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Relations between mind-mindedness (assessed using the describe-your-child interview) and stress were investigated in parents of children with developmental disorders (ADHD, n = 51, ASD, n = 23, Down's Syndrome, n = 38, and 22q11.2 Deletion Syndrome, 22q11.2DS, n = 32) and typically-developing children (n = 89). Mind-mindedness did not differ across diagnostic groups, and mind-mindedness predicted parenting stress across groups. Parenting stress was lowest in the typically-developing and Down's Syndrome groups. Across all groups, mind-minded and positive descriptions predicted lower parenting stress, and negative descriptions predicted higher stress. In the developmental disorder groups, describing the children with reference to their disorder was negatively correlated with mind-mindedness. Results are discussed with regard to interventions for families where children have developmental disorders.

In this article, I explore two epistemologies for theorizing infancy and treating autism--infant and child psychoanalysis expounded by Frances Tustin and colleagues and developmental psychology and developmental neuroscience. I address two main issues: (a) how early psychoanalytic insights informed empirical developments and theoretical scholarship in both infant psychoanalysis and developmental psychology, and (b) how the study of infant development within psychoanalysis has been derailed by faulty theorizing and failure to incorporate scientific scholarship on infant development into their theories and practice. First, I review current research on infancy including psychoanalytic contributions that have incorporated scientific methods and evidence. I then juxtapose this work with Frances Tustin's theory of autism as an exemplar of the problematic theorizing about infant development that remains unchallenged, even today, in some psychoanalytic circles, and how that theory is operationalized in treatment. I discuss possible reasons for the failure to revise theory and therapeutic practice and the adherence to faulty perceptions of "successful" therapeutic outcome. Despite these derailments, I conclude that a marriage of science and psychoanalysis (that is convergent with developmental research) is not only possible; indeed, it has produced talented progeny who have immeasurably advanced our understanding of human functioning across the life span by further illuminating the mysteries of infant experience.

Research suggests that individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have significant difficulties with adaptive behavior skills including daily living and functional communication skills. Few studies have examined the developmental trajectory of adaptive behavior across childhood and adolescence. The present study examined longitudinal trajectories of adaptive behavior in a community-based clinic sample of 186 individuals with ASD. The overall pattern indicated an initial increase in adaptive behavior during early childhood followed by a plateau in skills during adolescence for individuals of all IQ groups. Given the importance of adaptive behavior for employment and quality of life, this study emphasizes the importance of targeting adaptive behavior during adolescence to insure continued gains.

Joint attention, a synchronizing of the attention of two or more persons, has been an increasing focus of research in cognitive developmental psychology. Research in this area has progressed mainly outside of behavior analysis, and behavior-analytic research and theory has tended to ignore the work on joint attention. It is argued here, on the one hand, that behavior-analytic work on verbal behavior with children with autism needs to integrate the research body on joint attention. On the other hand, research on joint attention should integrate behavior-analytic principles to produce more effective analyses of basic processes involved. An operant analysis of phenomena typically considered under the heading of joint attention is followed by examples of training protocols aimed at teaching joint attention skills, such as social referencing, monitoring, gaze following, and such skills interwoven with mands and with tacts. Finally, certain research questions are pointed out.

Neurofibromatosis type 1 (NF1) is an inherited neurocutaneous disorder associated with neurodevelopmental disorders including autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The frequency of ASD/NF1 co-occurrence has been subject to debate since the 1980s. This relationship was investigated in a large population-based sample of 8-year-old children identified with ASD (N = 12,271) by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network. Twenty-two (1-in-558) children with ASD had diagnosed NF1, exceeding NF1 general population estimates by four to five fold. Children with ASD/NF1 versus ASD without NF1 were significantly less likely to receive a community-based ASD diagnosis (p = 0.04) and understand non-verbal communication (p = 0.001). These findings underscore the importance of including social-communication ability among relevant developmental concerns in children with NF1.

