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This article describes a simulation that fulfills many of the goals of a scholar/apprentice model--one that requires a sustained period of time during which an apprentice practices a set of discipline-specific skills under the guidance of his or her mentor. Such an extended simulation differs from shorter exercises in several ways, such as the necessity of including numerous checkpoints for monitoring student progress and of utilizing objective and systematic assessment tools. In particular, students must know that they will be assessed on the basis of both group results and their individual contributions. The simulation discussed in this article pays explicit attention to these two issues--the importance of "deliverables" and the need for dual-pronged, objective assessment instruments--as well as to the desirability of coordinated college-wide instructional support. (Contains 1 figure, 2 tables, and 19 notes.)

Will Vladimir Putin's penchant for staffing the state with siloviki undermine the prospects for democratization after he leaves office? The answer to this question hinges on whether Russian military and security officers currently possess a less liberal worldview than do civilian elites, yet little to no research has examined this question in close to a decade. In an effort to fill this gap in existing knowledge, this article investigates the orientations of influential Russians toward several core components of liberal democracy on the basis of a survey conducted in 2016. We find that attitudinal differences between siloviki and civilians persist into this decade. As was the case in both the 1990s and 2000s, elites with professional backgrounds in the force structures were less supportive of political pluralism and individual rights than were those with purely civilian resumés. In addition, active-duty officers were even less liberal than either their retired former colleagues or lifelong civilians. Finally, unlike the situation that apparently prevailed at the very end of Putin's second presidential term, conventional military officers now espouse nearly identical levels of support for political pluralism as do officers entrusted with internal security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Vladimir Putin took over the presidency, analysts have highlighted the large numbers of siloviki—those with experience in the military and security agencies—who have been recruited into government service. Two political scientists investigate this trend by reexamining previously published findings and using an original data set. Claims of the ‘FSB-ization of power’ under Putin and an underappreciated trend in elite formation under Putin—the increasing presence of business representatives in the government and society at large—are considered. The article examines the implications of its findings for Russia's future political development, particularly in terms of stability and democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tests two propositions derived from European transitions to democracy on three countries in East Central Europe: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On balance, the paper finds that new party systems seem to be developing differently in postcommunist regimes than they did in Southern and Western Europe. First, the political cleavages of the pre-authoritarian period that might have re-emerged after an interruption in democratic rule did not simply 'unfreeze' after the demise of communism. Second, the type of transition — whether by reform or ruptura — does not predict how ex-regime parties fared initially in East Central Europe. These findings suggest that, at least initially, the pre-authoritarian period and transition mode are likely to be less influential in shaping party systems than is the legacy of the communist authoritarian period. They also highlight the particularly destructive nature of communist rule in East Central Europe, in that it may have altered the bases of social and political life to a greater extent than did other types of authoritarian regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]