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Submitted by Maria Medeiros (maria.dilva1@ufcg.edu.br) on 2019-09-11T10:51:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 THAINNÁ AMORIM PINTO - DISSERTAÇÃO (PPGCP) 2019.pdf: 3068135 bytes, checksum: afe19adf73da045c75569427c689e148 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2019-09-11T10:51:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 THAINNÁ AMORIM PINTO - DISSERTAÇÃO (PPGCP) 2019.pdf: 3068135 bytes, checksum: afe19adf73da045c75569427c689e148 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-08-06 Capes Os vários debates que tratam acerca da qualidade democrática refletem uma visão que privilegia os aspectos eleitorais. As comparações acerca da aposta democrática enquanto direito ao sufrágio e ao exercício de liberdades políticas se constituem, de fato, a essência do caráter do regime político. Entretanto, enquanto isso repousa na suposição de que a democracia é assegurada nos países onde competição e participação política também o são, os dados mostram que tão somente esses fatores não explicam a disparidade entre o grau de democratização registrado nos países do globo, sobretudo na América Latina, onde cerca de 65% dos países não conseguem controlar suas taxas de homicídio. Neste trabalho analiso, de forma comparada, a qualidade democrática em 119 países, a partir de um índice criado por meio de análise fatorial. Pretende-se, a partir disso, estender a investigação acerca da existência e da importância da conexão entre segurança pública e democracia buscando uma melhor compreensão de tal regime político, da forma como ele existe na realidade contemporânea. Este estudo inclui uma dimensão empírica na qual a principal hipótese é de que nos países onde existe mais segurança pública, a qualidade democrática também é maior. A hipótese secundária é que isso encontra-se intrinsicamente relacionado à qualidade das instituições estatais de justiça criminal que têm a oportunidade de oferecer um leque de coerções que desestimule a prática criminosa segundo a perspectiva da escolha racional. As análises de regressão indicam que a segurança pública é fator explicativo na qualidade democrática exercendo papel mais relevante do que variáveis comumente utilizadas em estudos desse gênero. Sugere-se, então, que os complexos estudos acerca da democracia e seus aspectos determinantes devem incluir variáveis ligadas a violência e a forma como o Estado vem trabalhando para contê-la. The various debates dealing with democratic quality reflect a view that privileges electoral aspects. Comparisons about the democratic bet as a right to suffrage and the exercise of political freedoms constitute, in fact, the essence of the character of the political regime. However, while this rests on the assumption that democracy is assured in countries where competition and political participation are also, the data show that these factors alone do not explain the disparity between the degree of democratization in the countries of the globe, especially in America. Where about 65% of countries cannot control their homicide rates. In this paper, I analyze, comparatively, the democratic quality in 119 countries, based on an index created through factor analysis. From this, it is intended to extend the investigation about the existence and importance of the connection between public security and democracy seeking a better understanding of such political regime, as it exists in contemporary reality. This study includes an empirical dimension in which the main hypothesis is that in countries where there is more public security, democratic quality is also higher. The secondary hypothesis is that this is intrinsically related to the quality of state criminal justice institutions that have the opportunity to offer a range of coercions that discourage criminal practice from the perspective of rational choice. Regression analyzes indicate that public safety is an explanatory factor in democratic quality playing a more relevant role than variables commonly used in such studies. Therefore, it is suggested that the complex studies on democracy and its determinant aspects should include variables related to violence and the way the state has been working to contain it.

The authors would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for facilitating the research for this article through their support of the research network People Power versus State Power of the Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World. This paper examines the trajectories of different Islamist trends in the light of the Arab uprisings. It proposes a distinction between statist and non-statist Islamism to help understand the multiplicity of interactions between Islamists and the state, particularly after 2011. It is outlined how statist Islamists (Islamist parties principally) can contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the state when their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate consensus building in national politics. By contrast when these interactions are conflictual, it has a detrimental impact on both the statist Islamists, and the possibility of democratic politics at the national level. Non statist-Islamists (from quietist salafi to armed jihadi) who prioritize the religious community over national politics are directly impacted by the interactions between statist Islamists and the state, and generally tend to benefit from the failure to build a consensus over democratic national politics. Far more than nationally-grounded statist Islamists, non-statist Islamists shape and are shaped by the regional dynamics on the Arab uprisings and the international and transnational relations between the different countries and conflict areas of the Middle East. The Arab uprisings and their aftermath reshaped pre-existing national and international dynamics of confrontation and collaboration between Islamists and the state, and between statist and non-statists Islamists, for better (Tunisia) and for worse (Egypt). Postprint

