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Technology policy is the most widespread form of climate policy and is often preferred over seemingly efficient carbon pricing. We propose a new explanation for this observation: gains that predominantly accrue to households with large capital assets and that influence majority decisions in favor of technology policy. We study climate policy choices in an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous energy technologies and distortionary income taxation. Compared to carbon pricing, green technology policy leads to a pronounced capital subsidy effect that benefits most of the current generations but burdens future generations. Based on majority voting which disregards future generations, green technology policies are favored over a carbon tax. Smart “polluter-pays” financing of green technology policies enables obtaining the support of current generations while realizing efficiency gains for future generations., Economics Working Paper Series, 21/362

This paper examines how enhanced flexibility across space, time, and a regulatory dimension affects the economic costs and CO2 emissions of integrating large shares of intermittent renewable energy from wind and solar. We develop a numerical model which resolves hourly dispatch and investment choices among heterogeneous energy technologies and natural resources in interconnected wholesale electricity markets, cross-country trade (spatial flexibility), energy storage (temporal flexibility), and tradable green quotas (regulatory flexibility). Taking the model to the data for the case of Europe’s system of interconnected electricity markets, we find that the appropriate combination of flexibility can bring about substantial gains in economic efficiency, reduce costs (up to 13.8%) and lower CO2 emissions (up to 51.2%). Regulatory flexibility is necessary to realize most of the maximum possible benefits. We also find that gains from increased flexibility are unevenly distributed and that some countries incur welfare losses.

vEconomists tend to view a uniform emissions price as the most cost-effective approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This paper offers a different view, focusing on economies where society values the well-being of future generations more than private actors. Employing analytical and numerical general equilibrium models, we show that a uniform carbon price is efficient only under restrictive assumptions about technology homogeneity and intertemporal decision-making. Non-uniform pricing spurs capital accumulation and benefits future generations. Depending on sectoral heterogeneity in the substitutability between capital and energy inputs, we find that optimal carbon prices differ widely across sectors and yield substantial welfare gains relative to uniform pricing., Economics Working Paper Series, 21/360

Carbon pricing is a key instrument for achieving Europe's ambitious climate targets. It is therefore not surprising that reform of the EU carbon market is at the heart of the measures proposed by the European Commission (EC). One important policy innovation would be the introduction of a second emissions trading system in Europe that integrates other sectors like buildings and road transport. This addresses some of the inefficiencies of the existing, fragmented EU carbon markets, but at the same time requires a policy decision with potentially large implications in terms of economic costs to achieve European climate goals: How should the EU carbon budget be divided between two separate carbon markets? Achieving the EU climate target of 55 per cent causes a decrease in the aggregate consumption level of the EU-27 countries of 2.8 per cent or 248.9 billion euros in 2030 under current EU climate policy (without considering possible benefits from avoided climate change damages). A new emissions trading system reduces these costs by 21.5 per cent under the current allocation of the EU climate budget and by 33.0 per cent under the allocation proposed by the European Commission. Larger cost reductions of up to 61.6 per cent are possible if an even larger emissions budget is allocated to the buildings and transport sectors. Given the difficulties to politically determine the allocation of the EU climate budget, market-based flexibility mechanisms are desirable in order to achieve climate targets at the lowest economic cost.

While carbon taxes are generally seen as a rational policy response to climate change, knowledge about their performance from an expost perspective is still limited. This paper analyzes the emissions and cost impacts of the UK CPS, a carbon tax levied on all fossil-fired power plants. To overcome the problem of a missing control group, we propose a policy evaluation approach which leverages economic theory and machine learning for counterfactual prediction. Our results indicate that in the period 2013-2016 the CPS lowered emissions by 6.2 percent at an average cost of €18 per ton. We find substantial temporal heterogeneity in tax-induced impacts which stems from variation in relative fuel prices. An important implication for climate policy is that in the short run a higher carbon tax does not necessarily lead to higher emissions reductions or higher costs.