This study examined the developmental profile of male infants with fragile X syndrome (FXS) and its divergence from typical development and development of infants at high risk for autism associated with familial recurrence (ASIBs). Participants included 174 boys ranging in age from 5 to 28 months. Cross-sectional profiles on the Mullen Scales of Early Learning indicated infants with FXS could be differentiated from typically developing infants and ASIBs by 6 months of age. Infants with FXS displayed a trend of lower developmental skills with increasing age that was unique from the typically developing and ASIB groups. Findings suggest infants with FXS present with more significant, pervasive and early emerging delays than previously reported with potentially etiologically distinct developmental profiles.

Individuals with autism have difficulty generalising information from one situation to another, a process that requires the learning of categories and concepts. Category information may be learned through: (1) classifying items into categories, or (2) predicting missing features of category items. Predicting missing features has to this point been little used in special education. Children with autism were taught novel category information through either classification or feature prediction tasks. Both methods resulted in successful category learning. Furthermore, feature prediction learning resulted in better performance when predicting missing features of items at test. These results suggest that while both tasks are valuable tools for teaching categories to children with autism, the feature prediction task provides more successful post-learning use of the information acquired.

Children with autism use hand taking and hand leading gestures to interact with others. This is traditionally considered to be an example of atypical behaviour illustrating the lack of intersubjective understanding in autism. However the assumption that these gestures are atypical is based upon scarce empirical evidence. In this paper I present detailed observations in children with autism and typically developing children, suggesting that hand-leading gestures may be an adaptive form of interaction in typically developing children neglected by mainstream developmental psychology. I conclude that, although there may be features differentiating how these gestures are used in autism and typical children, systematic research on them is needed to clarify their nature and significance for both typical and atypical development.

The present qualitative study comprised interviews with nine young people with autism (aged 16-21 years) about their perceptions of autism. Using interpretative phenomenological analysis, three underlying themes were illuminated, and all these formed the superordinate theme Making Comparisons: (a) Changes over time: "I'm really glad this is developmental"; (b) Degrees of autism: "They've got it really bad"; and (c) Degrees of ability: "I'm not really disabled-disabled." Such comparisons were not explicitly sought at the outset of the study, and instead emerged from their conceptualisations of the autism concept. When comparing how they perceived themselves now, and how they perceived themselves in the past, the young people viewed themselves more positively in the present. In addition, when making comparisons with other people with autism, they tended to locate themselves as being in a better position than others were. The perspective of being in a more fortunate position because of heightened abilities also emerged from the comparisons made with people who did not have autism. Furthermore, similar comparisons were made when autism was compared to disability, with autism being evaluated as being more favourable than what was termed "proper" disability. The results of this study are discussed in relation to the existent social comparison literature.

The autistic impairments in emotional and social competence, imagination and generating ideas predict qualitative differences in expressive drawings by children with autism beyond that accounted by any general learning difficulties. In a sample of 60 5-19-year-olds, happy and sad drawings were requested from 15 participants with non-savant autism and compared with those drawn by three control groups matched on either degree of learning difficulty (MLD), mental age (MA) or chronological age (CA). All drawings were rated by two artists on a 7-point quality of expression scale. Contrary to our predictions, the drawings from the autistic group were rated similar to those of the MA and MLD groups. Analysis of the people and social content of the drawings revealed that although children with autism did not draw fewer people, they did draw more immature forms than mental age controls. Furthermore, there was tentative evidence that fewer social scenes were produced by the autism sample. We conclude that the overall merit of expressive drawing in autism is commensurate with their general learning difficulties, but the social/emotional impairment in autism affects their drawings of people and social scenes.

