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Evaluations and value-based decisions are often accompanied by a feeling of confidence about whether or not the evaluation or decision is accurate. We argue that this feeling of confidence reflects the variation of an underlying value distribution and that this value distribution represents previously experienced values related to an object. Two preregistered experiments in which the variation of such value distributions was systematically varied provide causal evidence in favor of this hypothesis. A third preregistered experiment showed that, for natural food items with uncontrolled prior experiences, confidence in evaluations is again related to the variation of individuals' self-reported value distributions. Similarly, for choices between items, the variation of experienced values related to a choice pair influenced confidence in the perceived correctness of the choice. These findings converge with other domains of decision making showing that confidence tracks the variation of the underlying probability distribution of the evidence that a decision is based on, which in the case of value-based decisions, is informed by a value distribution reflecting priorly experienced values. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Successful responding to acutely threatening situations requires adequate approach-avoidance decisions. However, it is unclear how threat-induced states-like freezing-related bradycardia-impact the weighing of the potential outcomes of such value-based decisions. Insight into the underlying computations is essential, not only to improve our models of decision-making but also to improve interventions for maladaptive decisions, for instance in anxiety patients and first-responders who frequently have to make decisions under acute threat. Forty-two participants made passive and active approach-avoidance decisions under threat-of-shock when confronted with mixed outcome-prospects (i.e., varying money and shock amounts). Choice behavior was best predicted by a model including individual action-tendencies and bradycardia, beyond the subjective value of the outcome. Moreover, threat-related bradycardia (high-vs-low threat) interacted with subjective value, depending on the action-context (passive-vs-active). Specifically, in action-contexts incongruent with participants' intrinsic action-tendencies, stronger bradycardia related to diminished effects of subjective value on choice across participants. These findings illustrate the relevance of testing approach-avoidance decisions in relatively ecologically valid conditions of acute and primarily reinforced threat. These mechanistic insights into approach-avoidance conflict-resolution may inspire biofeedback-related techniques to optimize decision-making under threat. Critically, the findings demonstrate the relevance of incorporating internal psychophysiological states and external action-contexts into models of approach-avoidance decision-making.

The current study focused on the degree to which decision context (deliberative vs. affective) differentially impacted the use of available information about uncertainty (i.e., probability, positive and negative outcome magnitudes, expected value, and variance/risk) when older adults were faced with decisions under risk. In addition, we examined whether individual differences in general mental ability and executive function moderated the associations between age and information use. Participants ( N = 96) completed a neuropsychological assessment and the hot (affective) and cold (deliberative) versions of an explicit risk task. Our results did not find a significant Age × Hot/Cold Condition interaction on overall risk-taking. However, we found that older adults were less likely to use the full decision information available regardless of the decision context. This finding suggested more global age differences in information use. Moreover, older adults were less likely to make expected-value sensitive decisions, regardless of the hot/cold context. Finally, we found that low performance on measures of executive functioning, but not general mental ability, appears to be a risk factor for lower information use. This pattern appears in middle age and progressively becomes stronger in older age. The current work provides evidence that common underlying decision processes may operate in risk tasks deemed either affective or deliberative. It further suggests that underlying mechanisms such as information use may be paramount, relative to differences in the affective context. Additionally, individual differences in neuropsychological function may act as a moderator in the tendency to use available information across affective context. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Choosing between smaller prompt rewards and larger later rewards is a common choice problem, and studies widely agree that frontostriatal circuits heavily innervated by dopamine are centrally involved. Understanding how dopamine modulates intertemporal choice has important implications for neurobiological models and for understanding the mechanisms underlying maladaptive decision-making. However, the specific role of dopamine in intertemporal decisions is not well understood. Dopamine may play a role in multiple aspects of intertemporal choices--the valuation of choice outcomes and sensitivity to reward delays. To assess the role of dopamine in intertemporal decisions, we tested Parkinson disease patients who suffer from dopamine depletion in the striatum, in either high (on medication, PDON) or low (off medication, PDOFF) dopaminergic states. Compared with both PDOFF and healthy controls, PDON made more farsighted choices and reduced their valuations less as a function of increasing time to reward. Furthermore, reduced discounting in the high dopaminergic state was robust across multiple measures, providing new evidence for dopamine's role in making decisions about the future.

Only very recently has research demonstrated that experimentally induced emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) affect risky choice (e.g., Heilman et al., 2010). However, it is unknown whether this effect also operates via habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice involving deliberative decision making. We investigated the role of habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice using the "cold" deliberative version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009). Fifty-three participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and--one month later--the CCT and the PANAS. Greater habitual cognitive reappraisal use was related to increased risk taking, accompanied by decreased sensitivity to changes in probability and loss amount. Greater habitual expressive suppression use was related to decreased risk taking. The results show that habitual use of reappraisal and suppression strategies predict risk taking when decisions involve predominantly cognitive-deliberative processes.

