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Resumen En esta investigación se lleva a cabo un estudio sobre un aspecto fundamental del derecho constitucional: la reelección presidencial desde el punto de vista del derecho comparado. Se expone una revisión teórica y práctica de esta institución jurídica, sus características y elementos fundamentales, que se profundiza al hacer un análisis jurisprudencial comparado de diversos tribunales constitucionales y altas cortes en América. La inquietud científica se origina en la actualidad jurídica, con base en las premisas y los postulados de la figura del presidencialismo desmedido, que recurre en muchísimos casos al populismo y a la violación de la separación de poderes para continuar en el ejercicio del poder. El estudio comparado de la reelección presidencial permitirá determinar el sentido que tiene cada ordenamiento jurídico en uno de los aspectos más relevantes y que ocupa mayor espacio en la ciencia política y el derecho: la democracia. Abstract This research involved a study of a fundamental aspect of constitutional law: presidential reelection from the point of view of comparative law. The article provides a technical and practical review of this legal institutions, its characteristics and fundamental elements, strengthened by a comparative jurisprudential analysis from diverse constitutional tribunals and high courts in America. The scientific question stems from the current legal situation based on the premises and postulates of the figure of excessive presidentialism, which often resorts to populism and the violation of the separation of powers to continue in the exercise of power. The comparative study of presidential reelection allows one to determine the meaning of each legal order in one of the most relevant aspects and that occupies the greatest space in political science and law: democracy. Resumo Nesta pesquisa, é realizado um estudo sobre um aspecto fundamental do Direito Constitucional: a reeleição presidencial do ponto de vista do Direito Comparado. Faz-se uma revisão teórica e prática dessa instituição jurídica, suas características e elementos fundamentais, que é aprofundada ao fazer uma análise jurisprudencial comparada de diversos tribunais constitucionais e de altas cortes na América. A inquietação científica é originada na atualidade jurídica com base nos princípios da figura do presidencialismo descontrolado, que recorre, em muitos casos, ao populismo e à violação da separação de poderes para continuar no exercício do poder. Este estudo comparado da reeleição presidencial permite determinar o sentido que cada ordenamento jurídico tem num dos aspectos mais relevantes e com maior espaço na Ciência Política e no Direito: a democracia.

Para el caso colombiano el procedimiento estipulado en la normatividad nacional para investigar, acusar y juzgar a los altos dignatarios ha sido muy flexible y, se podría decir, improductivo. Estos altos dignatarios son: el presidente de la República, los Magistrados de las altas Cortes y el Fiscal General de la Nación. Son ellos quienes ostentan la más alta jerarquía dentro de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico y, como todos los funcionarios estatales, deben cumplir con sus funciones. Es menester tener presente que estos funcionarios, en virtud del fuero constitucional que los cobija y precisamente por su especial investidura, deben ser investigados, acusados y juzgados por un órgano especial. Este órgano especial, para el caso colombiano, es la Comisión de Acusaciones de la Cámara de Representantes. Sin embargo, en vigencia de dicha comisión, a lo largo de la historia no se ha podido culminar ningún procedimiento de acusación, investigación y juzgamiento de ningún Presidente de la República de Colombia, ni magistrado de las altas Cortes; A excepción del fallo emitido por la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el segundo semestre del año 2019, contra el exmagistrado Jorge Ignacio Pretelt, como responsable del delito de concusión. Hasta la fecha en Colombia jamás había sido posible agotar o tan siquiera continuar la etapa de acusación y mucho menos la etapa de juzgamiento de los altos funcionarios del poder público. En este sentido, lo que se busca con la presente investigación es comparar y analizar la normatividad, el procedimiento, la estructura y las facultades empleadas por las instituciones estatales que se encargan de conocer y adelantar una investigación, acusación y juzgamiento en contra del Presidente de la República, como altos dignatarios estatales de Colombia y sus homólogos en Ecuador y Chile, en virtud de los lineamientos de cada uno de estos países para estos dignatarios como aforados; Así como también se estudiará el escenario fáctico y político en el que se desarrollan tales funciones dentro del sistema de gobierno de estos tres países de América Latina. In the Colombian case, the procedure stipulated in the national regulations to investigate, accuse, and try high-ranking dignitaries has been very flexible and, one could say, unproductive. These high dignitaries are: the President of the Republic, the Magistrates of the High Courts and the Attorney General of the Nation. It is they who hold the highest hierarchy within our legal system and, like all state officials, must fulfill their functions. It is necessary to bear in mind that these officials, by virtue of the constitutional jurisdiction that covers them and precisely because of their special investiture, must be investigated, charged and tried by a special body. This special body, for the Colombian case, is the Commission of Accusations of the House of Representatives. However, throughout history it had not been possible to complete any accusation, investigation and trial procedure of any President of the Republic of Colombia, nor a magistrate of the high courts; With the exception of the political trial during the years 1958 and 1959 against General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and the ruling issued by the Supreme Court of Justice, in the second half of 2019, against former magistrate Jorge Ignacio Pretelt, as responsible for the crime of concussion. To date, in Colombia it had never been possible to exhaust or even continue the accusation stage, much less the trial stage of high officials of the public power. In this sense, what is sought with this investigation is to compare and analyze the regulations, procedure, structure and powers used by state institutions that are in charge of hearing and carrying out an investigation, accusation and trial against the President of the Republic, as high state dignitaries of Colombia and their counterparts in Ecuador and Chile, by virtue of the guidelines of each of these countries for these dignitaries as graduates; As well as the factual and political scenario in which such functions are developed within the government system of these three Latin American countries will also be studied. Magister en Derecho Público http://unidadinvestigacion.usta.edu.co Maestría

