1. Is enterprise environmental protection investment responsibility or rent-seeking? Chinese evidence
- Author
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Chun-Xiang Zhao, Jian-Qiu Liu, Xin-Feng Jiang, Jing-Juan Ma, and Si-Hai Li
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,Economic policy ,020209 energy ,media_common.quotation_subject ,05 social sciences ,02 engineering and technology ,Development ,Investment (macroeconomics) ,Environmentally friendly ,Politics ,Quantitative analysis (finance) ,Scale (social sciences) ,0502 economics and business ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,Business ,China ,Environmental degradation ,Rent-seeking ,050203 business & management ,General Environmental Science ,media_common - Abstract
Having enterprises engaged in environmentally friendly behavior is an important part of reducing negative environmental impacts. This study makes a quantitative analysis against the backdrop of China's transitional economic system. The results show that politically-connected enterprises significantly reduce environmental expenditure, but this only holds for state-owned enterprises; private enterprises with political connections spend significantly more. Analysis of the efficiency of environmental expenditure indicates that, for private enterprises, environmental spending is used as a way to maintain political connections, with rent-seeking as the likely motivation. Politically-connected private enterprises have not reduced their emissions to the same extent as state-owned enterprises, despite increased expenditure. Given the scale of environmental degradation in China during a period of massive economic and social upheaval, the results of this analysis provide a quantitative case for policy change: governments should shift focus to the results that environmental spending produces.
- Published
- 2020
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