This paper examines the distributional impacts from (i) harmonizing prices for carbon dioxide emissions across sectors and EU countries and (ii) using alternative rules for carbon revenue distribution. We develop a numerical multi-country multi-sector general equilibrium model of the EU-27 economy which resolves household income deciles, based on micro-survey data on expenditure and income, and markets for fossil fuels, electricity, and (EU-wide and national) tradeable emissions rights. We find that carbon price harmonization yields efficiency gains at the EU level. The distributional effects between countries vary and depend largely on the redistribution of carbon revenues. Based on the rules currently in place in Phase IV of the EU ETS, efficiency gains flow disproportionately to low-income countries. Within-country incidence is progressive or neutral for most countries when revenue redistribution is ignored, and is not much affected by carbon price harmonization. Per-capita-based revenue redistribution rules lead to strong progressive outcomes and yield gains for low-income households. Evaluating different policy options using a social welfare function that incorporates inequality aversion suggests that there is no trade-off between efficiency and equity in harmonizing carbon prices in the EU economy.

Carbon taxes are commonly seen as a rational policy response to climate change, but little is known about their performance from an ex-post perspective. This paper analyzes the emissions and cost impacts of the UK CPS, a carbon tax levied on all fossil-fired power plants. To overcome the problem of a missing control group, we propose a novel approach for policy evaluation which leverages economic theory and machine learning techniques for counterfactual prediction. Our results indicate that in the period 2013-2016 the CPS lowered emissions by 6.2 percent at an average cost of €18 per ton. We find substantial temporal heterogeneity in tax-induced impacts which stems from variation in relative fuel prices. An important implication for climate policy is that a higher carbon tax does not necessarily lead to higher emissions reductions or higher costs., Economics Working Paper Series, 19/317 and 19/317bis

We examine the lifetime incidence and intergenerational distributional effects of an economywide carbon tax swap using a numerical dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of the U.S. economy. We highlight various fundamental choices in policy design including (1) the level of the initial carbon tax, (2) the growth rate of the carbon tax trajectory of over time, and (3) alternative ways for revenue recycling. Without revenue recycling, we find that generations born before the tax is introduced experience smaller welfare losses, or even gain, relative to future generations. For sufficiently low growth rates of the tax trajectory, the impacts for distant future generations decrease over time. For future generations born after the introduction of the tax, the negative welfare impacts are the smallest (largest) when revenues are recycled through lowering pre-existing capital income taxes (through per-capita lump-sum rebates). For generations born before the tax is introduced, we find that lump-sum rebates favor very old generations and labor (capital) income tax recycling favors very young generations (generations of intermediate age).

This paper exploits the randomness and exogeneity of weather conditions to identify the economic cost of decarbonization through renewable energy (RE) support policies. We find that both the aggregate cost and the distribution of cost between energy producers and consumers vary significantly depending on which type of RE technology is promoted—reflecting substantial heterogeneity in production cost, temporal availability of natural resources, and market conditions (i.e., time-varying demand, carbon intensity of installed production capacities, and opportunities for cross-border trade). We estimate that the cost for reducing one ton of CO2 emissions through subsidies for solar are e500–1870. Subsidizing wind entails significantly lower cost, which can even be slightly negative, ranging from e-5– 230. While the economic rents for energy producers always decrease, consumers incur three to five times larger costs when solar is promoted but gain under RE policies promoting wind. (JEL Q28, Q48, Q54, L94, C01)., Economics Working Paper Series, 17/273

This paper examines how the general equilibrium incidence of an environmental tax depends on the effect of different incomes and preferences of heterogeneous households on aggregate outcomes. We develop a Harberger-type model with general forms of preferences and substitution between capital, labor, and pollution in production that captures the impact of household heterogeneity and interactions with production characteristics on the general equilibrium. We theoretically show that failing to incorporate household heterogeneity can qualitatively affect incidence. We quantitatively illustrate that this aggregation bias can be important for assessing the incidence of a carbon tax, mainly by affecting the returns to factors of production. Our findings are robust to a number of extensions including alternative revenue recycling schemes, preexisting taxes, non-separable utility in pollution, labor-leisure choice, and multiple commodities.

This paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework. We characterize the drivers for non-uniform optimal taxes emanating from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences. Quantitatively assessing the case of price-based CO2 emissions control in the U.S. economy, we find that optimal carbon taxes differ largely across industries, even when social inequality aversion is low. Our results are robust with respect to the stringency of the environmental target, non-optimal redistribution schemes, and parametric uncertainty in firms’ and households’ equilibrium tax responses.

This paper examines the effects of knowledge diffusion on growth and costs of climate policy. We develop a general equilibrium model with endogenous growth which represents knowledge diffusion between sectors and regions. Knowledge diffusion depends on accessibility and absorptive capacity which we estimate econometrically using patent and citation data. Knowledge diffusion leads to a “greening” of economies boosting productivity of “clean” carbon-extensive sectors. Knowledge diffusion lowers the costs of global climate policy by about 90% for emerging countries (China) and 20% for developed regions (Europe and USA), depending on the substitutability between different knowledge types.

We quantitatively characterize optimal carbon, capital, and labor income taxes in an economy-climate integrated assessment model that features overlapping generations and distortionary fiscal policy. First, we show that the optimal carbon tax significantly differs from the Pigouvian carbon levy in a first-best setting with overlapping generations in which fully rational households optimize over finite lifetimes. The key driving force behind this result is the life-cycle structure of the our model, in conjunction with endogenously chosen labor supply. We also show that the assumed labor supply elasticity is important for the size of deviation of the optimal carbon tax from the Pigouvian tax, but not the existence of the deviation from Pigouvian pricing. Second, interacting life-cycle household behavior with distortionary fiscal policy is shown to further drive a wedge between the second-best optimal carbon tax and a Pigouvian carbon levy.

Firms subject to cost-of-service regulation cannot withhold windfall profits associated with free emissions allowances. This paper examines the efficiency and distributional impacts of two approaches to transfer free allowances to consumers: output subsidies and lump-sum payments. We employ an empirically calibrated model of the U.S. economy that features regulated monopolies in the electricity sector and many heterogeneous households. Under a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade policy, we find that using free allowances to subsidize regulated electricity prices increases aggregate welfare costs by 40-80 percent relative to lump-sum transfers. These inefficiencies are disproportionately borne by households in the tails of the income distribution., Economics Working Paper Series, 13/178

This paper develops a decomposition algorithm by which a market economy with many households may be solved through the computation of equilibria for a sequence of representative agent economies. The paper examines local and global convergence properties of the sequential recalibration (SR) algorithm. SR is then demonstrated to efficiently solve Auerbach- Kotlikoff OLG models with a large number of heterogeneous households. We approximate equilibria in OLG models by solving a sequence of related Ramsey optimal growth problems. This approach can provide improvements in both efficiency and robustness as compared with simultaneous solution methods.

This dissertation is composed of four essays on the role of energy and investment literacy in the domain of appliance choice and in explaining residential electricity demand among Swiss households. The dissertation also examines the role of information and the impact of decision support tools, such as education programs and online calculators, in adoption of new appliances. From a public policy perspective, one important avenue in reducing residential electricity consumption is to foster the adoption of energy-efficient lighting and household appliances. However, the identification of electrical appliances with the lowest lifetime cost is a challenging task – one that necessitates knowledge on a range of energy-related information (e.g., purchase price, electricity consumption and frequency of use of an appliance, current and future price of electricity) and cognitive abilities to correctly process all the information. The goal of this dissertation is to examine the decision-making process of boundedly rational consumers in the domain of appliance choice, to evaluate the role of information, support tools, and energy and investment literacy on the ability to identify an appliance with the lower lifetime cost, to estimate the electricity demand and the end-use efficiency in the use of electricity, and lastly, to study the determinants of the level of energy-related financial literacy among Swiss households.