El presente artículo busca explicar por qué Chile ha sido tan reticente a la elección democrática con niveles de autonomía del nivel intermedio de gobierno llamado gobierno regional, hoy a cargo de un intendente delegado del Gobierno Central aunque desde el 2014 con un consejo regional electo. Chile es el único caso en las grandes democracias de América Latina, ya que a los tradicionales países federales (México, Argentina, Brasil, Venezuela) y autonomistas (Colombia), desde el 2000 se han sumado a elegir el ejecutivo macro territorial Perú, Paraguay, Ecuador y Bolivia. La razón es la naturalización del modelo “presicrático”, de presidencialismo con centralismo, que se remonta a 1830. Finalmente se explica el auge de protestas regionalistas y los proyectos emanados de la Comisión Presidencial para la Descentralización que Bachelet creó el año 2014. También se grafica el modelo dual incremental que se debate en el Congreso y la tensión entre la derecha conservadora y la izquierda centralista que se enfrenta a la centro izquierda que busca profundizar la democracia aliada a la Democracia Cristiana y segmentos liberales. The present article seeks to explain why Chile has been so reticent to the democratic election with levels of autonomy of the intermediate level of government called regional government, today in charge of an intendente delegate of the Central Government although from the 2014 with an elected regional council. Chile is the only case in the great democracies of Latin America, in opossition a traditional democratic power whithin traditional federal countries (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela), Colombia from 1992 and since 2000 have joined to choose the macro territorial executive Peru, Paraguay , Ecuador and Bolivia. The reason is the naturalization of the "presicratic" model of presidentialism with centralism dating back to 1830. Finally, the paper explains the rise of regionalist protests and the projects emanating from the Presidential Commission for Decentralization that Bachelet created in 2014, generating an incremental dual model that is debated in Congress. Chile lives a tension between the conservative right allied with the centralist left that resist a change of political system against the left center that seeks to deepen democracy allied to Christian Democracy and liberal segments. Fil: Valenzuela Van Treek, Esteban. Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile

Resumen Una de las razones que justifica el rechazo a los Estados de excepción es el peligro que supone para una democracia que el ejecutivo asuma el ejercicio de la función legislativa. No obstante, un estudio detenido de los decretos con fuerza de ley que ha expedido el presidente de la República entre 1974 y 2014 pone en evidencia que esta función ha sido ejercida en una proporción sustancialmente mayor a partir de la delegación expresa que el propio Congreso ha hecho de ella. Contrario entonces a lo que afirman numerosos estudios, no se trata de un Congreso que observa impotente cómo el ejecutivo utiliza los Estados de excepción para arrogarse la función legislativa sino de un Congreso que participa activamente en la transferencia de la misma y en el desequilibrio de poderes que de ella resulta. Este trabajo tiene por objeto advertir sobre la necesidad de incorporar a la discusión otras figuras, como la delegación de facultades extraordinarias, que pueden llegar a ser más invasivas de las funciones del parlamento que los Estados de excepción y que suponen replantear las medidas que se han adoptado en Colombia para revertir la concentración de poderes en cabeza del ejecutivo. Abstract One of the reasons that justifies the rejection of states of emergency is the danger that supposes for a democracy that the executive assumes the exercise of the legislative function. However, a careful study of the decrees issued by the President between 1974 and 2014 shows that the executive has exercised the legislative function in a greater proportion based on the delegation that the Congress itself has made of it. Thus, contrary to what has been stated, it is not a congress that observes how the executive assumes its functions but a congress that actively participates in the transfer of them. This work aims to warn about the need to include in the discussion other figures that may be even more invasive of the functions of parliament than the states of emergency and to rethink the measures that the constitutional reforms have adopted to moderate the concentration of powers in the executive.

