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The art of command, how leaders apply judgment shaped by learning and experiencing their environment, has atrophied over the last 14 years of war. The length of the global war on terrorism, the inability to achieve decisive victory, and the return to Iraq in 2014 reveal a lack of artful command. The complex and ambiguous character of future conflict continues to require judgment under pressure and leaders to rely on their training to produce results. Leaders caught astride a transition between the Industrial Age and a new Information Age struggle to adapt to additional complexity. Generational tensions add strain between leaders educated by sequential Industrial Age models and those educated in a rapidly globalizing Information Age. This monograph will describe how Operational Design provides a tool to restore the art of command, reinforced with examples from transformational business practices and change experts. This restoration requires leaders who commit to demonstrate the art of command, operationalize it, and institutionalize its use.

Many senior leaders struggle because they do not understand their job at the strategic level. The leadership skills and processes needed to succeed change as rank and responsibility increase. As junior leaders, the focus is on the execution of tasks and is dominated by direct leadership and technical/tactical expertise. As leaders advance to more senior positions, the focus shifts to providing guidance and setting the conditions for others to succeed. Both the Army and industry spend enormous amounts of time and money on technical and tactical improvements such as developing new doctrine, weapon systems, or process improvement programs. Unfortunately, these improvements, while important, do not address the more important aspects of organizational effectiveness and efficiency. This paper will argue that effective strategic leaders must focus on three principle areas: strategic leadership, strategic planning and decision making, and organizational design.

"In American history few foreign policy decisions have been as controversial as the Bush Administration's choice to invade Iraq in 2003. This decision had many supporters but it also had significant, forceful opposition from both domestic and international opponents. The intellectual under-pinning for the opposition largely came from the philosophical doctrine of Just War Theory and the international law it informed. Accepting that war itself is terribly destructive and should be avoided if possible, this theory holds that a nation s decision to go to war is nonetheless justified only if certain criteria are met. This paper briefly discusses the historical origins of Just War Theory, concisely reviews the tenets of Just War Theory as they stand today, and examines if the Bush Administration adhered to the Jus Ad Bellum tenets of Just War Theory prior to its decision to invade Iraq."--Abstract.