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Recent studies show that people exhibit a reduced decision bias in a foreign language relative to their native language. However, the underlying mechanism remains unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) combined with an even-probability gambling task in which gambling feedback was presented in either a native language or a foreign language after each decision, we assessed the neural correlates of language modulated behavioral changes in decision making. In both foreign and native language contexts, participants showed a behavioral pattern resembles the Gambler's fallacy that losing a gamble leads to more betting than winning a gamble. While there was no language difference in gambling, bilateral caudate and amygdala gain signals were exaggerated by foreign language in relative to native language, suggesting that foreign language enhanced neural responses to rewards. Moreover, the individual difference in foreign language-induced Gambler's fallacy-like decision bias was associated with activation in the right amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, as well as functional connectivity between right amygdala and right putamen/right posterior insula. Our results confirm that outcome processing in emotion-related regions may underlie individual differences in foreign language effects in judgment and decision making., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Theoretical models distinguish between neural responses elicited by distal threats and those evoked by more immediate threats 1-3 . Specifically, slower 'cognitive' fear responses towards distal threats involve a network of brain regions including the ventral hippocampus (vHPC) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), while immediate 'reactive' fear responses rely on regions such as the periaqueductal grey 4,5 . However, it is unclear how anxiety and its neural substrates relate to these distinct defensive survival circuits. We tested whether individual differences in trait anxiety would impact escape behaviour and neural responses to slow and fast attacking predators: conditions designed to evoke cognitive and reactive fear, respectively. Behaviourally, we found that trait anxiety was not related to escape decisions for fast threats, but individuals with higher trait anxiety escaped earlier during slow threats. Functional magnetic resonance imaging showed that when subjects faced slow threats, trait anxiety positively correlated with activity in the vHPC, mPFC, amygdala and insula. Furthermore, the strength of functional coupling between two components of the cognitive circuit-the vHPC and mPFC-was correlated with the degree of trait anxiety. This suggests that anxiety predominantly affects cognitive fear circuits that are involved in volitional strategic escape.

Modern decision neuroscience offers a powerful and broad account of human behaviour using computational techniques that link psychological and neuroscientific approaches to the ways that individuals can generate near-optimal choices in complex controlled environments. However, until recently, relatively little attention has been paid to the extent to which the structure of experimental environments relates to natural scenarios, and the survival problems that individuals have evolved to solve. This situation not only risks leaving decision-theoretic accounts ungrounded but also makes various aspects of the solutions, such as hard-wired or Pavlovian policies, difficult to interpret in the natural world. Here, we suggest importing concepts, paradigms and approaches from the fields of ethology and behavioural ecology, which concentrate on the contextual and functional correlates of decisions made about foraging and escape and address these lacunae.

Informational social influence theory posits that under conditions of uncertainty, we are inclined to look to others for advice. This leaves us remarkably vulnerable to being influenced by others' opinions or advice. Rational agents, however, do not blindly seek and act on arbitrary information, but often consider the quality of its source before committing to a course of action. Here, we ask the question of whether a collaborator's reputation can increase their social influence and, in turn, bias perception and anxiety under changing levels of uncertainty. Human male and female participants were asked to provide estimations of dot direction using the random dot motion (RDM) perceptual discrimination task and were paired with transient collaborators of high or low reputation whom provided their own estimations. The RDM varied in degrees of uncertainty and joint performance accuracy was linked to risk of an electric shock. Despite providing identical information, we show that collaborating with a high reputation compared with a low reputation partner, led to significantly more conformity during the RDM task for uncertain perceptual decisions. Consequently, high reputation partners decreased the subjects' anxiety during the anticipatory shock periods. fMRI data showed that parametric changes in conformity resulted in increased activity in the ventromedial PFC, whereas dissent was associated with increased in activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Furthermore, the dACC and insula, regions involved in anticipatory pain, were significantly more active when collaborating with a low reputation partner. These results suggest that information about reputation can influence both cognitive and affective processes and in turn alter the neural circuits that underlie decision-making and emotion. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Humans look to others for advice when making decisions under uncertainty. Rational agents, however, do not blindly seek information, but often consider the quality of its source before committing to a course of action. Here, we ask the question of whether a collaborators' reputation can increase social influence and in turn bias perception and anxiety in the context of perceptual uncertainty. We show that when subjects are partnered with collaborators with a high reputation, this leads to increased conformity during uncertain perceptual decision-making and reduces anxiety when joint performance accuracy leads to an electric shock. Furthermore, our results show that information about reputation alters the neural circuits that underlie decision-making and emotion., (Copyright © 2018 the authors 0270-6474/18/382262-08$15.00/0.)

