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In a previous report we answered a number of questions by the editors about the Dutch strategic policy in the first half year of the SARS-CoV-2 cri- sis. In the present paper we reply to a number of additional questions of the editors about the steps put by the Dutch policy during the second half of 2020, when the SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 pandemic developed its second wave. Especially, the awareness of an upcoming second and third epidemic waves, the specific preventive actions and measures taken by the government and the changing compliance and trust of the public in the government’s strategy are described. Actions such as the Dutch test strategy, the division of regional vs national competences, partial and complete lockdowns, and cooperation with other member states and the (or their lack) are also briefly treated. Specific temporary and structural adjustments in the public health and health care system are mentioned. No hard conclusions or qualifications about the adequacy of the Dutch public health and health care policy are drawn. Nevertheless, in retro- spect it is clear that a straightforward, focussed and highly effective strategy in this unprecedented crisis by a new and dangerous and rapidly mu- tating virus is a great challenge for every country. Many things go well, but many more could or should have be done better. We have to learn, also from each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents the information on COVID-19 policy response in Italy in in the second half of 2020, when the second wave of the pandemic occurred. It builds on the authors previous report that addressed the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. In Italy, from October till December, the number of SARS-CoV-2 infections increased significantly. However, the Italian government, unlike many other European governments, re- frained from introducing a second nationwide lockdown. The pandemic was managed through a system of localized interventions (on a regional andor provincial basis) which significantly varied across the regions. At the end of December 2020, a national plan for vaccination against COVID-19 was approved. In February 2021, together with the change of government, a new public policy against the COVID-19 pandemic was formulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The vaccinations during COVID-19 pandemics in Poland When pandemics COVID-19 hit Poland, the people’s readiness to observe the recommended rules of rational healthy behaviour was partially ham- pered by the lasting activities of anti-vaccination circles which were appearing at grass root level and among parliamentary politicians. These activi- ties were supported by a component the medical persons who provided an impression of professional authority. This situation to the growing scepti- cism in the face of rational sanitary recommendations, the fact what was revealed the social attitudes investigations. Decision-makers’ negligence who implemented many inappropriate legislative measures also contributed to the disappointing effects. Sometimes the authorities tried to withdraw partly from this mistake – obligatory masks wearing is an example – but such facts did not strengthen people’s willingness to follow recommenda- tions. The authorities abandoned its concern of employees and clients health and refused to equip the management with the rights to check up their vaccination status. Following the same line the Government confirmed the Universities could not verify the students’ vaccination status or implement any restrictions for unvaccinated. The rectors trying to undertake any measures were criticised.It is justified to assert that decision-makers’ mistakes contributed at least partially to smaller efficiency anti-pandemic interventions, than this was potentially possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Occurrence of the Covid 19 Pandemic was totally unexpected, and governments of all countries were surprised. Pandemics always raises the feeling of fear and health policy is interested in such phenomena. In this specific case it was fully justified as Covid 19 was new and unknown. Everywhere the populations found themselves in psychological position presented years ago by Ulrich Beck in book "Risk Society". Influencing and shaping society's emotions - both feelings of safety and feelings of fear had a fundamental importance for social behaviour. In time when first information about Covid 19 came from China and Poland was still free from any infection, the government's representatives tried to play down the seriousness of the virus and equated the Covid 19 to a seasonal flu. At that time, it could have been justified as an attempt to avoid panic. But with the first episodes of infections the tone of messages essentially changed, and the virus was presented as a lethal danger. Such a context was applied as a direct rationalization of general lockdown and a broad catalogue of restrictions in social contacts. However, when The Presidential Election was approaching (with the act of balloting demanding presence of people in a polling station), the content of messages presented to the public changed again. In the new version the virus itself was shown as rather innocent and the pandemic was contained and under control. In this way all voters, including elderly people, were encouraged to take part in the election. If lessons are to be drawn from the past, we might conclude that in time of a pandemic, the instrumental management of social emotions and feelings is not always the best way of communicating with the general public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first positive case of COVID-19 in Canada was reported on January 25, 2020, in the city of Toronto, Ontario. Over the following four months, the number of individuals diagnosed with COVID-19 in Ontario grew to 28,263 cases. A state of emergency was announced by the Premier of Ontario on March 17, 2020, and the provincial health care system prepared for a predicted surge of COVID-19 patients requiring hospitalization. The Chief Medical Officer of Health and the Minister of Health guided the changes in the system in response to the evolving needs and science related to COVID-19. The pandemic required a rapid, concerted, and coordinated effort from all sectors of the system to optimize and maximize the capacity of the health system. The response to the pandemic in Ontario was complex with some sectors experiencing multiple outbreaks of COVID-19 (i.e. long-term care homes and hospitals). Notably, numerous sectors shifted to virtual delivery of care. By the end of May 2020, it was announced that hospitals would gradually resume postponed or cancelled services. This paper explores the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on multiple health system sectors (i.e., public health, primary care, long-term care, emergency medical services, and hospitals) in Ontario from January to May 2020. Given the scope of the sectors contributing to the health system in Ontario, this analysis of a regional response to COVID-19 provides insight on how to improve responses and better prepare for future health emergencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Italy was one of the worst-affected European countries. The rapid surge of cases and the limited capacity of intensive care unit departments have posed a serious threat to the Italian national health system. In this paper we describe the first response and the main measures carried by Italian policy makers, as coordinated by a governmental committee of public health experts, which have succeeded in preventing the pandemic from turning into a disaster. Early closure of the school, quarantine measures and lockdown were put in place and the response of the population has been good overall. Despite the Italian health care system of universal coverage is considered the second-best in the world, during phase 1, the Italian decentralisation and fragmentation of health services probably restricted timely interventions and effectiveness. In northern Italy, Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Piedmont, and Veneto, which reported most of the Italian cases, carried out different strategies against COVID-19, with great differences in testing, quarantine, and public health procedures. The improvement of the epidemiological situation has allowed an easing of the restrictive measures, with a progressive restarting of work activities. The government and technical-scientific bodies have prepared health strategies to support a possible second epidemic wave in the autumn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]