For three decades after Leo Kanner's first clinical description, research progress in understanding and treating autism was minimal but since the late 1960s the growth of autism discoveries has been exponential, with a remarkable number of new findings published over the past two decades, in particular. These advances were made possible first by the discovery and dissemination of early intensive behavioural intervention (EIBI) for young children with autism that created the impetus for earlier accurate diagnosis. Other factors influencing the rapid growth in autism research were the first accepted diagnostic test for autism, the Autism Diagnostic Interview and Observation Schedule (ADI and ADOS). Developments in brain imaging and genetic technology combined to create a fuller understanding of the heterogeneity of autism, its multiple aetiologies, very early onset and course, and strategies for treatment. For a significant proportion of children with autism, it appears EIBI may be capable of promoting brain connectivity in specific cerebral areas, which is one of autism's underlying challenges. Disagreements about the most appropriate early intervention approach between developmental and behavioural psychologists have been unproductive and not contributed to advancing the field. Naturalistic behavioural and structured discrete trial methods are being integrated with developmental strategies with promising outcomes. Over these past 30 years, young people with autism have gone from receiving essentially no proactive treatment, resulting in lives languishing in institutions, to today, when half of children receiving EIBI treatment subsequently participate in regular classrooms alongside their peers. The future has entirely changed for young people with autism. Autism has become an eminently treatable condition. The time is overdue to set aside philosophical quarrels regarding theories of child development and apply what we know for the benefit of children with autism and their families. (Contains 5 figures and 1 table.)

Restricted and repetitive behaviors (RRBs) are a core feature of autism spectrum disorders. They constitute a major barrier to learning and social adaptation, but research on their definition, cause, and capacity for change has been relatively neglected. The last decade of research has brought new measurement techniques that have improved the description of RRBs. Research has also identified distinctive subtypes of RRBs in autism spectrum disorders. Research on potential causal origins and immediate triggers for RRBs is still at an early stage. However, promising new ideas and evidence are emerging from neurobiology and developmental psychology that identify neural adaptation, lack of environmental stimulation, arousal, and adaptive functions as key factors for the onset and maintenance of RRBs. Further research is needed to understand how these factors interact with each other to create and sustain atypical levels of RRB. The literature indicates that RRBs have the potential to spontaneously reduce across time, and this is enhanced for those with increased age and cognitive and language ability. Research on interventions is sparse. Pharmacological treatments can be helpful in some children but have adverse side effects. Behavioral intervention methods provide the better intervention option with positive effects, but a more systematic and targeted approach is urgently needed. Evidence suggests that we will learn best from the last decade of research by taking a developmental perspective, by directing future research toward subtypes of RRBs, and by implementing early intervention targeted to improve RRBs before these behaviors become entrenched. (Contains 1 table and 1 footnote.)

This paper problematizes contemporary cultural understandings of autism. We make use of the developmental psychology concepts of "Theory of Mind" and "mindblindness" to uncover the meaning of autism as expressed in these concepts. Our concern is that autism is depicted as a puzzle and that this depiction governs not only the way Western culture treats autism but also the way in which it governs everyday interactions with autistic people. Moreover, we show how the concepts of Theory of Mind and mindblindness require autism to be a puzzle in the first place. Rather than treat autism as a puzzle that must be solved, we treat autism as a teacher and thus as having something valuable to contribute toward an understanding of the inherent partiality and uncertainty of human communication and collective life.

This article focuses on the learning that is enabled while a primary school child makes a story using multimodal software. This child is diagnosed with autism. The aim is to use a cultural-historical framework to carry out an in-depth analysis of a process of learning with action as a unit of analysis. The article is based on a collaborative research project in which assignments on narration concurrently served as experiments with cultural tools. The child's learning process in one assignment is analyzed sequentially, highlighting changes in the action, based on data from videotape. The child's decision to record audio was a turning point that expanded the formal learning and animated the idea of making the story in a desired multimodal format. The multifaceted quality and the dialectics revealed in the process are vital to achieve expansive action and learning. The combination of a generative narrative model and the multimodal affordances is crucial for actualizing the potential in the research approach to accomplish an analysis of the learner's changes "in" action. Thus, the study indicates the relevance of using a cultural-historical framework in research and practice that focuses on processes of learning and processes of becoming among diverse learners.

