of Islam, refurbish the role of police as symbolic guardians against evil, and aim to reproduce securitarian politics that advocate for more pre-emptive and surveillance powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether Islamic terrorism has seen a marked increase in Canada since the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks in New York City. It discusses the effect of the September 2001 terrorism to the Canadians and policymakers moving forward. The author argues that an analysis of terrorist incidents in Canada after the September 11 incident reveals a disturbing trend and also provides a clear indication of several areas which need to be investigated and addressed to mitigate this threat moving forward. It offers an overview of the six high profile terrorist incidents which occurred in Canada after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

The article presents a study of the nature of leadership and its association with perceived effectiveness in counter-terrorism community networks and explores the potential of complexity theory to inform leadership theory. The study uses phenomenography and components of ethnography as research methodologies. It states that the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Research and Technology Initiative (CRTI) of Canada is considered by CRTI personnel as a counter-terrorism network of communities, in which leader of every community networks collaborate with participants from various organizations. Results demonstrate the differences in the understanding of leadership and working environment by participants.

This article situates the subject of the academic–practitioner (AP) exchange within an International Relations-orientated critique of the imperial dynamics of counterterrorism practices and racial subjugation. It uses an analytical framework that upholds the significance of racial hierarchy to knowledge production. A key contribution of this article is to situate the AP nexus within the circumstances of liberal democratic counterterrorism regimes, to demonstrate how race becomes meaningful to the knowledge that is produced about Islamophobia. The main argument of this article is that in present policy debates concerning the existence of systemic racism, one of the mechanisms enabling counterterrorism practitioners to regulate the AP exchange is that of institutionalized whiteness. Exploring two scenarios of AP exchanges in the United Kingdom and Canada, where counterterrorism practitioners were challenged to reconcile with academic explanations of Islamophobia as a systemic issue, this article uses colour-line inspired critiques of white logic to identify instances where anti-racist knowledge was subjugated in the name of imperialism. The article finds that in each scenario discussed, practitioners demonstrate trajectories of white logic by contesting the suitability of anti-racist knowledge put forward by academics, on the basis of racial hierarchy and self-aggrandizement. It concludes by discussing how a lack of practitioner–academic consensus continues to affect the dissemination of knowledge concerning systemic racism, thus prompting considerations of what this means for an anti-racist future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada and the US The United States and Canada have a long tradition of bilateral and binational security coordination, cooperation and collaboration. This is evident in a vast and growing number of transgovernmental networks that facilitate and enable policy alignment and parallelism in defence, border security, intelligence and counter-terrorism. The security community has mastered coordination and cooperation. The US–Canada relationship is based on reciprocity. Despite its common cultural bedrock though, the US–Canada security community's hallmark is policy parallelism. Forms of mature collaboration remain limited and are only found on occasion. Partnerships have proven more successful in functional areas than in principled ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Entrapment has been a prominent, if rarely successful, defence in terrorism prosecutions. In this chapter, I sketch an egalitarian case for entrapment. On this account, the primary moral significance of entrapment is to prevent the police from generating crimes that would not otherwise have been perpetrated. In a context in which most people are, as Richard McAdams puts it, "probabilistic offenders," the power of the authorities to control the nature, frequency, and timing of an inducement to crime is the power to make criminals out of ordinary, but fallible, people. Entrapment is a means of constraining this power. In this regard, entrapment stands to undercover policing roughly as abuse of process stands to prosecutorial discretion: as a constraint on how officials choose which individuals to investigate, prosecute and punish. However, since judgments as to when this line is crossed are likely to be contestable, and since what is at issue is typically extraordinary state power used to ensnare particular individuals, I argue that courts should do more to encourage Parliament to regulate undercover policing ex ante rather than rely solely on an entrapment defence applied ex post, for instance by strictly applying an "authorized by law" condition in prosecutions based on undercover investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thwarted Toronto 18 terrorist plot was an early indication of things to come for terrorist financing in Canada and internationally. The self-financed plot demonstrated how terrorist cells, even those not directed by a terrorist group, could obtain enough money to fully fund a sophisticated and complex attack. In total, the main elements of the Toronto 18 plot likely cost thousands of dollars, but the organizers of the plot had accumulated far more than they needed for the components of the attack and had enough money to rent a safe house, pay for plane tickets to escape prosecution after the attack, and develop a plausible cover story for their activities. Despite the financial elements of the plot, no terrorist financing charges were laid in the case. This may have been due to the lack of international funding of the plot and a conceptualization within Canada's law enforcement and security services at the time that terrorist financing came from "abroad." The lack of financing charges, in this case, may have had longstanding implications in Canada, where, to date, very few charges of this nature have been laid, even 15 years after the plot was disrupted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Historical Review is the property of University of Toronto Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Legal systems should not always assume the legitimacy of state demands for secrecy and accommodate them with procedural innovations. This is especially so in Canada, which has made problematic policy choices to stress secrecy even in counterterrorism investigations where secret intelligence often has evidential value. A fairer and more efficient transition from secret intelligence to public evidence could be achieved if Canadian criminal trial judges, like those in other democracies, could make and revise non-disclosure or public interest immunity orders to protect secrets. The government of Canada has not justified adopting the procedural innovation of closed material procedures that would allow it to defend itself in national security civil litigation on the basis of secret evidence not seen by plaintiffs claiming to have been abused, but only by special advocates. There is a danger that even justified procedural innovation such as the use of special advocates will create new baselines that can be used to support additional innovations that may undermine the legitimacy of the legal system and discount the value of procedural regularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Captain Javed Latif, a Muslim Canadian pilot from Pakistan, was denied pilot refresher training by Bombardier Aerospace Training Center in Canada based on information received from US national security officials. Almost 12 years after Captain Javed Latif 's ordeal began, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal overturning a finding by a Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that Latif had been racially profiled. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision ultimately exposes and perpetuates a deep unwillingness to challenge the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada. In response, this commentary seeks to excavate Captain Latif 's fuller story largely through a reading of silences. It critically analyzes the Court's claim that the Tribunal had little or no evidence before it to ground its finding of discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada’s approach to proscription differs from that of other Westminster democracies. After the negative example of listing in the October Crisis, 1970 and with the subsequent advent of a constitutional bill of rights, Canada does not ban organizations; instead it penalizes certain forms of conduct, above mere membership, with terrorist groups. “Terrorist groups” include entities listed proactively by the executive, but also entities that meet a functional definition in Canadian criminal law. In practice, the latter, functionally-defined terrorist groups have figured in most terrorism prosecutions—only a few cases have involved listed groups. With the new focus on Daesh (a listed group), that may begin to change. However, executive listing raises unresolved constitutional doubts in Canada, prompting concerns that reliance on proscription may be more trouble than it is worth. Listing has also been used with respect to individuals, but such listings in Canada have already produced false positives, perhaps because of the due process deficits of listing by the executive. In many respects, therefore, terrorist group listing is yesterday’s law, problematic and of marginal utility. There may be reasons of administrative expediency to preserve listing, but the tool is more doubtful when used as a precursor to criminal prosecutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how theories of radicalisation have placed an emphasis on the development of an indicators-based approach to identify individuals who might engage in politically motivated violence. We trace how policing agencies have juxtaposed the search for indicators as a defence against criticisms of racial profiling. However, through an analysis of Canadian counter-terrorism training programmes, we demonstrate that the search for radicalisation indicators reaffirms pre-emptive and discriminatory security practices. We insist that despite efforts to theorise radicalisation outside of the practices of the “war on terror”, current trends risk rationalising prejudicial policing that affirms social exclusion and injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