The authors investigated risk taking and underlying information use in 13- to 16- and 17- to 19-year-old adolescents and in adults in 4 experiments, using a novel dynamic risk-taking task, the Columbia Card Task (CCT). The authors investigated risk taking under differential involvement of affective versus deliberative processes with 2 versions of the CCT, constituting the most direct test of a dual-system explanation of adolescent risk taking in the literature so far. The "hot" CCT was designed to trigger more affective decision making, whereas the "cold" CCT was designed to trigger more deliberative decision making. Differential involvement of affective versus deliberative processes in the 2 CCT versions was established by self-reports and assessment of electrodermal activity. Increased adolescent risk taking, coupled with simplified information use, was found in the hot but not the cold condition. Need-for-arousal predicted risk taking only in the hot condition, whereas executive functions predicted information use in the cold condition. Results are consistent with recent dual-system explanations of risk taking as the result of competition between affective processes and deliberative cognitive-control processes, with adolescents' affective system tending to override the deliberative system in states of heightened emotional arousal., (Copyright 2009 APA, all rights reserved.)

The authors investigated risk taking and underlying information use in 13- to 16- and 17- to 19-year-old adolescents and in adults in 4 experiments, using a novel dynamic risk-taking task, the Columbia Card Task (CCT). The authors investigated risk taking under differential involvement of affective versus deliberative processes with 2 versions of the CCT, constituting the most direct test of a dual-system explanation of adolescent risk taking in the literature so far. The "hot" CCT was designed to trigger more affective decision making, whereas the "cold" CCT was designed to trigger more deliberative decision making. Differential involvement of affective versus deliberative processes in the 2 CCT versions was established by self-reports and assessment of electrodermal activity. Increased adolescent risk taking, coupled with simplified information use, was found in the hot but not the cold condition. Need-for-arousal predicted risk taking only in the hot condition, whereas executive functions predicted information use in the cold condition. Results are consistent with recent dual-system explanations of risk taking as the result of competition between affective processes and deliberative cognitive-control processes, with adolescents' affective system tending to override the deliberative system in states of heightened emotional arousal. (Contains 8 figures, 4 tables and 18 footnotes.)

