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Ethiopia, a nation with almost a century old constitutional traditions, has very limited democratic culture. In its long history, the country was governed by four written constitutions, namely the 1931, 1955, 1987 and 1995 Constitutions. The first three Constitutions were ratified under the aegis of monarchy and dictatorship and were therefore undemocratic. The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is the best. However, Ethiopia does not qualify as yet a fully constitutional and democratic state. This article reflects on the constitutional experiences and the quest for constitutionalism in Ethiopia, from its constitutional traditions to its contemporary constitutional experiences. It focuses on the 1995 Constitution and critically examines its weaknesses which mainly relate to ethnic federalism, the right to self-determination or secession, and the land rights. Finally, it draws lessons from the past and the present and considers the prospects for constitutionalism and democracy in Ethiopia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new Latin American constitutionalism (NLC) is the term that has been coined to refer to certain constitutional processes and constitutional reforms that have taken place relatively recently in Latin America. Constitutional theorists have not been very optimistic regarding the scope and nature of this new constitutionalism. I thoroughly agree with this critical skepticism as well as with the idea that this new phenomenon does not substantively change the organic element of the different constitutions in the region. However, I argue that it is a mistake to focus analysis on this characteristic. My intention is to show that the NLC should be evaluated in the context of its relationship with contemporary neo-constitutional theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the developmental causes and consequences of the shift from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential system in Sri Lanka in 1978, examining its provenance, rationale and unfolding trajectory. Drawing on a wide range of sources, it sets out an argument that the executive presidency was born out of an elite impulse to create a more stable, centralised political structure to resist the welfarist electoral pressures that had taken hold in the post-independence period, and to pursue a market-driven model of economic growth. This strategy succeeded in its early years, 1978–93, when presidents retained legislative control, maintained a strong personal commitment to market reforms and cultivated alternative sources of legitimacy. In the absence of these factors, the presidency slipped into crisis from 1994–2004 as resistance to elite-led projects of state reform mounted and as the president lost control of the legislature. Between 2005–14, the presidency regained its power, but at the cost of abandoning its original rationale and function as a means to recalibrate the elite–mass power relationship to facilitate elite-led reform agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of colombian constitutionalism has been characterized by many interesting contradictions and particularities in terms of constitutional theory. This essay seeks to study some of the situations that we consider part of relative constitutionalism or the constitutional disguise. We believe that this concept can explain the reasons why Colombia has conserved certain stability despite having not consolidated rule of law. Some of the phenomena that are relevant in colombian constitutionalism and are characteristic of relative constitutionalism are: the constitutional dictatorship, the war and its relationship with constitutional legitimation, and the change in the meaning of sovereignty to facilitate the transfer of power to a benevolent dictator. We will try to show those ideas through a brief historical review, an approximation to classical authors of Constitutional Theory, the use of those concepts in Colombian republican history and at this moment. In our opinion we will demonstrate that relative constitutionalism has been the way to avoid material demands proper to the rule of law, while managing to maintain the appearance of a strong defense of constitutionalism and its values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]