En esta investigación se lleva a cabo un estudio sobre un aspecto fundamental del derecho constitucional: la reelección presidencial desde el punto de vista del derecho comparado. Se expone una revisión teórica y práctica de esta institución jurídica, sus características y elementos fundamentales, que se profundiza al hacer un análisis jurisprudencial comparado de diversos tribunales constitucionales y altas cortes en América. La inquietud científica se origina en la actualidad jurídica, con base en las premisas y los postulados de la figura del presidencialismo desmedido, que recurre en muchísimos casos al populismo y a la violación de la separación de poderes para continuar en el ejercicio del poder. El estudio comparado de la reelección presidencial permitirá determinar el sentido que tiene cada ordenamiento jurídico en uno de los aspectos más relevantes y que ocupa mayor espacio en la ciencia política y el derecho: la democracia. This research involved a study of a fundamental aspect of constitutional law: presidential reelection from the point of view of comparative law. The article provides a technical and practical review of this legal institutions, its characteristics and fundamental elements, strengthened by a comparative jurisprudential analysis from diverse constitutional tribunals and high courts in America. The scientific question stems from the current legal situation based on the premises and postulates of the figure of excessive presidentialism, which often resorts to populism and the violation of the separation of powers to continue in the exercise of power. The comparative study of presidential reelection allows one to determine the meaning of each legal order in one of the most relevant aspects and that occupies the greatest space in political science and law: democracy.

Los sistemas parlamentario y presidencial son formas de gobierno dentro de los regímenes políticos democráticos. Lo que hace especial a estos sistemas, es que son los diseños más influyentes en el mundo moderno occidental, aunque no son los únicos. México se encuentra en los preludios de una transición de gobierno que se presenta ambivalente ante sus gobernados, al despertar sentimientos opuestos en la misma ciudadanía. Las expectaciones respecto a este vaivén, oscilan en un cúmulo de variables que en el cas d’espèce se tornan insondables en temas político-constitucionales. Una gran incógnita es concierne al sistema de gobierno, en el que la disyuntiva abre el debate lego y académico para dilucidar qué régimen político sería más conveniente para nuestro país: ¿el presidencialismo, el parlamentarismo o acaso el semipresidencialismo?

RESUMEN El 2016 fue un año complejo para el Ecuador. En el frente económico, el país cayó oficialmente en recesión. El terremoto de abril de ese año agudizó la emergencia económica. En el plano político, la popularidad presidencial entró en declive por el impacto de la recesión. En este contexto dio inicio la campaña electoral para fijar la sucesión de Rafael Correa: el oficialismo barajó varias opciones para definir su candidato presidencial y la oposición no forjó una candidatura unitaria. A partir del cambio inminente de mando, se anticiparon algunas evaluaciones preliminares del legado de Correa. El artículo hace notar el híperpresidencialismo ecuatoriano —tanto en su diseño institucional como en su práctica autoritaria— así como el deterioro de la calidad de la democracia y su legitimidad.

RESUMEN En Latinoamérica, el contexto de crisis que acompañó a la mayoría de países durante la década de los noventa fue un claro síntoma del divorcio entre Constitución en sentido formal y material, con un evidente correlato en la escasa participación ciudadana en los asuntos públicos. Esto condujo a que en algunos países de la región, específicamente en Venezuela, Ecuador y Bolivia, se dieran situaciones particularmente críticas, las cuales desembocaron en sendas asambleas constituyentes, que dieron lugar a textos constitucionales con elementos y características contradictorias en algunos aspectos y complementarias en otros, que han llevado a hablar de un Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano (NCLA). El NCLA, a fin de profundizar la democracia, contiene instrumentos para una mayor participación ciudadana en los asuntos públicos. Sin embargo, la generación de presidencialismos fuertes (con parlamentos que no son contrapesos, sino "socios" del Presidente -los casos de Venezuela y Ecuador atraviesan situaciones confusas-) van en sentido contrario, es decir, debilitan la democracia. Esta tensión es una tarea pendiente de resolver para aquellos que consideran que el NCLA es un estilo que ha llegado para quedarse, trascendiendo el momento histórico y las condiciones que le dieron lugar. ABSTRACT In Latin America, the crisis context that accompanied most of the countries during the nineties a clear symptom of the divorce between the Constitution in a formal and material sense, with an evident correlate in the scarce citizen participation in public affairs. This led to some particularly critical situations in some countries of the region, specifically in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, which led to Constitutional Assemblies, which gave rise to constitutional texts with elements and characteristics, in some contradictory aspects and in other complementary, that have led to talk about a New Latin American Constitutionalism (NLAC). The NLAC, in order to deepen democracy, contains instruments for greater citizen participation in public affairs. However, the generation of strong presidentialisms (with parliaments that are not counterweights, but "partners" of the President - the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador go through confused situations) go in the opposite direction, that is, they weaken democracy. This tension is a pending task to solve for those who consider that the NLAC is a style that has come to stay, transcending the historical moment and the conditions that gave rise to it.

