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This chapter discusses the rules governing the release, accommodation in neutral countries, and repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). It covers repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries during hostilities; repatriation at the end of active hostilities; cases where repatriation at the end of active hostilities is not required; and status and treatment of prisoners of war who are not repatriated. Concerning the obligation to repatriate prisoners of war at the end of active hostilities, the determination of that point in time, the fact that this obligation is not subject to reciprocity, the relevance of objections and fears of prisoners of war to be repatriated, the destination of the repatriation, and practical arrangements and modalities are discussed. Finally, the relevance of the rules on repatriation of prisoners of war in non-international armed conflicts and particular legal consequences of an unlawful non-repatriation or repatriation of prisoners of war are discussed.

This chapter focuses on the concept and beginning of military occupation. It first discusses the traditional criteria that must be fulfilled for a territory to be considered occupied: the establishment of effective control over territory by a belligerent power, loss of effective control by its adversary and absence of consent by the latter. Subsequently, those criteria which are not relevant for determining whether a territory is occupied are discussed. On this basis the chapter then addresses the controversy of whether and to what extent the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) on military occupation already apply during an invasion. Lastly, the chapter deals with special cases, such as occupation without armed resistance and national liberation wars, the relevance of occupation in non-international armed conflicts and the particular legal consequences of a violation of IHL on military occupation.

This contribution argues that autonomous weapon systems may have advantages from the perspective of ensuring better respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), if they are one day capable of perceiving the information necessary to comply with IHL, then to apply IHL to that information, and if it can be ensured that they will not do what humans who created them did not want them to do. In view of the author, targeting decisions do not imply subjective value judgements, a machine would be unable to make. However, to respect IHL by using such autonomous systems, agreement must be found on how to interpret certain IHL rules discussed in this contribution properly when a machine executes autonomously attacks according to parameters established by human beings. In particular, the accountability of those who produce and program such systems must be clarified; the sytem must be constantly updated with information on the military advantage to enable it to determine what is a military objective and to apply the proportionality principle; parameters must be established for comparing the performance of autonomous weapon systems with that of human beings in carrying out attacks; and the feasibility of precautions must be redefined in relation with attacks using such systems.

The contribution discusses the general problems armed groups face when they want to respect, as they must, international humanitarian law (IHL) and specific difficulties in the field of the conduct of hostilities : whether the police and government officials may be targeted; how the proportionality of an attack aiming at symbolic political advantages can be assessed; how they can accept the surrender of government soldiers and then detain them; or the feasibility of precautionary measures when the group has only one weapon that is capable of reaching the enemy. The author however recalls that the rules of IHL are flexible and the obligations are situation-dependent. Therefore most rules are capable of being respected by an armed group, if interpreted taking the peculiarities of armed groups into account.

Based upon state practice, customary international law, Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions and the Harvard Manual on Air and Missile Warfare (which they critically review), the authors discuss the different precautionary measures for the benefit of the civilian population an attacker and a defender must take, in the conduct of hostilities in general, and specifically in air and missile warfare, including in attacks against aircraft.

La Partie I offre une analyse détaillée et systématique du droit international humanitaire (DIH). Les auteurs y exposent les éléments les plus importants de chaque thème. Une bibliographie structurée accompagne chaque sujet. La théorie est systématiquement reliée aux cas pratiques et documents de la partie II, ainsi qu'aux articles pertinents des Conventions de Genève et de leurs Protocoles additionnels, et aux règles de l'Étude du CICR sur le DIH coutumier. La Partie II comprend les cas pratiques et documents auxquels il est fait référence dans la Partie I. Ces textes publics et officiels, nombre d'entre eux disponibles pour la première fois en langue française , illustrent des thématiques particulières du DIH. L'originalité de cette partie réside dans la rubrique « Discussion » de chaque cas, qui comprend des questions mettant en lumière les règles de DIH concernées. Un grand nombre de documents et de décisions provenant du monde anglo-saxon sont pour la première fois traduits en français, p.ex. des décisions de tribunaux des États-Unis et israéliens, de la Commission inter-américaine des droits de l'homme ou le code de conduite des Talibans. La Partie III, sur CD-ROM, fournit des conseils sur la manière d'enseigner le DIH. Elle comprend une série de suggestions de plans de cours pour les professeurs d'université désireux de donner un cours de DIH.

Ces derniers vingt ans, le droit international pénal et la justice pénale internationale ont énormément contribué à la mise en oeuvre, à la crédibilité et au développement du droit international humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés. Les auteurs se concentrent sur les limites et risques inhérents à cette contribution, sans nier les progrès accomplis. Ils identifient deux catégories de limites du droit international pénal et de la justice pénale internationale dans la mise en œuvre du droit international humanitaire. Tout d'abord des limites que le droit international pénal et la justice pénale internationale portent en eux-mêmes, en tant que système, comme l'affaiblissement d'autres mécanismes et la résistance des États et des forces armées à l'égard de toute transparence sur leurs comportements. Mais aussi ensuite, des limites résultant de l'interprétation, parfois sujette à discussion, des normes contenues par le droit international humanitaire. On peut se demander si certaines interprétations données par la jurisprudence à des notions du droit international humanitaire sont réalistes pendant le conflit armé. Deux autres risques, qui auraient pu se réaliser, mais qui ne sont pas encore apparus dans la réalité, sont enfin brièvement évoqués.