THE COLLAPSE OF the notable twin towers of New York's World Trade Center in 2001 influenced Canada in a larger number of courses than the loss of two dozen Canadians among the unfortunate passings on that day. Instantly, American fingers indicated as far as anyone knows remiss northern outskirt security that had encouraged terrorist activity in the United States. In spite of the fact that this creation was in the long run recognized all things considered, the harm was finished. The characterized circumstance was genuine in its outcomes. In a bitingly humorous move, Canadian authorities exceeded themselves in showing security cautiousness with the outcome that few pure Canadian natives were whisked away by American constrains in remarkable version, to endure torment in Syria and Egypt and to have their lives shredded by the encounters. The best known of these is Syrian-conceived Maher Arar, an Ottawa architect (see O'Connor 2006). In every circumstance, the misusing of individual data relating to the casualties was vital to their wrongful detainment. In spite of the fact that security and observation are verifiably fundamental to this circumstance, with some striking special cases (Calhoun 2002) sociological examination did not figure unequivocally in endeavors to comprehend it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Native Studies is the property of Brandon University, CJNS, Faculty of Arts and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Following a critical review of the extensive literature on the topic of Canada’s Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan, from 2001 to 2011, this article traces the genealogy of the approach, identifies three major contributions as well as three serious limitations. A subsequent qualitative analysis of the content of this literature, as well as a quantitative meta-analysis provide a deeper than ever understanding of the complexity of Canada’s so-called Comprehensive Approach and as such, presents the theoretical underpinnings of a pragmatic executive decision-making model for Canada’s future engagements, to be developed through further iterations of grounded theory. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Anne-Marie Slaughter has described the "new world order" as characterized by some "conceptual shifts," including an increasing cooperation of domestic courts across nation-state boundaries. The crossjurisdictional referencing of legal norms and decisions, as Slaughter holds, would lead into a "global community of courts." This article takes issue with that observation. We argue that for such a community to emerge, cross-referencing would need to be followed by an effective transmission of meaning from one (legal) context to another. Following recent insights in the field of International Relations norm research, however, we can expect such meanings to be contested--in particular, when different cultural repertoires operate on either side of the interactive processes. Therefore, a need for translation ensues (i.e., a translation of constitutional norms or concepts from one legal order into another). The conditions of a "global community of courts" are thus not easily met. In this respect, the aim of the article is to put Slaughter's thesis to an empirical test. To extrapolate the "normative structures of meaning-in-use" the article builds on the analysis of semi-structured interviews with legal practitioners who were involved in the jurisprudence on anti-terrorism measures in two countries, Canada and Germany. During this empirical work, we found a “global community of courts” not yet emerged. Although the concept of community does matter as an explanatory reference for research on legal cross-referencing across national borders, our research suggests that practice of cross-referencing is still more “culturally” fragmented than unified, and normative references are more regionally diverse than globally shared. Moreover, the normative context within which referencing takes place remains strong, so that the meaning of “foreign” concepts is often constructed by means of contestation rather than transferred from one contest into another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Acquiring and maintaining public support is frequently cited as an important requirement for governments fighting non-state actors. But how exactly can public support influence the course of counterterrorism campaigns and thereby contribute to an escalation or de-escalation of violence? This article argues that public support can provide a mandate for action but that it can also set boundaries for the measures governments and their non-state adversaries can legitimately use. Fluctuations in the quantity and quality of public support for either side can expand or contract these boundaries, potentially instigating marked changes in conflict-related violence levels and affecting the efficacy of government countermeasures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares the counterterrorism strategies employed by the U.S. and Canada. It informs that the comparative examination of American-Canadian counterterrorism provides an important space of sharing intelligence that has been encouraged globally and domestically since the September 11 terror attacks. It mentions that the Canadian and U.S. governments are moving forward in security arrangements that will strengthen security cooperation such as information sharing.