Este documento, resultado de un trabajo de investigación sobre el presidencialismo y la política peruana, propone que en el vértice de nuestra política, se reproducen arcaísmos autoritarios de diversos signos y secuelas, a instancias del omnímodo poder que se enhebra en torno a los alcances legales y subjetivos de nuestra democracia presidencialista. Poder acrecentado a propósito de la débil institucionalidad republicana y democrática, a la búsqueda del “líder salvador” y al interesado sometimiento de poderes paritarios. Así, el derrotero presidencial se sustrae de los cauces legales hasta bordear los límites preocupantes del autoritarismo. Esta postura puede verse replicada por más de una autoridad política subnacional. Por ello, nos planteamos el objetivo de establecer la influencia del presidencialismo en la política peruana, así como en las autoridades políticas subnacionales. La metódica asume la rigurosidad del método científico y su variante histórico-cualitativa. Por su parte, los resultados constatan la tesis de Juan Linz, que considera al presidencialismo como menos favorable que el parlamentarismo para los fines democráticos. Aquel requiere de efectiva estabilidad institucional, política y jurídica. Concluimos que la política nuestra arroja saldos negativos, pues la arraigada verticalidad, ahora presidencial, tiende a estancarla, a desvirtuar la ciudadanía y a deformar sus instituciones. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31876/sl.v2i1.46 This document, the result of a research on presidentialism and Peruvian politics, proposes that at the apex of our politics, authoritarian archaisms of various signs and sequels are reproduced, at the behest of the omnipotent power that is threaded around the legal and subjective scope of our presidential democracy. Power increased on the basis of a weak democratic and republican institutionality, in search of the "savior leader" and the interested submission of joint powers. Thus, the presidential course is removed from the legal channels to border the worrisome limits of authoritarianism. This position can be replicated by more than one subnational political authority. For this reason, we have set ourselves the objective of establishing the influence of presidentialism on Peruvian politics, as well as on subnational political authorities. The methodology assumes the rigor of the scientific method and its historical-qualitative variant. For their part, the results confirm the thesis of Juan Linz, which considers presidentialism as less favorable than parliamentarism for democratic purposes. The first one requires effective institutional, political and legal stability. We conclude that our politics yield negative balances, because the entrenched verticality, now presidential, tends to stagnate them, to distort citizenship and to deform our institutions. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31876/sl.v2i1.46

