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Consistency in crisis communication is a key aspect of effective political leadership during crises, but can be difficult in multilevel systems due to the number of leaders and fragmentation of policymaking powers. The literature on multilevel governance suggests that centralisation enhances consistency in crisis communication while decentralisation leads to inconsistency. Consistency in crisis communication is also expected to depend on whether leaders coordinate crisis management. Comparing crisis communication in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, this paper shows that centralisation does not automatically lead to consistent crisis communication. At the same time, decentralised decision making does not necessarily undermine consistency. Overall, crisis communication tends to be more consistent when leaders coordinate crisis management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The COVID-19 pandemic required prompt action from governments all over the world. In federal systems, it can be important or beneficial to coordinate crisis management between the various governments. The extent to which intergovernmental coordination occurred and the form it took (vertical or horizontal) varied across countries and regarding the measures taken. By examining the introduction and the subsequent easing of containment measures and the procurement of medical supplies in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, this article identifies the circumstances under which intergovernmental coordination occurs. Surprisingly, the existence of strong intergovernmental councils did not lead to closer intergovernmental coordination. Governments coordinated more intensively when jurisdiction was shared, problem pressure was high, and measures were(re-)distributive in nature. Vertical coordination was more likely when vertical intergovernmental councils existed and powers were shared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability of federal states to manage the COVID-19 pandemic has created much debate. Federations differ considerably in the way they have been tackling the crisis, however. To shed light on how European federations (Austria, Germany, Switzerland) managed COVID-19, this paper distinguishes two dimensions of federal decision making: centralised/decentralised and unilateral/coordinated decision making. Drawing on official government documents and press reports, it examines decisions on the introduction of containment measures and their subsequent easing during the first wave. While Austria and Switzerland adopted a centralised approach, decentralised decision making prevailed in Germany. However, most decisions were coordinated between the governments at the federal and constituent unit level in Austria and Germany, in contrast to Switzerland where unilateralism prevailed. This difference in approaches can partly be explained by the distribution of powers. Political and economic factors also influenced the choice of crisis management strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]