The article focuses on the developments in the Canadian intelligence community after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. It notes that the country's intelligence community gained substantial new resources and revised mandate, as well as the modification of institutional structures to focus on new threats and improve coordination, after the terrorist attacks. It states that the mobilization of resources to prevent a direct attack on Canadian citizens or Canadian infrastructure became the immediate priority of the government. The country's Department of National Defense was also increased to meet new military commitments and expanded its intelligence gathering.

The article focuses on the military responses and capabilities of the national security policy in Canada after the September 11, 2011 terror attacks in New York. It notes that Canada's federal government has tightened up financial restrictions on potential fund-raising by identified terrorist groups, introduced new legislation and bureaucratic structures focusing on security issues. The author suggests that the Canadian military is reasonably prepared for a military response to the eventuality of a terrorist incident or an act in the country.

The article presents the efforts of Canada in preventing terrorism attacks wherein more terrorist groups are said to be active in the country due to its proximity to one of the world's pre-eminent terrorist targets, the U.S. According to the article, the country's terrorism activities started in 1970 when a government minister of the Canadian province of Quebec was kidnapped and killed by his captors who advocated the separation of Quebec from Canada. Thus, counterterrorism function shifted to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Agency (CSIS) in 1984 wherein the agency assumed responsibility of investigating terrorism and prevent further violence. It also mentions the important role of RCMP, the Canadian police, to help Canadians keep their communities safe and secure.

This article explores the recent UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism. Contrasts can be readily drawn. Essentially the UK is engaged in both internal/domestic and external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism. Therefore, it has adopted a wide-ranging 'broad risk management' approach. Meanwhile the US is engaged mostly in external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism, conceived of as counter-insurgency in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has adopted a narrower 'risk prevention' approach. The Canadians, confronting a smaller threat, are less embroiled in 'firefighting' activities, enabling them to adopt more of a 'risk pre-emption' approach involving some social engineering. Arguably, the Canadian model outlined in this article can offer some instructive lessons for both the US and the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Political Science Review is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article argues that there are five major challenges currently facing Western intelligence communities. First - ensuring skills retention for intelligence officers and analysts, while developing knowledgeable managers and customers, all in an increasingly-complex security environment. Second - instituting and inculcating knowledge and expertise in these staff - while addressing an opponent in al-Qaeda which demonstrates increasingly sophisticated use of IT, new media, etc. Third - drawing-in outside expertise from the research and business communities, as is done currently in the US and Canada but in only a very limited manner in the UK. Fourth - overcoming institutional rigidity in dividing the foreign and domestic - alongside rigid sharing and co-operation relationships. Fifth - creating truly collaborative environments that offer genuine socio-cultural incentives to collaboration rather than mere 'IT solutions'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various developments that took place in Canada in 2008. It continued its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the Dominican Republic, and four South American countries including El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. On June 28, 2008 Canada entered a mutual recognition agreement with the U.S. recognizing the compatibility between the U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program and Canada's Partners in Protection program.