Search

Abstract: This study assesses four proposals to generate funds for international climate financing in developing countries according to three criteria: adequacy, predictability and equitability. The focus year is 2020, in which USD 100 billion should be available for climate financing according to the Copenhagen Accord. The four financing proposals assessed include auctioning emission allowances (Norwegian Proposal), a global carbon tax (Swiss Proposal), an emissions trading (IET) levy, and a tax on international aviation and shipping emissions (bunker fuel emissions tax). Adequacy and predictability are assessed by calculating the revenue of the financing proposals for three mitigation scenarios. Equitability is assessed by comparing the regional distribution of costs of the financing proposals to that of a common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities approach, which can be regarded as an equitable approach. For the calculations, the integrated FAIR model is used. Based on the three criteria above, we conclude that the Swiss Proposal and the bunker fuel emissions tax are the most promising financing proposals of the four. An IET levy receives a low score for all three criteria. Importantly, a low price on the carbon market, resulting from a low mitigation ambition level (as under the current unconditional Copenhagen Accord pledges), would undermine generating funding for all financing proposals analysed here except for the Swiss Proposal. Combining such proposals would therefore not increase the predictability of funding. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: As part of the Copenhagen Accord, Annex I Parties (industrialised countries) and non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) have submitted reduction proposals (pledges) and mitigation actions to the UNFCCC secretariat. Our calculations show that if the current reduction offers of Annex I and non-Annex I countries are fully implemented, global greenhouse gas emissions could amount to 48.6–49.7 GtCO2eq by 2020. Recent literature suggests that the emission level should be between 42 and 46 GtCO2eq by 2020 to maintain a “medium” chance (50–66%) of meeting the 2°C target. The emission gap is therefore 2.6–7.7 GtCO2eq. We have identified a combined set of options, which could result in an additional 2.8 GtCO2eq emission reduction. This would lead to an emission level just within the range needed. The options include reducing deforestation and emissions from bunker fuels, excluding emissions allowance increases from land use and forestry rules, and taking into account the national climate plans of China and India. However, there are also important risks that could widen the emissions gap, like lower reductions from countries with only a conditional pledge and the use of Kyoto and/or trading of new surplus emission allowances. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In order to stabilize long-term greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-eq or lower, developed countries as a group should reduce emissions by 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020, while developing countries' emissions need to be reduced by around 15-30%, relative to their baseline levels, according to the IPCC and our earlier work. This study examines 19 other studies on the emission reductions attributed to the developed and developing countries for meeting a 450 ppm target. These studies considered different allocation approaches, according to equity principles. The effect of the assumed global emissions cap in these studies is analysed. For developed countries, the original reduction range of 25-40% by 2020 is still within the average range of all studies, but does not cover it completely. Comparing the studies shows that assuming a global emissions cap of 5-15% above 1990 levels by 2020 generally leads to more stringent reduction targets than when a global emissions cap of 20-30% above 1990 levels is assumed. For developing countries, the reduction range of 15-30% below their baseline levels by 2020 corresponds to an increase on the 1990 level from 70% (about the 2006 level) to 120%. Reducing deforestation emissions by 50% below baseline levels by 2020 may relax the emission reductions for either group of countries; for developing countries by about 7% or for developed countries by about 15% (but not for both). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Substantially postponing the emission reductions, compared to the ranges indicated in IPCC’s recent assessment for 2020 as required for meeting the longterm 2°C target, increases the risk of exceeding this target. The costs of a delay strategy are lower in the short term, but leads to higher costs in the longer term. The analysis shows if the emission reductions are postponed to 2030 it is not likely that higher emissions from the earlier years can be fully compensated in future decades in a so-called ‘delayed action scenario’. A full compensation would require emission reduction rates in the coming decades that are much higher than those found in the scenario literature. Without compensation, the risk of exceeding the global temperature rise target of 2°C will increase. This confirms that it is not only the reduction commitments for 2050 that determine the risk of exceeding the 2°C target, but also the path between now and 2050. To meet this 2°C target, more ambitious 2020 reduction targets are needed for the developed and developing countries than those that have been pledged so far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies have been published to evaluate the consequences of different post- 2012 emission allocation regimes on regional mitigation costs. This paper goes one step further and evaluates