Children with autism achieve mirror self-recognition appropriate to developmental age, but are nonetheless reported to have problems in other aspects of a sense of self. We observed behaviour in the mirror in 12 pre-school children with autism, 13 pre-school children with Down syndrome (DS) and 13 typically developing (TD) toddlers. Reliable differences in reflecting actions, social relatedness and positive affect towards themselves, and an absence of coy smiles differentiated the children with autism from the others. The children with DS showed the highest interest in their own faces. These differences were largely independent of mirror self-recognition (MSR), broadly supporting arguments for dissociation between interpersonal and conceptual aspects of self. Mirror behaviour may be a subtle but easily elicited measure of the social quality of a sense of self. (Contains 3 tables and 2 figures.)

My aim in this paper is to present reasons for adopting a focus on the development of self/other-awareness when characterizing the developmental psychopathology of autism. The strengths of such a position include an emphasis on children's emotional relations with embodied persons as foundational for their growing understanding of minds. I give special attention to the process of identifying with the attitudes of others, and experience of other-person-centred emotions, for the development of communication and thinking. The study of limitations in these aspects of self-other relatedness among individuals with autism is pivotal for understanding the pathogenesis of the syndrome.

There is strong evidence to suggest that individuals with autism show atypicalities in multiple cognitive domains, including theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF), and central coherence (CC). In this study, the longitudinal relationships among these 3 aspects of cognition in autism were investigated. Thirty-seven cognitively able children with an autism spectrum condition were assessed on tests targeting ToM (false-belief prediction), EF (planning ability, cognitive flexibility, and inhibitory control), and CC (local processing) at intake and again 3 years later. Time 1 EF and CC skills were longitudinally predictive of change in children's ToM test performance, independent of age, language, nonverbal intelligence, and early ToM skills. Predictive relations in the opposite direction were not significant, and there were no developmental links between EF and CC. Rather than showing problems in ToM, EF and CC as co-occurring and independent atypicalities in autism, these findings suggest that early domain-general skills play a critical role in shaping the developmental trajectory of children's ToM. (Contains 5 tables.)

Everyday conditional reasoning is typically influenced by prior knowledge and belief in the form of specific exceptions known as counterexamples. This study explored whether adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; N = 26) were less influenced by background knowledge than typically developing adolescents (N = 38) when engaged in conditional reasoning. Participants were presented with pretested valid and invalid conditional inferences with varying available counterexamples. The group with ASD showed significantly less influence of prior knowledge on valid inferences (p = 0.01) and invalid inferences (p = 0.01) compared with the typical group. In a secondary probability judgment task, no significant group differences were found in probabilistic judgments of the believability of the premises. Further experiments found that results could not be explained by differences between the groups in the ability to generate counterexamples or any tendency among adolescents with ASD to exhibit a "yes" response pattern. It was concluded that adolescents with ASD tend not to spontaneously contextualize presented material when engaged in everyday reasoning. These findings are discussed with reference to weak central coherence theory and the conditional reasoning literature. (Contains 5 tables and 2 figures.)

Two experiments were conducted to explore the extent to which individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), as well as young typically developing (TD) children, are explicitly aware of their own and others' intentions. In Experiment 1, participants with ASD were significantly less likely than age- and ability-matched comparison participants to correctly recognize their own knee-jerk reflex movements as unintentional. Performance on this knee-jerk task was associated with performance on measures of false belief understanding, independent of age and verbal ability, in both participants with ASD and TD children. In Experiment 2, participants with ASD were significantly less able than comparison participants to correctly recognize their own or another person's mistaken actions as unintended, in a "Transparent Intentions" task ( Russell & Hill, 2001; Russell, Hill & Franco, 2001). Performance on aspects of the Transparent Intentions task was associated with performance on measures of false belief understanding, independent of age and verbal ability, in both participants with ASD and TD children. This study suggests that individuals with ASD have a diminished awareness of their own and others' intentions and that this diminution is associated with other impairments in theory of mind.

