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Even though the immediate urgency of the COVID-19 pandemic seems to have passed, many countries did not reach the vaccination rates they initially aimed for. The stagnation in vaccine uptake during the height of the pandemic presented policy makers with a challenge that remains unresolved and is paramount for future pandemics and other crises: How to convince the (often not insubstantial) unvaccinated proportion of the population of the benefits of a vaccination? Designing more successful communication strategies, both in retrospect and looking ahead, requires a differentiated understanding of the concerns of those that remain unvaccinated. Guided by the elaboration likelihood model, this paper has two objectives: First, it explores by means of a latent class analysis how unvaccinated individuals might be characterized by their attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccination. Second, we investigate to what extent (i) varying types of evidence (none/anecdotal/statistical) can be employed by (ii) different types of communicators (scientists/politicians) to improve vaccination intentions across these subgroups. To address these questions, we conducted an original online survey experiment among 2145 unvaccinated respondents from Germany where a substantial population share remains unvaccinated. The results suggest three different subgroups, which differ regarding their openness towards a COVID-19 vaccination: Vaccination opponents (N = 1184), sceptics (N = 572) and those in principle receptive (N = 389) to be vaccinated. On average, neither the provision of statistical nor anecdotal evidence increased the persuasiveness of information regarding the efficacy of a COVID-19 vaccine. However, scientists were, on average, more persuasive than politicians (relatively increase vaccination intentions by 0.184 standard deviations). With respect to heterogeneous treatment effects among the three subgroups, vaccination opponents seem largely unreachable, while sceptics value information by scientists, particularly if supported by anecdotal evidence (relatively increases intentions by 0.45 standard deviations). Receptives seem much more responsive to statistical evidence from politicians (relatively increases intentions by 0.38 standard deviations)., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

• First study to examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on public support for development assistance in Germany. • Neither health-related nor economic worries correlate with support. • Trust in government marginally interacts with health-related worries in predicting support. • Being aware that developing countries are most affected by the pandemic correlates with higher support. • Moral obligations, trust in government, and self-interest remain important predictors of support in times of the pandemic. The global COVID-19 pandemic poses challenges to the economy, politics and public health systems of developed and developing countries alike. However, the latter are less well placed to cope with adverse effects. In particular, important advances towards sustainable development might be reversed. Tackling the pandemic and its effects therefore requires global cooperation as well as solidarity in the form of development assistance. Yet, support for development assistance among donor publics might be dampened by individual health-related and economic worries as well as decreasing trust in government during the pandemic. Against this backdrop, we investigate the possible effect of pandemic-induced worries on public support for development assistance as well as the moderating role of moral considerations and trust in government. Drawing on literature on aid attitudes, and using survey data for Germany provided by the COVID-19 Snapshot Monitoring (COSMO) project from April 2020 (N = 1,006), our analyses show that neither health-related nor economic worries are associated with less support for providing development assistance during the first wave of the pandemic. However, we observe a marginal interaction between health-related worries and trust in government in predicting support for development assistance. For those with high levels of trust in government the effect of worry regarding the loss of friends or relatives on support for development assistance is positive, whereas it is close to zero for those with low levels of trust. We conclude that at the peak of the first wave of the pandemic there was little need for concern by policy-makers endorsing development assistance as neither form of worry correlated negatively with public support for development assistance and trust was high. However, when worries recur and trust in government simultaneously decreases, public support for global solidarity may wane. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]