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The felony murder rule would appear to be an anomaly in the common law. It represents one of the very few instances in criminal law where the element of intent is waived. Criticism of the rule is almost uniform among scholars and commentators, yet it endures in most jurisdictions throughout the United States. Typically, critics assert the rule's longevity is the result of political forces that make it difficult to change laws that make criminal prosecutions easier. Others claim the rule fills some psychological need to mete out retribution when harm occurs to innocent parties. If a justification for the rule is offered, it generally focuses on the deterrence properties of the rule, however empirical research suggests the rule does little to deter felonies or felony murders. We offer a model in which the felony murder rule serves to deter crimes against relatively more vulnerable victims, who would otherwise be more attractive targets of crime in the absence of the rule. This model predicts only a relatively modest decrease in felonies, as perpetrators substitute away from relatively more vulnerable toward less vulnerable victims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Roman law, manifest theft (essentially, one in which a thief was caught in the act) was punished with a more severe penalty than non-manifest theft. This legal policy seems to contradict the economic theory of efficient deterrence. In this paper, we try to explore how economic analysis of criminal law and law enforcement points to several efficiency-based arguments to understand the puzzle, and allows us to tentatively conclude that technological changes in law enforcement in the broad sense might have been the major factor in the disappearance of the rule in modern legal systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality. Severe punishment reduces the dimension of a criminal network, but it might augment the effectiveness of its members. Smaller firms are easier to manage, and consequently fewer mistakes are committed, which in turn diminishes the likelihood of detection. Hence, a less severe enforcement of the law could be considered in order to achieve optimal deterrence. We also show that the allocation of sanctions between employer and employees is not unimportant as previous literature indicated. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Behavioral economic analysis of law is about bringing recent research about behavior and choice together with classical law and economics. In this essay we assess its relevance for the theory of optimal law enforcement. It is our view that criminal law is an area where behavioral analysis has a role to play. Notwithstanding the results so far provided by the behavioral approach are somehow disappointing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction of the special issue of the journal is presented in which the editor discusses an article on Italian reforms of labor law by Antonio Nicita and Matteo Rizzoli, the formal models to address criminal law reforms in France by Bruno Deffains and colleagues, and the problems caused by litigation where the State is the defendant by Fernando Gómez-Pomar and colleagues.