This chapter focuses on the interaction of particular norms of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) that regulate specific situations and on the adequacy of existing mechanisms for resolving norm conflicts. It expands the interest in the ‘war on terror’ to additional types of new conflicts (asymmetric conflicts, conflicts in failed states, and UN peace operations). Noting that from the perspective of the application of either IHL or IHRL, the novelty of the conflicts is overstated, the chapter compares them to the archetypes of conflicts for which IHL was originally designed; determines the threshold questions relative to the applicability of both regimes ratione materiae, ratione personae, and ratione loci; and proceeds to focus on their co-application. The latter is explored in the light of the lex specialis principle on both a general level and in relation to the pertinent questions of the targeting and preventive detention of members of an armed group. The chapter concludes that existing law, properly interpreted, contains realistic, albeit controversial and situation-dependent, solutions for the legal problems arising in these types of conflicts.

In a debate with Prof. Yuval Shany, the author argues that the equality of belligerents in international humanitarian law of non-international armed conflicts should be abandoned, because it either subjects many armed groups to unrealistic requirements they cannot comply with or it limits the obligations of governmental forces to minimal obligations. The author provides examples of fields in which IHL of non-international armed conflicts, which becomes increasingly similar to IHL of international armed conflicts, is unrealistic for most armed groups. The author suggest rather a sliding-scale of obligations for armed groups, that will increase according to the intensity of violence and the degree of organization of the group.

International humanitarian law forms part of international criminal law. The international criminal law of war crimes in turn forms part of international humanitarian law. International criminal law and its application through international criminal tribunals (international criminal justice) are increasingly important for the implementation of international humanitarian law. In this contribution, the author tries to define and differentiate the two branches. Particular emphasis is put on the influence of international criminal law upon international humanitarian law. The former has contributed to the implementation of the latter in general and to the development and clarification of the substance of the latter, but that viewing international humanitarian law through the lens of international criminal law also entails risks, which are discussed in this article

This article first discusses when terrorism can be classified as armed conflict under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It looks at how terrorist acts committed in a genuine armed conflict are prohibited by IHL. The article then analyzes the relationship between armed conflicts, IHL and antiterrorism instruments. The basic options for the relation between terrorism and armed conflicts are first either to exclude or to include acts committed in armed conflicts from the definition of terrorism. Second, it is controversial whether state behaviour should be included or excluded from the definition of terrorism. Third, it is controversial if terrorism should only cover acts prohibited by IHL. However those controversies are solved, the solution should not refer to the legitimacy of the cause for which someone is fighting, but to the methods he or she is applying. Furthermore the two sides of a genuine armed conflict should not be treated differently by international anti-terrorism law. Finally, it would be preferable not to criminalize in armed conflicts an act as terrorist if that act is not prohibited by IHL, because such a definition would weaken the incentives to comply with IHL. Finally, it is suggested that, de lege ferenda, it might be useful to define terrorist acts in peacetime by analogy to what is prohibited in wartime. This approach would still necessitate the solution of some legal problems, in particular the determination of who could be considered as a “ civilian” and who a “ combatant” in peacetime. Such an analogy would however solve many political problems. Current discussions about a comprehensive convention against terrorism do not go into this direction. In this and other discussions about the definition of terrorism, people from very different horizons make the fight against terrorism more difficult by selectively referring to war and IHL., Cet article analyse tout d’abord dans quelle mesure un acte terrorisme peut être qualifié de conflit armé et ainsi se voir appliquer les règles du droit international humanitaire (DIH). Nous examinerons alors comment, dans un véritable conflit armé, le DIH interdit les actes qui pourraient raisonnablement être qualifiés d’actes terroristes. La réflexion se portera ensuite sur la relation entre conflits armés, DIH et instruments juridiques anti-terroristes. À cet égard, trois questions centrales doivent être soulevées : premièrement, doit-on inclure ou exclure de la définition du terrorisme des actes commis durant les conflits armés ; deuxièmement, est-il nécessaire de se positionner quant à savoir si les actes étatiques tombent sous le coup de cette définition ; troisièmement, faut-il établir si la notion de terrorisme doit couvrir uniquement des actes prohibés par le DIH ? Quelle que soit la solution donnée à ces controverses, elle devra se garder de faire référence à la cause soutenue par celui qui commet un acte et plutôt se baser sur les méthodes employées pour faire valoir cette cause. Par ailleurs, les instruments juridiques anti-terroristes ne devraient pas traiter les deux parties à un conflit armé différemment. Il semble également préférable que les actes commis durant les conflits armés et permis par le DIH ne soient pas qualifiés de terroristes, puisque la solution inverse réduirait davantage la volonté des groupes armés de se soumettre au DIH. Finalement, il est suggéré que, de lege ferenda, la notion de terrorisme en temps de paix soit définie par analogie avec ce qui est interdit par le DIH en temps de guerre. Certes, cette approche nécessite encore que certains problèmes juridiques soient clarifiés. Il faudra notamment déterminer qui peut être qualifié de «combattant » et de «civil » en temps de paix. Néanmoins, elle a le mérite de résoudre plusieurs impasses politiques. Or, les discussions actuelles en vue d’une convention générale sur le terrorisme ne vont pas dans ce sens. Au contraire, les négociations sur la définition du terrorisme sont menées par des acteurs de divers horizons qui, malheureusement, se réfèrent au DIH de manière sélective. La lutte contre le terrorisme n’en devient que plus difficile., Sassòli Marco. La définition du terrorisme et le droit international humanitaire. In: Revue Québécoise de droit international, hors-série avril 2007. Hommage à Katia Boustany. pp. 29-48.