Many approaches to word learning argue for the importance of joint attention and other social-pragmatic abilities. This study explored word learning in children with autism (CWA), by examining it in ostensive and non-ostensive contexts, tested through both comprehension and elicited production. Novel nouns were taught to 17 CWA and 13 children with moderate learning difficulties (MLD) using an adapted version of Tomasello and Barton's (Developmental Psychology, 30: 639-650, "1994") search paradigm. In elicited production for words learnt within an ostensive context, CWA performed at a significantly "higher" level than MLD children. This is contrary to prior findings and suggests that word learning abilities in CWA have been underestimated.

An important issue in the field of clinical and developmental psychopathology is whether cognitive control processes, such as response inhibition, can be specifically enhanced by motivation. To determine whether non-social (i.e. monetary) and social (i.e. positive facial expressions) rewards are able to differentially improve response inhibition accuracy in typically developing children and adolescents, an "incentive" go/no-go task was applied with reward contingencies for successful inhibition. In addition, the impact of children's personality traits (such as reward seeking and empathy) on monetary and social reward responsiveness was assessed in 65 boys, ages 8 to 12 years. All subjects were tested twice: At baseline, inhibitory control was assessed without reward, and then subjects were pseudorandomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions, including (1) social reward only, (2) monetary reward only, (3) mixed social and monetary reward, or (4) a retest condition without reward. Both social and non-social reward significantly improved task performance, although larger effects were observed for monetary reward. The higher the children scored on reward seeking scales, the larger was their improvement in response inhibition, but only if monetary reward was used. In addition, there was a tendency for an association between empathic skills and benefits from social reward. These data suggest that social incentives do not have an equally strong reinforcing value as compared to financial incentives. However, different personality traits seem to determine to what extent a child profits from different types of reward. Clinical implications regarding probable hyposensitivity to social reward in subjects with autism and dysregulated reward-seeking behaviour in children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are discussed.

The term executive function is used increasingly within developmental psychology and is often taken to refer to unfolding brain processes. We trace the origins of research on executive function to show that the link with social interaction has a long history. We suggest that a recent frenzy of research exploring methods for studying individual executive skills should pay more attention to the tradition exploring the role of social interaction in their development.

Social life rests in large part on the capacity to understand the intentions behind the behavior of others. What are the origins of this capacity? How is one to construe its development in ontogenesis? By assuming that action understanding can be explained only in terms of the ability to read the minds of others--that is, to represent mental states--the traditional view claims that a sharp discontinuity occurs in both phylogeny and ontogeny. Over the last few years this view has been challenged by a number of ethological and psychological studies, as well as by several neurophysiological findings. In particular, the functional properties of the mirror neuron system and its direct matching mechanism indicate that action understanding may be primarily based on the motor cognition that underpins one's own capacity to act. This article aims to elaborate and motivate the pivotal role of such motor cognition, providing a biologically plausible and theoretically unitary account for the phylogeny and ontogeny of action understanding and also its impairment, as in the case of autistic spectrum disorder. (Contains 2 footnotes.)

The importance of eye gaze as a means of communication is indisputable. However, there is debate about whether there is a dedicated neural module, which functions as an eye gaze detector and when infants are able to use eye gaze cues in a referential way. The application of neuroscience methodologies to developmental psychology has provided new insights into early social cognitive development. This review integrates findings on the development of eye gaze processing with research on the neural mechanisms underlying infant and adult social cognition. This research shows how a cognitive neuroscience approach can improve our understanding of social development and autism spectrum disorder.