Este artículo pretende develar la existencia de una democracia incompleta. Se establecen los factores que coadyuvan a que el ejercicio democrático se precarice. En esa dirección, la violación de Derechos Humanos está a un paso. El objetivo de este trabajo procura hacer disecciones, desde una perspectiva comprensiva que analice el aspecto integral de la democracia colombiana y su contribución a la preservación de derechos. Estos últimos están sujetos a la existencia de un Estado que en ocasiones resulta ineficiente por falta de una estructura orgánica que revitalice las instituciones This article aims to reveal the existence of an incomplete democracy. The factors that contribute to the democratic exercise is precarious in sets. In that direction, the violation of human rights is one step. The aim of this paper attempts dissec-tions, from a comprehensive perspective to analyze the integral aspect of Colombian democracy and its contribution to the preservation of rights. The latter are subject to the existence of a state that is sometimes inefficient for lack of an organizational structure to revitalize the institutions

Somalis face a daunting development challenge to overcome the legacy of two decades of sustained conflict and fragility, but substantial progress is now being made. Since 1991 and the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, Somalia has experienced cycles of conflict and fragility that fragmented the country, undermined legitimate institutions, and created widespread vulnerability. The new government that emerged following the Transitional Federal Government and the Roadmap to End the Transition in 2012 inherited a dysfunctional economy facing high levels of poverty and inequality, a youth bulge, high unemployment, and large infrastructure gaps. Against a backdrop of political progress marked by the emergence of new Federal Member States (FMSs) within the new constitutional framework and continued insecurity, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has embarked on a process of structural, legislative, and institutional reform. The economy is starting to respond: Somalis are returning from abroad to invest, shops are opening, and the property market is booming. This is the first economic update for Somalia since the 2005 World Bank country economic memorandum for Somalia. The long conflict made monitoring of economic and social data nearly impossible since the late 1980s. With the relative stability of the past few years, new data have become available. The update is divided into two parts. Part one presents information on the social, economic, and governance status of Somalia. Part two focuses on intergovernmental fiscal relations.

Azerbaijan is a secular, majority-Shiite, oil and gas-rich country whose per-capita income quadrupled in real terms during the period 2004-10. While rising incomes have reduced poverty, steps towards a more secure, diversified economy are held back by a public sector that rests on vested interests, patronage-based incentive structures, and ingrained patterns of behavior that include significant rent extraction, particularly from the non-oil economy, with minimal checks and balances from Parliament, the private sector, and civil society. Bank engagement in Azerbaijan at the country level focused on areas which had government support. Some modest results have been achieved, even though in many cases modern laws and practices were adopted without adequate plans for implementation. At the project level, the Bank has supported the strengthening of project implementation units (PIUs) and tools for monitoring, and governance and institutional filters have signaled that Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) processes need to be embedded in the Bank projects. At the sector level, the Bank's work was highly relevant in supporting oil revenue transparency, primary education, roads, and the development of safeguards. It was substantially relevant in public financial management, and private sector development and procurement. Bank engagement was moderately relevant in decentralization, civil service reform, and accountability institutions.

Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest and most densely populated countries, and subject to annual cyclones and flooding. Despite these challenges, it benefits from strong economic growth, good performance on health and education, and poverty reduction, alongside weak governance and pervasive corruption. The reasons include strong macroeconomic policy, pro-poor spending, credible elections, export growth and remittances, improved capacity for managing natural disasters, and a stronger civil society than comparable countries. After over a decade of intense engagement with the Bank on governance, Bangladesh adopted in 2006 a governance-oriented Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) with four main objectives: to improve implementation capacity; to 'tackle corruption' by fully operationalizing the Anti-Corruption Commission; to lay the foundation for comprehensive legal and judicial reform; and to strengthen 'voice, empowerment and participation.' The choice of a wide range of instruments and areas of intervention was appropriate, given the political instability at the time of 2006 CAS preparation. The Bank signaled it was ready to engage in all areas, and could scale up or pull back depending on emerging political and bureaucratic commitment. The 2006 CAS yielded mixed results, and the subsequent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) has been more selective on GAC issues. At the project level, governance has been a key priority, in line with the South Asia region's heavy emphasis on GAC-in-Projects. Investments in GAC-in-primary education, a local government project, anti-corruption efforts in the power sector, and projects strengthening the investment climate have yielded positive results. Investments in GAC-in-roads projects have had mixed results in terms of effectiveness. GAC activities were mainly adopted prior to the 2007 GAC strategy. Although Bangladesh was a Country Governance and Anticorruption (CGAC) country, the country team chose not to use CGAC funds because the country had already been intensively using GAC approaches well before the GAC strategy was adopted.

The focus of this paper is on the institutions outside the executive branch that include supreme audit institutions, legislative oversight bodies (such as parliamentary public accounts and budget committees, and ombudsmen), related independent bodies, and civil society organizations. Through their support for accountability, donor countries and international financial institutions seek to help countries: promote voice and accountability as an intrinsic human right, and improve development outcomes in terms of poverty reduction, sustainable development. The report is organized as: first, provide a brief literature review of research on accountability, and how donors and other actors can work to improve it, including a review of the experience of other bilateral and multilateral donors in supporting domestic accountability through their policies, strategies, and behaviors as well as through direct support to accountability actors and systems. Second, briefly review the guidance prepared for Bank staff toward enhancing accountability. Third, review some examples of the Bank's experience in supporting domestic accountability. Finally, we present some conclusions and accountability-related questions for further analysis.

The purpose of this issues note is to review the experience in and outside the World Bank of using different diagnostic tools in fragile state situations. It will identify trends in the use of such tools, lessons learnt, and arrive at suggestions for the future. Because governance has continued to be a major concern in the international community, over the years this has led to a growing diversity in the application of the concept. With this diversification the types of assessment in use have also increased, a process that reflects two things. First, each agency tends to design an assessment to meet its own program needs. Second, diagnostic tools have often fallen short of expectations leading agencies to develop new ones, including more recently political economy studies that go beyond what was at least until recently mainstream types of assessing governance. Accepting the diversity of definitions and assessments, this note does not intend to review the whole field. A diagnostic tool here refers to the approach and methodology used in assessing governance. Choice of tool has a direct bearing on how an activity is designed and carried out. Making the right choice, therefore, is important. A tool may become 'main stream' and the original rationale for its use disappears. It is applied because everyone else is using it or there is pressure to use the same tool as others. A shift to other tools, however, may become necessary because existing tools do not deliver. Such a shift is occurring in the governance field where a focus on institutions is being increasingly complemented, if not replaced, by a studies of underlying political economy factors. This Note tries to trace this process by highlighting both specific and more general experiences with tools used to assess governance. Fragile states or situations are not typical but they give rise to governance challenges that more than other contexts test the limits of particular tools. This becomes an especially important issue given that what works in countries that are not fragile seems to fall short of the same achievement in fragile situations.

A key driver of Liberia's re-emergence from utter destruction, between 2004 and 2008, was the willingness of international actors to accept the responsibility and risks associated with stabilization. This was accomplished by confronting these risks directly, even at the cost of temporarily filling institutional voids and sharing sovereignty with the Liberian transitional authorities. The main international diplomatic representations and aid agencies on the ground came to accept from their varying perspectives that peace in Liberia was fragile and that the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (ACPA) of September 2003 was only the beginning of a protracted stabilization effort. The domestic market for consultants and goods did not exist, requiring the World Bank to innovate with new modes of delivering assistance. Thus, peace consolidation compelled international partners to simultaneously (i) prevent full state capture by corrupt elites in advance of elections and (ii) secure a peace dividend to vulnerable groups which could most directly threaten peace (young ex-combatants and refugees). Building on a solid UN-World Bank partnership, the international community found the internal consensus to address each of the two complementary peace consolidation challenges, adopting two highly innovative instruments: (i) an anti-corruption scheme labeled Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), involving such robust measures as expatriate co-signing authority, and (ii) a short-term employment-generation scheme now known as roads-with- United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), centered on a rare direct collaboration between the Bank and the engineering units of the UN's military peacekeeping force on the ground. This paper examines these two instruments more closely, in their successes and failures as well as from the perspective of temporary shared sovereignty and co-production.