not only mitigation costs, but also adaptation costs and climate change damages. Three post-2012 emission allocation regimes (Contraction & Convergence, Multistage and Common but differentiated convergence) and two climate targets (2°C and 3°C above the pre-industrial level) are considered. This explorative analysis shows that including these other cost categories could lead to different perspectives on the outcomes of allocation regimes. Up to 2050, the poorest regions have negative mitigation costs under all allocation regimes considered, as they benefit from emission trading. However, these regions also suffer from the most severe climate impacts. As such, the financial flows due to emission trading from developed to developing countries created under these allocation regimes could also be interpreted as compensation of climate change damages and adaptation costs. In the longer run, the sum of climate change damages, adaptation costs and mitigation costs are the highest in the poorest regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, for both climate targets and practically all emission allocation regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Recent proposals at the UNFCCC meeting in Bali in December 2007 suggest that a 2% levy on the CDM could finance adaptation costs in developing regions. Other proposals include extending the scope of the levy to emissions trading. This study applies an Integrated Assessment Model to gain insight in the interactions between adaptation costs, residual damages and mitigation costs and to analyse the effectiveness of a 2% levy on both the CDM and emissions trading from developing countries. We show that adaptation is especially important in lower income regions where damages are higher. The revenues of a 2% levy strongly depend on both the climate mitigation target and the burden-sharing regime. A more stringent climate mitigation target results in more emissions trade and, in the longer run, less need for adaptation. Both factors increase the share of adaptation costs that can be funded. The burden-sharing regime strongly affects the revenues of a 2% levy as well: relatively more stringent targets for developed countries increase the revenues of a 2% levy. However, in the next two decades the share of adaptation that can be financed remains well below 20% in most cases. Additional funding mechanisms are therefore necessary to substantially finance adaptation costs in developing countries. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group III, summarises in Box 13.7 the required emission reduction ranges in Annex I and non-Annex I countries as a group, to achieve greenhouse gas concentration stabilisation levels between 450 and 650 ppm CO2-eq. The box summarises the results of the IPCC authors’ analysis of the literature on the regional allocation of the emission reductions. The box states that Annex I countries as a group would need to reduce their emissions to below 1990 levels in 2020 by 25% to 40% for 450 ppm, 10% to 30% for 550 ppm and 0% to 25% for 650 ppm CO2-eq, even if emissions in developing countries deviate substantially from baseline for the low concentration target. In this paper, the IPCC authors of Box 13.7 provide background information and analyse whether new information, obtained after completion of the IPCC report, influences these ranges. The authors concluded that there is no argument for updating the ranges in Box 13.7. The allocation studies, which were published after the writing of the IPCC report, show reductions in line with the reduction ranges in the box. From the studies analysed, this paper specifies the “substantial deviation” or “deviation from baseline” in the box: emissions of non-Annex I countries as a group have to be below the baseline roughly between 15% to 30% for 450 ppm CO2-eq, 0% to 20% for 550 ppm CO2-eq and from 10% above to 10% below the baseline for 650 ppm CO2-eq, in 2020. These ranges apply to the whole group of non-Annex I countries and may differ substantially per country. The most important factor influencing these ranges above, for non-Annex I countries, and in the box, for Annex I countries, is new information on higher baseline emissions (e.g. that of Sheehan, Climatic Change, , this issue). Other factors are the assumed global emission level in 2020 and assumptions on land-use change and forestry emissions. The current, slow pace in climate policy and the steady increase in global emissions, make it almost unfeasible to reach relatively low global emission levels in 2020 needed to meet 450 ppm CO2-eq, as was first assumed feasible by some studies, 5 years ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Climate Policy (Earthscan) is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The “South–North Dialogue” Proposal, developed by researchers from developing and industrialised countries, outlined equitable approaches to mitigation. These approaches were based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate, and include deep cuts in industrialised (Annex I) countries and differentiated mitigation commitments for developing countries. This paper quantitatively analyses the implications of the proposal for countries’ emissions and costs. The analysis focuses on a “political willingness” scenario and four stabilisation scenarios. The analysis shows that stringent stabilisation targets imply that many developing countries would have to take on quantitative mitigation obligations by 2030, even when the Annex I countries take on ambitious mitigation commitments far beyond the Kyoto obligations. The “political willingness scenario” will probably not suffice to limit a warming of the Earth''s atmosphere to below 2°C. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]