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Context: While the World Health Organization (WHO) has established guidance on COVID-19 surveillance, little is known about implementation of these guidelines in federations, which fragment authority across multiple levels of government. This study examines how subnational governments in federal democracies collect and report data on COVID-19 cases and mortality associated with COVID-19., Methods: We collected data from subnational government websites in 15 federal democracies to construct indices of COVID-19 data quality. Using bivariate and multivariate regression, we analyzed the relationship between these indices and indicators of state capacity, the decentralization of resources and authority, and the quality of democratic institutions. We supplement these quantitative analyses with qualitative case studies of subnational COVID-19 data in Brazil, Spain, and the United States., Findings: Subnational governments in federations vary in their collection of data on COVID-19 mortality, testing, hospitalization, and demographics. There are statistically significant associations (p < 0.05) between subnational data quality and key indicators of public health system capacity, fiscal decentralization, and the quality of democratic institutions. Case studies illustrate the importance of both governmental and civil-society institutions that foster accountability., Conclusions: The quality of subnational COVID-19 surveillance data in federations depends in part on public health system capacity, fiscal decentralization, and the quality of democracy., (Copyright © 2021 by Duke University Press.)

Expenditures on police departments account for significant portions of local government budgets in the United States. Yet activism on police reform and changing views on the causes of violence have called into question law enforcement's role in public safety. While intergovernmental transfers have historically supported traditional policing, the American Rescue Plan Act's Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (CSLFRF) affords cities the opportunity to disrupt the status quo by providing them with the federal funds and flexibility to reshape their public safety policies around Community Violence Interventions (CVIs). This article examines how 13 cities that participated in a White House convened collaborative used CSLFRF aid to support CVIs. Our analysis reveals significant variation in how these cities in allocated CSLFRF dollars to CVI programs, suggesting that the combination of federal aid and White House encouragement has thus far led to incremental policy changes, whose durability remains an open question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Emergency fiscal transfers to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments have been at the core of the U.S. federal government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The most extensive of these transfer programs is the Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (CSLFRF) program, contained in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. The CSLFRF is not only larger than prior rounds of emergency aid, it was also designed to address a broader series of crises, address pre-existing inequities, and provide greater discretion to public officials in deciding how to allocate funds. In this article, we consider the extent to which this program represents a departure from what some have called "fend for yourself" federalism. We conclude that while the coordinated effort of intergovernmental organizations resulted in a greater measure of federal fiscal activism and flexibility than might have been anticipated, lingering political conflicts and legacies of austerity will continue to inflect the CSLFRF's implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poor people proved especially vulnerable to economic disruption during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, which highlighted the importance of poverty reduction as a policy concern. In this article, we explore the politics of poverty reduction during the COVID-19 crisis in Canada and the United States, two liberal welfare-state regimes where poverty reduction is a key policy issue. We show that, since the beginning of the pandemic, policies likely to reduce poverty significantly have been adopted in both Canada and the United States. Yet, this poverty reduction logic has emerged in different ways in the two countries--with the United States embracing more significant departures from its policy status quo. This situation leads us to ask the following question: in each country, what are the political conditions under which public policies susceptible of reducing poverty are enacted? To answer this question, we study the politics of poverty reduction both before and during the pandemic, as we suggest that grasping the evolution of partisan and electoral patterns over time is necessary to explain what happened during the pandemic, whose impact is closely related to how it interacts with such patterns. Our analysis suggests the need to consider more carefully the impact of both crises and partisanship on social policy, including poverty reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the global COVID-19 crisis, whereas many world leaders enacted swift lockdown orders and robust testing regimes to preserve public health and to speed up economic recovery, Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil responded to outbreaks by publicly downplaying the significance of the crisis and argued that overly restrictive health measures would create too sizable an economic risk. These two presidents have done much to weaken democracy and trust in government. In this article, we examine the extent to which two institutions in each country––federalism and the party system––impacted the ways in which they framed the COVID-19 crisis and policy responses to it in 2020, especially during the first months of the pandemic. Our evidence suggests that each of these institutions provided opportunities for both leaders to reconstruct public understandings of the crisis while deflecting blame for negative public-health outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National responses to COVID-19 depend in part on national health care financing arrangements. Yet the pandemic itself has not only strained system capacity, it has – through subsequent economic shocks – strained revenue sources that prop up these arrangements. In federal countries, fiscal pressures are particularly pronounced. As this paper argues, however, federal health financing regimes differ in ways that are shaping the agenda for post-pandemic reforms. The analysis, which focuses on health care financing in three federal countries (Canada, the United States, and Mexico), explores the current and potential future impact of COVID-19 on existing policy legacies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada and the United States are often grouped together as liberal welfare‐state regimes, with broadly similar levels of social spending. Yet, as the COVID‐19 pandemic reveals, the two countries engage in highly divergent approaches to social policymaking during a massive public health emergency. Drawing on evidence from the first 5 months of the pandemic, this article compares social policy measures taken by the United States and Canadian governments in response to COVID‐19. In general, we show that Canadian responses were both more rapid and comprehensive than those of the United States. This variation, we argue, can be explained by analysing the divergent political institutions, pre‐existing policy legacies, and variations in cross‐partisan consensus, which have all shaped national decision‐making in the middle of the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Federalism plays a foundational role in structuring public expectations about how the United States will respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, as both an unprecedented public-health crisis and an economic recession. As in prior crises, state governments are expected to be primary sites of governing authority, especially when it comes to immediate public-health needs, while it is assumed that the federal government will supply critical counter-cyclical measures to stabilize the economy and make up for major revenue shortfalls in the states. Yet there are reasons to believe that these expectations will not be fulfilled, especially when it comes to the critical juncture of the COVID-19 pandemic. Though the federal government has the capacity to engage in counter-cyclical spending to stabilize the economy, existing policy instruments vary in the extent to which they leverage that capacity. This leverage, we argue, depends on how decentralized policy arrangements affect the implementation of both discretionary emergency policies as well as automatic stabilization programs such as Unemployment Insurance, Medicaid, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. Evidence on the US response to COVID-19 to date suggests the need for major revisions in the architecture of intergovernmental fiscal policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]