What happens when the state's vision and expanding reach bring it into contact with traditional value systems and governance structures? In what circumstances can the distribution of resources in a fragile society prevent-or exacerbate-conflict within and between communities? How do state expansion and public spending impact upon societal expectations of the state and state legitimacy? This report examines these questions through the lens of access, claiming, and decision making in government-sponsored community development programs. The findings illustrate the hurdles faced by government and development actors operating in pluralistic societies, and provide input on how local governance and decision making might be incorporated to enrich programming. This report aims to provide the government of Timor-Leste, particularly those responsible for decentralization, community development, and local governance planning, with information to inform their determination of an appropriate mix of models for local development. The relative priority the government will ultimately give to these different models, partly a trade-off between speed and depth, will impact on the way in which development and local governance are understood and taken on board by rural communities. This report finds that the achievement of the dual goals of state legitimacy and sustainable, effective local development hinges in large part on the willingness of state officials (and the donors that support them) to engage productively with communities and locally legitimate customary systems of authority.

This paper examines the relationship between narcotics trafficking and violence in Central America. The first part of the paper addresses particular questions posed for the 2011 World Development Report and examines several competing hypothesis on the drivers of crime in Central America. A key finding is that areas exposed to intense narcotics trafficking in Central America suffer from higher homicide rates. Drug trafficking has corrupted state institutions, which have been overwhelmed by the resources deployed by trafficking organizations. The second part of the paper reviews the reasons drug trafficking and anti trafficking enforcement are associated with violence in general and consider policy options.

The Horn of Africa (HOA) is one of the most underdeveloped regions on earth. It is also one of the most conflict-ridden, insecure regions in the world. While Africa as a whole has enjoyed a trend in recent years toward reduction and termination of many of its civil wars, the HOA is the exception to the rule. Indeed, the region's prolonged armed conflicts have spread, engulfing several neighboring states in warfare and partial state collapse. While aspects of the HOA case are obviously unique, and sensitivity to context and complexity must be privileged in both analysis of and policy toward the Horn, the region's crises are not so distinct that they preclude useful comparative analysis. This paper considers conflict dynamics across the entire Horn of Africa, but devotes special attention to the case of Somalia which, because of the depth, length, and significance of its crisis, is a source of particular international concern. Because Somalia's crisis has been so protracted and has gone through several very distinct phases, it provides an opportunity to compare conflict dynamics in a single country over time.

Strengthening the rule of law is widely regarded among traditional donors, multilateral institutions, and a growing number of middle income and fragile states as a necessary precondition for sustainable peace, poverty alleviation, and development. Crime and violence deter investment and lower employment, undermine social institutions, and divert resources through direct and indirect costs, all of which hinder development. It is likely to disproportionately affect poor and marginalized populations by limiting access to basic services. The formal criminal justice system is seen in many environments as failing to deliver justice. Most states experiencing fragility do not have the capacity to effectively prevent crime, enforce laws, or peacefully resolve disputes across the whole of their territories. There is another powerful deterrent for communities to seek redress through state criminal justice institutions: they are frequently a primary instrument for the government and elites to maintain power and control through the perpetration of injustice. The informal system, however, is alone insufficient to handle the pressing justice requirements of fragile states, not least for preventing and responding to inter-communal conflict, to serious organized and cross-border crime, and to public corruption and other 'white collar' crime.