Surpassing negative evaluation is a recurrent theme of success stories. Yet, there is little evidence supporting the counterintuitive idea that negative evaluation might not only motivate people, but also enhance performance. To address this question, we designed a task that required participants to decide whether taking up a risky challenge after receiving positive or negative evaluations from independent judges. Participants believed that these evaluations were based on their prior performance on a related task. Results showed that negative evaluation caused a facilitation in performance. Concurrent functional magnetic resonance imaging revealed that the motivating effect of negative evaluation was represented in the insula and striatum, while the performance boost was associated with functional positive connectivity between the insula and a set of brain regions involved in goal-directed behavior and the orienting of attention. These findings provide new insight into the neural representation of negative evaluation-induced facilitation., (© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Real behaviors are binding consequential commitments to a course of action, such as harming another person, buying an Apple watch, or fleeing from danger. Cognitive scientists are generally interested in the psychological and neural processes that cause such real behavior. However, for practical reasons, many scientific studies measure behavior using only hypothetical or imagined stimuli. Generalizing from such studies to real behavior implicitly assumes that the processes underlying the two types of behavior are similar. We review evidence of similarity and differences in hypothetical and real mental processes. In many cases, hypothetical choice tasks give an incomplete picture of brain circuitry that is active during real choice., (Copyright © 2016. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

Fearful faces are believed to be prioritized in visual perception. However, it is unclear whether the processing of low-level facial features alone can facilitate such prioritization or whether higher-level mechanisms also contribute. We examined potential biases for fearful face perception at the levels of perceptual decision-making and perceptual confidence. We controlled for lower-level visual processing capacity by titrating luminance contrasts of backward masks, and the emotional intensity of fearful, angry and happy faces. Under these conditions, participants showed liberal biases in perceiving a fearful face, in both detection and discrimination tasks. This effect was stronger among individuals with reduced density in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region linked to perceptual decision-making. Moreover, participants reported higher confidence when they accurately perceived a fearful face, suggesting that fearful faces may have privileged access to consciousness. Together, the results suggest that mechanisms in the prefrontal cortex contribute to making fearful face perception special., (© The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press.)

Alexithymia, a sub-clinical personality construct associated with disturbances in affect regulation and social functioning, is known to be comorbid with a number of psychiatric conditions. We combined a distressing real-time altruism task with functional magnetic resonance imagining to explore the brain behaviour relationship between alexithymia and prosocial action. Here we show that individuals high on the alexithymia spectrum report less distress at seeing others in pain and behave less altruistically. This behavioural result is mirrored in the brain, where individuals who have difficulty recognizing and experiencing others' emotional distress have reduced neural activation within the anterior insula and temporoparietal junction, key regions in the experience of distress and perspective-taking., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Classic social psychology studies demonstrate that people can behave in ways that contradict their intentions--especially within the moral domain. We measured brain activity while subjects decided between financial self-benefit (earning money) and preventing physical harm (applying an electric shock) to a confederate under both real and hypothetical conditions. We found a shared neural network associated with empathic concern for both types of decisions. However, hypothetical and real moral decisions also recruited distinct neural circuitry: hypothetical moral decisions mapped closely onto the imagination network, while real moral decisions elicited activity in the bilateral amygdala and anterior cingulate--areas essential for social and affective processes. Moreover, during real moral decision-making, distinct regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) determined whether subjects make selfish or pro-social moral choices. Together, these results reveal not only differential neural mechanisms for real and hypothetical moral decisions but also that the nature of real moral decisions can be predicted by dissociable networks within the PFC.

Humans are creatures of routine and habit. When faced with situations in which a default option is available, people show a consistent tendency to stick with the default. Why this occurs is unclear. To elucidate its neural basis, we used a novel gambling task in conjunction with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Behavioral results revealed that participants were more likely to choose the default card and felt enhanced emotional responses to outcomes after making the decision to switch. We show that increased tendency to switch away from the default during the decision phase was associated with decreased activity in the anterior insula; activation in this same area in reaction to "switching away from the default and losing" was positively related with experienced frustration. In contrast, decisions to choose the default engaged the ventral striatum, the same reward area as seen in winning. Our findings highlight aversive processes in the insula as underlying the default bias and suggest that choosing the default may be rewarding in itself.

Moral ideals are strongly ingrained within society and individuals alike, but actual moral choices are profoundly influenced by tangible rewards and consequences. Across two studies we show that real moral decisions can dramatically contradict moral choices made in hypothetical scenarios (Study 1). However, by systematically enhancing the contextual information available to subjects when addressing a hypothetical moral problem--thereby reducing the opportunity for mental simulation--we were able to incrementally bring subjects' responses in line with their moral behaviour in real situations (Study 2). These results imply that previous work relying mainly on decontextualized hypothetical scenarios may not accurately reflect moral decisions in everyday life. The findings also shed light on contextual factors that can alter how moral decisions are made, such as the salience of a personal gain. (Contains 2 figures.)