The discovery that 3-year-old children have difficulties understanding false belief has fuelled two decades of research directed at understanding why children have this problem. One unresolved question is whether false belief problems are due to difficulties with mental or representational aspects of mental states. This question has implications for current arguments about the domain specificity of theory of mind in typically developing children and in populations with autism and brain damage. We revisit this question, presenting evidence that preschoolers' difficulty with false belief is not a domain-specific problem with mental states but a more general difficulty with understanding representations.

Using a gaze-following task, the authors assessed whether self-experience with the view-obstructing properties of blindfolds influenced infants' understanding of this effect in others. In Experiment 1, 12-month-olds provided with blindfold self-experience behaved as though they understood that a person wearing a blindfold cannot see. When a blindfolded adult turned to face an object, these infants gaze followed significantly less than control infants who had either (a) seen and felt the blindfold but whose view had not been obstructed by it or (b) experienced a windowed blindfold through which they could see. In Experiment 2, 18-month-olds experienced either (a) a trick blindfold that looked opaque but could be seen through, (b) an opaque blindfold, or (c) baseline familiarization. Infants receiving trick-blindfold experience now followed a blindfolded adult's gaze significantly more than controls. The authors propose 3 mechanisms underlying infants' capacity to use self-experience as a framework for understanding the visual perception of others. (Contains 2 figures and 3 footnotes.)

The present study compared the representational drawings of children with autism, children with Down syndrome and typically developing children. Participants were asked to draw a series of objects and their depictions were scored for the incidence of intellectual realism. The tasks sought evidence of conceptual as opposed to episodic influences on intellectual realism in terms of (1) omission errors for the visible decorative attributes of isolated objects and (2) commission errors for the hidden categorical attributes of contextually situated objects. All groups evinced sensitivity to meaning as gauged by the former measure but the autistic group were impaired in their performance on the latter measure. Whereas children without autism were less likely to depict the occluded handle of a cup when the model was presented in context rather than independently, this trend was lacking in the autistic sample. We consider these findings in terms of weak central coherence and alternative accounts of impaired conceptualization in autism.

Children with autism have been shown to be less susceptible to Kanisza type contour illusions than children without autism (Happe, 1996). Other authors have suggested that this finding could be explained by the fact that participants with autism were required to make a potentially ambiguous verbal response which may have masked whether or not they actually perceived the illusory contours (Ropar & Mitchell, 1999). The present study tested perception of illusory contours in children with autism using a paradigm that requires participants to make a forced choice about the dimensions of a shape defined by illusory contours. It was reasoned that accuracy of the participant on this task would indicate whether or not children with autism could perceive illusory contours. A total of 18 children with autistic spectrum disorder, 16 children with special educational needs not including autism and 20 typically developing children completed an experimental task which assessed perception of Kanisza-style rectangles defined by illusory contours. There were no significant differences between the performance of the children with autism and either of the two control groups, suggesting that perception of illusory contours is intact in autism.

The aim of this study was to gather information on the tools used by special education teachers for the assessment of severely intellectually disabled students (SID), preparing an individual education plan, and about the methodology used for monitoring their learning progress. The survey included all Finnish special education teachers working with children who were placed in groups for the severely, intellectually and multiply handicapped in Finnish comprehensive schools. According to the survey, the teachers mentioned that they used 22 different methods for assessing SID students. The most widely used tools were those based on developmental psychology, and originally intended for assessing autistic children. (Contains 1 table.)

Two explanations for deficits underlying autism were tested: weak central coherence (WCC) and executive dysfunction. Consistent with WCC, Happe ("British Journal of Developmental Psychology" 15 (1997) 1) found that children with autism failed to use sentence context in pronouncing homographs. In an alternate approach, we investigated whether children with autism can use meanings of related word primes. We presented children with autism and controls with primes for homographs, semantically related, and unrelated targets. Children with autism used primes to correctly pronounce homographs upon first presentation but showed difficulty inhibiting prior responses upon later presentation of the homographs with different primes. Children with autism also showed semantic priming effects. We conclude that children with autism do not show an absolute deficit in ability to use contextual information.