There is broad recognition, across the political spectrum and in both 'northern' and 'southern' countries, that justice reform, and more generally the promotion of the 'rule of law', are central to development policy, particularly in conflict-affected, fragile and violent contexts. More recently an increased focus on global security and the interaction between security and development as put a renewed emphasis on such efforts. However, while legal, regulatory and 'justice' institutions are now seen as key part of the 'solution' to problems of conflict, fragility and development, this recognition is not matched by a correspondingly clear sense of what should be done, how it should be done, by whom, in what order, or how 'success' may be determined. There often tends to be a clear misunderstanding of both the nature of the problem and (thus) of the solution. In this paper, the author seek to provide some insight into these questions and sketch out a practical conception of effective justice reform in situations of conflict and fragility that may provide the basis for effective programming.

Violent conflict is the multifaceted and cyclical problem that the international community is trying to grapple with. To date, there has been a clear hierarchy concerning what forms of violence are seen to matter most, with political violence that threatens the state taking pole position. In examining this argument, this paper sets out a number of issues relating to security and justice definitions. It will then examine some of the problems associated with placing conflict into a box-set typology: mass violence associated with war and genocide carries unique features but also spawns new challenges which are often being ignored. The paper will then examine in brief some of the measures used by communities, governmental actors and international partners in contending with violence before outlining some key conclusions and recommendations. In reading this paper two further points need be borne in mind: 1) this does not provide a comprehensive overview of violence and security - that is the role of the World Development Report (WDR) itself, and 2) this paper does not present fresh research, but more an overview, along with the other papers in the security-justice series, of some of the key issues confronting policy makers in the domain of security and development.

This report seeks to inform the development of a framework for addressing governance reform in fragile and conflict affected environments through are view of international experiences. The report analyzes the experience both of countries that sustained a transition to peace and those that fell back into conflict. Pertinent lessons will be drawn selectively from a range of fragile and conflict affected countries, including Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mozambique, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. No specific typologies have been adopted or formed in order to assess these lessons, because typologies can be limiting and experiences can be better assessed based on the specificity of each country's context. The first section of the report sets out broadly accepted definitions of key terms such as governance, state building, and fragility. The second section reviews experiences with diverse governance dimensions and explores the objectives, opportunities, and constraints associated with each.

This report examines the theoretical and practical synergies between three intervention models that are currently being employed to improve local governance in developing countries: 1) democratic decentralization or devolution; 2) community participatory approaches, and; 3) rights-based approaches. The aim is to identify the possibilities and challenges of an 'integrative approach' to local governance that combines the strengths of each of the three intervention models. It is assumed that an integrative approach can help enhance efforts to improve the downward accountability of local governments, enhance equity in the distribution of services and in various citizens' access to influence, and increase citizen participation in local governance processes. This is supported by a number of empirical cases from Africa, Latin America, Asia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are presented in the report. Each case also highlights a number of context-specific challenges to using an integrative approach, such as available financial resources, national policy environments and local conflicts. The report fills this gap by both identifying theoretical synergies and by drawing on the few empirical cases that exist.

The devolution of procurement responsibilities to local levels of government is increasingly occurring across South Asia. This trend is significant because increasingly localized decision-making better enables communities to hold government authorities accountable for the effectiveness of public spending, which can lead to various improved development outcomes, such as improvements in quality of service delivery; greater empowerment and understanding by end-users services supplied through public procurement processes; and improved oversight and accountability of service delivery agencies. The objective of this report is to set out an overview of the strategic approach developed by World Bank Institute (WBI) as a component of the Norwegian governance trust fund (NTF) program `procurement and service delivery: establishing effective collaboration between government and beneficiaries on monitoring procurement outcomes`. WBI received funds under the NTF to facilitate the development of context and audience-specific knowledge products by recognized practitioners and civil society organizations in South Asia as part of a broader effort to create a practical curriculum on social accountability in procurement.

The aim of this study is to convince national and multilateral policy makers of the importance of the public sphere concept for democratic governance and strategic post-conflict assistance planning with the objective of positive and sustainable change in current post-conflict assistance policy and practice. The study introduces the conceptual thinking underlying the public sphere framework and, citing evidence from different countries, highlights its relevance and calls for its application in post-conflict environments. For practitioners the study provides a public sphere assessment toolkit and a toolbox for interventions. It also offers concrete examples and recommendations on how to address the specific governance challenges identified through a public sphere analysis in three countries: Timor-Leste, Liberia and Burundi.