Esta tese traz um estudo descritivo e comparado dos dispositivos de impeachment estabelecidos pelas Constituições de setenta e sete países presidencialistas e semipresidencialistas. Seu primeiro objetivo é identificar os modelos de impeachment existentes por meio de uma classificação taxonômica que considera as semelhanças e diferenças dos casos para agrupá-los em modelos de impeachment. Seu segundo objetivo é classificar os modelos identificados de acordo com um índice de dificuldade formal para a realização desse tipo de procedimento. Por fim, seu terceiro objetivo é apresentar uma proposta normativa de modelo de impeachment que reduza sua utilização como instrumento meramente político-partidário para pressionar ou afastar Presidentes sem fundamentos técnico-jurídicos. Para a consecução desses objetivos, analiso os dispositivos constitucionais dos países com o foco voltado para as seguintes variáveis: (a) instância responsáveis pela aceitação ou rejeição do pedido de impeachment, (b) instância responsável pelo julgamento do Presidente, (c) votação exigida para a aprovação do pedido, (d) votação exigida para a condenação, (e) tipo de participação do Judiciário no processo, se direta ou indireta, e, no caso de participação direta, (f) qual sua modalidade, se como gatekeeper no início do processo ou em alguma de suas etapas intermediárias, se como instância julgadora ou, ainda, se pelo desempenho dessas duas funções.Os resultados mostram que há duas matrizes de impeachment, a norte-americana, herdeira do formato inglês, e a francesa. As diferenças fundamentais entre essas duas matrizes reside no tipo de participação atribuída à Justiça nesse tipo de procedimento. No modelo norte-americano, sua participação é indireta; no modelo francês, é direta. Os dados mostram também que, a partir dessas duas matrizes, desenvolveram-se dezoito modelos de impeachment e, a maioria deles, é alguma variação da matriz francesa. Também há alguns casos sui generis, com inovações relevantes. Com esse enfoque e seus achados empíricos, a tese contribui para o preenchimento de uma lacuna na literatura comparada, cujas análises se concentraram apenas na detecção das condições políticas e econômicas associadas à ocorrência de impeachment, resultando num déficit de estudos desse dispositivo enquanto uma estrutura de regras e procedimentos que regulam sua aplicação. Como o neoinstitucionalismo é a perspectiva teórica adotada pela literatura temática, e também nesta tese, é indispensável considerar que esse arcabouço institucional condiciona as estratégias dos atores, assim como estabelece os custos e os ganhos de se adotar o impeachment como arma política nas relações entre governo e oposição. Por isso, também é relevante conceber modelos de impeachment que previnam ou que reduzam essa distorção no seu uso, algo que é apresentado no final deste estudo. This thesis shows a descriptive and comparative study of the impeachment procedures established by the Constitutions of 77 presidential and semi-presidential countries. Its first aim is to identify the existing impeachment models by means of a taxonomic procedure, which considers the similarities and differences of the cases to group them. Its second aim is to classify the identified models according to an index of formal difficulty to the execution of the impeachments. At last, its third aim is to present a normative proposal of an impeachment model, which reduces its provision as a mere political instrument to pressure or to remove Presidents without any legal and technical principles. In order to achieve this goal, constitutional provisions of the countries are analyzed, focusing on the following variables: (a) institution responsible for accepting or declining the impeachment request, (b) institution responsible for the President's trial, (c) necessary vote for the approval of the request, (d) necessary vote for the conviction, (e) type of participation of the Judiciary, if direct or indirect, and, in case of direct participation, (f) which modality, if as a gatekeeper at intermediate stages, if as a judgmental institution, or if by the performance of these two roles. The findings of this study show that there are two impeachment matrices – the North- American, resulting from the English model, and the French one. The main differences between these two matrices lie on the participation assigned to the Judiciary during the process. In the North-American model, its participation is indirect; in the French model, it's direct. Moreover, the data collected for this thesis show that 18 types of impeachment have developed from these two matrices and, most of them, evolved from the French model. There are also some sui generis cases, with relevant innovations. Under this approach and with these empiric findings, this thesis contributes to fulfil a gap in the comparative literature, whose analysis only concentrate in the detection of political and economic conditions associated with the occurrence of the impeachment, neglecting its study as a structure of rules and proceedings which regulate its application. Since the neo-institutionalism is the theoretical perspective adopted by the thematic literature and also in thesis, it's imperative to consider that this institutional framework condition the actors, as well as establishing the costs and the gains of adopting the impeachment as a political weapon in the relations among govern and opposition. Consequently, it's also relevant to conceive models of impeachment that prevent and reduce this distortion in its use, which is presented at the end of this study.

The article aims at understanding the determinants of ministerial turnover in presidential systems. There are essentially three key factors that govern the propensity for ministerial turnover in a presidential system: 01. political ambition - reflected in the individual or collective strategies and tactics employed by the party-affiliated actors represented in the cabinet; 02. the presence or absence of a governing coalition - which has bearing on the degree of ideological distance between the president and such political parties as form part of any governing coalition, with consequences for ministerial scrutiny; and 03. accountability - a determinant in responding to such external pressures as may be brought to bear by public opinion. In order to investigate the impacts of these factors, this inquiry seeks to analyze the new and dynamic democracy of Brazil. Brazil's presidential system presents interesting features that make it an excellent laboratory in which to test hypotheses concerning every aspect of ministerial turnover. To this end, this paper employs a multivariate methodology, as well as descriptive and survival analyses, based on a comprehensive and original database of cabinet ministers that draws on three presidencies over five democratically elected governments from 1995 to 2014. Among other results, our most original finding was that there is an inverse correlation between the degree of ministerial politicization (political ambition) and ideological distance from the president during political scandals (interaction between the governing coalition and accountability) on the one hand, and the length of ministerial tenure on the other.