When children draw pictures of human beings, they reveal things not only about their general intellectual and artistic abilities, but also about their awareness and conception of themselves and others. What might the human figure drawings of children with autism reveal about their images of self and other--and what might they disclose about social factors that shape the drawings of children who do not have autism? On the basis of an hypothesis about the restricted social awareness of children and adolescents with autism, we predicted that there would be little differentiation between their drawings of themselves and other people. To test this prediction, we investigated a group of children and adolescents with autism and a group with learning difficulties but not autism (N=14 per group) who were individually matched for both chronological age and verbal mental age. Participants with autism mostly drew human figures that were little distinguished from one another, but introduced clear contrasts among their houses, whereas most of those with learning difficulties drew distinctive human figures as well as houses. These different profiles of performance occurred despite similarities in the numbers and kinds of feature included in the drawings, and the individuality of participants' drawing styles. Although the results were in keeping with our hypothesis that human figure drawings might reflect abnormalities in the way that children with autism mentally represent themselves and others, we conclude by stressing our tentativeness over this interpretation of the findings.

Happe (1993) proposed that theory of mind (ToM) understanding was necessary for comprehension of metaphorical expressions. The current study investigated the role of both ToM and language ability in metaphor understanding. Ninety-four children aged 8-15 years with communication impairments were grouped according to language ability and autistic symptomatology in the first instance, and then according to ToM performance. Their performance on a metaphor task was compared to 34 typically developing age-matched peers. These analyses showed that only children with language impairment, with or without concurrent autistic features, were impaired on the metaphor task. Furthermore, possession of first-order ToM skills did not ensure metaphor comprehension. Instead, semantic ability was a stronger predictor of performance on the metaphor task. These results are considered with reference to the view that ToM understanding is necessary for the comprehension of metaphor.

Developmental psychologists have been interested in the cognitive ability of perspective-taking for a number of years due to the apparent link between perspective-taking deficits and Autistic Spectrum Disorder. Most of the research in this area has employed the concepts and techniques of the approach commonly referred to as "Theory of Mind." The current paper is concerned with an alternative operant account of perspective-taking based on a modern behavioral approach to human language and cognition called Relational Frame Theory. According to this approach, the relational frames of I-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW-THEN are central to the development of complex perspective-taking. The present paper reports 3 studies that investigate the development of perspective-taking in terms of these 3 relational frames. In Study 1, 5 age groups of participants ranging from early childhood to adulthood were exposed to a protocol assessing their abilities to respond to relational perspective-taking tasks. A developmental profile was then constructed from the relative performances of the different age groups on this protocol. The findings from Study 1 overall indicated that accuracy increased as a function of age. Studies 2 and 3 were subsequently conducted as controls. Specifically, Study 2 was employed to determine whether the low rates of accuracy recorded with the youngest group of participants in Study 1 was simply a function of the length of the statements contained within some of the tasks. The results from Study 2 suggested that this was not the case. In Study 3 an automated version of the protocol was employed to determine whether the high rates of accuracy recorded with the adult participants in Study I was a function of cueing. The results from this study similarly indicated that this was not the case. Overall, the findings from the 3 studies lend support to the Relational Frame approach to the development of perspective-taking as generalized operant behavior. (Contains 3 tables and 6 figures.)

Joint attention (JA) initiation is defined in cognitive-developmental psychology as a child's actions that verify or produce simultaneous attending by that child and an adult to some object or event in the environment so that both may experience the object or event together. This paper presents a contingency analysis of gaze shift in JA initiation. The analysis describes reinforcer-establishing and evocative effects of antecedent objects or events, discriminative and conditioned reinforcing functions of stimuli generated by adult behavior, and socially mediated reinforcers that may maintain JA behavior. A functional analysis of JA may describe multiple operant classes. The paper concludes with a discussion of JA deficits in children with autism spectrum disorders and suggestions for research and treatment. (Contains 2 figures.)