Avoidance, a hallmark of anxiety-related psychopathology, often comes at a cost; avoiding threat may forgo the possibility of a reward. Theories predict that optimal approach-avoidance arbitration depends on threat-induced psychophysiological states, like freezing-related bradycardia. Here we used model-based fMRI analyses to investigate whether and how bradycardia states are linked to the neurocomputational underpinnings of approach-avoidance arbitration under varying reward and threat magnitudes. We show that bradycardia states are associated with increased threat-induced avoidance and more pronounced reward-threat value comparison (i.e., a stronger tendency to approach vs. avoid when expected reward outweighs threat). An amygdala-striatal-prefrontal circuit supports approach-avoidance arbitration under threat, with specific involvement of the amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) in integrating reward-threat value and bradycardia states. These findings highlight the role of human freezing states in value-based decision making, relevant for optimal threat coping. They point to a specific role for amygdala/dACC in state-value integration under threat. A human fMRI study shows that defensive cardiac states moderate the neural computations of reward and threat value underlying approach-avoidance arbitration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals may differ systematically in their applied decision strategies, which has critical implications for decision neuroscience but is yet scarcely studied. Our study's main focus was therefore to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying compensatory versus noncompensatory strategies in risky choice. Here, we compared people using a compensatory expected value maximization with people using a simplified noncompensatory loss-minimizing choice strategy. To this end, we used a two-choice paradigm including a set of "simple" items (e.g., simple condition), in which one option was superior on all attributes, and a set of "conflict" items, in which one option was superior on one attribute but inferior on other attributes. A binomial mixture analysis of the decisions elicited by these items differentiated between decision-makers using either a compensatory or a noncompensatory strategy. Behavioral differences were particularly pronounced in the conflict condition, and these were paralleled by neural results. That is, we expected compensatory decision-makers to use an integrated value comparison during choice in the conflict condition. Accordingly, the compensatory group tracked the difference in expected value between choice options reflected in neural activation in the parietal cortex. Furthermore, we expected noncompensatory, compared with compensatory, decision-makers to experience increased conflict when attributes provided conflicting information. Accordingly, the noncompensatory group showed greater dorsomedial PFC activation only in the conflict condition. These pronounced behavioral and neural differences indicate the need for decision neuroscience to account for individual differences in risky choice strategies and to broaden its scope to noncompensatory risky choice strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adolescence is often described as a period of increased risk taking relative to both childhood and adulthood. This inflection in risky choice behavior has been attributed to a neurobiological imbalance between earlier developing motivational systems and later developing top-down control regions. Yet few studies have decomposed risky choice to investigate the underlying mechanisms or tracked their differential developmental trajectory. The current study uses a risk-return decomposition to more precisely assess the development of processes underlying risky choice and to link them more directly to specific neural mechanisms. This decomposition specifies the influence of changing risks (outcome variability) and changing returns (expected value) on the choices of children, adolescents, and adults in a dynamic risky choice task, the Columbia Card Task. Behaviorally, risk aversion increased across age groups, with adults uniformly risk averse and adolescents showing substantial individual differences in risk sensitivity, ranging from risk seeking to risk averse. Neurally, we observed an adolescent peak in risk-related activation in the anterior insula and dorsal medial PFC. Return sensitivity, on the other hand, increased monotonically across age groups and was associated with increased activation in the ventral medial PFC and posterior cingulate cortex with age. Our results implicate adolescence as a developmental phase of increased neural risk sensitivity. Importantly, this work shows that using a behaviorally validated decision-making framework allows a precise operationalization of key constructs underlying risky choice that inform the interpretation of results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Real-world health and crime statistics indicate that adolescents are prone to engage in risks in the presence of peers. Although this effect has been documented in several lab studies, existing evidence varies and the psychological mechanisms that give rise to peer observation-induced shifts in adolescent risky decision-making remain poorly understood. We conducted a systematic literature review and meta-analysis to quantify the magnitude of the effect of direct peer observation on risky decision-making in adolescents. Across 186 effect sizes, representing data from 53 distinct research reports and over 5,000 participants, we found evidence that during adolescence, observation by peers increases decisions to take risks relative to decisions made while unobserved, with a small mean effect size (Hedges' g = 0.16). We also found high effect size heterogeneity (I2 = 82.63% and τ2 = 0.078), motivating analysis of moderation. We evaluated whether variables hypothesized by theory and prior research to amplify or reduce risk taking in the presence of peers systematically moderated the size of this effect, including factors related to the decision context, the peer context, and the experimental design. The overall effect was moderated by peers' expression of risk-seeking preferences, such that the effect of peer observation was only significant when peers were also expressing pro-risk attitudes. Evidence for publication bias was not consistently observed. Taken together, this work supports the notion that mere peer observation increases adolescent risky decision-making, but this effect is extremely small unless the peers are additionally expressing pro-risk preferences. Moreover, this work provokes questions regarding whether the field's approach to studying peer influence is optimal at conceptual and practical levels, and whether it is maximally translatable to real-world contexts. We offer suggestions for future work that could lead to a clearer understanding of peer observation effects during adolescence. Public Significance Statement: Adolescents are conceptualized as risk-takers in the presence of peers, as evident in real-world health statistics, laws, and policies such as graduated licensing procedures that restrict the number of nonfamily passengers for adolescent drivers. The present meta-analytic review found that peer observation increased adolescents' tendency to make risky decisions, but the effect is small in magnitude and was much greater when peers were expressing pro-risk preferences. We discuss the practical relevance of an effect of this size, provide recommendations to the field for conducting research toward a robust, translatable understanding of the nature of how peers influence preference for risk during adolescence, and discuss implications for policies involving youth decision-making in social contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Morally challenging decisions tend to be perceived as difficult by decision makers and often lead to post-decisional worry or regret. To test potential causes of these consequences, we employed realistic, morally challenging scenarios with two conflicting choice options. In addition to respondents' choices, we collected various ratings of choice options, decision-modes employed, as well as physiological arousal, assessed via skin conductance. Not surprisingly, option ratings predicted choice, such that the more positively rated option was chosen. However, respondents' self-reported decision modes also independently predicted choice. We further found that simultaneously engaging in decision modes that predict opposing choices increased decision difficulty and post-decision worry. In some cases this was related to increased arousal. Results suggest that at least a portion of the negative consequences associated with morally challenging decisions can be attributed to conflict in the decision modes one engages in. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Life is full of risky decisions, from the mundane to matters of life or death. Individuals differ in the risks they accept (or even deliberately embrace). However, risk taking is not a single trait but is a behavior influenced by characteristics of the situation (what the decision is about and to what extent it engages affect vs. deliberation), the decision maker (age and gender), and interactions between situation and decision maker. Understanding the mechanisms behind risk taking--or who takes risks when and why--is particularly important when the goal is to influence and modify the behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite evident heightened adolescent risk-taking in real-life situations, not all experimental studies demonstrate that adolescents take more risks than children and adults on risky decision-making tasks. In the current 4 independent meta-analyses, neurodevelopmental imbalance models and fuzzy trace theory were used as conceptual frameworks to examine whether adolescents engage in more risk-taking than children and adults and whether early adolescents take more risks than children and mid-late adolescents on behavioral risk-taking tasks. Studies with at least 1 of the aforementioned age comparisons met the inclusion criteria. Consistent with imbalance models and fuzzy trace theory, results from a random effects model showed that adolescents take more risks (g = .37) than adults, and early adolescents take more risks (g = .15) than mid-late adolescents. However, inconsistent with both perspectives, adolescents and children take equal levels of risk (g = -.00), and early adolescents and children also take equal levels of risk (g = .04). Meta-regression analyses revealed that, consistent with imbalance models, (a) adolescents take more risks than adults on hot tasks with immediate outcome feedback on rewards and losses; however, contrary to imbalance models but consistent with fuzzy trace theory, (b) adolescents take fewer risks than children on tasks with a sure/safe option. Shortcomings related to studies using behavioral risk-taking tasks are discussed. We suggest a hybrid developmental neuroecological model of risk-taking that includes a risk opportunity component to explain why adolescents take more risks than children in the real world but equal levels of risks as children in the laboratory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]