Flight initiation distance (FID), the distance at which an organism flees from an approaching threat, is an ecological metric of cost-benefit functions of escape decisions. We adapted the FID paradigm to investigate how fast- or slow-attacking "virtual predators" constrain escape decisions. We show that rapid escape decisions rely on "reactive fear" circuits in the periaqueductal gray and midcingulate cortex (MCC), while protracted escape decisions, defined by larger buffer zones, were associated with "cognitive fear" circuits, which include posterior cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, circuits implicated in more complex information processing, cognitive avoidance strategies, and behavioral flexibility. Using a Bayesian decision-making model, we further show that optimization of escape decisions under rapid flight were localized to the MCC, a region involved in adaptive motor control, while the hippocampus is implicated in optimizing decisions that update and control slower escape initiation. These results demonstrate an unexplored link between defensive survival circuits and their role in adaptive escape decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fearful faces are believed to be prioritized in visual perception. However, it is unclear whether the processing of low-level facial features alone can facilitate such prioritization or whether higher-level mechanisms also contribute. We examined potential biases for fearful face perception at the levels of perceptual decision-making and perceptual confidence. We controlled for lower-level visual processing capacity by titrating luminance contrasts of backward masks, and the emotional intensity of fearful, angry and happy faces. Under these conditions, participants showed liberal biases in perceiving a fearful face, in both detection and discrimination tasks. This effect was stronger among individuals with reduced density in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region linked to perceptual decision-making. Moreover, participants reported higher confidence when they accurately perceived a fearful face, suggesting that fearful faces may have privileged access to consciousness. Together, the results suggest that mechanisms in the prefrontal cortex contribute to making fearful face perception special. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there is evidence that implicit self-esteem transfers to chosen objects (associative self-anchoring), it is still unknown whether this phenomenon extends to explicit selfesteem. Moreover, whether the knowledge that these objects might belong to the self in the future or not affects the evaluation of these objects has received little attention. Here, we demonstrate that evaluations of chosen objects are further enhanced when they are obtainable as compared to when they are not in participants with high explicit selfesteem, whereas participants with low explicit self-esteem exhibit the opposite pattern. These findings extend previous results and shed new light on the role of self-esteem in altering preferences for chosen objects depending on their obtainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classic social psychology studies demonstrate that people can behave in ways that contradict their intentions—especially within the moral domain. We measured brain activity while subjects decided between financial self-benefit (earning money) and preventing physical harm (applying an electric shock) to a confederate under both real and hypothetical conditions. We found a shared neural network associated with empathic concern for both types of decisions. However, hypothetical and real moral decisions also recruited distinct neural circuitry: hypothetical moral decisions mapped closely onto the imagination network, while real moral decisions elicited activity in the bilateral amygdala and anterior cingulate—areas essential for social and affective processes. Moreover, during real moral decision-making, distinct regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) determined whether subjects make selfish or pro-social moral choices. Together, these results reveal not only differential neural mechanisms for real and hypothetical moral decisions but also that the nature of real moral decisions can be predicted by dissociable networks within the PFC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Moral ideals are strongly ingrained within society and individuals alike, but actual moral choices are profoundly influenced by tangible rewards and consequences. Across two studies we show that real moral decisions can dramatically contradict moral choices made in hypothetical scenarios (Study 1). However, by systematically enhancing the contextual information available to subjects when addressing a hypothetical moral problem—thereby reducing the opportunity for mental simulation—we were able to incrementally bring subjects’ responses in line with their moral behaviour in real situations (Study 2). These results imply that previous work relying mainly on decontextualized hypothetical scenarios may not accurately reflect moral decisions in everyday life. The findings also shed light on contextual factors that can alter how moral decisions are made, such as the salience of a personal gain. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Accurately estimating safety is critical to pursuing nondefensive survival behaviors. However, little attention has been paid to how the human brain computes safety. We conceptualize a model that consists of two components: (i) threat-oriented evaluations that focus on threat value, imminence, and predictability; and (ii) self-oriented evaluations that focus on the agent's experience, strategies, and ability to control the situation. Our model points to the dynamic interaction between these two components as a mechanism of safety estimation. Based on a growing body of human literature, we hypothesize that distinct regions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) respond to threat and safety to facilitate survival decisions. We suggest safety is not an inverse of danger, but reflects independent computations that mediate defensive circuits and behaviors. Survival decisions often hinge on the perception that one is safe. Without safety, defensive behaviors are prioritized at the expense of other behaviors. Underestimations of safety can therefore hinder survival and self-actualization. Extant accounts of threat-related decision making implicitly suggest safety is an inverse of threat, or, in other words, as threat reduces, safety increases. While this may be true under certain conditions, we argue that safety computations are often distinct from threat systems due to separable metacognitive processes. We propose that the human ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) integrates sensory information about threats with top-down predictions about self-oriented coping ability to drive safety decisions. Building on evidence from threat-focused paradigms, we identify the anterior vmPFC as a candidate hub of safety decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]