This article presents a developmental perspective on language acquisition that can serve as a framework for understanding and treating the language and communication challenges faced by children with autism. Profiles of five children (ages 3-7) with autism spectrum disorders are discussed to illustrate the application of a Developmental Social-Pragmatic Model. (Contains references.) (Author/CR)

Programmes designed to support children with known, or increased likelihood of, autism or ADHD often focus on reducing behaviours central to a clinical diagnosis. However, supporting children to pursue their own goals and cope with everyday life through fostering executive function (EF) development, without enforcing neuro-normative assumptions, may be more acceptable to neurodivergent people, and more beneficial. The co-production process for this neurodiversity-affirming programme involved: Review of research priorities identified during published public-and-clinician consultations; iterative programme development through two pilot rounds with a general community sample; and consultation with stakeholders (parents with a connection to autism or ADHD, alongside early years specialists, psychologists and therapists) to check acceptability of the proposal, and refine the logic model and materials. The logic model for the resultant programme—Supporting Toddlers with a connection to autism or ADHD to develop strong Attention, Regulation and Thinking skills (START)—involves three mechanisms of change: The child has appropriate play-based opportunities to practise EF skills; Parenting behaviours linked to strong EFs are encouraged; Parents are empowered to improve environmental-fit for their child so that EF stressors are reduced. Plain English Summary: Children showing many autistic traits, or who have a close family member on the autism spectrum or having ADHD, are more likely than average to struggle with attention, regulation and thinking skills. This may lead to difficulties with mental health and independent living in later life. We aimed to create a parent-toddler programme that would help children with a connection to autism or ADHD to thrive, without pressuring them to act in a certain way. To do this we first reviewed the results of previous studies and community consultations, and identified how we could build on an existing parent support programme structure to meet the project goals. Next, we tried out our ideas with 18 families. Then, we asked nine parents with a connection to autism or ADHD (because they are neurodivergent themselves, and/or raising a neurodivergent child), and five professionals to help us improve the materials further. The end result is a programme called START (Supporting Toddlers with a connection to autism or ADHD to develop strong Attention, Regulation and Thinking skills). This 12-week group-based parent-toddler programme aims to foster children's development in three ways: (1) Giving children opportunities to practise their skills through play and everyday activities (2) Creating a welcoming, accessible and non-judgemental space for parents to hear about and share ideas (3) Helping parents to identify ways to help their child feel calm, safe and supported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Risk preference changes nonlinearly across development. Although extensive developmental research on the neurotypical (NTP) population has shown that risk preference is highest during adolescence, developmental changes in risk preference in autistic (AUT) people, who tend to prefer predictable behaviors, have not been investigated. Here, we aimed to investigate these changes and underlying computational mechanisms. Method: We ran a game-like risk-sensitive reinforcement learning task on 75 participants aged 6–30 years (AUT group, n = 31; NTP group, n = 44). Focusing on choices between alternatives with the same objective value but different risks, we calculated the risk preference and stay probability of a risky choice after a rewarding or non-rewarding outcome. Analyses using t-tests and multiple regression analyses were conducted. Using the choice-related data of each participant, we fit four reinforcement learning models and compared the fit of each model to the data. Furthermore, we validated the results of model fitting with multiple methods, model recovery, parameter recovery, and posterior predictive check. Results: We found a significant difference in nonlinear developmental changes in risk preference between the AUT and NTP groups. The computational modeling approach with reinforcement learning models revealed that individual preferences for surprise modulated such preferences. Conclusions: These findings indicate that for NTP people, adolescence is a developmental period involving risk preference, possibly due to lower surprise aversion. Conversely, for AUT people, who show opposite developmental change of risk preference, adolescence could be a developmental period involving risk avoidance because of low surprise preference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]